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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Christian theologian Mho attempts In the 
second half of the twentieth century to re-thlnk the 
basis and content of the Christian community's faith 
in Jesus assumes a complex task. Not only must he 
involve himself in the ongoing research of the various 
forms of ForntKeschlchte. Redactlonsgeschlchte. and 
Traditionsgeschichte to protect himself from hasty 
generalizations or false emphases In his interpreta-
tion of Scripture; not only must he be attentive to 
the findings of the history of dogma and specifically 
the history of Chrlstology in the Christian 
communities; he must also bring to bear a systematic 
tenmer of mind which can assess the times in which he 
lives and can relate the Christ of faith to the needs 
and searchings of the men of his own time. 
Any one of the research areas Just mentioned 
calls for specialized study, and yet the systematic 
theologian must show a reasonable acquaintance with 
all of them. He has to be able to make sense of the 
various Chrlstological titles and models, either by 
finding a motif that underlies them all or by choosing 
one or more as being more suitable and fruitful for 
modern development than the others. He must contend 
with the fact that the ancient Chrlstological councils 
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have been as much the source of dissatisfaction within 
theology as they have been a touchstone of orthodoxy. 
He must take cognizance of the hard fact that In the 
mind and Imagination of the ordinary Christian, Christ 
Is pictured more often than not as either a "split-
level personality" or as a divine figure disguised as 
a man—precisely the errors the Councils and all 
subsequent orthodox Chrlstology sought to avoid. 
In the following study we wish to Investigate 
an Important aspect of the Chrlstology of one of the 
more recent figures In Christian theology: Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Ordinarius for Systematic Theology on the 
evangelical Theological Faculty of the University of 
Munich. As a critical response to the "theology of 
the Word" represented by Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann 
and the "Post-Bultmannlans," Pannenberg's GrundzOge 
der Christologie1 has been concerned with finding a 
reason for the hope that lives In the Christian, so 
that Christian theology and with It Christian life 
might regain a positive relation to the other Important 
dimensions of Western Intellectual and cultural 
life. 
These general remarks about Pannenberg1β theolo­
gical Intention acquire more substance when we 
consider his understanding of the task and the method 
ili 
of Christology. 
A. The Гаэк of Chrlstology 
In the first chapter of irundzüge der ChrlstoloKle 
Pannenberg makes It clear that the task of a contem-
porary Chrlstology must be not only to unfold the 
content of the Christian s faith in Jesus Christ by a 
close study of the New Testament sources, the classical 
Chrlstoloclcal tradition and more modern efforts to 
formulate the meaning of Christ for faith; beyond this 
is the need to ground this faith, to show its appropri-
ateness, to show why the Christian s response of faith 
in Christ is the only adequate response to his reality 
and significance. 
The basis for faith in Jesus Christ can be nothing 
else than the historical Jesus, his life and fate.2 
All Interpretations of the meaning of Jesus must be 
Judged In the light of the historical person Jesus of 
Nazareth. This implies the necessity of going beyond 
the apostolic kerygma to the concrete figure behind it. 
This search for the basis of faith in the historical 
Jesus (including his fate) is necessary if we are to 
satisfy ourselves that the Jesus in whom we believe is 
not the product of faith but a historical reality. Here 
Pannenberg agrees with Wilhelm Herrmann's criticism of 
•artin Kahler's view that the ground of faith is Jesus as 
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witnessed to by the apostles. (Herrmann and 
Pannenberg, however, do not agree on the question 
whether historical knowledge lies at the base of faith.3) 
Admitting that the form-critical study of the Gospels 
rules out any attempt to exploit the sequence of the 
presentation in our Gospels as a chronology of Jesus' 
life and ministry, Pannenberg still Insists that it 
is possible to distinguish the figure of Jesus himself, 
as well as the outlines of his message, from the 
particular perspectives in which it is transmitted 
through the New Testament witnesses. 
Another reason why we must try to go behind the 
New Testament text to Jesus himself is that this is 
the only way in which we can perceive the unity of the 
Scripture. That unity consists in the one Jesus to 
whom all the texts refer (p. 18). 
If we are to come to the recognition that in Jesus 
God was revealed, then historical study is called for, 
because Jesus lived in the past.^ If this revelatory 
character is not something added to Jesus' life from 
outside but Indicates the Inherent significance of 
Jesus' life and fate, then historical research will 
have to make this out. The contemporary religious 
experience of Christians cannot have the primacy here 
(p. 22). 
ν 
Ε. The Method of Chrlstology 
The method of Chrlstology follows from the task 
to be fulfilled. f.odern dogmatics follows one of two 
methods In Chrlstology proceeding either "from above," 
that Is, from Jesus' divinity, or "from below," from 
Jesus' life and fate to a confession of his divinity. 
In the first approach the concept of Incarnation Is 
at the center, while for the second approach this 
conception Is arrived only at the end of the investi­
gation. 
While Christolo^y "from above" was the more conunon 
approach In the ancient church, we now know that the 
historical process of the development of the earliest 
understanding of Jesus proceeded in the direction 
opposite to this. 
Pannenberg sees three reasons why such a method 
"from above" is not feasible: (1) such a Chrlstology 
presupposes the divinity of Jesus, yet the most 
important task of Chrlstology Is to ground the Christian s 
confession of Jesus as "rod; (2) such an approach 
gives the emphasis to the Losros, and finds its only 
problem in the union of Tod and man In Jesus; the 
determinative significance inherent In the distinctive 
features of the real, historical man, Jesus of Nazareth 
are missed;-" (3) we would have to have the divine 
vi 
point of view to develop such a Chrlstology (p. 29). 
Pannenberg does not claim to be the first modern 
theologian to follow the method "from below." The 
Enlightenment challenged the Image of the dogmatic 
Christ and In response Herrman approached Christ 
"from below" as did Werner Elert, Paul Althaus, Emll 
Brunner, Carl Heinz Ratschow, Friedrich Gogarten, and 
Gerhard Ebellng. Nonetheless, Pannenberg will differ 
from these theologians both regarding the substantia­
tion of the claim that Jesus Is divine and regarding 
the manner In which he carries out the systematic task 
of Chrlstology. 
С Chrlstology and Soterlology 
Before moving Into his own Chrlstologlcal reflec­
tions, Pannenberg explains why he cannot make 
soterlology the principle of Chrlstologlcal doctrine.° 
While a study of the principal types of soterlology 
reveals that the understanding of Jesus has been bound 
up at each stage of Chrlstologlcal reflection with the 
understanding of his significance pro nobis, still 
the latter concern, important as it Is, can never be 
allowed to dominate the Chrlstology since It Is, after 
all, logically posterior to the question of who Jesus 
was in his own time and circumstances. If we are to 
avoid the Teuerbachian critique that our religious 
vil 
Ideas—In this case our Chrlstologlcal fornmlatior.s— 
are only projections of our human needs, we must give 
attention to the historical roots of our faith. 
Pannenberg grants that with the exception of Kant, 
Schleiermacher, Bultmann, and Tllllch the soterlolo-
glcal Interest has never been so dominant that the 
reality of Jesus of Nazareth suffered. 
The criterion for an examination of the 
Chrlstologlcal traditions and the various soterlologlcal 
Interests Is to be found In the historical reality of 
Jesus. All the soterlologlcal motifs have this In 
common: In this Individual Jesus of Nazareth the 
humanity, the destiny of man has been fulfilled (no 
matter how this Is variously understood). And so 
Fannenberg will first address himself to the problem 
of the knowledge of Jesus1 divinity, which Is the 
basis of his universal, savin? significance; then he 
will discuss the question of Jesus as the fulfillment 
of human destiny, and finally, the relation of his 
divinity to his humanity. 
D. The Scope of this Study 
It Is Important to note at the beginning of this 
essay what I am attempting. I have chosen a central 
and classic problem of Chrlstology, the Christian 
confession of Jesus Christ as person and as personally 
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one with God, as the focus of my investigation. This 
choice requires that all other themes and concerns of 
Pannenberg, however important they may be in them-
selves, will be viewed here in relation to our chosen 
theme. In Part I, I will examine three representative 
Protestant theologians who can serve as the background 
against which Pannenberg' s contribution can stand out 
in relief, as it were. 
In Part II, I will offer a summary of the argu-
mentation in 'irundziige. making use of other writings of 
Pannenberg in the text and in the notes to clarify 
and amplify his thinking. In the last Part I will 
select for discussion some of the most important Issues 
of an exegetlcal-hlstorlcal and a systematic nature 
that are Involved In Pannenberg' s notion of Jesus as 
personally one with God. It is recognized all along 
that Pannenberg Is an extremely systematic thinker, 
so that for the truth of his Christology all the 
"parts" must be analyzed and tested. Yet this study 
may, I hope, serve as a contribution to the evaluation 
of Pannenberg's Christology as a whole. No better 
entree to that system is possible than that of an 
understanding and critical assessment of his response 
to a central and classic—and persistent—Christological 
question: the question of Jesus as person, of Jesus 
who, as person, is confessed to be one with God. 
PART I : BACKGBOUNO 

1 
CHAPTER I : EACIOBOUND 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the purpose 
of this chapter is to ascertain the background against 
which Pannenbero- s Christology is to be understood. 
We want to arrive at an overview of the major 
Chrlstological alternatives in Protestant theology 
which were available when Pannenberg published 
^rundzüge der Christologie in 19^. 
Ve have had to be selective, and so we have 
restricted ourselves to considering three major 
Protestant systematic theologians who have exerted 
great influence in Christology in the past several 
decades. We begin with a report on the Christology of 
Karl Earth, followed by Rudolf Eultmann. The last figure 
to be reported on is Gerhard Ebellng who, as a represen-
tative of the so-called "post-Bultmannlan " Word of Sod 
theology, stands, with Earth and Eultmann, for the 
kind of theology to which Pannenberg' s Christology and 
indeed entire theological undertaking are a critical 
response. 
In each case we shall be concerned with two inter-
related questions: the position of the theologian with 
respect to the Church's traditional two-nature doctrine 
of Christ, and his attitude to the role of historical 
science in determining the true significance of Jesus. 
2 
A. Karl Barth 
The great Reformed theologian, Karl Barth, 
devoted much of his multi-volume Kirchliche Dogmatlk 
to the Chrlstologlcal problen.^ Indeed, Earth's 
Korit is profoundly Chrlstocentric In conception and 
execution.2 In this brief overview of his position 
rearardina- the two-nature doctrine and the role of 
historical science in proundlng this doctrine, we shall 
have to omit from consideration much of what Earth has 
to say about the significance of Jesus Christ. 
In Volume I of his massive work Earth deals with 
the doctrine of the l\ord of God. Because his theology 
of the Word of Cod is a ttology of revelation his 
treatment of Jesus Christ as the reality of revelation 
Is found here.-Э The doctrine of the incarnation 
which belongs to the foundation of the Church Dogmatics 
for Earth is found in this volume, and the Prolegomena 
as well, while the doctrine of Christ's person and 
works belonsrs to the thai OP-y of reconciliation 
(3oteriolo?y). 
1. The Possibility of Revelation 
Barth asks what it is in ^od which makes revela­
tion possible. This question does not Imply that we 
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can Impose huelan standards on the divinity, because 
we have to read off, as It were, this possibility 
from the revelation which de facto has occurred. 
Here we must first pose the question of fact and then 
the question of understaidln . In other words, we 
"lust first come to »rips with the reality of Jesus 
Christ as such, and on this basis move into the 
question of the possibility enclosed within his reality. 
"his Oosslbllity we must honor as the divine necessity.^ 
"od s revelation is ti° "Jame JPSUS Christ. This 
naire is the definition of revelation, becaus0 Tö'3ns 
Christ is not one element among others in the \'ет-
Testament witness, but Is what Farth calls th«3 "mathe-
matical point" to which all lines of thouçht In the 
\"ew Testament are related. Phis name, in its apparent 
emptiness as mere name, is the point. Thus it is not 
a principle, or a truth, or an idea which unites the 
witness of Scripture, but this name, this sign of a 
person.с 
Jesus is the Uord or Son of "od. The Word or 
Son of Tod is Jesus. Uhlle exegetlcally this double 
sentence is not often found in the Mew Testament 
explicitly, it is at its center, for the content of 
the Mew Testament is not the Tod-Tan, or the incarna­
tion, but the Чате.? This is primary, and the 
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Chrlstologlcal confessions are secondary. One must 
not think that people first had a definite concept of 
the divine Son or Word and then applied It to Jesus. 
No, the original and proper thing Is this: We have 
encountered God, we have heard his Word. Here we must 
not think from "below" to "above," but from "above" to 
"below." For the New Testament witnesses the sentence, 
"Jesus Is the Son of God" Is Just as fundamental a 
sentence as the sentence, "The Word became flesh." 
α 
And these sentences are not synthetic, but analytic. 
Vhat we are able to hear beyond the name Jesus 
Christ is the witness of God's Son, who became man, 
of the man who was God's Son. "Man" and "God's Son" 
are related to one another in such a way that the 
first does not cease to be Itself, and the second 
remains Itself, and they do not enter Into a higher, 
third reality. We are supposed to hear the first— 
the Word—in the second—the man, and the second in 
the first. This cannot occur within a system, but In 
a way of thinking which allows us to hear In both the 
q 
one: Jesus Christ. 
Earth asks, how Is it possible In God's freedom 
that his revelation can happen to man? In other words, 
how is Jesus Christ the objective possibility of 
τ η 
revelation? In Jesus Christ we are told that God is 
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free for us, and that he is in no other way free for 
us. Only here, in this divine humanity and in this 
divinity of a man is he free for us. Thus the answer 
to Earth's question Is: God's revelation can happen 
to man insofar as the reality of Jesus Christ is 
required for God's revelation. 
rhe possibility of revelation Is rooted in five 
things. 
1) It Is rooted in the condescendence in which 
Tod becomes identical with a reality different from 
himself and us. If he wishes to communicate himself 
to us he raust become his own mediator, for otherwise 
we would receive less than himself. If one were to 
try to deduce this fact from a universal concept of 
God, man, or revelation, it would be false. Outside 
of the revelation which de facto occurred, there would 
be no reason for seeing this necessity. 
2) The possibility of revelation is also rooted 
in the fact that Jesus Christ is identical with God's 
Son or Word. The difference between lather, Son and 
Holy Spirit are differences of "modes of being" 
(Seinswelsen). In each mode God is completely Zod, 
so that we can say that Tod in his full divinity 
became man. The possibility of revelation Is grounded 
in the fact that God is essentially himself only in 
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his modes of belne-j on this basis he Is able to be 
free for that which Is other than himself. 
3) The possibility of revelation is founded 
also on the fact that Jesus Christ belongs to the 
universe to which we belong. This entrance of the 
Word of God Into our world brings with It his hldden-
ness, his kenosls and passion, and these had to happen 
If he was to come finally to his full manifestation 
and exaltation and so to the full achievement of 
revelation. 
k) This possibility of revelation Is also based 
on Jesus Christ's undiminished belonging to God. The 
incarnation does not mean the dlmlnishment of the 
divinity, but Its concealment. The Word does not 
become transformed Into something else, even partially; 
the Word who becomes flesh, remains the Word. Here 
we stand before a mystery which we cannot conceptua-
l « 1 7 
llze. 
5) The possibility of God's revelation Is also 
founded on man, that Is, the being flesh of God 
himself. The word Scripture uses Is not man, but 
flesh; man as he stands before God. flesh means man 
as created by C-od out of nothlnp· and held by'him over 
the abyss of nothingness, fallen victim to death. 
When we still live In the midst of death It is because 
7 
ι β 
of the redemption we have found. 
Originally and properly only Jesus Christ Is the 
"an, who Is flesh, and secondarily and derivatively 
those who in faith through the Holy Spirit are one 
flesh with him. "Originally and properly the flesh 
as possibility of God's revelation is completely 
the possibility of Jesus Christ himself."1-9 
11. rhe Mystery of Revelation 
ilany later theologians were not able to under­
stand the bitterness with which the ancient Church 
went to work to develop and defend the doctrine of 
Jesus Christ. Later theologians often tried to answer 
the question of Jesus Christ with less effort, less 
battle, and less exactitude. But they could do this 
because they simplified the question, by trying with 
various methods and reasons to escaoe the mystery 
20 posed them by the 4ew Testament. 
The ancients were not primarily interested in an 
ethical question, nor was their interest physical. 
Their concern went beyond both interests, for they 
had the simple all-embracing concern to understand 
Jesus Christ as Lord of all men, as the brlnger of 
life, as the reconciler of humanity, bor example, 
when they spoke of Christ's "human nature" they meant 
?1 his humanity in its unity and totality. The ancient 
8 
Christology was healthy in spite of the dangers and 
mistakes. "Modern" Christology Is trying to say 
something completely different from the Christology 
of the ancient Church, and the polemic which they 
wage against the concept of the two "natures" in Christ 
22 
cannot be reduced to a linguistic misunderstanding. 
By rejecting the "natural" In revelation they are 
rejecting the ontologlcal character, the realism of 
23 the biblical revelation. 
Barth has no time for the objection that the 
ancient Christology was Intellectuallstlc. This 
objection has the same root both formally and materi-
ally: "a half-daring, half-embarrassed oversight of 
what the \ew Testament said and what the Church now 
has to hear." The ancient Church did not overlook 
what the New Testament said, whatever one may say 
against the ancient Christology. For the presupposi-
tion of all further statements Is: "Jesus Christ, 
true God and true man." But to the extent that this 
Is a genuine presupposition It Is Itself not rooted 
2k in a higher presupposition. Christology must be 
"fixated" on this object, Jesus Christ, who Is man 
without reservation and God without reservation.2^ 
Modern Christology, however, has committed an unpardo-
nable error, which ancient Christology was able to 
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avoid. The latter did not surrender the problem, 
did not try to reduce the tension, but held fast to 
It, so that even if It had other defects. It at 
least was able as a whole to be faithful to the 
mystery. Given this assessment It Is not surprising 
that Barth finds his startlna-polnt with the ancient 
Church and builds his Chrlstology on the foundations 
which it laid.26 
'True God and true man" Is a reformulation of 
John 1.14, "The Word became flesh," which in turn is 
the answer to the question, "Who is Jesus Christ?" 
Because the ancient Chrlstology zealously defended the 
statement that Jesus Christ is true God, it acquired 
a complicated and polemical image. Modern theologians 
cannot understand what Barth calls the simple, child-
like, irenic concern of the old Chrlstology: to say 
quite directly that this man, oCzos , Jesus Christ 
?7 is in the beginning with God (John 1.2). 
Barth spells out four elements In the statement 
"The 'word became flesh:" 
1) The Word Is subject here, subject of a free 
act. The act is not part of the world-process, nor 
2b is it something that was demanded by creation. 
.2) The incarnation was not a necessity of the 
divine nature, or of the intra-trinitarian relations. 2i 
10 
3) The Word did not become less divine In the 
Incarnation; It did not cease to be, or form a 
tertlum quid with the flesh. The Word Is not, and can 
never be, predicate In a proposition that has anything 
but the divine as subject. If one says that Jesus 
Christ Is true man who Is true God, one must Immedi­
ately add that this Is so because the true God became 
man. "The Word became flesh, and only by virtue of 
this becoming, that was his becoming as completely 
free and completely alone, did the flesh become Word. 
The Word speaks, the Word acts, the Word conquers, 
the Word reveals, the Word reconciles. To be sure, 
the Word-beсome-flesh, thus the Word not without the 
flesh, but the Word In the flesh and through the 
30 
flesh—but the Word and not the flesh!" The Word 
has his being from the Father and this from all eter­
nity, and of himself and not because of the flesh. 
Without the Word the flesh could have no being. 
Ό Theotokos. "Mother of GodJ1 is an appropriate 
title for Mary. Its acceptance or rejection is a 
test of the right understanding of the Incarnation. 
It says that through Mary Jesus belongs to the human 
race; It also says that the one who was born of Mary 
was none other than the Son of God. 
"The Word became flesh"—he who Is the Risen Lord 
11 
was truly man. In the Creel, everythinii from birth 
to burial is meant to underscore the vere homo. 
Reconciliation of man with 3od is possible an<! under­
standable only when there is no reservation with 
respect to Jesus' humanity or divinity. Jesus Christ 
is God himself in person. ""Tie only revelation of the 
eternal Word is Christ's humanity. Flesh is not "a 
man," but human essence and existence (Jaseln). 
human nature, that which makes man man and not angel 
or animal. The Word became a man, but this concrete 
reality of a man Is the work of the Kord, not a 
presupposition of this work (which Is the error of 
adoptlonlsm). 
The ground of beine; (Oaselnsjrund) of this man 
and so of t.he flesh of Christ is the Son of 3od, who 
assumed this particular possibility of beino; man. 
The humanity has no Independent existence outside the 
Vord, it exists only in the man who as the creature 
of the Word is himself the Word. "What comes to the 
Word In his incarnation is not a second reality 
besides himself, but his own work for himself which 
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consists in this: he assumed human existence." 
"od himself is actively present In the flesh. 
'S. * η f: this Is "flesh," man before "od's Jude-ment, 
man unable to know and love God. The divine Word came 
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down on the side of his own contradlcter. This Is 
the extent of the divine condescension, that God 
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became flesh In this precise sense. -
Jesus' slnlessness rests for Barth on the fact 
of the Incarnation. The assumption of concrete human 
nature by the Word means a claiming, a sanctification 
and a gracing of this humanity which excludes sin; 
God himself is subject In Jesus Christ, and he cannot 
come into real contradiction with himself. While the 
Word existed in the state of sinful man, he did not 
conform to this condition. By being assumed by the 
divine Word, our unholy humanity became a sanctified 
and sinless humanity. We can see this slnlessness not 
In this or that virtue, but in Jesus' obedience in 
which he wanted to be and do Just one thing: to be 
God in flesh, the divine bearer of the burden which 
sinful man bore. Only the God-man Jesus Christ lived 
from God's mercy, no other had done so. He conquered 
before he fought, and he was already victorious when 
he began the struggle. The resurrection was the 
revelation of the vere Deus, and in Its light the New 
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Testament can speak of Jesus' slnlessness. 
The Word became flesh. 
The question Barth poses here Is: How can becoming 
be said of God so that It is real and yet God remains 
13 
"od? Since It is unacceotable to say that change 
happens to Ood, as it were, from outside, Barth joins 
an old tradition which interprets egeneto to refer to 
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the assumption of the flesh. He appeals to 
Philipplans 2.7. The unity of God and man In Jesus 
is the act of God in the person of the Word. Creator 
and creature are here related to one another in a way 
different from the relation obtaining between God and 
other men. In other creatures God is present In them 
and united with them, but in the case of Jesus Christ 
the humanity, as we have seen, does not have Its own 
existence, for that is the kord's. The fact that 
Jesus has no existence, other than the Word's, that 
Jesus Christ Is God, that he does not exist indepen-
dently in and of himself as man, is expressed negatively 
by the traditional term anhypostasls and positively 
3? 
by enhypostasls. Anhypostasls expresses the fact 
that Christ's human nature does not have existence in 
and of Itself. The eternal Word did not assume a man, 
but a human nature, or more abstractly expressed, a 
second possibility of existence, not a second existent. 
Enhypostasls says that the human nature has its exis-
tence, its subsistence in the mode of being ("person," 
hypostasis) of the Word on the basis of the assumption 
of the humanity by the divinity. e 
Ik 
Occasionally one finds In more rece it times the 
"primitive" argument that the human nati re of Christ 
lacked its own personality because of the anhypostasls 
and enhypostasls of the human nature, SJ that he was 
not truly and completely human. Barth contends that 
what is overlooked here is the fact thet the ancients 
spoke of individuality where we would ьеап personality, 
and personality or person meant for th< m existence or 
subsistence. The negative assertion o: anhypostasls 
is made for the sake of the positive; 1 he original 
meaning of enhypostasls is appropriate to express ал 
act of divine Lordship in Its unlqueners over against 
all other events. 
ill. The Election of Jesus Chr'st. 
Karl Earth's understanding of the divine election 
and préexistence which he offers In the second half-
volume of Volume II of Kirchliche Dogme tik offers a 
striking illustration of his "high Chrlstology." He 
takes sharp exception to any talk of an absolute 
decree in which God's decision to communicate himself 
in Jesus Christ to the world Is founded on another, 
deeper, less accessible decision, or to express It 
differently, a decision which is not Identical with 
the divine decision for the world which Is Jesus Christ. 
For Barth Christ "is the free grace of God, Insofar 
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as this not only remains identical Kith Ood's inner, 
eternal essence, but Is also powerful in -od's ways 
ani v'ords ad extra. bor Just this reason there is 
no choice, no bepinnin^ and décision, no word of îod 
before ani above, next to or outside hin, ...Jesus 
Christ is himself "od's gracious choice and thus 
"od1s Word, decision, and be^innin? in that way which 
embraces absolutely everyone and everythlnc, the 
independence of all other words, decisions, and 
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be^ innings. " "¡od's choice consists in this V ori 
and decision in the Ье^іппіпз- as his free, subjective 
self-detenination. 
"od's choice is oririnally the decision for that 
which Jonn l.lf. described: that the ι· ord whose name 
is Jesus is at the bea-innlnr, by "od, equal to hlm 
and one with hiii in divinity. The decision was in the 
beirlnnlr.-;, and Jesus Christ was the subject ani object 
of the decision at the beajlnnln--. K ot at the be^innin-· 
of "od, that is Impossible, but at the be. iiinln r of 
all things, at the be.-innlnç of all Sod's actions 
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із-а-т is that which is other than himself. 
The divine predestination is the election of 
Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is the elected and the 
elector, the latter insofar as he is "od, and the 
for-ier insofar as he is ^an. le is elector also as 
16 
man insofar as he as man "elects" God, his Father, in 
faith, and he is the elected as God insofar as he is 
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the elected of his father. 
Jesus Christ was in the beginning with God, not 
only in the way one can say that the eternal knowledge 
and will of God was before all things, but as the 
firstborn of all creatures (Col. 1.15), for he himself 
Is the divine plan and decree. This préexistence of 
Jesus Christ does not mean that we should overlook the 
necessary distinctions, however. "For the Son of God 
In his eternally chosen unity with the son of man is 
one thing, and the world created for the sake of this 
unity and world-history in its community with God which 
was decided from all eternity are something else. 
One thing is God's Word, through which all things came 
to be, and something else the things which came to be 
throufrh this Word. One thing is God's eternal election, 
another God's creation, reconciliation, and redemption 
based on this choice. One thing is the eternal cove-
nant, which God made with himself In hls pre-temporal 
eternity with respect to man, another the covenant 
of grace between him and man which was established and 
carried out in time." 4 3 
We have seen that for Barth the eternal Son of 
God is elector as well as elected. He elects not 
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without the Father and the Holy Spirit, but he does 
elect. He takes part in the divine election, he is 
his own election, he himself sets the beginning of 
all things and makes the decision through which the 
establishment of the covenant between man and jod 
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comes about. "Jesus Christ Is the electlm; God." 
As the elected man, Jesus Christ stands before lod 
over other men and for them; this man is not only 
creature, but also creator; his own electing as 
creator precedes his bein»· elected as creature. And 
In that he (as God) wills himself (as nan), he wills 
4 s 
all other elected creatures. 
iv. The Ground of Faith 
we have already seen that Sarth treats the 
statement "Jesus Christ, true God and true man" as a 
presupposition in the strict sense. He wants this 
to be taken most seriously. In the first half-volume 
of Kirchliche Ooffmatlk Earth devotes a section to 
"Die Erkennbarkelt des Wortes Gottes," and in this 
section he makes clear that faith In God's kord, 
faith in the reality of the Vord made flesh, has no 
ground outside of God's mysterious srace. 'The fact 
which is God's lnord receives its worth and value in 
no respect and in not the slightest way from a presup-
position which we bring to it, but that it is true 
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for us is based absolutely In Itself, just as Is the 
other fact, that It is true in itself." a "Men can 
recognize the Vo^d of God because and insofar as God 
wills that they recognize it, because and to the extent 
that there is over against God's will only the weakness 
of disobedience, and because and Insofar as there is 
a revelation of God's will in his V'ord, in which 
precisely this weakness of disobedience is sublated 
(aufgehoben)." The possibility of recognizing God's 
V'ord comes with and in the event of God's grace, not 
before this and not in any other way. Man does not 
come to faith, but faith comes to him through the 
'Aord which, as object of faith, is also its ground. " 
The Word of God makes Itself recognizable, writes 
Barth. "The possibility of recognizing God's Word is 
God's miracle in us. Just as is the Word itself and 
52 
its being addressed to us." In faith man is conna-
tural with God (gottfffrmlg): that means he is able 
in faith to perceive God's Word. This ability does 
not in any way belong to man's own possibilities; 
sinful man is radically Incapable in himself of hear-
ing that Word. He is opened up from above, as it 
were, end allowed to believe. Yet the manner of this 
"opening" remains as hidden to us as God himself. 53 
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В. tìudolf Eultmann 
i. New Testament vs. Greek .•¡etaphysics 
In 1951 Rudolf Bultmann addressed himself to the 
Chrlstological confession of the isorld Council of 
Churches which had been formulated in Amsterdam In 
•54 I95O. The sentence which was the focus of his 
essay Is the followln/r: "The '• orld Council of Churches 
is made up of Churches which recognize Jesus Christ 
as God and Savior." Bultmann tries to answer the 
question whether this formula corresponds to the Mew 
Testament view of Christ. Initially he admits that 
he cannot say beceuse the statement is not a clearly 
expressed one. ^ г example, the German word for 
savior—Heiland—has fallen out of use, and its mean­
te 
ing is not clear. 
The statement that Jesus Christ is Ood can refer 
to his nature, his metaphysical essence, or to his 
siarnificance for us. The only place where Jesus is 
definitely addressed as God is John 20.28. In 
Titus 2.13 ("our great God and Savior Jesus Christ") 
it is possible that two realities are referred to, 
although Bultmann admits that grammatically one reality 
is at issue. All other titles in the Vew Testament 
which are applied to Jesus subordinate him to God. 
The decisive question for Bultmann is whether the 
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titles want to sav somethlniç about Jesus · nature. 
Do they want to speak of Jesus as he Is In himself, 
thus In an objectifying way, or do they want to speak 
of Christus pro me? Now In the ancient Church 
reflection vas directed to Christ's CwiS. his 
nature, which is understandable, trlven the tradition 
of "'-reek thought. One must maintain with James, " 
however, that knowledge of his nature without know-
ledge of myself Is the kind of belief In God which the 
demons have. ror Bultmann the answer regarding the 
New Testament Is clear: the titles and assertions 
regarding Jesus are expressions of his significance 
for us. Naive texts such as Hora. 5.15 and II Cor. 
P.9, verses such as Acts 17.31 and Col. 1.17· 
Tim. 1.18, II Pet. 1.11 which speak of Christ as being 
In "Tod's place, or "parallel to God, or speak of 
Christ' s role In the universal Judgment, or Christ s 
lordship, are all saying that the divinity of Christ 
shows Itself In the event in which we are placed by 
the preaching of the Uord, which proclaims him as the 
grace of aod. 58 
The New Testament clung to the humanity of Jesus 
against all docetlc attempts to compromise It, but 
did so with a naïveté which Greek thought with Its 
objectifying tendencies was not able to correct in a 
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satlsfyirwr way. The solution triven by Chalcedon was 
expressed in a way which is impossible for us. Jesus 
Christ is the eschatologlcal event, but this must not 
be interpreted as a worldly event, or as one which 
occurs at some supernatural helarht. Jesus Christ is 
eschatologlcal event and so cannot be objectively 
"pinned down" in a manner which would provide a ground 
for faith in him. Jesus' divinity is not In the realm 
of nature, but in the realm of event.-9 One cannot 
be faithful to the reality of Jesus Christ if one 
objectivizlnzly relegates him to the past, for as event, 
as reality, Jesus Christ is present, active, challeng-
ing, and as such is totally removed from a neutral 
metaphysical sphere. In Jesus Christ we encounter 
God not as a reified or reifiable quantity, but as 
the acting r;od, the "eventful" Tod. 
il. Demytholofflzlng 
Fhe reinterpretatlon of objectifylncr speech about 
God and the human person is the point of Pultmann s 
program of demythologizlng. Jesus and the earliest 
community had a mythological view of God' s rule and 
of the end drama In which world history would find 
its consummation. They lived in a three-level uni-
verse consisting of heaven, earth, and underworld, 
and the early Church' s kerygma, or proclamation, that 
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"Jesus Is Lord and Christ" was spelled out In terms 
of that mythological world. The modern preacher who 
tries to address his hearers with this same proclama-
tion must realize that both modern science and modern 
historiography methodologically refrain from all talk 
of divine beings interfering with or in any way 
affecting the earthly course of events. The notion 
of a man who is préexistent as the Son of God and who 
descends to earth, is conceived of the Holy Spirit, 
and born of a virgin in order to save men is in part 
borrowed from gnostic doctrine, and no one would hesi-
tate to call it mythological. 
If one Is not willing to retain this mythological 
way of speaking because one considers it an obstacle 
to faith today, then there exist two possibilities. 
One can emphasize Jesus1 ethical teaching, but this 
Involves an attenuation of what Jesus was really 
intending. Or one can so interpret the New Testament 
that the deeper meaning behind the mythological Images 
is uncovered—this is the hermeneutlcal procedure 
which Bultmann calls "demythologlzlng" (although he 
61 
Is not satisfied with this term). 
While sometimes mythology Is viewed as a primi-
tive form of science, Bultmann sees it as well as an 
expression of a definite understanding of human 
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existence, in which transcendence is expressed in 
spatial terms and demons express the power of evil 
in man, but do so in the image of dominating forces 
above h'm. The biblical image of the temporal end 
of history is another mythological image standing for 
the meaning of Cîod's transcendence, and putting in 
focus the ephemeral character of all thincs and the 
uncertainty of the present in the face of the unknown 
future. In the biblical view the end of the world is 
associated with Tod's Judgment, so that the announce-
ment of the world's Imminent end is really a call to 
respoisibilìty, a call to decision in the face of 
God's coming. This demythologlzing urocedure has a 
basis in the New Testament itself, because Paul, and 
more radically still John, demytholo^ized the 
Christian raessaf-e. For John the coming and depar-
ture of Jesus are the eschatological event; the 
resurrection, Pentecost, and Jesus' parousia are one 
single, decisive event, and the faithful already 
Dossess eternal life. 
To those who object that demythologizing Involves 
one, in the last analysis, in a rationalization of the 
Scriptures, Bultmann replies that only such a procedure 
as the one he recommends is capable of bringing the 
real scandal (Anstoss) of Scripture to li^ht, by 
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removinfT the false scandal offered by an antiquated 
picture of the world. The cross, the Word of the 
cross, cannot be received by reason or In a sacrifIciuir, 
Intellectus, but must be accepted by a mature, adult 
faith, б3" 
Living as he does In a world ruled by natural 
laws, modern man does not appeal to or expect super­
natural Intervention "from above," yet he Is likely 
to forget two things In the midst of science and 
technology: first, that all his plans and undertakings 
should not be led by his desire for happiness, but 
should be guided by an obedient response to the 
demands of the good, by obedience to God's law; and 
second, that security cannot be guaranteed by man 
himself, or by his efforts at organizing his life 
privately or as part of society. 6 4 
The Word of God calls man from his self-
centeredness, his Imagined security, and yet at the 
same time It calls man to his real self. Both the 
Word of God and man's true Inner life, his real "I", 
live beyond the objective world and beyond rational 
thought. Science and mythology, as objectifying modes 
of thought, cannot disclose or Illuminate this 
encounter of God's Word with human existence. 
Oemythologlzing Is able to make the meaning of God's 
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mystery clear, because Cod's l^compT-ehensibllity does 
iot beloT»· to the le^el of theoretical thought, but 
to th° doTiain of personal existence. " ;he Tystery 
ii vhich faith is inte^^sted is not vh^t "od is in 
himself, but ho»' he acts with men." ^5 -an linovs ~od 
insofar as he enters into personal existence. 
"powled-'e of "¡od and self-lcnowledse are inseparable. 
lult "am tries to defenvi his use of artin 
-leiden er's ÎxistenzpMlosophle in interpretine; the 
4
 ew restaiient. Since any interpretation of a text 
involves Dresupposition s on the part of the inter-
ureter, th0 question is not. Can one interpret »'ith-
out xjresuppositions?, bnt rather, l hat a^e the 
correct and aDOrooriat0 DresupOositlons'7 In aues-
tioninT a text I -mst use ideas and Questions wMch 
arise out of ny life and experience, ani when Ζ stand 
in a vital relation to th* matter (Sache) with which 
the text deals, then questions can aris" which are 
aOcroüriate. .'hil° the Fible can be used as a source 
of 'tnowlei'-s about the oast, -nore approoriately it 
can help the inquirer learn about hl'self and th" 
'leanin· of his life. -uitham is convinced that ve 
io ha-"e a vital relation to tha 3lble prior to inter-
nretinor it, a relation of desire, search, question 
recrardin •' the matter of the 0 i M 0 which is Tod hifself. 
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"/Tian/ does have a relation to God In his search for 
God, be it conscious or unconscious. ¡'an's life is 
moved by the search for God because it is always 
moved, consciously or unconsciously, by the question 
of his own existence. The question about '"od and the 
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question about myself are Identical." 
Thus to understand the Bible one must ask this 
question: "How is human existence understood In the 
Bible?" This question Is directed to a book which, 
unlike other documents from the past. Is not a collec-
tion of universal truths about man, but is a Word 
directed at me, claiming me, demanding a response from 
me. Because existential philosophy speaks of man as 
Existenz, In his possibilities for authentic exis-
tence, without giving a definite prescription for an 
individual, it is accepted by Bultmann as suitable 
for illuminating the Word of Scripture. While it is 
true that the decision of faith does not require 
philosophical knowledge, still scientific interpreta-
tion of the Bible does require existential concepts 
to explain the biblical way of understanding human 
existence. Yet, existential philosophy need not 
endanger faith, since philosophy must prescind from 
the question of God and because philosophy cannot 
speak of the concrete events of Individual existence. 
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"If it is true that God's revelation occurs really 
only In the concrete events of life here and now and 
that the analysis of existence is limited to the 
temporal life of man in its succession of 'here and 
now,' then this analysis uncovers an area which only 
faith can understand as the reelon of the relation 
between man and God." 
In this region opened to faith, one speaks of 
God's action, God's active relation to the human 
person. cut ought this way of speaking also fall 
victim to the sharp knife of demythologlzinß? 
Bultmann thinks not, provided thet we do not objectify 
God's action by representing it to ourselves as an 
event атопз events, as part of the chain of cause and 
effect. Cod's action is seen only by the eye of faith 
in the events of history which are there for all to 
see. There exists for Bultmann a paradoxical identity, 
not a direct identity between God's action and worldly 
events, f'4 The world is a closed system of cause and 
effect, but faith says to this a dennoch ("however"): 
God is here to work. In denying the closed connection 
of events in the world, faith need not sDeak in mytho­
logical terms of divine intervention in the world, but 
of God and myself, my "I," neither of which is visible 
or provable. (The necessary use of universal concepts 
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ι he ι sneakint; of Cod's action should not mislead us; 
our talk of Cod's action always refers to me, my self-
"nderstanding, my meeting with God in narticular, 
concrete, historical events.) Talk about Jod's action 
is described by ^Itmann as analogical talk. ke speak 
of rod's action In our lives in analogy with the 
Interaction of men. "To speak of the acting God means 
that we are situated over açainst God, addressed, 
Questioned, judred, or blessed by God. ι or this rea­
son such talk is not a matter of speakinp in symbols 
or iraae-es, but an analogical way of speaking... . 
especially In the representation of God as Father the 
mythological meaning disappeared long ago."6^ 
H i . Jesus Christ and History 
But to say that talk about God is talk about 
myself and God's action In my life does not mean that 
God does not exist outside the believer. To be sure, 
faith cannot defend itself asalnst the objection that 
it is an illusioni yet, on the other hand, faith is 
not merely a psychological, subjective event. The 
ground and object of faith are one and the same, since 
we cannot speak of what God is in himself, but only of 
what he does In and with us. One cannot look back at 
Jesus of iMazareth and find a proof there of the 
Christian кегуітаа. The objective historian cannot 
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affirm that an historical figure was the eternal V'ord, 
the Logos. Jesus' life and fate occurred in world 
history and is a part of the ong-oing process of 
history, but what God did in Jesus, the eschatologlcal 
event, cannot be discerned by historical research. 
In his essay, "Das Verhältnis der urchristlichen 
Christusbotschaft zum historischen Jesus," Bultniann 
pursues the question of the historical Jesus and his 
role In theoloary. 71 rie maintains that the Issue for 
contemporary theology is not (as It was for Liberal 
theoloery) how one can free the picture of the histori-
cal Jesus from the accretions of the kerypma, but how 
one can ascertain a unity between the Jesus of history 
and the Christ of the кегудапа. There is a discernible 
historical continuity between Jesus and the emergence 
of the kerygma in the early Church, because they are 
related historical quantities. But the Christ of the 
keryrçma and Jesus of Nazareth do not stand in a simi-
lar relation because the kerygmatlc Christ Is not an 
historical quantity but rather the object of faith. 
(Bultmann asserts unequivocally that Jesus of Nazareth, 
the historical figure, is not the oblect of faith.) 
Paul and John both give witness to the paradoxical 
truth that an historical event (Jesus of Nazareth) is 
the eschatoloTical event (the Christ). for Bultmann, 
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Jesus' OTOclamation belongs to the presuppositions of 
i\iew Testament theology, for It Is part of the Jewish 
background of that theology. The fact, the Pass of 
the Identity of the historical event and the eschato-
loglcal event Is sufficient for Paul and John, and 
Jesus according to the flesh Is not of saving Import. 
Vhen we add up what we know about the earthly 
Jesus, it Is fragmentary and In no way amounts to a 
leciitlinatlon of the kerygma. "In the Synoptic Gospels 
¿which are appealed to by some who seek to legitimate 
the kerygma7 the combination of historical report and 
kerygmatic Christology does not Intend to legitimate 
the kery;ma of Christ by history, but the reverse Is 
true, it intends as it were to legitimate the history 
of Jesus as messianic, by placing it In the light of 
kerygmatic Christology."7'1 
Historical science Is able to defend the truth 
of the fact of Jesus' appearance within history with 
a certain degree of probability, and it can prove the 
historical continuity between the historical Jesus and 
the emergence of the kerygma, but It cannot prove that 
there Is a material agreement between Jesus and the 
kerygma. This recognition that what the kerygma says 
about Jesus as the Christ is true is possible only in 
faith, fehat history can discern is the Christology 
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inrolied In Jesus' actions and proclamation, "insofar 
as he called for a decision with regard to his person 
as the bearer of God's word, the decision on which 
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salvation or ruin depended." Jesus understood 
himself as an eschatoloçical phenomenon, a sip;n of 
the breaking in of divine rule. To this extent his 
proclamation implied a Chrlstology. "5 Yet this 
assertion does not take one beyond the historical 
anele of vision, so that the question of whether the 
post-resurrection kerygma is the true interpretation 
of the теапіпя of the event Jesus of Nazareth remains 
7(^ 
unanswered. Only faith can offer the answer. 
Jesus' preachinç; was not simply repeated by the 
early Church, but Jesus himself became the content of 
the Church's proclamation. Why? rhe reason for this 
is that the oldest community understood Jesus' history 
as the decisive eschatolosrical event, and therefore 
transformed the Einmal of the historical Jesus into 
the Sln-für-allemal of the Christ. The decisive 
eschatological event could never simply belong to the 
past, but remains present, in the proclamation of the 
Church. It is in this sense that one should understand 
Bultmann's controversial statement that Jesus "rose" 
into the kerygma. Here Bultmann presupposes that the 
kery-cma, the actual event of proclamation which calls 
з? 
for faith in the listener, ¿s the eschatological event, 
and that Jesus is really present in the kerygma, that 
this kerygma is his Word. "If this is so, then all 
speculation about the status (Selnswelse) of the 
Risen One, all stories about the empty tomb and the 
Easter legends, whatever elements of historical fact 
they may contain, ...become a matter of indifference. 
The meaning of the Easter faith is that one believes 
78 In Christ present in the kerygma." 
C. Gerhard Ebellng 
If the Christian proclamation is the proclamation 
of Christ, then, writes Gerhard Ebellng, the kerygma 
brings the problem of Christology to a focus. More-
over, the historical thinking of the modern era has 
concentrated the theological problem most strongly in 
Christology, for It is here that the relation of faith 
and history becomes decisive. "The success of 
Christology depends on whether it can be shown in a 
convincing way that in Jesus God comes to speech in 
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such wise that faith remains dependent on Jesus." 
It would appear that the historical understanding of 
reality is fatal to Christology, when one considers 
the difference between Jesus' proclamation and the 
early Christian kerygma, the difference between Jesus' 
faith and faith in him. Further, the plurality of 
ээ 
Christologles which one finds In the early Church, 
a plurality which cannot be harmonized and which Is 
mixed with mythological traits, makes one suspect 
that Chrlstolopy and historical understanding cannot 
be reconciled. ïet one cannot surrender the 
historicity of Jesus, which remains Incontrovertible, 
although orthodox Chrlstology cannot be easily cleared 
of the suspicion of docetism. Vere Jeus, which used 
to be the primary article of faith with respect to 
Jesus, has now become the problem. And the "problem 
of God" would seem to bring with it the removal of 
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the fundamental presupposition of Chrlstology. 
1. The Kerygma 
The notion of kerys"na has assumed an eminent 
position in contemporary theology, ror Ebeling the 
important question here is the relation of history 
and kerygma, a relation which becomes crucial as soon 
as one realizes the centrallty of the name of Jesus 
in the Church's proclamation. The kerygmatic character 
of the sources can neither forbid nor make hopeless 
the historical question about Jesus, even if the 
"Leben-Jesu-torschung" failed in its attenrot to write 
a biography of Jesus accordina; to a definite ideal of 
history. Ebelln? pol-its out that Eultmann's reaction 
to the "Leben-Jesu-iorschung" and his entire attitude 
з^ 
toward the historical question of Jesus Is determined 
by his concept of God's saving act occurring only within 
2 
the relation of Word and faith. Ebeling affirms 
this concentration on Word and faith, but asks if 
Bultmann has thought sufficiently about the ground 
(Grund) of this relation. Since the kerygma is not 
discourse about existence, but witness of a happening, 
a "relation of understanding" opens up to this event. вэ' 
If we are to avoid making the kerygmatic Word Into an 
abstract mythologoumenon, it Is essential to reflect 
B4 
on the historical Jesus. "Bultmann does not pose 
the question of the ground of faith, because he sees 
In it a question which from the very start is Inappro­
priate to faith. It would be Indeed inappropriate, if 
it were after something which did not let faith be 
dependent only on the Word and so be pure faith. The 
question of the ground of faith is nevertheless in no 
way to be understood in the sense of a « founding' 
(Begründung) which makes faith partially superfluous, 
but rather as the question of that which makes faith 
faith, out of which faith arises, what gives faith Its 
freedom and maintains faith as pure faith." s5 
The kerygma as Word is an event in the hearer 
which brings him to the decision regarding belief and 
unbelief. The kerygma as address (Anrede) is the 
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communication of the eschatological act of God in 
Jesus Christ—the paradox of the eschaton in time. 
This means that the kerygma in its form as Anrede is 
identical with the matter it communicates, the escha-
toloslcal event in the relation of kord and faith. 
But how does one come to understand the kerygma as 
kerypma? How does the Pass of the saving fact in the 
past become a Pass, a fact, in its proclamation now? 
Because the kerygma is Chrlstologlcal in content, there 
seem to be profound obstacles in the way of making 
kerygma actual today, since the Chrlstologlcal titles 
and statements in the i\iew Testament are in no sense 
self-evident to contemporary man. for the true scandal 
of the kerygma to come to the fore, the false scandal 
of a misunderstood kerygma must be removed. In demy-
thologizing and reinterpreting the understanding of 
reality which the Chrlstologlcal titles express, the 
true situation of present-day man can be disclosed, 
and he will be placed in a position in which he will 
be claimed by the kerygma, while those elements of the 
early Church's kerygma which cannot be rendered actual 
will stand revealed. Because all titles underwent a 
transformation when applied to Jesus, one must first 
understand how eschatological models and images, which 
were plentiful in Jesus' tlme^  become precisely kerygma. 
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Yet the theoloiical enterprise called Chrlstology 
Is not exhausted In the simple interpretation of the 
Chrlstolo?les which have been handed down. The keryiçma 
of the past must also be made actual as kerysma today, 
an actual claim or demand for decision addressed to 
contemDorary man. And the latter is possible only if 
it can be shown that the situation in which we find 
ourselves is profoundly keryo-matlc, a situation which 
ΘΒ 
"verifies" the Christian kerygma. 
11. The Historical Jesus 
Because of the central role of Jesus in the кегугта 
the question of the historical Jesus is unavoidable, 
Indeed Ebelin? terms it the hermeneutlcal key to 
Chrlstology. The historical question about Jesus does 
not mean the determination of objective facts concern­
ine- Jesus which supposedly prove that he is the Son 
of God or that he rose from the dead. Still, when one 
views the kerygma as something historical, as definite 
texts which have been handed down, then the historical 
question cannot be forbidden. What is forbidden Is 
an historical inquiry which seeks to "legitimate" the 
kerygma by means of proofs which remove the call to 
faith; permitted is an Inquiry which leads to the 
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interpretation of the kerygma. ' Since the historical-
critical method need not and should not be narrowly 
3? 
understood as an objectlvlzlng determination of "the 
facte," a chasm need not exist between the historical-
critical method and existential Interpretation, that 
Is, Interpretation which explicitly Involves the self-
understanding of the Investigator. By asking what It 
was that came to expression In the past, by viewing 
the past event as "word-event," historical research 
can aid one In understanding the kerygma and Its 
challenge, for when one Is dealing with Jesus one Is 
not Involved with pure facts, but rather with pure 
Word. "The search behind the early Church's kerygma 
Is thus. If performed correctly, not at all a search 
behind the Word which renders the kerygma believable, 
but a search behind a Word which needs Interpretation 
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for the Word-event which Is presupposed In It." 
Both the fact that the kerygma has as Its center 
the historical figure of Jesus and the fact that one 
must come to understand how the appearance and procla-
mation of Jesus led to the kerygma of the Church show 
the theological necessity of Inquiring behind the 
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kerygma. If the kerygma is not myth, then one must 
be able to discover the base It possesses in the 
historical Jesus. 
The naming of Jesus In the kerygma is not meant 
simply to Indicate Its content, but also its ground, 
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because Jesus Is named by the kerygma as its criterion. 
The continuity which Bultmann perceives betw^n th^ 
historical Jesus and the kerygma, namely, the Pass of 
God's eschatological action, is criticized by Ebeling. 
"Bultmann transfers the—let us presume this for now— 
legitimate theological use of the expression, 'the 
Jass of the eschatological event' that Is expressed 
in reference to a historic (geschichtliches) event, 
in what seems to me an unjustifiable way into talk of 
the Pass in the purely historical (historischen) sense 
of the bare factlcity of an historical event. For 
neither In historical perspective can the Isolated 
relation to the Pass be realized, nor does it corres-
pond to the theological meaning of the Pass that it 
is said in relation to a factor that Is already 
abstracted to mere historicality (Historizität). The 
theological scope of the phrase 'the Pass of God' 
depends precisely on the fact that It is testified to 
and believed in relation to the concrete Was und Wie 
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of historic reality." 
Bultmann himself avers that Jesus' appearance and 
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proclamation lmt)lied a Chrlstology. This view, 
which sees the passage from an implicit to an explicit 
Chrlstology, ought to try to express as well how the 
kerygma has a base in the historical Jesus; but, 
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surprìsiiTly, Bultmann considers this relation of 
Implicit and explicit Christology as unessential, 
since it does not change anything in the sole relevance 
of the Pass, the bare historicity of the earthly Jesus. 
Once a^aln. Fuitmann is reacting to the use of proofs, 
of facts, which would °Trpty faith of its character as 
decision. But this should not cause us to overlook 
the other point of view, namely, that historical-
critical research sees in the кегустча not just any 
response to Jesus' call to decision, but the appropri­
ate response (sachremässe): the appropriate раззате 
fron iaplicit to explicit Christolo^y.' '5 Confuslm: 
for Ebelln·; is "ultmann's insistence, on the one hand, 
that we cannot Justifiably то beyond the pure Dass of 
Jesus' factlcity and, on the othei- hand, that there 
is substantial unity betveen Jesus' vork and proclama­
tion and kerygma. Ebelinn: airees with Eultirann's 
focus on the Vori of God which occurred once in Jesus' 
proclanatlon and which now occurs in actual kery?-na. 
Surely God's Word is to be distlnruished from Jesus' 
words and the words which reoort about Jesus, yet one 
must illu-nlnate the understandin'· of the Vori of "od 
in tens of the proclamation and behavior of Jesus, 
and interpret the keryria in the 11-ht of one's 
appreciation that its character as "od's Vord depends on 
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lts appeal to Jesus. Chrlstologlcal kerygma arose out 
of a situation qualified by Jesus' proclamation, his 
call to decision. In this sense the kerygma finds Its 
«round in Jesus, as a consequence of his power to 
express God correctly; he so shaped the situation that 
the choice between faith and unfaith became acute. 
The question how kerygma becomes kerygma now is 
not yet answered. This Involves us In the fundamental 
question of what we mean by God and God's Word, and 
the event-character of the Word in which God is 
expressed. If kerygma can occur now, it can because 
It is necessary, because the situation today as well 
Is "kerygmatically qualified." This qualification is 
a matter for the proclamation itself, but this insight 
must be Joined to the recognition that the proclama­
tion truly enters into the factual situation in order 
to bring it to its truth and that one cannot reduce 
the proclamation to exclusively explicit Chrlstologlcal 
kerygma, since the basis of explicit Christology Is 
always Implicit Christology. God has come in Jesus ! 
Jesus is God's Word. Neither historical science nor 
the kerygma itself can make the kerygma understandable 
today. Ш е kerygma can be understood only in the 
kerygmatically qualified situation. The encounter with 
the man Jesus means the encounter with what comes to 
kl 
speech In him. 
ill. Anhypostasls and the Daag 
In an extended note to his article "Кегукта und 
historischer Jesus" Ebellng addresses himself most 
explicitly to the theme of the traditional understand-
97 Ing of Jesus' unity with God. Here he Is discussing 
Bultmann's notion of the Pass of the historical Jesus 
In comparison with the traditional doctrine of 
anhypostasls. The horizon against which each unfolds 
Is, to be sure, different, for the former Involves an 
historical horizon while the latter Implies a metaphysical 
horizon. According to the anhypostasls doctrine the 
human nature of Christ Is not taken Into consideration 
for an understanding of the person of Christ, because 
the divine nature Is viewed as personal or hypostatic 
and as constituting the one person of Christ. In 
Bultmann's view the understanding of the revelatory 
character of Jesus' appearance does not depend on Jesus' 
historical Was und Wie; only the Pass, the fact of his 
historical existence Is of significance because only 
this has the character of a divine activity. A further 
difference between Bultmann and the traditional doctrine 
Is that the latter saw evidence of this anhypostasls In 
the special Was and Wie of Jesus' human nature 
(finding this evidence In history) while Bultmann does 
І4.2 
not find the divine In the human nature and Its special 
prerogatives, but only with reference to an historic 
event. In order to allow the revelatory character of 
Jesus as event to stand out, the Was and Wie of his 
historical appearance become a matter of Indifference 
for Bultmann, Just as the orthodox theology felt It 
had to eliminate the human person for the sake of Jesus 
as God's revelation. 
Yet both Chrlstoloçies are concerned to hold on 
to the human and divine in Christ. Orthodox thought 
did this by Inserting the divine person In that place 
where the hypostasis of a human nature would otherwise 
be. Eultmann puts God's action at that place where 
historically purely human action In Its Was and Wie 
appears. This Was and Wie has no Chrlstologlcal rele-
vance, for they do not contribute to Christ as a 
revelatory event. 
In making the Was and Wie of Jesus' human nature 
a matter of Irrelevance Bultmann Is testifying to his 
conviction that the revelatory character of this event 
cannot be formally proven or legitimated. "For only 
in the mode of Word can God be related to history. 
Only as kerygma can God's action appear In history. 
It is precisely in the Incomprehensibility (Unanschau-
llchkelt) of the mere Pass that the possibility is 
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given of speaking of the presence of God in history. 
Thus one must clearly realize the strict connection, 
anchored in Eultmann's concept of kerygma, between 
the concentration on the pure Pass, that is, on the 
pure event-character of revelation, and the concentra­
tion on the pure Word-character of revelation. A 
corrective in the question of the historical Jesus 
thus necessarily touches on Bultmann's understanding 
of Word and kerygma." 9 
In the light of what Ebellng wrote in his article 
on Bultmann which we have cited above, one can say the 
following about his own position: (1) he fully 
subscribes to the shift from the metaphysical to the 
historic horizon, so that one will look in vain for a 
discussion of the two natures in Christ expressed In 
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classical terms; (2) he endorses Bultmann's concen­
tration on the kerygma, on the event-character of 
revelation, and on the Integrity of the relation of 
Word and faith which cannot be founded on objective 
1 OP facts or proofs; (3) he refuses to reduce the pure 
Liass of the eschatologlcal event to bare hlstorlcality, 
but stresses the ground of faith which is the person 
of Jesus, that is to say, the historical Jesus. 1 01 
While the question of how different Ebeling's view 
really is from certain suggestive lines of thought in 
hls former teacher's writings Is debatable,102 still 
there is no doubt that Ebellne; considers himself as 
making programmatic themes which in Pultmann stand in 
tension. If not contradiction, to the letter's more 
forcefully accented and developed themes.103 
Summary of Chapter 1 
In this chapter three εΐ-ξπΐίleant Protestant 
theolop-lans ha\'e been examined re^ardlnp- their views 
of the tvo-nature doctrine of Christ and their atti-
tuie to the role of historical science in determinlnir 
the true significance of Jesus of Nazareth and the 
validity of the Christian proclamation and faith. 
Karl Parth asks what it Is which makes revelation 
possible. The answer lies in the reality of Jesus 
Christ and not in an examination of abstract possibi­
lities. Jesus Christ is the "mathematical point" to 
which all lines of thought in the New Testament are 
related. In thinking of Jesus as the Word or Son of 
lod, we must think not from "below' to "above" but 
from "above" to "below." The reason for this is that 
at the heart of the Christian mystery Is the initiative 
of ".od who is freely communicating himself. 
In Jesus Christ we are told that Ood is free for 
us and that he is in no other way free for us. God 
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can reveal himself to man insofar as the reality of 
Jesus Christ is required for Cod's revelation. The 
possibility of revelation is rooted In five things: 
(1) in the condescendence in which lod becomes identi­
cal with a reality different from himself; (2) it is 
rooted in the fact that Jesus Christ is identical with 
God's Son or Word; (3) It is rooted in the fact that 
Jesus Christ belongs to the universe to which we 
belong; (4) it is rooted In Jesus Christ's undiminished 
belonging to God; (5) finally, it is rooted in the 
being flesh of God himself. 
rhe ancient Chrlstology was healthy in spite of 
its dangers and mistakes. Its concern was not "physi­
cal," nor merely ethical, but realistic and ontological. 
This concern is demonstrated by its use of the notion 
of "nature," rightly understood. Eut the presupposi­
tion of all further statements in the ancient 
Christology is the statement: "Jesus Christ, true God 
and true man." This presupposition Is not derived 
from any other proposition or truth; it is a presuppo­
sition in the strict sense. Barth is convinced that 
this presupposition should be the starting-point for 
his Christologlcal reflections as well. 
The Word of God Is the bearer of the humanity of 
Jesus Christ. The traditional terms anhypostasis and 
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enhyDostasis express this fact that Jesus1 humanity 
does not have its own existence in itself, but In the 
Word. However, this does not mean that Christ lacked 
human personality, 
God's decree of election Is not to be sought 
behind the revelation which is Jesus Christ, for he 
is himself the electing God and elected man. Cod's 
Yes to man is expressed in the revelation of his Son. 
rhe ground of faith is identical with his object, 
Jesus Christ. Man does not come to faith, but faith 
comes to man through the Word. The possibility of 
recornizlng. God's Word is Ood's miracle in us. Nan 
is opened up "from above" and so allowed to believe. 
But the manner in which this opening occurs is as 
hidden to us as is God himself. 
Hudolf Bultmann's demythologlzing program tries 
to interpret the mythological elements in the New 
Testament so that the true challenge of the kerygma 
will confront the contemporary believer with the deci-
sion of faith. The mythology present in the New 
Testament contains a definite understanding of human 
existence, in which transcendence is expressed In 
spatial terms and demons express the power of evil in 
man. Demythologlzing does not involve one in a rationa-
lization of the Scriptures, but rather is able to 
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uncover the true scandal of the Scripture by removing 
the false scandal offered by an antiquated picture of 
the world. The Word of the Cross cannot be received 
by reason or In a sacrlfIclum Intellectue. but must be 
accepted by a mature, adult faith. 
Pultmann adopts the existential language of 
decision, authenticity, and self-understanding to 
Illuminate the saving character of God's Word. He 
accordingly eschews all objectifying, metaphysical 
speech about Ood, such as talk of natures and substance. 
Of life and death moment to man Is not the question of 
how God and Christ are In themselves, but how they are 
pro me. Neutral metaphysical God-talk must therefore 
yield to a more existential kind of discourse. 
The "objective" historian Is able to defend the 
truth of the fact of Jesus' appearance within history 
with a degree of probability, and he can prove the 
historical continuity between the historical Jesus and 
the emergence of the kerygma, but he cannot prove 
that there Is a material agreement between Jesus and 
that kerygma. The recognition that what the kerygma 
says about Jesus Is true Is possible only In the 
decision of faith. History can discern, however, the 
Chrlstology which Is Implicit In Jesus' actions and 
proclamation. 
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The early Christian community transformed the 
Slnmal of the historical Jesus into the Sln-für-allemal 
of the Christ, because it saw in Jesus' Cross the 
decisive eschatologlcal act of God, an act which could 
not belong simply to the past, but is present and 
active in the actual event of proclamation. The mean-
in·- of faster faith is precisely this, that one 
believes in Christ present in the kerygma. 
Gerhard Ëbellnr; stresses as well the central 
role of the kerygma. But because the kerygma has an 
historical figure at its center, the question of 
history cannot be minimized. The ground or basis of 
faith In Jesus Christ must be sought. Such a ground 
does not mean to make faith superfluous, but seeks to 
discover what It Is which makes faith to be faith, 
what it is out of which faith arises, what яі ез faith 
its freedom and maintains faith as pure faith. We 
cannot legitimate the kerygma by adducing historical 
"proofs" with regard to Jesus' divinity, for example. 
We should go behind the early Church's kerygma not to 
find that which would make the kerygma believable, but 
we should search behind the Word which needs Interpre­
tation for the Word-event which is presupposed in it. 
There Is a theoloslcal necessity for this Inquiry 
behind the kerygma. One must be able to find the 
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kerygma's base In Jesus of Nazareth. It Is wrong to 
treat Jesus of Nazareth, who Is the Pass of the escha-
tological event, as simply a bare facticity, an event 
In the past. The theological scope of the phrase "the 
Dass of God" depends precisely on the fact that It Is 
testified to and believed In relation to the concrete 
Was und Wie of historical reality. 
All discussion of the two-natures doctrine or 
hypostatic union Is absent from Ebellng, as It Is In 
Bultmann. Metaphysical thinking must give way to an 
historical and existential horizon, although Ebellng 
Is able to find a correlation between the traditional 
notion of anhypostasls and Bultmann's notion of the 
eschatologlcal Pass of Jesus Christ. 
The three theologians discussed In this chapter 
all represent the kind of theological reflection to 
which Pannenberg's undertaking Is opposed. For all 
his emphasis on the necessity of grounding Christian 
faith In history, Ebellng Is strongly opposed to any 
attempt to legitimate the act of faith. He Joins 
ranks with Barth and Bultmann in his determination to 
preserve Christian faith from an endeavor which he 
feels will jeopardize the grace-character and risk-
character of faith. The insistence with vhlch 
Pannenberg will call for a legitimation of faith in 
50 
historical evidence which Is accessible to anyone with 
an open mind becomes at least understandable against 
the background of this Word-of-God theology. 
As we move on now to consider Pannenberg's con-
tribution to the contemporary Chrlstologlcal discussion 
a second Important factor to be considered will be how 
he stands with respect to the dogmatic tradition of 
the Church concerning Christ. Here Earth stands for a 
positive appreciation of the tradition represented by 
the Council of Chalcedon, while Bultmann and Ebellng 
wish to formulate Chrlstologles which dispense with 
metaphysics. Pannenberg himself will take sides quite 
emphatically In this longstanding discussion among 
Protestant theologians. 
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CHAPTER II: ГНЕ R-:CO";"I ГІСГІ Ci· J^SUS· JI 144 ΓΪ 
In the preceding; chapter ve review"-! the theolo-
яісаі backTound out of vhich Pannenber^'s Chrlstoloiy 
emersred and to which It offers a critical resDonse. 
In addition, we reviewed in the Preface the methodolo-
•-ical discussion which forms the basis of Fannenberc's 
entire study. Ve saw that the basis of the Christian 
faith must be found in the human history of Jesus of 
Nazareth insofar as that human history has universal 
significance. Pannenbera-1 s claim that Jesus' universal 
sin-nificance proceeds from his special relationship to 
"od leads him into Fart I of his book, consisting of 
tfco chapters. Ve shall now examine the content of 
these chapters with soecial attention to our chosen 
theme: th» oe^sonel unity of Jesus and Tod. 
A. The Resurrection: 
Ground of Jesus' Unity with Cod 
i. Proleptlc Claim 
Ve have seen that Pann°nbern wishes to develop a 
Chrlstolory "from below," a Chrlstolo-y that finds its 
startinr-point and supporting-ground in the historical 
existence of Jesus. ¿ince Pannenberj is by no means 
the first ìvan-'-elical theologian so to develop 
ChristolOT-y, he begins the third chapter of his book 
with a discussion of the differences betveen his 
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Christo!ogy írom below and those that have preceded 
him. Pannenberg finds that in most cases dogmatics 
and exegesis have attempted to ground Jesus' unity 
Kith "od in his claim to authority as this is expressed 
in his Droclamation and conduct, with the result that 
the resurrection does not play an essential role as a 
substantiation of this claim.' 
As examples of this type of dogmatics Pannenberp 
discusses Werner Eiert, Faul Althaus, Emil Brunner, 
rt-ledrich "¡ogarten, and Hermann Jiem. All these 
authors locate the ground for the affirmation of Jesus' 
unity with Ood in the pre-resurrectlon earthly life 
of Jesus. bor Elert the decisive argument for Jesus' 
divine Sonship is that Jesus claimed to be the Son of 
God; this he indicated by speaklncr of " my bather" and 
(with respect to the disciples)" your Father" (p. 47). 
for llert the predicate "Son of lod" is the condition 
for, and not the consequence of, the faith of the 
disciples. Pannenberg points out that, as recent 
studies have shown, the Chrlstologlcal titles are more 
probably expressions of the interpretation, made in 
faith, of Jesus' claim (p. 48). Paul Althaus maintains, 
with others, that the authority that Jesus claims 
presupposes a nearness to God, a solidarity with him, 
that no other man had. This claim is either true or 
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blasphemous (p. 48). Emil Erunner puts it differently: 
Jesus1 "lived claim" to be the Christ needs to be 
supplemented by the apostolic witnesses and their 
visions of the Risen Lord in order to be the basis of 
faith, yet the knowledge of the Easter event already 
presupposes faith in Jesus1 absolute Lordship (pp. 48f.; 
cf. p. 108). For l-tiedrich C-ogarten Jesus' claim that 
what was promised is present in him means that God is 
present in him. But Jesus cannot legitimate himself 
by appealing to smother, higher authority, for then 
men would ^Ive allesiance to it and not to the God of 
Jesus (p. 49). Finally, Hermann ulem believes that 
Jesus' proclamation is the basis of faith. This pre-
Easter proclamation comes to us in Jesus' self-
proclamation in the Gospel, yet we can go behind the 
Gospel to the "first phase" in the history of the pro-
clamation, the proclamation of the earthly Jesus 
himself (p. 49). 
Pannenberg now turns his attention to the exegetes, 
to the so-called "new quest for the historical Jesus" 
and its principal voices: Ernst Käsemann, Ernst Fuchs, 
Günther Bornkamm, and Hans Conzelmann. Käsemann seeks 
the continuity between the message of the Gospel and 
Jesus' own message. The Sermon on the Mount ("but I 
say to you"), Jesus' position regarding: the Sabbath 
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and purification laws, the solemn "Amen," all express 
Jesus' special claim, a claim the New Testament 
Interpretatlvely expresses by the Chrlstologlcal 
titles (p. 50)- ior fuchs Jesus' conduct is the basis 
of the Cospel, especially his celebration of the 
eschatolorçlcal meal with tax collectors and sinners 
already in the present (p. 5I)· Eornkamm puts It this 
way: Jesus' claim results from the presence of the 
expected eschatolo^ical future in his activity. He 
interprets Jesus' claim against the apocalyptic back-
ground of his proclamation (p. 52). Conzelmann takes 
the opposite tack: Jesus1 claim Is the abandonment of 
the apocalyptic horizon (Ibid.). Yet for both Rornkanm 
and Conzelmann Jesus' claim, in the sense of his 
conduct as well as his proclamation, is the historical 
basis of the keryocma. 
It is at this point that Pannenberg Introduces 
his own view regarding the significance of Jesus' 
message and claim as basis of both kerygma and faith. 
MndinüT fault with Conzelmann's "absolutizing" of 
Jesus' claim to be the presence of God, since it allows 
no room for the "not-yet" character of the eschaton. 
Pannenberg maintains that Jesus' claim means an antici-
pation of a confirmation that Is to be expected only 
from the future. In this connection Pannenberg finds 
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Luke 12.8 to be of great Importance. All of the ver-
sions of the saying, with the exception of .It. 10.32f.. 
dlstlnsulsh Jesus from the Son of man as a different 
figure, and for Pannenberg this Is the most Important 
argument for the authenticity of the saying.2 This 
loglon expresses the same proleptlc claim that is 
Implied by the "but I say to you" in the Sermon on 
the ;Ount and the celebration of the eschatological 
meal with tax collectors and sinners. The presence 
of salvation in Jesus is proleptlc in structure pre-
cisely Insofar as it anticipates and requires a future 
confirmation (p. 55)· 
PannenberT relates this proleptlc structure to 
apocalyptic and Old Testament prophecy. The prophets 
received messages that would be confirmed in the 
future by their fulfillment: this fulfillment would 
reveal that they were indeed Yahweh's words. Phis is 
eaually true of the apocalyptic visionary's view of 
history. For example, in Dan. 11.1-39 the course of 
history described from the Persian empire to Antlochus IV 
provides the basis for confidence that the remainder 
of the prophecies will be fulfilled. A comparison of 
Jesus' activity with the apocalyptic seer reveals a 
four-fold difference, however: Jesus does not hide under 
the name of a canonical f l'aure from the Old Testament, 
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for Ι 0 brintrs s ο •"β fil "ir rpallv n°v; Jesus did not 
describe the COUT-S° ol events loading to the last are, 
but called for repentance in the presen1-, perhaps 
because he expected an Imminent end to history; la 
'esus' actlvity--iinlike tha Baptist's call to 
repeitance—eschatolo^ical saltation has already made 
its appearance; lastly, with Jesus the end is not 
only seen in advance, but It has happened in advance. 
41 of this shows >hy apocalyptic Dlctures of the end 
are not essential to Jesus' messasp, even though the 
aüocalvptlc horizon of understanding is indispensable 
fo1- realizin"· what Jesus vas about (pp. ^ cf.). 
Pannenberx is willing to admit that the SOeclflc turn 
to the p^es^nt found in Jesus' proleptic claim is 
not inherent In the «renerai apocalyptic background. 
¿ut the indispensable background for understanding the 
accent on the present found in Lk. R.12 is, according 
to Pannenbere, the eschatoloffical expectation of 
Jesus' day. As we shal] see, Jesus' resurrection, 
unlike his claim, stands against the nore specific 
background of apocalyptic expectation as such.3 
Го be sure, the'-e are occasions when Jesus tries 
to l^ Britl-nate his claim (see . t. 11.5f.; Lk. 11.20). 
Yet. there a^e also times when he refuses to offer con-
fii-matlon, namely vhen a "sien from heaven" is demanded 
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by the Pharisees (Mk. 8.11f.). This suggests to 
Pannenberç that Jesus pointed to his deeds as a partial 
legitimation of his claim, but that his unambiguous 
confirmation as personally the one in whom salvation 
or judgment was decided had to wait, for it could not 
come from Jesus but from God, in a future event. This 
reference to the future explains the reason for the 
Journey to Jerusalem. Jesus seemed to want to bring 
about a decision, and the cleansing of the Temple 
virtually forced a decision (p. 6o). 
The above reflections lead Pannenberg to maintain, 
over against the opinions marshalled earlier, that 
Jesus' conduct and proclamation are not sufficient to 
provide the basis for faith in him, since there is a 
proleOtic or future-oriented dimension to his claim: 
"the pre-Saster Jesus' claim to authority stands from 
the beginning in relationship to the question of the 
future verification of his message through the occur-
rence of the future Judgment of the Son of han accord-
ing to the attitude taken by men toward Jesus" (ΕΓ, p.66). 
li. The Resurrection: 
Confirmation and Revelation 
a. The Importance of the Resurrection 
The first step in Pannenberg's Christology has 
been made: the proleptlc character of Jesus' claim has 
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beer, indicated, with the consequence that the event 
anticipated by that clain must receive a great deal 
of attention. itiat event is the resurrection. 
It is significant that РаппепЬегя entitles this 
section "Oie Bedeutunç der Auferweclfuna; Jesu in der 
traditionsn:eschichtllchen Situation des Urchristentums." 
He 1 s convinced that the event of the resurrection 
possessed its own inherent slgnlficance within the 
context of its time, which was characterized by a 
tension between the present and the expectation of what 
the future would bring. "tor Jesus' Jewish contempo-
raries, Insofar as they shared the apocalyptic expecta-
tion, the occurrence of the resurrection did not first 
need to be interpreted, but for them it spoke meaning-
fully in Itself: If such a thing happened, one could 
no longer doubt what It meant" (ЕГ, p. 67). Earlier 
Pannenberg had written In a more general vein that 
history does not consist of brute facts, because all 
human events are seeded with understanding and Involve 
hope and memory. For this reason, all of history is 
the history of the transmission of traditions 
(rradltionsR;eschlchte) and even natural events, insofar 
as they are taken up into nen's understanding of them­
selves, have their significance in their relation to 
man's traditions and expectations. ivents speak their 
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own language, "die Sprache der fatsachen," and one can 
hear this language only when one attends to the context 
of tradition and expectation In which these events 
occur. -> We shall return to this position of 
Pannenberg later, but for now It Is important to see 
the stress he gives to the consideration of the resur­
rection as it occurred within its own historical 
context of Jewish eschatolo^y, and more specifically, 
of Jewish apocalyptic expectation. 
Pannenberg points out that it is most probable 
that Jesus did not look forward to a privately experi­
enced resurrection, and it is clear that some twenty 
or thirty years after Jesus' death Paul still expected 
an imminent, final arrival of the risen Jesus as 
Judge, accompanied by the universal resurrection of 
the dead ( I Thess. *K15. 17; I Cor. 15.51). The 
relation between the resurrection of Jesus and the end 
of the world ("universal resurrection of the dead") 
would soon be lost from view, but such a relation 
belongs to what Pannenberg calls the "Immediate inhe­
rent significance" (unmittelbar Innewohnende 
Bedeutun-Ό of the resurrection-event.6 Paul's 
spealclns of Jesus as "the first-born among many 
brothers" (Rom. 8.29) and as the first fruits of those 
who have fallen asleep (I Cor. 15.20) hl3:hllp:hts the 
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universal import of Jesus' fate, as does the early 
Christian conviction (Rom. 8.11) that the Spirit of 
God—an eschatoloçical reality—already dwells in 
Christians (p. 62). 
A second element in what Pannenbero; calls the 
"immediate inherent significance" of the resurrection 
is that God himself has confirmed Jesus' pre-Easter 
activity. The apparent rejection of Jesus by the God 
of Israel in Jesus' death is shown "visibly and 
unambiguously" to be in fact an acceptance and ratifi-
cation of all Jesus was and claimed. Texts which 
express this early Christian conviction are Acts 2.36, 
3.15. and 5.30f. For a Jew, God is involved where 
resurrection from the dead occurs (pp. 62f.). 
A third element in the "Inherent significance" 
of the resurrection-event Is the suggestion that the 
Son of Пап and the man Jesus who will return in glory 
are one and the same. Jesus during his earthly life 
claimed a functional correspondence between the atti­
tude of men toward him and the future attitude of the 
Son of Man to them. The "only" distinction between 
Jesus and the Son of Man was that Jesus was an earthly 
figure and the Son of ilan a heavenly one. In Jesus' 
resurrection the difference evaporated, so that the 
coming from heaven of the Son of Man and that of Jesus 
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were identified very early in the Christian community, 
as is testified to by «ς" (pp. 63f.).'' Next, if Jesus 
has been raised from the dead then Cod is ultimately 
revealed in Jesus. For Pannenberg God1 s divinity, 
his яіогу, as the one who works all things and is the 
power over all things, can only be revealed at the end 
of all things. Го the extent that Jesus' resurrection 
is the beginning of the end of history, to that extent 
Cod's glory, his divinity, is ultimately manifested 
in him.S This apocalyptic idea would soon be inter­
preted in Hellenistic categories to mean that God's 
appearance or epiphany on earth took place in Jesus. 
Our author sugirests that this may be the path which led 
to the thesis of Jesus' true divinity (pp. 64f.).° 
The next element which Pannenberg considers is 
the mission to the Gentiles. He admits that the sig­
nificance of the resurrection here is less clear than 
the elements previously considered. The fact that 
Jesus was raised by God from the dead as the Crucified 
One led Paul to reconsider the meaning of the law and 
the relation of God's eschatologlcal salvation to non-
Jews (Gal. 3.13f.)· "Thus, even though the transition 
to the Gentile mission does not represent a direct 
consequence of the significance inherent in Jesus' 
resurrection by itself, it was inevitable as soon as 
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•"esus
1
 гезиггэсtion і.эз understood in its connection 
with the crucifixion as the expression of his rejection 
by Jsrael" (-T, p. 72). jnieed, Pannenbero; sees 
Paul's "-oso^ l of freedom from the law as immediately 
irplied In his confrontation vith the resurrected 
Crucified One. 
i'his last observation leads pannenbero; to a dis­
cussion of the relation of the appearances of the 
resurrected Jesus to the words spoken by him. These 
words are transmitted by the Christian community and 
are to be understood as the explication of the meanino· 
inherent in the resurrection Itself. This view is a 
concrete application of Fannenbera;' s more general 
thesis en the relation between word and event, fact 
and interpretation in the two Testaments, according 
to which a "word of God" never has authority apart from 
a "vindicating" event or events. Revelation comes to 
us in hifitory, in events, not, to be sure, in events 
apart from the Interpreting word which Illuminates 
them, but nonetheless In events which bear their own 
intrinsic sip-nif icance. The "word" does not add a 
new meaning, not already present In the event, but 
expresses the meanin'T present within the event set 
against its context. *•" 
Paul's claim that he received his Cospel through 
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the revelation of Jesus Christ does not mean to 
Pannenberp that Paul received his Gospel by audition, 
since this would make the development in Paul's 
thought impossible to explain, but rather that Paul's 
Gospel is the exegesis of the aopearance of the 
resurrected Jesus that he experienced (p. 68). rhe 
unity of word and event in the resurrection appearances 
expresses a fundamental concern of Pannenberg. Only 
if word and appearance form an original unity, so 
that the word does not function as an external, supple-
mentary interpretation, can faith be said to have a 
basis in history, and only then can interpretations 
of the past event be tested as to their truth (p. 69).H 
b. rhe Question of rieanin^ 
Before entering into a discussion of the histo-
ricity of the resurrection of Jesus, Pannenberg tries 
to show what that notion really means, in its own 
original, post-exilic Jewish context and for the 
present day. The expression "resurrection from the 
dead" is basically a metaphor alluding to the normal 
experience of rising from sleep to express the "com-
pletely unknown" destiny expected for the dead in 
connection with the end of the world. In this 
metaphor the Intended reality and the way in which it 
is expressed are quite different. A further complication 
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enters when we realize that what Paul, for example, 
has in mind when speaking of a resurrection from the 
dead Is not the resuscitation of a dead body to 
earthly life, but the new life of a new body, a body 
w"lch Is not the earthly body, but a "spiritual 
body" (pp. VOff.).1' 
There are two principal points with regard to the 
resurrection that Pannenber^ treats: the resurrection 
considered as the content of salvation, and the 
resurrection as a transformation. He points out that 
for Paul the resurrection of the dead is the content 
of salvation, which implies that only believers will 
rise from the dead. rhe oldest biblical witness to 
hope in the resurrection (Is. 26.?ff.) says as much. 
Cn the other hand, üan. 12. 1-3 views the resurrection 
as a preliminary step (and one which is not universal) 
before some are Judged rifrhteous and receive their 
reward, while others are judged to be especially bad 
and are punished. Enoch shows a view similar to Dan. 12 
in Chapter 22, while in Chapter 51 the resurrection 
Is universal. rhe latter idea seems to have prevailed. 
(Pannenberg refers here to IV Ezra 7. 29 ff. and 
Syriac Baruch 50. 2ff.) 
fhe second question Pannenberg wishes to treat 
Is the problem of the transformation involved In the 
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resurrection of the body, and this Is closely allied 
with the question of the resurrection as the content 
of salvation. In Paul (I Cor. 15) resurrection and 
transformation are one event, because resurrection is 
apparently destined only for the saved; such Is not 
the case, for example, in Syrlac Baruch (Chs. 50 and 
51), where transformation takes place only after 
resurrection and judgment. In these chapters the 
manner of transformation is described In detail, while 
other apocalyptic writings spoke simply of transforma-
tion in the resurrection to the "radiance of ann-els" 
(Jan. 12.3; Enoch 51.^; 104.2; IV Ezra 7-97). 
Pannenberg's conclusion: 'Thus the idea that a trans-
formation Is connected with the resurrection of the 
dead—whether In the act of the resurrection itself 
or in a subsequent, special event—is in no way a 
specifically primitive Christian or even Pauline 
understanding in contrast to the 'orthodox' Jewish 
resurrection faith" (ST, p. 80). 
Pannenberg takes Paul's notion of resurrected 
body to Involve a radical transformation which will 
occur to the present mortal body, in which there is 
no substantial or structural continuity, and yet It 
Is not a totally new "creation from nothing" since 
there is an historical continuity In the sense that 
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there is a connection between the berinnlna: and the 
S'id point v'-ilch rcsiies in the process of transforma­
tion Itself (op. 71f.). 
Рам] is the only witness to the resurrected Jesus 
who reported his exoerience personally. Yet Pannenberg 
does not see in the confrontation of Paul with the 
resurrected Jesus the startinT-point for his idea of 
resurrection as transformation. "Only the traditional 
expectation of the end of history rooted in apocalyp­
tic zave Paul the opportunity of desifmatinp: the 
oarticular event that he experienced, as Jesus1 other 
disciples had experienced It previously, as an event 
belon^lncr to the category of resurrection life" 
(si-, p. ει). 
In I Cor. 15.16 Paul seems to be saying that the 
general resurrection of the dead is the presupposition 
for the truth of Jesus' resurrection. In verse 20, 
however, Paul employs Jesus' resurrection as substan­
tiation of the truth of the expectation of a resurrec­
tion from the dead for believers, particularly for 
Gentile Christians who did not brln^ this expectation 
with thera from their pre-Christian background. 
Pannenberg's co.imient on this apparent circularity: 
"The expectation of resurrection must already be pre­
supposed as α truth that is ті еп by tradition or 
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anthropologically or is established philosophically 
when one speaks about Jesus' resurrection. That this 
expectation has already become an svent In Jesus can 
strengthen ex post facto the truth of the expectation, 
but cannot establish it for the first time" (ET, p. 81). 
"îven in the "lissionary кегусча addressed to the 
Geitiles ке find the apocalyptic expectation of the 
end of history (1 rh°ss. 1.10), and th= resurrection 
of the dead Dr^s^ted as an eleTent of the fundamental 
doctrine of the Christian faith (4=b. f.lf.). ^hat 
"i^ ans that °ven for the "entil» Christian Church th° 
anocalyotic °xooctation e^rralr^ d "a] Id In Its basic 
lines (D. 78). 
¿fter locatine the resurrection vl'-hin the context 
of .levish aoocalyptic, Pannenterç tries to shov that 
such a strange world as this has somethinr valid to 
say to us. This is an unavoidable question, and on,= 
must b0 cl°ar wh°n one Is discussine th0 truth of this 
apocalyptic expectation of a future resurrection of 
the dead, that one is іеаііпг with the basis of th» 
Christian faith. Vhy the man Jesus can be th0 ultimate 
ro-.ro iati on of "od, whv In him and only in him '"'od is 
«upDOsed to ha"0 apocar0!, remains unint0lliilble 
арат-t fT-OT the horizon or apocalyptic exD=ctation. ^ ^ 
"hls l°als Fann^nbero- Into a discussion of a '-alid 
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anthrcmoloT, one that sees man as one open to the 
future, findlnr essential but not ultimate fulfillment 
in society and within human history, but who remains 
a project directed beyond the finite, continually 
transcending the finite, always threatened by the 
shadow of death. The hope that Is in man reaches 
beyond death. Phis does not imply that a phllosophl-
ca] anthropology can establish that that hope would 
in fact be realized, but it does relate contemporary 
man—as open question—to what apocalyptic and the 
resurrection event occurring within its horizon have 
to say about reality. At this point Pannenberg shows 
that the "holistic" concept of resurrection (l.e the 
fact that in this concept the entire person is 
Involved), corresponls much better to man's nature as 
transcendence than does the philosophical notion of 
the Immortality of the soul.15 It thus appears that 
the apocalyptic notion of the resurrection of the dead 
is a philosophically defensible imajre of the hoped-for 
destiny of man, corresponding as it does to the non-
dualistlc conception of man prevalent amonsr thinking 
oeople in the middle of the twentieth century (pp. 84f.). 
c. i'he question of Truth 
Until now Fannenber; has been concerned with the 
meanin^fulnsss of the expression "resurrection from the 
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dead." In discussion of the "truth-question" Pannenbero; 
grapples with the N'ew Testament testimony In an histo-
rical, and not slmoly a literar\r-exea;etlcal way. The 
two traditions which call for examination are those 
of the appearances of the Risen Jesus and the tradition 
of th0 empty tomb. Since In the oldest strata of the 
\1ew Testament (Paul and Mark) th°se tvo traditions are 
seoarate, they will have to be Investigated separately. 
In discussine the Easter appearances Pann^nbers- refers 
principally to 4ans Grass.•'^ 
Pannenbero- concentrates on the Pauline report 
contained In I Cor. If. l-lli since the appearances 
reported in the "ospels are elthe^ also found in Paul, 
but with more legendary embellishments (for example, 
an accent on the risen Jesus' corporeality, which is 
contrary to Paul) or are not found in Paul and are so 
developed that It is difficult to discern what—if 
any--historlcal core is at their base (p. P5)· 
I Cor. 15 offers a list of recioients of aüpearances 
of the Risen Jesus: Peter, the Twelve, fi^e hundred 
Christians at one time (most of whom, Paul writes, are 
still ali^e), James, all the apostles, and Paul himself. 
The Intention of the list for Paul is to offer thereby 
a proof by witnesses for the facticity of the resurrec-
tion. 
72 
An analysis of the rrnort Indicates that it stands 
very close to the events themselves, since I Cor. was 
written in 5£ or 5? and Fani had probably been in 
"cruj-qle"! six to 0i~ht years after .'esus' death where 
he -iet co".e of the nrir.ciwal reciDients of appearances. 
Another ar^uT.ent for the ате of the reports is the fact 
that in at least 1 Cor. 1^.3Ь-,С, we have to do with 
either an originally unified formula (this is the 
~eneral view of exer-etes) or a fornula formed by Paul 
froip elements that were first seoarate formularized 
units (Ulrich iiilokensl?). these units would have been 
огідіпаііу lep-itlmatlon-formulae for persons with 
authority in the early community, but Pannenber^ points 
out that such Is not the role they have in Paul (p. 87). 
In the ll~ht of these two points, Pannenberg writes: 
"the assumption ttrat apcearances of the resurrected 
were really experienced by a nuir.ber of members of the 
primitive Christian community and not perhaps freely 
invented in the course of later legendary development 
has îîood historical foundations" (£Г, p. 91)· 
Our author moves on now to the question of the 
experiences involved. He sunposes that in I Cor. 15 
Paul took his experience to be one similar to those 
^iven to the other apostles. The description of the 
exnerience -iven by Peul in '"al. 1.12 and l6f. Is 
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followed by Pannenberg, and Acta (9.1-22; 22.3-21; 
26.1-23) Is used to the extent that It agrees with 
Galatlans. Five elements are discernible: 
1) The relation between the appearances and the 
man Jesus of Nazareth Is clear to Paul (Gal. 1.16; 
cf. I Cor. 9.1); 
2) What Paul saw was a soma pneumatlkon 
(Pannenberg considers this point already established; 
cf. pp. 71f.); 
3) The appearance was from heaven (see Acts, 
Ch. 9); this ties In with the earliest view of the 
resurrection as Identical with the Ascension 
(cf. Phil. 2.9; Acts 2.36; 5.30f.; lark 1^.62); 
k) Given the last two points, then "It Is 
probable" that the appearance at Damascus was a light 
phenomenon (Acts 9.3f.); 
5) An audition accompanied the Chrlstophany.^9 
With the possible exception of the fourth element, the 
light phenomenon, all the other elements may be presup-
posed for the other appearances of the resurrected 
Lord. Jesus was recognized In these encounters because 
of the presupposition of a particular form of the 
apocalyptic expectation of the resurrection of the 
dead (pp. 89ff.).20 
An examination of the Easter appearances indicates 
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that an extraordinary vision may be Involved, Involving 
an event which was not visible to all.21 In the 
Damascus vision Paul's experience was shared by his 
companions to the extent that they saw but did not 
hear the voice (Pannenberg follows Acts 22.9 and 
26.13f.). He finds It Impossible that the companions 
heard the voice but saw nothing. In any case, only 
Paul understood the meaning of the appearance (p. 90).2' 
The Munich theologian points out that Grass* assertion 
that there were no neutral witnesses, nor any who were 
only halfway Involved Is "a mere postulate."23 
If It Is true that the experience of the Risen 
Jesus Involved visions, that does not answer the 
question whether or not they were Imaginary. For 
instance, how Is one to distinguish the appearances 
listed In I Cor. 15 from the enthusiastic visions of 
a Hellenistic sort that even Paul experienced 
(cf. II Cor. 12)? Pannenberg agrees with Paul Althaus 
and Ulrich Wllckens2^ that the content of these later 
visions was probably Identical with that of the earlier 
Jesus Christ (cf. Stephen's vision, Acts 7.55). It 
Is difficult to determine Just how early Christianity 
distinguished these experiences. The view that the 
difference Is related to the commission of apostles 
is not probable because in I Cor. 15 where Paul speaks 
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of the appearance to him as the last appearance, he 
is attesting the reality of the resurrected Lord and 
not speaking of his commission as an apostle (p. 91)· 
The attempts to declare the Saster appearances 
illusory have to reckon with three factors: (1) in 
the area of the history of religions, which hands down 
only exceptional phenomena, the psychiatric notion of 
"vision" as hallucination or psychogenic vision must 
not be postulated unless a more specific point of 
contact for it is given by the tradition; (2) the 
faster faith of the disciples calls for explanation, 
and that is the function of the appearances; (3) the 
number of the appearances and their distribution in 
time make the "subjective vision hypothesis" difficult 
to sustain. 
With regard to the second point above, Pannenberg 
is not interested in maintaining the traditional 
"psychological" argument that the disciples' state of 
mind after the failure of the cross was not such as 
to produce these confirmatory experiences, so that the 
psychological change attests to the reality of the 
appearances. Such psycholoslcal considerations by 
themselves are as little suited to support any posi-
tive conclusions as they are suited to support negative 
criticism of the New Testament traditions. These 
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arguments have weight for Pannenberg only when they 
are related to the history of traditions In which the 
faith that Jesus, and he alone, rose from the dead, 
emerged In spite of Its Improbability. This fact calls 
for explanation, for It is somethlnç new, not derived 
from the apocalyptic tradition of the universal resur-
rection of the dead, even though that tradition was 
the background against which the significance of Jesus' 
resurrection for his fellow men was perceived (pp. 93f.).^5 
The third factor mentioned above hangs on the 
dating of the Easter appearances. There are at least 
three stages to be distinguished: first, the appearance 
to Peter, which took place probably soon after his 
return to Galilee; second, the appearance to James, who 
probably Joined the Jerusalem community after the 
first group of Jesus' followers returned to Jerusalem; 
third, the appearance to Paul, which occurred three 
years after Jesus' earthly end. Of the other appearan-
ces listed by Paul, the appearance to the five hundred 
brethren has the best claim to not being a secondary 
construction, since Paul says that most of the five 
hundred are still alive. 
The task of the historian with respect to the 
testimony Is critically to Investigate the tradition 
to determine whether the explanation offered by Jesus' 
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disciples for their faith is the only adequate expla-
nation for their conviction that Jesus, once dead, is 
now "alive."2" If this explanation is Indeed the only 
appropriate one, then the resurrection of Jesus would 
be designated an historical event.^7 
When he turns to the second tradition bearing on 
the resurrection of Jesus—that of the empty tomb— 
Pannenberg insists that the arguments adduced for the 
historicity of the resurrection appearances stand or 
fall apart from the tradition of Jesus' empty tomb. 
Admitting that when one restricts oneself one-sidedly 
to the analysis of the textual tradition as the basis 
for the historical Judgment, one really comes to a 
negative result in the question of Jesus' tomb, 
Pannenberg rests his case for the basic truth of the 
tradition, positively, on two historical (but non-
exegetlcal) arguments, and, negatively, on the rebuttal 
of some of the more important objections that have been 
thrown up. The first historical artruraent is that the 
preaching of the risen Jesus in Jerusalem would have 
been impossible if the tomb was not empty or if the 
fate of the body was known to people to be a more 
mundane one than that claimed by the disciples of 
Jesus. (Pannenberg accepts it as true that the procla-
mation of the risen Jesus began in Jerusalem.) The 
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second argument Insists that even Jewish polemicists, 
who, of course, denied that Jesus rose, agreed with 
the followers of Jesus that the body was missing; they 
simply blamed the disciples for this strange fact 
(pp. 97ff.). Z 8 
To the objection that Paul Is silent about the 
empty tomb, Pannenberg answers that such a tradition, 
even If he knew of It (which he probably did not), 
would not fit Into the pattern of his thinking, which 
spoke of Jesus1 resurrection in terms of its relevance 
for the fate of Christians and not in Its singular 
aspects. Го the objection that the grave would not 
be opened because of the taboos that surrounded such 
things, Pannenberg answers that evidence exists that 
in Palestine at that time there was a problem with 
violations of tombs, not to mention the possibility 
of the Jewish authorities making an exception In Jesus' 
case. A more serious objection is one which bears on 
the heavily legendary aspects of Mark 16, which is 
nonetheless in Its core the oldest witness to the 
tradition. Following Bultmann, Pannenberg views v. 7 
and v. 8b as additions to the Marcan material (similarly 
for 14·. 48) which allude to an appearance tradition 
which Mark knew of, but did not include, perhaps because 
the passion narrative Including the story of the discovery 
79 
of the empty tomb had lain before him as a local 
Jerusalem tradition that was already complete. 
Pannenberg denles that Mark 15. 42-4-7 (the burial 
account) Is pure legend; he points out that the name 
of Joseph of Arimathea, a non-dlsciple. Is central to 
the account. The account of burial, as well as that 
of the discovery of the grave, seem to have a firm 
place in the pre-Marcan Jerusalem passion tradition. 
I Cor. 15. ^  with its "he was burled" also indicates 
the age of the tradition. 
Pannenberg admits that if it could be shown that 
the disciples remained in Jerusalem for Jesus' death 
and found his grave empty and then went to Galilee and 
exDerlenced the Easter visions (where the majority of 
the exegetes locate the fundamental appearances), then 
a psychological motive for these visions would be 
given that would shake their "reality." But the 
disciples returned to Galilee without knowledge of the 
empty tomb, and came back to Jerusalem only after the 
appearances. This Is suggested by the fact that the 
two traditions, that of the appearances and that of 
the empty tomb, are separate. Another supporting 
argument for this hypothesis Is the striking fact that 
In the account of the passion and burial the disciples 
play no role (only John introduces a disciple into the 
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passion), and, moreover, the disciples show no interest 
in the empty tomb, according to the oldest strata of 
the tradition. If these two traditions, the appearance 
tradition and the grave tradition, came Into existence 
separately, then this fact serves to indicate that the 
reality of the resurrection is historically very 
probable. Since the empty tomb was not the reason 
that the disciples returned to Galilee, then the 
possibility of spontaneous visionary experiences is 
slight.29 
d. Other Approaches 
Pannenberg has presented In this chapter a thesis 
which runs counter to the way in which Christology 
"from below" Is developed elsewhere In contemporary 
theology: the thesis, namely, that Jesus1 resurrection 
is the basis for the perception of his divinity. 
Briefly contrasting his approach with that of others, 
Pannenberg finds that no one attributes genuine histo-
ricity to the resurrection (as an event distinct from 
Jesus' life and death) to the degree that he does 
(pp. 106-112). In Werner Slert the resurrection seems 
to be only a repetitious confirmation of what was 
already adequately established before Easter, while 
Paul Althaus admits that historiography can speak of 
the experience of the disciples, the "appearances" 
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of Jesus after his death and probably the fact of 
the empty tomb, but the meaning of these facts Is left 
to religious Judgment, to faith.3° Gerhard Ebellng Is 
fearful that the essence of faith Is endangered when 
one tries to prove the ground of faith. (Pannenberg 
agrees, however, with Ebellng that the resurrection as 
an Isolated fact cannot be the ground of faith In 
Jesus.)31 Karl Barth views the resurrection as the 
non-historical relating of Jesus' entire historical 
life to its origin in God. Still the Incarnation Is 
the foundation on which Chrlstology rests for Barth, 
not the resurrection event.32 р
о г
 Karl Rahner, the 
resurrection of Jesus Is the appearance of that which 
has happened In Christ's death. The resurrection is 
not a distinct event, and Jesus' death is spoken of In 
positive terms, as the total act of Christ's life, the 
ultimate act of his freedom.33 Ernst Puchs thinks that 
he Is following Paul in putting the cross In the center, 
overlooking the fact that for Paul the cross received 
saving significance only In the light of Jesus' resurrec­
tion. З^ Walter Iflinneth and Gerhard Koch each tried to 
work out a theology of the resurrection, and Pannenberg 
commends them for bringing out the fundamental signifi­
cance of Jesus' resurrection for primitive Christianity 
and for all Christian theology.35 neither does Justice 
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however, to the radical sense of the past character of 
the Christ-event, since they both put central emphasis 
on meeting Jesus in the sacraments, where the believer 
attains the certainty of faith regarding the reality 
of the Risen Lord. 
In this brief examination of other theologians, 
Pannenberg makes several points regarding the histori-
city of the resurrection. He denies that historical 
science is concerned only with facts and not with 
meaning. The separation of fact and meaning or value 
is Kantian in origin and belongs to a narrowly 
conceived, posltivlstlc view of historiography 
(pp. 106f.). Healthy historical research, on the other 
hand, "always takes place from an already given context 
of meaning, out of a preunderstanding of the object of 
inquiry, which, however, is modified and corrected in 
the process of research on the basis of the phenomena 
examined" (ET, p. 109). If historical science cannot 
establish what "really" happened on Easter, then faith 
cannot do so, "for faith cannot ascertain anything 
certain about events of the past that would perhaps 
be inaccessible to the historian" (ET, p. 109). 
Pannenberg also maintains that the event of the resur-
rection was an event in the past, at a definite place 
and at a definite time, so that it Is genuinely 
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historical (pp. llOf.). A distinction is here made 
between the resurrection event and the life of the 
resurrected Jesus, which Is not bound to the past." 
excursus: Scripture and History 
as Discussed in Other Writings of Pannenberg 
Religiously, the resurrection event is widely 
considered a reality which is only accessible to faith, 
as a reality which the historian can deal with neither 
positively nor negatively. Pannenberg, on the other 
hand, has Just attempted to offer historical proof 
that the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth from the 
dead did occur. While the most complete argumentation 
for this is offered In jrundzflne der Christologie. 
Pannenberg had prepared the ground before entering Into 
discussion of the particulars of the New Testament 
witness to this unusual event. At this point In our 
study we would like to summarize the reflections of 
Pannenberg on the more fundamental questions of the 
relation between scriptural witness and history, 
between the theological and the critical-historical 
study of the past. 
In 19^2 Pannenberg wrote that the central role 
that Sacred Scripture plays in the Christian understand-
ing of reality Is due to its authoritative charactfr 
for Christians. This authority stems not from the 
Bk 
Яоіу Solrit's Involvement in the formation of these 
Divotal writings, but in their disclosure of and 
witness to specific events in history which, as it 
were, stand "behind" these writings and which are 
themselves authoritative in the sense that their inhe­
rent meaning Involves their being acts of God, the 
power over all reality, who alone can give history, 
and thus human life, unity and final significance.37 
Theology, basino- itself on these events and 
attempting to explicate their meaning, is thus con­
cerned in a central way with real history, with past 
events, and with the relation of these past events 
to the whole of history, since the God theology 
asserts is acting in these past events claims all 
reality as his.-'0 
Luther spoke of the "outer clarity" of Scripture, 
meaning that the Scripture's most Important or 
"essential" content arises clearly and unlvocally from 
its words when they are expounded in accord with sound 
principles, so that Scripture does not need a special, 
additional interpretation to be understood.39 
Pannenberg takes over this idea, with the caution 
that Luther's identification of the literal sense of 
Scripture with the historical, and both of these with 
Luther's own doctrine, is critically untenable today.^0 
*5 
Still, Pannenberg Insists that the objective meaning, 
the essential content ("die Sache") of Scripture, 
that which gives its manifold witness a basic unity, 
Is, as It was for Luther, the historical figure of 
Jesus, his life, message, death and resurrection. 
As a consequence, the essential content of Scripture, 
what which gives it its authority, is in principle 
accessible to historical research, or not accessible 
(in a founded way) at all.^2 
Ш е question arises whether the way one goes 
about interpreting Scripture differs essentially from 
the method or methods of interpretation proper to 
critical-historical hermeneutic. Pannenberg's formu­
lation of the answer to this question also takes 
interrogative form: If one maintains that revelation 
occurred in a past event, and that the historian Is 
the one whose responsibility It is to study the past, 
must not one also ask the historian to ascertain 
whether in Jesus of Nazareth Ood's definitive revela­
tion occurred?^3 However, a small segment of past 
history cannot possibly Justify the assertion that here 
God is at work and that he has revealed himself. 
Because God is universal by nature, related to all as 
its ground, revelation can be an object of historical 
inquiry only when all of history Is inquired about with 
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special reference to the segment of past history which 
claims revelatory significance.^ 
Thus, if history and theology are to find agree-
ment In this area then they have to agree first on the 
question of universal history, the question, namely, 
whether the Idea of "history as a whole," history as 
a unity, is Justifiable, since the question of God 
arises with the question of the meaning of all of 
reality (history), not Just a segment of it. Now the 
historian appears to presuppose a unity to history as 
a (usually) unspoken postulate of his research, since 
he recognizes that the assignment of meaning to an 
event In history depends on the relation of that event 
to its contemporary context (which is an ever-widening 
circle of meaning) and Its relation to its own past 
and future.^"5 The ultimate horizon against which an 
event has its definitive meaning is thus all of 
history, including natural history. The unity of 
history and the wholeness of history can only be 
postulated or expected from the future, indeed from 
the end of history, since until then history is incom-
plete and Its unity is not yet accomplished. ° 
Pannenberg suggests that a teleologica! unity, accord-
ing to which the past and its potentialities have the 
primary role and the future is viewed as the unfolding 
87 
of what is given in the past, cannot do Justice to the 
contingency of historical events nor to the genuine 
newness of events as they come to be, nor to the 
continuity which exists within history in spite of 
radical contingency. Any unity which is derived from 
the Imminent course of history such as the morphologi­
cal orderino- of history in the fashion of a Dilthey, 
a Spengler, or a Toynbee, falls to express the speci­
fic unity of history.^ ''' Pannenberg suggests that the 
postulate of historical science, that all events have 
their complete meaning only in the totality of history, 
as well as the historian's recognition that history is 
contingent as well as continuous finds its best corro­
boration In the af ГІ "iiation of the transcendent, 
freely creating and yet faithful God of Israel and 
Christianity, who In the resurrection event prolepti-
cally effected the end of the world In the fate of 
Jesus of Nazareth.^" While this is not meant as a 
proof of God's existence, it is intended by Pannenberg 
to be an Invitation to the historian to consider 
seriously the claims of the central events of Israel 
and Christianity as revelatory events. The historian 
most likely to be attracted to this claim is not one 
who simply restricts himself to a small area of man's 
history, but one who reflects philosophically, that is, 
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"foundationallly, " on the presuppositions of his own 
scientific work. 
In a lecture given in 196k and revised for publi-
cation in 1967 Pannenberg discussed the relation 
between historical and theological hermeneutiek 
His conclusion is that theological hermeneutlc is only 
a special case of historical hermeneutlc. The special 
character comes from the distinctiveness of the 
essential content (Sache) with which theology deals 
and the great emphasis given to application In theolo-
gical hermeneutlc (for example, In preaching).5° 
Fundamental to both historical and theological herme-
neutlc, however, is the requirement that the interpreta-
tion be controlled by the essential content to be 
interpreted. A second point which Is fundamental to 
both historical and theological hermeneutlc is the 
contention that the significance of an individual, 
factual historical event transcends its location at a 
point in the historical past; in other words, that the 
facticlty of the content to be interpreted always 
contains more than Is immediately present in It, which 
implies an anticipation of meaning and consequence. 
An event has its full meaning only in the whole of 
history, so that the interpretation of an event and 
the criterion for judging the validity of interpretation 
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are themselves never final but always subject to fresh 
discussion.51 nils convergence indicates that every 
dualism of historical and theological hermeneutlc Is 
excluded. Because Scripture cannot responsibly serve 
as a supplementary Interpretive principle possessing 
Its own unquestionable authority, but rather receives 
Its authority from the intrinsic significance of the 
event of Jesus of Nazareth, there is no unqualified 
formal distinction between historical and theological 
hermeneutlc.52 
In this way Pannenberg Justifies his pursuance 
of historical reasons for the conviction that Jesus, 
once dead, is now alive and Lord. 
B. The Divinity of Jesus and the 
i-ather'e Divinity 
i. God's Presence In Jesus 
Pannenberg has already shown how the resurrection 
of Jesus has revelatory character and how this In turn 
Is the key to the understanding of Jesus' relation to 
God. Before developing his own account of this relation, 
he summarizes the attempts in the New Testament and the 
tradition inspired by it to understand the presence of 
God in Jesus.53 Five types of Christology are distin-
guished. The first Is the so-called "Splrlt-Chrlstology," 
which Is probably the oldest attempt to characterize the 
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presence of God In Jesus. The Old Testament and 
Jewish traditions regarding the Spirit provide the 
principal background for the Palestinian Jewish-
Christian community' s understanding of Jesus in terms 
of the Spirit. The early Palestinian community saw 
in Jesus the New Moses, the eschatological prophet 
(Deut. 18.15) who, endowed with the Spirit, mediated 
the law and worked miracles. The tradition of Jesus 
anointment with the Spirit at his baptism became later 
the link between the view of Jesus as the eschatologi­
cal Christus title to the earthly Jesus. Rom. 1.3f. 
Involves a "two-stage Chrlstology " (Jesus "according 
to the flesh" and according to the Spirit ), and it 
can be compared with the non-Pauline views of the 
Spirit related to Jesus resurrection (I Tim. 3.16; 
I Peter 3.І8). With Ignatius of Antloch, the double 
origin of Jesus from 3od and man becomes the center 
of attention. He applies the Spirit-flesh schema to 
the imperishable divinity and the perishable humanity 
which taken together constitute the existence of the 
one Lord Jesus (Eph. 7.2). Pannenberg approves of 
Friedrich Loof's conclusion that the assessment of Jesus 
accordine: to the flesh and accordine; to the Spirit provides 
the basis for the doctrine of the two natures. Even in 
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Paul this tradition of a two-stage Christology was in 
tension with a ргр-exlstence of Christ (e.g., Gal. Ц-Л, 
Phil. 2.5ff.). The Splrlt-Christology in Paul is not 
adoptionist in the sense of the second century contro­
versy because the question of a separate hypostasis 
and of Jesus' full Identity had not yet been raised 
(pp. Il4f.). 
The second type of Christology Pannenberg speaks 
of is the Christology of "substantial presence," 
which refers to the dominant view of God's presence 
in Jesus developed by the Alexandrian theologians. 
Two starting-points in the early Church for the affir­
mation of the presence of the divine substance or 
essence in Jesus were the Hellenistic concept of a 
divine being that has appeared in Jesus (thus divine 
Sonship), expressed either as the sending of God's 
Son in the flesh (Paul) or as Jesus' hidden epiphany 
(Hark), and, secondly, the use of Kurlos to designate 
Jesus in Greek, since Kurlos in the Septuagint is not 
only the translation of the Aramaic polite form of 
address, but Is the translation of the divine name; 
in the Hellenistic mystery reli/rlons as well it is the 
name for God. Here Jesus came to be viewed not as a 
mere man, but as a divine person; the Loros Christology 
of the Apologists made this step possible (pp. 119ff.). 
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The third type Is called "Hediator Christology." 
Important to this type of Christology is Jesus1 mid-
position between God and man. No interest is shown 
in the question of an accidental or substantial 
presence of God himself in Jesus. The Jewish-Christian 
angel-Chrlstolorçy is rooted in such a view of Christ. 
Justin, Tatlan, and Origen subordinate the Logos to 
the Father, and in Arianism this tendency is developed 
while the eternal generation of the Logos is denied. 
Later Christologies, relying on the doctrine of two 
natures, also developed the mediator concept. Calvin, 
for example, saw Jesus' divine person as the bearer 
of his office as mediator (pp. 121ff.). 
"Presence as mere Appearance" is a fourth type of 
Chrlstolopry. There are at least three forms of this 
"appearance Christology:" Gnostic Christology, 
Sabellianism, and, in modern times, the Christologies 
of Paul Tllllch and Fritz Burl. There are important 
differences between these three forms, yet in all of 
them God appears In Jesus without the latter sharing 
in divinity in a permanent way that Is distinct from 
the Father's. John's Gospel with Its doctrine of the 
incarnation fought this Docetic tendency at work in 
the early Church (pp. IZJT.).^ 
The last category is the one that most interests 
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Pannenberg: "Revelatlonal Presence." This cateçory 
differs from the precedinir In that "appearance" or 
"revelation" is here taken to imply, rather than 
exclude, the concept of essential Identity between 
Jesus and God.55 Pannenberg sees this implication 
most pointedly expressed when revelation is spoken of 
as self-revelation, a notion which he admits is a 
modern one.56 in the old Testament and in the New the 
words for "revelation" and "to reveal" were used to 
refer to the making known of information. This does 
not preclude that both Testaments speak of the subject-
•natter of a self-revelation of "od. In the Old 
Testament this comes to the fore especially in the 
so-called Brwelswort ("word of demonstration") which 
was a formula that designated the knowledge of Yahweh's 
divinity as the purpose, the goal, of the divine 
activity in history.57 "The more all happenings were 
perceived in Israel as a single great historical 
unity, the more the full knowledge of Yahweh became 
an event that would be possible only at the end of all 
happenings. Yahweh would complete the entire course 
of world events, world history, In order that man 
ml^ht thereby know his divinity. Only at the end of 
history is he ultimately revealed from his deeds as 
the one Cod who accomplishes everythinn" (ST, p. 128).58 
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Three steps are required to move from an under-
standing of revelation as self-revelation to the 
knowledge of Jesus' divinity:59 
1) The Christ-event can be said to be God's 
revelation only to the extent that it brings about the 
beginning of the end of all things. For this reason 
the resurrection of Jesus is the actual revelatory 
event;60 
2) The concept of self-revelation Includes the 
fact that there can be only one single revelation. 
If God's self-revelation is full, complete, and ulti-
mate (at least in an anticipatory way), then it can 
only happen once ;"^ 
3) The concept of God's self-revelation Implies 
that the revealer and revealed are Identical. God Is 
as much the subject and author of his self-revelation 
as he is the content. In other words, God's self-
revelation means that the medium through which God 
makes himself known Is not something foreign to 
himself.62 
If these three points are valid, adds Pannenberg, 
then it Is wrong to say that we first know who God is 
and then also something about Jesus, but rather only 
in relation to Jesus do we know that the ground of all 
reality about whom every man Inquires, at least implicitly, 
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is In its real essence identical with the "od of 
Israel (p. 128). 
Pannenberg hopes that the course of the discussion 
will show that the concept of the revelatory presence 
of Rod in Jesus, which includes identity of essence, 
Is the only appropriate understanding of the presence 
of God in Jesus, and of his unity with Jesus. He is 
convinced that the other legitimate Christologlcal 
conceptions (Spirlt-Chrlstology, the Chrlstology of 
substantial presence, and mediator Chrlstology) receive 
their due In this more fundamental conception of 
revelatory presence."3 
ii. Indirect Revelation 
because Pannenberg is offering here a succinct 
statement of his views regarding the nature of reality, 
of God and revelation, it would be .ffood to pause a 
moment to consider what he has said In other publica-
tions on these fundamental topics. 
For Pannenberg reality is thoroughly historical, 
and even God, in his own way, has a history. By 
"historical" is meant that reality is constituted by 
events which are genuinely new, which are not simply 
produced by and out of those which preceded them, but 
which emerge, as It were, out of the "power of the 
future" which is Pannenberg's name for the creative 
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ground which gives history lts (developing) unity and 
which guarantees the newness of the freshly produced 
events.°5 This creative ground, which Pannenberg also 
likes to call the "power over all" (die Macht über 
Alles). " is he whom the Old and New Testaments call 
God. History is created when the finite event is sepa-
rated from God, cast off from God himself. In that he 
passes on to the bringing forth of new, hitherto not 
present, events. In this way ^od Insures that history 
always brings forth a future which is open and which 
Is more than the sum of potentialities in the past.«7 
Pannenberg maintains that the relation between the finite 
ana. Infinite is always mediated negatively: "History 
is... the ongoing collapse of the existing reality 
which Is enclosed in Its own 'immanence' (because 
centered on Itself). The power of the Infinite Is 
active and present In this collapse of the finite. 
Thus the infinite expressed Itself in the first place 
¿a 
negatively."00 The mediation of the relation between 
finite and Infinite Is also positive, in that the 
Infinite reconciles and preserves the finite In the 
midst of Its collapse. ° This does not mean that 
God's existence can be proven on the basis of our 
knowledge of the finite, but it does mean that finite 
reality is, as it were, an open question.70 
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Because God's action makes history to be, one can 
say that God reveals himself In history by revealini; 
his divinity as the power over all through history. 
This revelation Is Indirect and can only be Indirect, 
that Is, mediated by finite events which are distinct 
from God and yet are his "doing." These events allow 
themselves to be Interpreted as having meaning In 
themselves, and this possibility makes the divine 
revelation through and In these events Indirect In 
character.'^ Because any single event, or any complex 
of events within history can only partially disclose 
the ultimate author of those events, Pannenberg believes 
that only history as a totality can be the genuine 
revelation of God, only history as a whole can tell us 
who God is.' The indirectness of God's self-disclosure 
to us through his acts In history leads to the idea 
that only at the end of history will God's self-
revelation really occur—once and for all, because only 
at the end of history will God be in the full sense 
the power over all, for only then will his rule, which 
is inseparable from his being, be fully accomplished.'3 
lil. Jesus' Essential Unity with Cod 
Having discussed the mode of God's presence In 
Jesus, Pannenberg proceeds now to the question of the 
"scope" of God's presence in Jesus. Here the question 
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Is, whether Jesus became one with God only at one 
particular stage of his life or was he one with God 
from the beg-inning. Adoption, virgin birth, and 
incarnation are the topics of concern. 
The resurrection-event was without doubt central 
in the oldest Christian community's appreciation of 
Jesus' relation to God. Because of this event the 
early Christian community could speak of the return 
of Jesus as Son of Man, could address him In the 
liturgy with "maranatha," and view him as the messlas 
deslgnatus. For Pannenberg the parallelism In 
Rom. 1.3f. between Jesus as Son of David and as Son 
of God gives expression to the underlying theme that 
is at work uniting the otherwise disparate titles 
which are applied by the early community to different 
stages of Jesus' life: the theme of the continuity of 
the resurrected Jesus with the earthly Jesus. The 
centrality of the resurrection is misunderstood, 
however. If with kalter Künneth we say that only at 
the resurrection Jesus shared in the divine nature. 
What is wrong with this position Is that It overlooks 
the fact that Jesus' earthly life is affected by the 
resurrection. The resurrection event Is the confirma-
tion of all that Jesus was and claimed; it was the 
manifestation and confirmation of Jesus' "divine 
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oonshlp." It was the event that enables us to recog­
nize Jesus' share in God's nature and which definitely 
settles the fact that Jesus was divinely authorized. 
Because of its confirmatory character, the resurrection 
is retroactive. "To that extent it is not a special 
case that Jesus' essence is established retroactively 
from the perspective of the end of his life, from his 
resurrection, not only for our knowledge, but in its 
being" (ЧТ, p. 136). Accain: "...from the perspective 
of his resurrection, Jesus is recognized as the one 
who he was previously. He was not only unrecognizable 
before 3aster, but he would not have been who he was 
without the faster event" (ET, p. 137). Fannenberp· 
thinks that with this approach he can be faithful to 
two otherwise conflicting affirmations in Christoloaiy: 
(1) that Jesus was essentially one with nod from the 
beginning of his earthly existence; (2) that Jesus was 
truly human and so had a history. The idea of "retro­
activity" is well known from legal terminology, where 
laws can be said to have retroactive force. Retroacti­
vity is also an ontologlcal concept when one Is willing 
to oro beyond the Treek notion of essence as that which 
has always been what it is, and when one realizes that 
only the future (including the new and unpredictable) 
decides what something is. The essence of a man, of a 
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situation, or of the world In general will be decided 
in the future. Thus It is not altogether a special 
case that Jesus' essence was established retroactively 
from and by the end of his life (pp. IJkf.). 
But even if one were to grant Pannenberg hls claim 
regarding the retroactive power of the resurrection, 
It remains a fact that there was a strong tradition 
witnessed to In the New Testament according to which 
Jesus was "adopted" into Sonshlp during his earthly 
life, and this at the baptism by John. Such a tradi-
tion threatens to make the resurrection simply an 
appendix to or confirmation of something Jesus was or 
became by virtue of an event within his life before 
his death. For this reason our author devotes several 
pages to the question of Jesus' baptism. Even if one 
is willing to grant that John's baptism of Jesus was 
different from his usual baptisms since It Involved 
In Jesus' case the Impartatlon of the Spirit of the 
end times (and this point Is disputed); even If one 
postulates that this baptism was really a prophetic 
consecration in which Jesus became aware of a special 
"call" (and this too is open to dispute), still one 
has to inquire about the motives which permitted such 
a tradition to be passed on after the disaster of 
Jesus' death.' Could such a claim as Jesus' survive 
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hls death as blasphemer, apparently rejected by the 
God of Israel? If that claim did continue after 
Jesus' death (and receive embellishment and nuance 
depending on where It was preached) then the only 
reason Is because Jesus was raised by "od and so 
confirmed by God In all he claimed before his death. 
Pannenberg feels Justified In relegatine: whatever 
historical basis there may be for the baptismal story 
to a secondary rank in the life and fate of Jesus, not 
because it was not important, but because it cannot 
stand on its own, slven the kind of death that he 
underwent (p. 137). 
Another tradition in the early Church which tried 
to express the fact that Jesus was the Son of God 
before his resurrection was the story of the virgin 
birth. The concern of this tradition was to say that 
Jesus was the Son of God in person from the bepinnlm: 
of his life. Unlike the tradition reg-arding his 
baptism, which could have a basis in the pre-Easter 
life of Jesus, the virgin birth tradition arose rela-
tively late In Hellenistic-Jewish circles because of 
their concern to relate Jesus in his entire existence 
to God. 
A major point Pannenberg makes is that the context 
of the legend of Jesus' virgin birth stands in 
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Irreconciliable contradiction to the Chrlstology of 
the Incarnation of the pre-exlstent Son of God found 
In Paul and John. To say that Jesus became God's Son 
through Mary's conception, and that the Son of God, a 
pre-exlstent person, became a man are mutually exclu-
sive statements.'6 On the other hand, Paul did not 
see a contradiction when he said that the pre-exlstent 
Son became man and at the resurrection was Installed 
as Son. These two Ideas are reconcilable, but 
"Sonshlp cannot at the same time consist In préexistence 
and still have Its origin only In the divine procreation 
of Jesus In Mary" (ET, p. 1 Ό ) . On the other hand, the 
legend of the virgin birth Is Justified only as a 
passing stage In the primitive Christian history of 
tradition. Following Paul Althaus, Pannenberg Insists 
that human fatherhood Is not In competition with the 
divine, that the virgin birth Is not required for Jesus' 
slnlessness, and lastly, the virgin birth cannot be 
placed on the same level as the resurrection. Pannenberg 
adds to this that the tradition concerning Easter, even 
If they contain many legendary elements, are In their 
core historical. The legend of the virgin birth, 
however, "bears all the marks of a legend that has been 
constructed out of an etiological Interest, namely. In 
order to Illustrate the title 'Son of God.' It Is 
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therefore highly probable that the story Is to be 
Judged as non-hlstorlcal" (ΞΓ, p. 1^9). ?? 
The idea of revelation also allows one to appre­
ciate what the concept of Jesus' préexistence was meant 
to be : "At least this concept appears as a meaningful 
expression for a material concern that we too, must 
retain, namely, for Jesus' full and complete affilia-
tion with the eternal God» {ET, p. 150). Paul 
presupposed the Son's préexistence (Gal. 4.4·; Rom. 8.3), 
but it remains one of the principal problems in the 
development of traditions how from the resurrection 
Jesus came to be seen as the préexistent Son of God. 
After rejecting the "gnostic redeemer myth" as the 
real influence at work here,'" Pannenberg considers 
on the one hand the Jewish traditions concerning the 
Son of Man in Enoch and IV Esdra, as well as Syrian 
Baruch's notion of the descent of the Messiah from 
heaven and his return, and on the other hand. Wisdom 
speculation; he concludes that the New Testament idea 
does not find its starting-point here. We do not find 
nention of a préexistent Son of .Ian in the Synoptic 
tradition, nor did the Wisdom interpretation of Jesus' 
deeds (fit. 11.25ff.) lead immediately to the idea of 
of Jesus' préexistence; this latter was primarily 
connected with the idea of the Son of God by relating 
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the concept of Jesus' being sent, which may have had 
at first only the meaning of a commissioning, to 
Jesus' birth. This Is the case In the Pauline texts, 
Gal. ЬЛ and Rom. 8.3. It Is clear to Pannenberg that 
the Idea of préexistence was developed from the under-
standing established by Jesus' resurrection that he 
was the coming Messiah, the Son of God. It is probable 
that the idea of sending was early associated with the 
préexistence notion, so that a pattern of descent and 
ascent emerged that is familiar from later Gnosticism 
and the Church's doctrine of the incarnation. Rather 
than seeing the development of the notion of préexis-
tence from Hellenistic sources which were then 
mistakenly "applied" to Jesus' case, Pannenberg 
considers préexistence as a logical requirement impli-
cit in the very meaning of Jesus' resurrection as the 
revelation of his oneness with God, even though the 
manner of expression is mythical. Its mythical character 
consists in the fact that the Incarnation idea divides 
what Is Initially given In Jesus as complementary, 
total aspects of his one concrete life and then, by 
the notion of incarnation, rejoins them after this 
mental separation. "The concept of préexistence stands 
under the suspicion of conceptually separating Jesus' 
community with God as a special being (the préexistent 
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Son of God) and his temporal appearance" (ET, p. 15^)· 
The question of the contemporary г ]етапсе of 
the notion of préexistence is unavoidable, since the 
concept labors under the above-mentioned difficulty 
that It seems mentally to divide what is originally 
given as a unity. ïet Pannenberg admits that we must 
distinguish between the eternal Son and the man Jesus, 
as two distinct aspects of the one Jesus Christ. 
Moreover, "all Chrlstology must keep in view that the 
two aspects distinguished here, the eternity of the 
Sonshlp and the earthly, human mode of Jesus' existence, 
are a part of a single, concrete life" (ET, p. 155). 
This unity is not the only truth that Is to be 
maintained. An attractive and important aspect of the 
incarnation idea is that it lays needed stress on the 
fundamental movement from God to man, so that the 
grace-character of God's revelation in Jesus receives 
its due. Nevertheless, the Incarnational model involves 
a loss of substance: "Through its contact with Hellenistic 
conceptions the concept of incarnation had a tendency 
to emancipate Itself from the basis of Old Testament 
apocalyptic expectations" (ET, p. 156). Pannenberg 
finds the criterion for Judging this process In the 
concept of revelation, which links the apocalyptic 
theology of history to the incarnation theology. The 
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disengagement of the concept of Incarnation from Its 
original background In the Old Testament theology of 
history began In the second century under the Influence 
of the Logos Christology. The Old Testament more and 
more served as source of proof texts from prophecy or 
for reasons of piety. This brought about the Increas-
ingly mythical character of the IncarnatIon-model, the 
myth of a divine being "descending" from heaven and 
"ascending" again. 
The Idea of God's Incarnation In Jesus Is the 
final result, the last expression of the truth origi-
nally expressed In Old Testament and apocalyptic terms, 
of God's eschatologlcal self-revelation In the fate of 
Jesus. When taken for Itself, the Idea becomes mytho-
logical, but when situated within the horizon of Jesus' 
historical life and fate It Is appropriate and unavoid-
able, even If It soon leads to the limits of the 
expressible In this matter and to peculiarly paradoxi-
cal formulations. 
The real meaning of the Incarnation comes from a 
right understanding of the Old Testament, from the 
apocalyptic expectation of late Judaism, and from the 
concrete life and claim of Jesus as they were confirmed 
by God in the resurrection. This Is the fertile ground 
that must be cultivated even in our time. 
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Iv. The Startlng-Polnt of the 
Doctrine of the Trinity 
a. Distinction within the Godhead 
Pannenberg has considered the unity of the man 
Jesus with God from the viewpoint of Jesus as God's 
revelation. He now moves to a discussion of the rela-
tionship of Jesus' divinity to the divinity of the 
Father. A fundamental point comes immediately to the 
fore: Jesus, who is revealed to be essentially united 
with, and the self-revelation of God, stands in a 
dialogical relation to his rather. Because Jesus is 
one in essence with the Godhead, then the distinction 
which exists between Jesus and the Father belongs to 
the Deity of God (p. 159). Our author is willing to 
grant that Jesus may not have spoken of himself as 
Son; still the best way to summarize the relation of 
Jesus to the Father is by the filial relation of obedi-
ence or dedication (Hingabe).79 The historical man 
Jesus of Nazareth stood in a relationship of Son to 
Father, albeit the words "tather" and "Son" are being 
used in a figurative, or transferred sense here. 
The God revealed in Jesus is thus characterized 
by a duality, a tension; God cannot be viewed by the 
Christian as an undifferentiated unity. Jesus is, as 
person, God's self-revelation (and thus divine), and 
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If that same person is In a "Father-Son" relation with 
God, then the essence of God Is complex."°0 
b. Logos Chrlstology 
Pannenberg sees as the merit of the Apologists' 
Logos Chrlstology that It was able successfully to 
combat modallsm as well as achieve something which the 
earlier Logos-Christology of John and Ignatius did not 
achieve, namely, an Initial clarification of how the 
Son of God could be other than the Creator and yet be 
one with him in divinity. The Apologists employed a 
Hellenistic, cosmologlcally oriented concept of the 
Logos which did not involved dependence on Gnostic 
ideas. rhe Apologists' Logos was a combination of 
Platonic and Stoic elements; The Logos' middle position 
between the Supreme Deity and the world is due to 
Platonlsm, while the description of the Logos' coming 
from God and his earthly appearance is in Stoic thought-
patterns. The Stole Logos doctrine was originally 
concerned with the problem of the origin of the world, 
so that Its application to Jesus as God's historical 
revelation Involved theology with alien philosophical 
presuppositions. For Justin the nature of God involves 
a power of reason, Identical with him, but which became 
distinguished from God so that the world might be created. 
For Tatlan there is a real self-unfolding of the one God: 
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God distinguishes hls logical power from himself In 
such a way that It remains at the same time united with 
him. This Logos, as prototype of the world, appears 
In the world and In particular In man, and this In 
varying degrees. In Jesus Christ the entire Logos (to 
loglkon to holon) appeared (pp. lélff.). 
Two significant aIvantajes accrue to the Logos 
Chrlstology. 71rst, It was able to show. In an Initial 
way, how the Logos and the Creator of the world can be 
distinct and yet one God: the Logos, distinct from the 
Father as his eternal thought. Is different as a 
beln¿ only numerically. The second advantage Is that 
the Logos doctrine was able to relate Zoi as revealed 
In Jesus to the Hellenistic world In a way that was 
meaningful to It. Jesus' universal significance was 
made clear In terms of the appearance on earth of the 
divine principle which mediated all creation and was 
Its principle of unity. Its "Inner meaning." 
These two advantages are offset by three weak-
nesses. The first Is the ever-present danger of 
subordlnatlonlsm, which Imperils the divine unity In 
the revelation event. The Father has no beginning, 
while the Logos was not Independent alongside the 
Father but went forth from him only at a definite time, 
at the creation of the world. For this reason Arlus, 
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rather than Athanaslus, was supported by the logic of 
the Logos Christology. The second weakness Is that 
the connection of the divine Son to Jesus of Nazareth, 
God's historical revelation, was loosened. Indeed, 
Tatlan could' develop his whole Logos doctrine without 
saying anything about Jesus Christ (p. I65). But we 
have seen that It Is possible to speak of Jesus' pré-
existent divinity. Only In this way Is Jesus' unity 
with God apparent. This manner of speaking leads to 
paradoxical statements If one wishes to avoid a mytho-
logical representation of what came to pass In Jesus. 
But one finds few traces of paradox In the Apologists 
or In the Logos Chrlstology of early Christianity in 
general (p. I65). 
The third problem Is that of the unbroken Influ-
ence on Christian theology of the Greek philosophical 
concept of God, the Idea of an unchangeable origin of 
the world, attained by the Logos doctrine. While the 
use of the philosophies at hand In the Hellenistic 
world was required If Christianity was to move beyond 
the limits of Judaism, the domination of the philo-
sophical concept of God Is to be regretted. ^ The one 
God revealed In Jesus Is not the unchangeable ultimate 
ground of phenomena, but the free source of contingent 
events of the world whose Interrelations are contingent, 
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and thus form history. Christology was not able to 
bring out the difference between the Biblical "od and 
the God of Greek philosophy. 
The presupposition that made the Logos Christology 
intelligible and necessary at the beginning of 
Christianity Is the existence of a principle that Is 
not Identical with the world process and yet Is its 
Immanent "law" or reason. The presupposition is, of 
course, no longer accepted. Can and should such an 
idea be re-interpreted now? The equivalent now would 
be an attempt to view (for example) Einstein's theory 
of relativity as incarnated In the material world and 
yet as somehow also transcendent to that world! (D. 16?) 
Çmil Erunner is an example of a recent theologian 
who, under the Influence of ferdinand ЗЬпег and Kartin 
p
uber, tried to re-interpret the concept of God's 
Logos. He does this by taking Logos to mean not 
"reason" but "Word." Here Ignatius of Antloch's con­
cept of Logos Is put In place of that of the Apologists. 
Pannenberg sees an element of truth in this. Insofar 
as Jesus' word was made Tod's by the resurrection; in 
the last analysis, however, the concept has no more 
value than that of a metaphor which can be replaced 
by a more appropriate mode of expression, namely, self-
revelation. The invisible God "speaks" only in a 
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flcuratlve sense and to call God's revelation a "word" 
spoken In history still requires a substantiation for 
the fact that God is revealed in the person of Jesus. 
However, the concept of the Word does not have the 
ontoloplcal significance of a subsistent hypostasis 
distinct from God the Father. ^ 
Pannenberg suggests that the concept of revelation 
should take the place of the Idea of Logos as the 
starting-point for Christology. Only the recognition 
of Jesus as God's self-revelation can substantiate 
the view that Jesus is one In essence with the Father 
and distinct from his as Son. 
The idea of Jesus as the revelation of God must 
also be able to help us to see the Word's Involvement 
In the creation of the world: we can no longer act 
as if the Hellenistic Intellectual horizon against 
which the Logos idea makes sense can also belong to 
us. Neither empirical science nor the philosophy of 
nature can make use of such a principle. Thus we are 
confronted with a most difficult task: that of 
uniting the modern understanding of the world with the 
understanding of reality derived from the revelation 
in Jesus. 
С Jesus and the Holy Spirit 
In order to show why Christian reflection on God's 
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revelation led to the affirmation of a Trinity, and 
not simply a duality between tather and Son, Pannenberg 
enters into a discussion of the Holy Spirit in its 
relation to Jesus and to his Father. In primitive 
Christianity the Spirit was conceived as an eschatolo-
«çlcal reality, the power of life which will be 
especially active at the end of history (Is. Ц-2.1·, 
Szech. 36.2?! Is. 44.3). As the power of life, God's 
Spirit raised Jesus from the dead (Hom. 1.4, 8.2, 11; 
cf. 1 Peter 3·18)· furthermore, Paul can speak of 
the uniqueness of resurrection life as being a soma 
pneumatlkon (I Cor. 15.44f.). Jesus as the resurrected 
Lord Is thus most intimately related to the Spirit of 
". od. 
The basis for affirming the full divinity of the 
Holy Spirit is to be found, accordimi to Pannenberg, 
In the fact that the revelatory event of the resurrec­
tion l£ revelatory only when the Christian recognizes 
it as such. For this the Koly Spirit is needed, not 
as a supplementary ail added to the revelatory event, 
but as part of God's own reality in the revelatory 
event, since we are speaking of self-revelation (p. 1?6). 
An even more difficult question Is that of the 
Holy Spirit as person. There are grounds for thin'-cln^ 
that the resurrected Jesus and the Holy Spirit are 
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Identical (I Cor. ІЗ.^ЗЪ: the second Adam is himself 
the life-giving Spirit; II Cor. 3.1?: the Lord Is the 
Spirit). But there arose a differentiation between 
the present time of the Spirit and the future of Jesus 
of Nazareth, a distinction which became clearer the 
longer the parousla was "delayed." Again, the glori­
fication which Jesus received from the Father at the 
resurrection was something that happened to Jesus from 
outside himself. Just as the one who leads us to 
glorify the rather and the Son Is other than the 
father and the Son. To this extent Pannenberg Is able 
to follow Basil* s argument based on the Church* s 
ancient doxology (p. 180). 5 
d. Unity and Trinity 
We can now move on to Pannenberg's discussion of 
the ways In which the unity of God has been thought in 
rrlnitarian terms. The Christian doctrine, he points 
out. Is that God reveals himself in history, and 
Indeed as triune. Pannenberg expresses it this 
way: "the concept of God's revelation In Jesus Christ 
contains within Itself the Trinity of the Father, Son, 
and Spirit "(ET, p. 180). but If God reveals himself 
as triune, then he Is so in his eternal essence. The 
problem of the unity and trinity of God is thus posed. 
Three principal attempts at a solution or clarification 
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of this mystery are the Eastern Church's doctrine of 
procession, the Western Church's relational theory, 
and, stemming partially from the latter, the theory 
of the self-subllmatlon (Selbstaufhebun,a:) of the three 
persons in God's unity. 
The Eastern theory finds the unity of the three 
hypostases in the bather as the common source of 
divinity (pëgg theotêtos). The Soa and Spirit 
proceed from the lather in an eternal movement that 
Is more than a voluntary act. Meoplatonlsm and 
Stoic ideas lie behind this theory, but the equal divi-
nity oí the three hypostases breaks through the pap-an 
pattern. The Cappodocian theolorians, Стгетогу 
'Mazlanzen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Pasll are the çreat 
exponents of this theolory. The Western understanding 
of the Trinity since Augustine has been expressed In 
terms of a relational unity. In this view the distinct-
iveness of the oersons is constituted by their relations 
among themselves. iach nerson exists in reference to 
the others. Pannenberg sees as the ?reat weakness of 
this theory that it tends to dissolve the personal 
character (PersonhaftIffkeit) of lather. Son and Spirit. 
The climax of the »est's tendency to shy away from 
callin; the three "persons" is seen in rarth, who in 
tne Kirchliche PommâtIk prefers to speak of three 
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"modes of beino;" (Seinsweisen) (p. 182). 
Richard of St.-Victor tried to get out of the 
difficulty of attributing too much Independence to 
the three by defining the concept of "person" by 
means of that of "relation." The personal subsistence 
of each person consists In the relation of origin 
(ex-slstentla) by which the persons are united. Yet 
here one does not overcome the Impression that the 
unity of the divine essence Is limited by the plura-
lity of the persons. 
In his treatment of the rrlnlty In the 
Philosophie der Religion Hegel accentuates the perso-
nality of each of the three hypostases as they 
confront one another as subjects. As Hegel himself 
puts It, It Is the character of the person to 
relinquish Its Isolation and particularity by extend-
ing It to universality, and the truth of personality 
Is acquired by Immersion In the other. Pannenberg 
considers this concept of the person as existing In 
self-dedication to another person and Its application 
to the Trinity to be the high point of the conceptual 
elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity with 
respect to the relation between unity and trinity.°7 
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Summary of Chapter II 
In this part of C-rundzütre der Christologie 
Fannenbersj has tried to show the path by which one is 
led from the historical knowledge of Jesus of Nazareth 
to the recognition of his divinity. Jesus' divinity, 
once recognized, provides the basis for his universal 
and saving siiçnlficance. 
Pannenberg sees in Jesus' behavior and messacre 
a claim of a special sort. Mot only did Jesus claim 
that Cod's coming Kingdom was imnlnent, but that 
entrance into that Κίηςάοπι was contirgent on the 
resOonse men made to Jesus. JThis claim was special 
in another way: It was characterized by a confidence 
that "od would ratify this claim by usherln/- in the 
last events of history. Phis confidence allowed 
Jesus to relate men's response to him to the judgment 
the eschatoloirical 3on of ;,an would render with regard 
to those same men. This complex of ideas is expressed 
by Parmenberg's statement that Jesus' claim was a 
proleptic one and that f-od (^ od's Kingdom) was prolep-
tlcally present and at work in Jesus. 
"od did indeed ratify Jesus' claim by raisin- him 
from the dead. V»hile the notion of resurrection is a 
metaphor borrowed from the familiar experience of 
wskin.-; from sleep, the metaphor Intends a real event 
118 
which can defensibly be called "historical" as well. 
Ulthin its own social and historical context such an 
event—if it did occur—had its own inherent meaning. 
If Jesus rose from the dead, then the beginning of the 
end of the world has occurred; then Rod has ratified 
Jesus* pre-Easter activity, so that the Son of Man and 
the Jesus who would return again were soon recognized 
as one and the same; then God, the power over all, is 
revealed in Jesus. 
The meaning inherent in Jesus' resurrection comes 
to light when it is considered against the Jewish 
apocalyptic expectation. While the apocalyptic 
expectation was directed toward a universal resurrec-
tion of the dead, God showed his faithfulness by 
fulfilling this expectation is a surprising way: he 
raised one man as the beginning of the end events. 
This "surprise" character of God's way of fulfilling 
his promise is such as to confirm the hope that was 
transmitted in the tradition, and yet to lead it into 
a new stage of self-understanding (Traditionsgeschichte). 
rhe apocalyptic notion of resurrection is shown 
to be relevant to today's concerns, because both 
apocalyptic and contemporary anthropologies are non-
dual ist ic, concerned with the whole man. Pannenberg 
is convinced that man, striving in his openness to 
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the world for self-fulflllment, can attain that 
fulfillment only beyond death and the finite objects 
of his desire. This transcendence of man with respect 
to his world Is another link between apocalyptic and 
a true understanding of man. 
The analysis of the New Testament tradition of 
the visions of Jesus to the disciples after his death 
and of the tradition of the empty tomb leads 
Pannenberg to affirm that the resurrection of Jesus 
Is the most probable explanation for the emercrence of 
Christianity. The truth of the resurrection event Is 
thus accessible to anyone who studies the sources In 
an unprejudiced way, and this means that God's ratifi-
cation of Jesus and his self-revelation in Jesus is 
not something knowable only to a closed circle of 
believers. A survey of earlier writings of Pannenberg 
shows that he is convinced that theological hermeneutic 
and historical hermeneutic are not essentially 
different. 
It was said that In his earthly life God was 
üroleptically present in Jesus insofar as Tod's 
Kingdom and rule were to be met in Jesus. rhis proleptlc 
presence is now called a functional unity of Jesus and 
God. In addition, the resurrection event as the self-
revelation of r"od in Jesus allows one to say that 'iOd 
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Is revelationally present in Jesus and that Jesus and 
?od by virtue of this event are essentially one, are 
Identical, which first of all means something negative, 
namely, that henceforward Ζοά cannot be thought of 
apart from Jesus, iurthermore, this revelation of 
God is Jesus is an indirect revelation, a point which 
is essential to Pannenberg's eschatological notion of 
revelation. It is the resurrection event which dis­
closes to us Jesus unity with God, and because this 
event was God's ratification and fulfillment of 
Jesus' earthly life, we may say on the basis of the 
resurrection that Jesus was always one with God. The 
retroactive power of the resurrection, as Pannenberg 
calls it, is ontologlcal as well as epistemologica!: 
if Jesus had not been raised from the dead, he would 
not have been essentially one with God from the first 
moment of his life. 
Havinz given primacy to the resurrection in 
Jesus' life and in our understanding of him, 
Pannenberg critically evaluates the role of Jesus' 
baptism, the virgin birth, and the notion of préexis-
tence. While the virgin birth is Judged unhlstorlcal 
and the idea of préexistence an understandable but 
nonetheless "mythological" development In the light 
of the resurrection event of the idea of Jesus' being 
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sent by ^od, John's baptism of Jesus Is judned to be 
not the "moment of Incarnation" as some would have it, 
but a pivotal experience in Jesus' life which would 
lose Its ambiguity only in the resurrection. 
The beiinnlnçs of Trinitarian theology can be 
traced to the fact that Jesus, while essentially one 
with .'od by virtue of the resurrection, distinguishes 
himself throu-'hout his earthly life from the Pather. 
thus the reality of God is "complex." hile modern 
man does not have a concept such as that of "loros" 
to help him elaborate the implications inherent in 
Jesus' relationship to his father, the concept of 
revelation can serve in its place. That the Чоіу 
bpirit is person is difficult to substantiate, 
although one can refer to the fact that Jesus 
receives glorification from someone other than himself, 
and vre are lead to glorify the lather and Son by 
Another who is essentially Involved in the revelation 
process and Is not identical with I-ather and Son. The 
best way to think the unity of God in ''rlnltarian 
terms is that of ". *. i . Heöel, for nhom the person 
is essentially self-surrender into the other. 
The preceding summary of Pannenberjr* s position, 
Incomplete as it is, reveals fundamental traits vhlch 
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clearly set him off from the three Word-of-God theo-
logians whom we examined In Chapter I. 
First, Pannenberg's careful and detailed histor-
ical treatment of the New Testament records regarding 
the life and fate of Jesus of Nazareth stands out. Un-
like Barth, Bultmann and Ebellng, Pannenberg seeks to 
Interpret and legitimate, the Christian's commitment 
to Jesus Christ. Most striking here Is his concern to 
show the relevance of apocalyptic as the Indispensable 
context for understanding what Jesus was about, as well 
as his insistence that the resurrection is an histor-
ical event which falls within the purview of the 
historian. 
A second fundamental trait In Pannenberg's dis-
cussion so far which distinguishes him from the three 
Word-of-God theologians is his contention that only by 
virtue of the resurrection was Jesus essentially one 
with God. The role which the Incarnation plays In 
traditional Chrlstology Is assumed by the retroactive 
power of the resurrection. Here he differs strongly 
from Karl Earth's Incarnational Chrlstology as well as 
from the kerygmatic Chrlstologies of Bultmann and 
Ebeling, who do not pose the question of Jesus' unity 
with God in terms of the classical question of Jesus' 
constitution as a person. 
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CHAPTER III: J5SUS ГНЕ KAN BEFORE ΊΟΌ 
Pannenberg has thus sought to determine the 
meaning of Jesus of Nazareth within his own time, as 
he was wltneased to In the preaching of the primitive 
community, and, most fundamentally. In his relation 
to God, whom he called "bather." The relation of 
Jesus to Ood, which was seen to be a "substantial" 
or "essential" one, Is the basis of his universal 
significance. Jesus was so allied—indeed, 
consubstantial—with the deepest meaning of history 
(for God is the ultimate ground of history) that his 
life and destiny say something indispensable about the 
final meaning of the life and destiny of every other 
man. This universal significance is a saying signi­
ficance, for it involves the emancipation of men for 
their common destiny as men. The destiny of man is 
not present all along in the Internal structure of 
individuals as what is common to them, but, so to speak, 
it comes upon them from outside as their future. 
Therefore, it can constitute Jesus1 uniqueness that In 
him that which is man's destiny as man has appeared for 
the first time in an individual and has become accessi­
ble to all others only through this individual (p. 193). 
Given this background, Pannenberg now turns his 
attention to the earthly activity and fate of Jesus, 
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In order to determine In more detail what Jesus' 
unity with God means for all men. 
A. The True Man 
i. Jesus' Deeds and Destiny as the 
Revelation of Man's Destiny 
Jesus presented himself to men in such a way that 
their destiny was decided in their decision regarding 
him (cf. Lk. 12. 8f. ; 'ЛЬ. 11.6). He knew that he was 
commissioned to carry out the ultimate decision about 
the men whom he met In the name of God himself. By 
going beyond the law, which was the norm for deciding 
who would share in the future salvation, and by taking 
sinners into the community of the eschatologlcal meal, 
Jesus made himself equal to God. This "pretention" 
and the commission or office associated with it, found 
their confirmation in the resurrection. 
In the resurrection the ultimate destiny of all 
men was revealed: the destiny to be raised from the 
dead to a new life. Thus In Jesus we find both the 
revelation of God to man and of man to himself. This 
double relationship already existed in the eschatolo­
glcal expectation of apocalyptic. Here the revelation 
of God brings the revelation of all the riddles of 
existence, and the glorification of the righteous and 
the revelation of God's glory belong together.1 So, 
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too, man's salvation Is Intimately related to God's 
revelation In Jesus.2 By "salvation" Is meant the 
fulfillment of the ultimate destiny toward which man 
is aimed, that which he seeks In all that he does. 
Man cannot acquire this fulfillment by his own efforts, 
because the essence of man consists in the destiny 
that transcends the present of a person's life and Is 
given only when a man is united with his present and 
future. This wholeness is something that must be 
hoped for, beyond death. And In the two-fold way in 
which man's essence was revealed through Jesus—in 
his earthly deeds, where salvation was granted to men 
by him, and In his fate. In that man's final destiny 
was revealed In Jesus—it was shown that the fundamen-
tal structure of being human is openness for God 
(p. 197). 
It was Jesus' "office" to Invite all men to open 
themselves to God's Kingdom. Pannenberg prefers this 
word "office" to describe Jesus' life and activity. 
Albrecht Bltschl used the concept of "ethical vocation" 
but this seems to Pannenberg to Imply a "free vocation" 
and omits the cardinal idea of commissioning, which 
Parmenberg wishes to stress (pp. 198f.).3 in executing 
his office, Jesus represented God before men, and at 
the same time, represented the human situation over 
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against God. 
11. Jesus: Representative of Man Before God 
Pannenberg Insists that the effect, so to speak, 
of Jesus* unity with God on Jesus' human life under-
went a process of development. In spite of the fact 
that Jesus' divinity (as we know from the resurrection) 
always existed, even before his earthly existence 
(p. 199). This process of development can be expressed 
In three periods of his life as It Is related to God: 
the dedication to his office, the acceptance of his 
fate, and his glorification by God. All of Jesus' 
conduct must be understood In terms of his office. 
Jesus was not a private citizen alongside and outside 
this office. The fulfillment of the office In the 
resurrection Is of such universal significance that 
Paul can speak of the risen Lord as the New Adam, 
hereby drawing on the terminology of the Jewish Adam 
speculation.^ By bringing the destiny of all men to 
fulfillment In his own person, Jesus became the repre-
sentative of all men before God. This exemplary 
significance of Jesus' life was expressed at various 
times differently., For Irenaeus, Athanaslus, and 
Alexandrian Chrlstology, Jesus Is the perfect man, 
because he realized completely the definition of man: 
zolon logon echon. a living being possessing the Logos.^ 
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For Paul of Samosata and the later Antiochene 
Chrlstology, Jesus Is the exemplary man because through 
his ethical perfection he becomes divinely unchange-
able (homoloslB theol). Anselm sees Jesus' significance 
In the perfect act of supererogation he was able to 
perform on the cross. Luther saw Jesus as the proto-
type of God's dealings with men and the prototype of 
Justification by faith. Schleiermacher viewed Jesus 
as the man dominated by the consciousness of God, 
while Karl Barth sees Jesus' exemplary character In 
the fact that he Is completely obedient to God and 
thus completely dedicated to his fellowman." 
Gogarten, in a peculiarly modern Interpretation, sees 
Jesus as the prototype of what all men should be: the 
Son who In trusting obedience to the Father assumes 
responsibility for the creation entrusted to him. 
Ebeling prefers to consider Jesus the "witness of 
faith," the believer who offered himself directly to 
God's future.' Karl Rahner and Bernard Weite stress 
the exemplary character of Jesus as the fulfillment of 
that unlimited openness that makes man to be man." 
Pannenberg wonders whether this changing perspec-
tive on Jesus' significance Is another confirmation of 
the thesis that each age finds its own ideal in Jesus. 
Each can find a correspondence in the New Testament, 
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however some more than others. Part of the problem 
Is that the notion of the person In the West has 
been deeply Influenced by the Bible, so that the 
correspondences are almost assured; still each age 
can yield to the tendency to exaggerate Its own 
Insight. Every age must have the general and most 
relevant aspects of Jesus* life and fate preached 
to it, but It Is to be expected that some of the 
presentations will be more faithful than others. 
Pannenberg considers the ethical Ideal of the 
homolosls theol and Anselm's view of Jesus' ethically 
supererogatory activity as having little basis In the 
New Testament tradition regarding Jesus. On the 
other hand, the understanding of Jesus as the eschato-
loglcal man, expressed by Paul as the Second Adam, 
had a basis In Jesus' resurrection and In his appear-
ances, which were experienced within the horizon of 
apocalyptic expectation (p. 205). The Adam specula-
tion underwent a great change when It was transferred 
to Jesus, Insofar as Paul had to force the category of 
man from the sphere of the suprahlstorlcal and 
speculative Into that of history. The patristic Logos 
Chrlstology found a support In John's Incarnated Logos, 
which Itself was a transformation of the kind of Logos 
found In Philo. Luther's and Schleiermacher's views 
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of Jesus stand close to the real figure of Jesus 
perceived behind the Synoptic tradition, even though 
Schleiermacher Is too abstract, giving us no informa-
tion about the concrete form which knowledge of the 
true God in history must have. 
The result of Pannenberg1s survey Is that every-
where that Jesus was thought of as the true man, 
corresponding to the Intention of the respective 
theologians, the idea involves stressing the universal 
significance of aspects of Jesus' own particular 
individuality. Thus one can say that the formal law 
which operated in the earliest transmission of the 
traditions about Jesus was at work later on as well. 
"This is surely the task of the church's doctrine of 
Jesus' humanity: to point out the universally human 
significance of his particular individuality, of his 
particular life and work. This significance, because 
of the uniqueness of Jesus' activity, cannot reside 
in something distinct from himself, not in a life work 
that can be separated from his person, but rather only 
in his person Itself" (ET, p. 20k). 
Pannenberg next takes up the question of the 
relation between Jesus' resurrection and the specific 
hopes of Israel, since any discussion of Jesus as the 
fulfillment of man's hope and destiny remains abstract 
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when It le not first situated within the original 
context In which It acquires Its significance. Were 
the promises made to Israel fulfilled In Jesus? 
Their hopes were definite enough: possession of land, 
posterity, wise and Just government, emancipation 
from bondage (e.g.. Is. 26. 19). The promises for 
the future took several turns from First Isaiah, 
through Second Isaiah and Daniel, to the preaching of 
Jesus related to the "Son of flan" and then to the 
figure of "man" as we meet It In Paul's letters to 
the Romans and Corinthians. But In all this there Is 
a relation between the fulfillment of Israel's hopes 
and that of all people. Only as the fulfillment of 
the longing of the peoples Is Jesus really the fulfill-
ment of Israel's eschatologlcal promises. There was 
no direct fulfillment of Israel's expectations as 
such.9 But there was a deeper, more radical fulfillment 
achieved In Jesus' resurrection, for here the true 
destiny of all men was not merely Indicated but 
realized (pp. 212f.). 
B. Jesus' Office and Person 
1. Critique of the Doctrine of the Three Offices 
rhe concept of Jesus' office has played approxi-
mately the same role In Protestant Chrlstology as 
"opus" In medieval scholastic Chrlstology. It has been 
131 
the expression of the attempt of dogmatic theologians 
to understand the core meaning of Jesus1 activity 
on earth and his risen life with the Father. Later 
Catholic Chrlstology took over the notion of office 
and made It Its own. The three-fold office—Priest, 
King and Prophet—goes back to Andreas Oslander (1530), 
who derived Its three-fold character from the Chrlstos 
title, appealing to the Old Testament and to iit. 23.8ff., 
Lk. 1.32ff. and Ps. 110.4. An analysis of the Old 
Testament texts classically employed to Justify this 
three-fold office tells Pannenberg that only the title 
of King Is solidly Implied by the title "Christ," or 
"Anointed One." The office of prophet did not require 
an anointment, and priesthood Is never automatically 
Implied by "Christ." A reference In Josephus makes It 
probable that In the time of Jesus the Israel people 
considered prophecy, kingship and priesthood the high-
est honors they knew, and occasionally they would 
apply them to one and the same person.10 But It Is 
not a question of deriving these titles from the one 
title of Christ. 
A critical appraisal of Jesus' activity on earth 
as testified to by the New Testament makes the three-
fold office applied to that life equally objectionable. 
Orthodox Protestant dogmatlclans were accustomed to 
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apply the title of prophet to Jesus on the basis of 
hie teaching activity, since he Interpreted the 
Mosaic law and proclaimed the good news of the 
Imminent Kingdom of Sod. Yet the basic problem 
remains: the. term prophet does not without more ado 
signalize what Is proper to Jesus' activity. Neither 
the ancient Israelite nor the contemporary Jewish 
expectation ground such a conception. The prophets 
of ancient Israel received God's word and presented 
It to the people with the formula: "Thus says the 
Lord." Jesus Is never reported as speaking In this 
way.υ His "Amen" expresses the reception of a commu­
nication, but he never proclaimed his sayings as words 
received from God. Again, If Mt. 11.13 can be traced 
back to Jesus himself, then he himself made a point of 
not Including himself among the prophets, even if he 
saw his life In terms of what was the fate of the 
prophets (pp. 221ff.). 
If Jesus was not a prophet, as that term was under­
stood In ancient Israel, neither was he an apocalyptic. 
He never wrote an apocalypse, yet he did think In 
apocalyptic categories. If John the Baptist (who also 
wrote no apocalypse) may be considered as acting as a 
preacher of repentance against the background of apoca­
lyptic, then Jesus differs from him In that he—unlike 
John—granted the salvation to men expected In the 
future (pp. 222f.). 
Aa far as the office of king is concerned, Jesus 
neither sought nor exercised It. Indeed, he rejected 
It In the terms In which it was understood In his day. 
This takes nothing from the fact that his death was 
related to the fear on the part of the Jewish leaders 
and Romans that his claim to authority was Implicitly 
a challenge to the established powers. Nevertheless, 
the royal title belongs to Jesus properly speaking 
only after the resurrection and even then the "two-
stage" Chrlstology understood the risen Jesus as the 
designated, future .iesslah-Klng (pp. 223ff.). 
rhe priestly office offers the most difficult 
problem. This doctrine has two roots in the New 
Testament, the designation of Jesus as High Priest 
(especially the Letter to the Hebrews), and the view 
that Jesus' death was an atonement for the sins of 
men. The idea of atonement has a broader basis than 
the Chrlstology of Hebrews. The latter is an Alexandrian 
thought-pattern, while the atonement Idea goes back 
further into Hellenistic-Jewish Christianity, as Paul 
testifies (Rom. 3.25), where it is related to the 
notion of sacrifice. It is but a short step to the 
concept of priesthood. Yet the notion of priesthood 
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as applied to Jesus Is not without difficulties. In 
hom. 4.25 God Is said to give up Jesus to death; he, 
rather than Jesus, Is the priest. If one wants to use 
the title at all. Moreover, Jesus' death Issues from 
God's love for man, and that death Is not required In 
order (as some pious Jews thought In connection with 
their sacrifices) to change God's wrath Into favor. 
Again, the Synoptic passion stories are stylized In 
such a way that Jesus' way to the cross Is viewed as 
pre-ordained, even In details, and premeditated by 
Jesus. Yet we must affirm that Jesus' death was more 
something Imposed on him than willed and prepared by 
himself. The Jesus of the Synoptic passion stories 
Is not simply the earthly Jesus but the earthly Jesus 
seen In the light of Easter (pp. 225ff.). 
Why Is It, Pannenborg asks, that the older 
Protestant dogmatic theology was able to attribute this 
three-fold office to Jesus, even when we see that we 
have to distinguish between Jesus' office and his fate 
(which happened to him), while the older dogmatics 
united these? 
The basic, unavoidable explanation for this Is 
the fact that the bearer of the office for the older 
dogmatics was not the man Jesus, but the God-man. 
Luther, for example, could speak with relative ease 
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of the earthly Jesus as God-man, since this concept 
belonged to the contemporary Intellectual world. 
In our time this concept has to be regarded as mytho-
logical (p. 228). Calvin, much more than Luther, 
spoke of Jesus as having the office of mediator, and 
this too could be said of Jesus as dlvlne-human 
person. Catholic Scholastic Chrlstology, on the other 
hand, found the basis of Jesus1 medlatorshlp In his 
human nature, and not as something grounded In Jesus' 
theandrlc constitution. 
Pannenberg1s approach Is In a sense allied to 
Catholic Chrlstology, Insofar as he roots Jesus' office 
In his humanity, while he Is more sensitive to the 
difference between the pre-Easter and post-Easter Jesus 
than Is traditional Catholic position. Jesus was the 
bearer of an office from God first simply as man; this 
statement Is a presupposition for the discussion of 
his divinity. A major problem of the traditional view 
of Jesus' office was that he held It from birth to 
resurrection; no genuine historicity was allowed In 
this scheme. With regard to the view that Jesus already 
possessed kingly authority In his earthly condition 
and merely kept It hidden, Pannenberg Insists that In 
such a view Jesus' life and the self-awareness Involved 
therein take on a superhuman, mythological coloring. 
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In the "orthodox" conception that which Is known In 
the light of the Easter event—Jesus' unity with God— 
Is read back Into his life on earth as If, Indepen-
dently of the Easter event. It had already provided 
the base for Jesus' actions In their humanly psycholo-
gical progression. 
The resurrection Is ontologlcally constitutive 
for Jesus' divinity ani not Just constitutive for our 
perception of his divinity (p. 230). "In retrospect 
from the perspective of the resurrection. It Is true 
that Jesus In his person was one with God also In his 
life before Easter. However, when Jesus' pre-Easter 
life Is conceived as having been already dlvlne-human 
In a direct sense, our conception of Jesus falls back 
Into the mythological realm. Jesus' resurrection Is 
not only constitutive for our perception of his divi-
nity, but It Is ontologlcally constitutive for that 
divinity. Apart from the resurrection from the dead, 
Jesus would not be God, even though from the perspec-
tive of the resurrection, he Is retrospectively one 
with God In his whole pre-Easter life. Here, then, 
Is a final objection to the traditional dogmatlclan's 
coordination of the history of Jesus with his dlvlne-
human person" (ST, p. 22k). 
Ihe particular merit of the three-office notion 
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of Protestant dogmatics Is that Christology can 
thereby express Its recognition that Jesus' life and 
fate are to be understood first of all In terms of 
Israel's traditions. Pannenberg sees here a typolo­
gical pattern rather than a historically solid 
description of the significance of Jesus' life. The 
real connection between Jesus and the Israelite 
traditions Is to be found not In the typological 
pattern of the threefold office, but In the apocalyptic 
transformations of the prophetic traditions (p. 232). 
11. The Call to the Kingdom 
One of the most serious problems facing the 
theologian when considering Jesus' earthly mission as 
a call to God's Kingdom Is the expectation that Jesus 
apparently shared with many of his contemporaries, 
that God's universal rule and the world's transforma­
tion would take place In his own generation (lit. 23.36; 
16.28; Ис. 13.30 and par.). Even If we have to say 
that such an expectation was erroneous, are we compelled 
to say at the same time that Jesus' expectation went 
completely unfulfilled? Pannenberg thinks not. for 
Jesus' expectation was fulfilled In the surprislns way 
that God's prophetic proclamations are fulfilled. Ώιβ 
eschatologlcal reality of the resurrection from the 
dead appeared In Jesus, not simply as a single Individual, 
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but as the anticipated end of the world. This Justifies 
Jesus' Imminent expectation and establishes in a new 
way the eschatologlcal hope for the rest of mankind. 
The fulfillment of Jesus' expectation жав of such 
a kind that it made a new and permanently valid under­
standing of man possible; Indeed, the resurrection was 
the first realization of man In that new vision. As 
a result of the resurrection all men are served notice 
that God's Lordship is nearby, that the date of its 
final and total arrival Is not the major question. 
Man, who by nature is always transcending that which 
is already given, now knows that the fulfillment of 
that transcending ¿Ian Is not to be found within the 
world, but in the God-who-comes, God's future. This 
truth of man's existence Is not a philosophical truth, 
tlmelessly true, but a "truth of history," so to 
speak, a truth rooted in the particular, unrepeatable 
event of Jesus' resurrection. If this basis should 
collapse, then, as far as Pannenberg Is concerned, 
the openness for the future of human existence would 
also lose its decisive impulse. Man's nature is 
indeed openness to the future, but that does not mean 
that this openness is always explicitly willed. A 
consumer society, for example, can sap man of all his 
creative strength, if he does not root himself in a 
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profound truth regarding his possibilities (pp. ZJJf.). 
The relation between Jesus and his rather is 
another clue to Jesus1 connection with the Imminent 
Kingdom of God. Jesus spoke to God as "Abba," which 
was the familiar address that a child would use for 
its earthly father. It could only seem disrespectful 
to the pious Jew. This nearness to God expressed in 
Jesus1 calling "od "Abba" is Identical with the 
eschatological nearness of the Kingdom of God. Since 
the beginning of the Kingdom of God is so near, God 
has also drawn near to man in Jesus1 preaching in the 
sense that one can converse with him in the language 
of everyday familiarity. 
The apparent incongruity between the eschatological 
message of Jesus expressed in the appeal for Immediate 
conversion and his ethical message regarding his 
Father's provident care, expressed In parables and 
Wisdom sayings, calls for attention. Some commentators 
such as Hans Conzelmann are content to let these two 
streams simply parallel one another. Pannenberg thinks 
otherwise, iollowlng the lead of Ulrich Wllckens, he 
sees a vital link between these apparently disparate 
moments in the Synoptic Gospels. Both conceptual 
complexes are stamped by the same conviction of God's 
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Immediacy. Giving oneself to God each day In confi-
dence and looking forward Intensely to the approaching 
Kingdom of God do not diverge but rather coincide. 
For Pannenberg this signifies that all of creation 
(which Is the theme of the parables and Wisdom sayings) 
finds Its meaning In the light of the approaching end. 
What things really are, what man and his activity 
really mean, will only be visible at the eschaton. 
"Creation Is not to be understood as an act that 
happened one time, ages ago, the results of which 
Involve us In the present. Rather, the creation of 
all things, even Including things that belong to the 
past, takes place out of the ultimate future, from 
the eschaton. Insofar as only from the perspective 
of the end are all things what they truly are" 
(ET, p. 230). 3 Even the structure of the parables 
Jesus employed presupposes the correspondence of 
creation and eschaton. Indeed, the uniqueness of 
the Kingdom of God Is supposed to be made clear In 
everyday affairs. The special point Pannenberg wants 
to emphasize here is sharpened when he criticizes 
Ernst Käsemann for writing In i960 that Jesus left 
behind the apocalyptic horizon of the Baptist and 
proclaimed the "Immediacy of the near 3od." For 
Pannenberg this Is unacceptable. God's Immediacy Is 
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In Jesus' eschatologioal message. And it Is this 
nearness of the Kingdom that discloses God's nearness 
to man as well as to all creatures In general. The 
"natural essence" of man Is revealed In Jesus' preach-
ing, because the nearness of the Imminent Kingdom of 
God puts all things into that relation to God which 
belonged to them as God's creatures from the very 
beginning (p. 237). 
The nearness of God to all creation Is not simply 
a metaphysical truth. It means much more: God offers 
his salvation to the Just and the unjust. This fact 
Is the basis for man's forgiving his neighbor: God's 
forgiveness, which opens the future to the recipient, 
makes It possible for him to open up the future for 
his fellowmen too. This Is the freely proffered love 
that Is revealed In God's message and which Is to be 
reflected In those who follow him. Now the radical 
nature of the love Jesus demands may seem Utopian and 
Inapplicable, but this judgment is possible only when 
one does not realize that what Jesus means by love 
is the power imparted to the hearer by the message 
of forgiveness equipping him to help free his neighbor. 
Ihus Jesus shows himself to be the fulfillment 
of Israel's hope for the ïlesslah by virtue of the fact 
that his message makes love possible among men. Indeed, 
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the title "Son of David·· (№. 10.46-52) probably has 
to do with Jesus' activity as helper of those In 
trouble. This, while not explicitly the Christian 
title, relates him to the kingly office, Insofar as 
Israel's kings were supposed to defend the rights of 
those whom the law did not protect.^ 
The Messlahshlp of Jesus was only gradually 
affirmed In early Christianity. Jesus probably 
rejected the title, yet he was accused and executed 
for messianic pretentions (Mk. 8.27-37), and this 
was probably the starting-point for the earliest 
community. The next step entailed the affirmation 
of Jesus as Messias deslgnatus. then as actually 
reigning. Finally, Messianic elements were found In 
Jesus' earthly life. The resurrection of Jesus from 
the dead made the coming of another líeselas Impossible, 
thus Jesus, In spite of the absence of royal elements 
In his life, came to be viewed even then as the 
promised one. 
Pannenberg puts very great stress on the life and 
activity of Jesus as the basis (together with their 
confirmation In the Resurrection) of the falth-
commltment Christians offer him. If Jesus' activity 
was not such as to bring to light the true relation of 
men and of their world to God In Its entirety, then we 
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cannot say that Jesus was the ultimate revelation of 
the one God. 
Friedrich Nietzsche launched the strongest attack 
against the universal significance of the man Jesus.15 
Yet It Is not Nietzsche but Karl Jaspers to whom 
Pannenberg gives his attention.1" For Jaspers Jesus 
Is one of the greatest philosophers of all time, yet 
he Is a very one-sided philosopher. Jesus directed 
men's attention to the Immediate Kingdom of God, so 
that there was no longer any Interest possible for 
constructive work In the world. Pannenberg sees some 
point to Jasper's criticism, especially when he 
considers how Jesus acted when people tried to draw 
him Into speaking about political situations (Lk. 13.Iff.· 
"Oc. 2.13ff.; Lk. 12.ΙΌ. But an Important distinction 
Is entered: are Jesus' reactions to be explained by his 
own particular situation, namely, that he probably 
expected the Imminent end of the world, or are we to 
say that there are no points of contact between Jesus 
and constructive work In the world In what he said? 
Jasper thinks that the second Is correct so that the 
later Involvement of Christianity In political affairs 
was in all respects a betrayal of Jesus. Pannenberg 
sees the admission of a cleft between Jesus and the 
Church's faith In him dominating Jasper's point of 
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view, but the Munich theologian pointe out that this 
standpoint does not take Into account the more 
recent New Testament scholarship that sees a continuity 
between Jesus and the Gospels. There Is a connecting 
between the Implicit Chrlstology of Jesus' own life, 
and the explicit Chrlstology that emerged after Easter 
(p. 245). 
In Jesus' own time the political Involvement of 
the Jews In the affairs of the Empire was minor, so 
that It was not surprising that Jesus and the primitive 
community should not exhibit more than a "typical 
subject morality·1 (von Campenhau sen K 1 ? There was no 
particular Christian program for structuring the 
world, and It Is precisely this that enabled Christia-
nity to express Itself differently In different 
circumstances. Pannenberg sees the basis of this 
flexibility In Jesus himself. Both the commandment 
of love and the parable of the talents reveals an 
attitude which. In changed political circumstances, 
would lead to political Involvement without Internal 
contradiction. Jasper's criticism that for Jesus and 
his faithful followers there can no longer be any 
Interest In constructive work In the world, misjudges 
the scope of Jesus' commandment of love. The univer-
sality of Jesus' activity and message Is such that he 
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is not to be slavishly Imitated (even the Franciscan 
movement was quite different from Jesus' own Involve­
ment In the world of his day), but rather he and his 
teaching have relevance for our world only If the 
differences between them are also attended to. 
The temptation to call Jesus' behavior into 
question because of the apocalyptic background of his 
message is hardly restricted to a philosopher like 
Jaspers. Faced with the newly discovered apocalyp­
tically conditioned character of Jesus' message, some 
scholars tried to escape by distinguishing between 
the ethics of Jesus and his eschatology. Ш principal 
proponents of this effort were Albert Schweitzer and 
Martin Werner, proponents of the so-called "consistent 
eschatology" Interpretation. Pannenberg thinks that 
all such attempts are doomed to failure, because 
Jesus' interpretation of his bather's will for men 
cannot be separated from his eschatological message. 
Bultmarm's effort to re-Interpret the eschatological 
message by dlvestinc it of Its concrete temporal 
framework and establishing the validity of the formal 
attitude of openness for the future in general as its 
decisive aspect In order to save it for modern under­
standing is given greater credit by Pannenberg.18 
But even this Is not sufficient, because the contrast 
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between history and eschatology such as Bultmann 
maintains cannot be said of either apocalyptic or 
Jesus. The eschatologlcal expectation that Informed 
Jesus' message can have relevance for us, but only 
on condition that we conceive It In terms of the 
Easter event as was explained above. One cannot 
expect the Imminent arrival of God's Kingdom, but 
Jesus' message does confront man with the nearness of 
the Creator. 
C. The Meanlnii of Jesus' Death on the Cross 
In the previous chapter Pannenberg discussed the 
significance of Jesus' public life. Now he considers 
the culminating moment of that life, hie death, which 
he brings under the rubric of Jesus' "fate." As we 
have seen, Jesus' death Is called his fate, Seschlck. 
because It is more something that happened to him 
than something he actively accomplished. Modern 
critical exegesis supports this when It shows that 
the passion prophecies are to be viewed as vatlclnla 
ex eventu. ° 
1. The Oldest Interpretation of Jesus' Death 
For Pannenberg, as we have seen, the resurrection 
was an unambiguous event within the context of Jewish 
tradition and in connection with the earthly life of 
Jesus. His death, on the other hand, was highly 
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ambiguous. The earliest attempt of the Christian 
community to Interpret this ambiguous event expressed 
Itself most probably in terms of the rejection of a 
prophet by a stubborn people (e.g.. Acts 2.22). 
This Idea was linked to the view that Jesus died 
accorrîine, to a decree of "-od, thus fulfilling the 
Scriptures. The latter provided the means whereby to 
show both the necessity of the event and Its signifi-
cance. Various notions were employed: rsnsom, blood 
poured out for many ('-It. 10.Uf, lU-.2k), expiatory 
sacrifice (Rom. 3.25)· covenant sacrifice (e.g., 
Lk. 22.20), as well as the notion so central In Faul 
that Jesus' death spelled th* end of the law (3al. 3.13: 
TI Cor. 5.31; cf. Col. ?.13f.. ^ph. 2.14-16). Pannenter* 
poses the question how all these ideas are related to 
Jesus' death and to each other. 41s answer Is 
characteristic. The various concepts of expiation, 
vicarious suffering, and of Jesus' death as curse and 
end of the law have to be rooted In the unique 
historical path of Jesus to the cross. We cannot 
* simply make our own the Ideas end models alive at the 
time of Jesus' death, but must test them by what we 
know of Jesus himself. 
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11. Jesus' Self-Understanding and the 
Disaster of his Condemnation 
There Is a very close connection between Jesus' 
activity and his death In Jerusalem. The claim to 
authority expressed In the act of forgiving sins by 
the offering of the table fellowship to sinners was 
such as to set him over the law; It equated his 
authority with that of God, thus nullifying the law. 
The Jews had to reject Jesus precisely because of the 
law which they accepted as the definitive statement of 
God' s will for them. ·* The rejection of Jesus was 
Inevitable for the Jew who was loyal to the law so 
Ion? as he was not prepared to distinguish between 
the authority of the law and the authority of Israel' s 
jod " (ET, p. 253). By claiming an authority greater 
than Hoses, he claimed an authority that was literally 
"jod-llke." He did not have to attack the law Itself: 
his claim to be above It sufficed to provoke the pious 
Jew. Thus Jesus was not a prophet rejected by evil 
men, who could not see the good In him; Jesus ' claim 
had to be seen as blasphemous outrage. Pannenberg Is 
of the view that the real reason the Jewish authorities 
took action açalnst him was precisely the reproach of 
blasphemy—he claimed authority properly belonging to 
lou (Mk. Ik.6k). The earliest Palestinian community 
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did not see the death of Jesus In this light; rather 
It viewed Jesus as the \ew .loses. In full continuity 
with the Mosaic Law. In Paul there is ambiguity— 
Jesus' death as end of the law (Rom. 10.Ό and as 
Its fulfillment (Gal. 5.14). Yet there is no doubt 
but that Paul introduces an understanding of Jesus ' 
death that makes Jesus' conflict with the law as 
central. 
Pannenberg finds his startinç-polnt in agreement 
with Galatians: through the cross of Jesus the Jewish 
legal tradition as a whole has been set aside in its 
claim to contain the eternal will of 3od in its final 
formulation. ^ Jesus' comirandment of love Is both a 
radicalizing of the law and its usurpation—break and 
continuity are both present here. Jesus never turned 
against the law in general, but he did interpret It 
with free authority, which In turn spelled a real 
break. The continuity with the law Is expressed in 
the commandment to love. One may say perhaps that the 
validity of the Jewish legal tradition has come to an 
end through its conflict with Jesus, and that the divine 
will has now been given its new and final form in 
Jesus' commandment to love. 
Jesus' conflict was with the law itself, the 
Israelite legal tradition which in post-exilic times 
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was calcified as "the law." Through his death Jesus 
appeared a blasphemer before the law, but after his 
confirmation by God In the resurrection It was seen 
that those who put Jesus to death were the blasphemers 
and not Jesus (p. 26l). 
111. Jesus1 Death as Substitution 
That Jesus' death has universal significance Is 
a central conviction for all Christians. Pannenborg 
sees two starting-points In early Christianity for this 
conviction; the tradition of the Last Supper (Jesus' 
blood poured out for many: Mk. 14.2*0 and Jesus' 
saying about his serving In the disciples' midst 
(Lk. 22.27b.), which has been expanded In Hark to 
refer to ransom (Mk. 10.45). Jesus' whole life was 
a service for his fellowmen and in this sense it has 
vicarious character, for a service satisfies another's 
need which the person would otherwise have to satisfy 
himself. What is not Immediately clear is precisely 
how Jesus' death was also a service for his fellowmen. 
It may have only been the consequence suffered by one 
whose life had been a service for others. In order to 
determine the significance of Jesus' death we must 
Investigate the meaning Inherent in the events which 
led to that death. 
Jesus was killed ultimately because of his 
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challenge to the law. As has been said, he appeared 
to be a blasphemer In his claim to authority, and 
althoush the law did not explicitly provide for his 
case, he clearly violated the Intention of the law. 
Yet the resurrection was the confirmation of Jesus' 
claim. Thus It turned out that Jesus was the one who, 
Innocent before C-od, had borne the punishment which 
belonged to the real blasphemers, namely his Jewish 
Judges, and thus every Jew (since every good Jew would 
have done the same out of fidelity to the law).21 
Indeed, all of humanity is also Included In Jesus' 
vicarious death. In order to establish this one must 
show that Jesus In his dying suffered the abandonment 
by God that Is the effect of the pride of equality 
with God, which separates man universally from God, and 
that he takes It away once and for all. Pannenberg 
follows Paul's lead here. Negatively, Jesus' death 
annulled the law, thus making salvation accessible to 
all those who were not bound to Israelite law. 
Positively (and more fundamentally) Paul found the 
clue to the Inclusive character of Jesus' death In the 
Jewish "Adam" speculation. According to Paul, Jesus 
suffered the consequence of all men's sin: death, 
understood as alienation from God, the source of life. 
Jesus' death has vicarious significance on the basis 
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of the universal anthropological preeuppoeltlon that 
all men and not only the Jews are doomed to death, a 
death which one Just man has suffered for them. The 
Jews are thereby the representatives of all men over 
against Jesus (pp. 267ff.). 
Pannenberg thinks that Paul's relating sin and 
death to one another is still valid, since man is 
subject to death because he is locked up in himself, 
yet by his "open structure" his being points beyond 
death. The Jewish people represented all humanity 
when they rejected Jesus, and this to the extent that 
the Jewish law has universal significance as the 
explicit formulation of the universally valid relation 
between sin and death. The kind of substitution 
involved here Pannenberg calls "inclusive substitution.11 
Jesus died in our stead. That of course does not mean 
that we do not have to die, but the full weight of 
death (understood as exclusion from community with 
God, the source of life) was born«by Jesus in hie death, 
and so that we have a death full of hope. Only Jesus 
died completely forsaken. Since then, no one else need 
so die. 
The understanding of Jesus* death here offered is 
not self-explanatory for twentieth-century man. It 
requires fundamental Justification, since the world of 
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the Old Testament is vastly different from ours. 
Fundamental to the notions of substitution, expiation, 
and vicarious suffering as they appear in the Old 
Testament are the following convictions: (1) a man's 
actions and the consequence of those actions have a 
great measure of Independence from the doer; thus the 
consequences of sin--punlshment—can affect another; 
(2) that the punishment for a sin is part of the 
essence of the sin. Sin and its result are even 
designated by the same word in Hebrew; (Э) that God 
is able in his providence to determine who will 
undergo punishment. The Old Testament offers, 
unfortunately, a weakening of these presuppositions, 
as the unity of the people dissolved (e.g., in 58? 
B.C.). wore and more writers of the Old Testament 
went over to the view that each one should be punished 
for his own sins. Phis lead to apocalyptic expectation 
of Justice beyond this life, since the evil prospered 
and the good suffered on this side of the grave 
(pp. 271ff.). 
The Old Testament view of man's solidarity with 
man is not completely lost on us, however. Substitution 
occurs in multiple ways in any society, even in a 
modern one. Anyone who serves and anyone in a 
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profession or In a division of labor performs something 
which has substitutionary character. 
But these general anthropological considerations 
are not enough to understand Jesus* death as a 
vicarious event, because crucial here Is the unique 
reversal which occurred when God confirmed as the Just 
one him whom God's (provisional) law said was a 
blasphemer, while the upholders of that same law were 
condemned as the true blasphemers. They had made the 
law into what It was not: the final expression of 
God's will. That role Jesus was now revealed as 
having filled, who, having experienced the real essence 
of death (God-forsakenness), freed all men to live and 
die with hope In the God who was near and still to 
come. 
Pannenberg employs the same method to Illumine 
the meaning of the descent of Christ into hell, namely, 
he determines the meaning of Jesus * death only within 
the context of his resurrection and his earthly life. 
This method leads him to side with the Reformed 
theologians who viewed Christ's descent Into hell as 
a part of his passion and death, as the deepest point 
of his humiliation. This stands diametrically opposed 
to the classical Lutheran view, which considered the 
descent to be the first act of Christ's exaltation. 
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The language employed In 1 Peter 3.19*\; ^.6, and 
elsewhere In the New Testament is symbolic and as such 
tried to say something about the significance of Jesus1 
death. While there are theologians who wish to say 
the same thing about the resurrection (viz., that It 
Is symbolic talk about the meaning of Jesus death) 
Pannenberg maintains that one can assign significance 
to language about a descent into hell only In the 
light of the resurrection.22 
For the "descent Into hell" wants to express the 
universal significance of Jesus' vicarious life. 
Jesus died the full death of the sinner, which Is an 
estrangement from the source of life. This death was 
an experience of hell. If we take hell to be the exclu-
sion from (ìod in spite of full consciousness of his 
nearness. Now Jesus, as the proclaimer par excellence 
of God's nearness, was rejected by the law precisely 
on the authority of God. This experience, which was 
the form In which Jesus concretely died. Is the experi-
ence of "hell," the experience of what Jesus suffered 
In the stead of all blasphemers, that Is, humanity 
(pp. 277ff.). 
iv. Theories of the Saving Significance 
of Jesus' Death 
Pannenberg concludes this chapter with a consideration 
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of three classical theories of redemption which attri­
bute a particular saving significance to Jesus' death: 
the theory of Jesus' death as ransom for sin, the 
satisfaction theory, and the penal suffering theory. 
The notion of ransom goes back to the Palestinian 
community (Mark 10Λ5) and Is later found In Paul, the 
Deutero-Pauline epistles, Hebrews, Revelation, I and II 
Peter, I Clement, and Barnabas. This expression had 
great symbolic value and was not expanded In a realis­
tic sense, so that the question of the one to whom the 
ransom was paid was not raised. Later, Irenaeus, 
Tertulllan, Origen, and Augustine expanded the image 
to Include a payee. The concept does not attribute 
significance to Jesus' death as such, but sees in it 
only the result of what the incarnation had already 
established. 
The satisfaction idea of Anselm of Canterbury 
overlooks the Pauline insight that it was God who 
gives Jesus up as an expiatory sacrifice, and it 
does not succeed In expressing the fact that Jesus' 
death was something that happened to him rather than 
an accomplishment on his part. 
According to Luther's penal suffering theory, the 
punishment for sin was applied to Jesus. The basis 
for this substitution was rooted by him In the 
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Incarnation. Го this Fannenbertr says: "'•'ethololocrlcal 
reasons do not permit us to vork In this way vlth the 
Incarnation as a theological presupposition. Го do so 
would make the humanity of Jesus' life problematic from 
the very beglnnlne. Го be sure, all Chrlstologlcal 
considerations tend toward the idea of the incarnation; 
It can, however, only constitute the conclusion of 
Chrlstolocy. If it is put Instead at the beglnnlnff, 
all Chrlstolo^lcal concepts, incluiln" that of penal 
suffering, are given a mythological tone" (5Г, p. ?79). 
Luther's 'nslfrht that Jesus' death Is to be understood 
as vicarious penal sufferlntr, and not an action of Jesus 
hlniself, is still quite valid. Here Luther made much 
use of Tal. 3.13, Il Cor. 5.21, ROTI. Ч.З, and, sensitized 
by his own experience of temptation," saw Jesus as one 
te.Tpted In such a way that temptation must lose Its 
terror for his disciples. Jesus, related to all of 
humanity, takes all mer 's guilt upon himself and bears 
it as his own. 
buamary of Chapter 111 
In the second part of Grundzüce Fannenbera- seeks 
to develop the significance of Jesus of Nazareth for 
all other men. rhis Involves him in a discussion of 
lesus as the true man, of Jesus' office, and finally, 
of the nature of Jesus ' death as a vlcsrious event. 
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In these chapters the central theme which Is the 
concern of the present study Is Implied and the funda-
mental role of Jesus' earthly life in the light of the 
resurrection Is underscored, even though Jesus' 
personal unity with God is not the explicit point at 
issue. 
In both his earthly deeds and in his fate Jesus 
revealed the essence of man to he openness for God, 
that openness which transcends every finite reality 
and which points beyond death. Because the fulfill-
ment which awaits every man who opens himself to 
God's kingdom already appeared in Jesus, so that since 
then the understanding of what man is has been shaped 
in considerable measure by one's understanding of 
Jesus, it is not surprising that every age seems to 
find its ideal of man realized in Jesus of Nazareth. 
In each Instance the universal significance of Jesus' 
life is stressed so that the same formal law which was 
at work in the early Church is still at work. 
The three-fold office of Jesus is critically 
examined, and Pannenberg finds that the earthly Jesus 
was not really a prophet, priest or king. The 
reason earlier theologians were able to attribute these 
three offices to the earthly Jesus was because they 
were always thinking of the God-man, as if Jesus' 
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essential unity with God was constituted Independently 
of the resurrection. Since for Pannenberg the 
resurrection was ontologlcally constitutive for Jesus' 
divinity, we are methodologically prohibited from 
drawing any such conclusion on the basis of the earthly 
Jesus considered as the God-man, prescinding from the 
resurrection. The one great truth expressed in the 
designation of Jesus in terms of the three offices is 
that Jesus can only be understood in the light of the 
Israelite traditions, even If the apocalyptic trans-
formations of the prophetic tradition are more appro-
priate to this task than the typological pattern of 
the three offices. 
Pannenberg•s effort to view Jesus against the 
background of apocalyptic Is shown once arain in his 
treatment of Jesus' call to the "Clngdom. rhe delay 
oí the parousla, the use by Jesus of Wisdom sayings 
and parables of a non-eschatologlcal nature, and the 
apparent fact that Jesus' message did not allow for 
participation in the betterment of the world all call 
Into question the value of apocalyptic as the relevant 
background for understanding Jesus in his own time and 
its value as a link with later Christianity and for a 
renewed Chrlstolo^y. h 1th regard to the first 
challenge, Pannenberg Insists that in Jesus' resurrection, 
1бО 
while the hoped-for universal resurrection did not 
occur, still he was shown to be the fulfillment of 
Israel's deepest longings. With regard to the 
apparently non-eschatologlcal dimension of Jesus' 
message, Pannenberg refuses to see a contradiction, 
since for him creation (and providence) occur out of 
the future, as It were, and creation and eschatology, 
rather than being opposed, are allied. Finally, 
Pannenberg defends the apocalyptic background and tone 
of Jesus' call against attacks by critics such as 
Karl Jaspers. 'The radlcallty of Jesus' call to love 
hinges on the nearness of the coming God, and precisely 
because apocalyptic expectation was fulfilled (in a 
surprising but true form) in Jesus, Christianity has 
great flexibility In Its relation to the world. 
Turning to Jesus' death on the cross, Pannenberg 
first points out that the earliest Interpretation 
contained the seeds of later thinking of Jesus' death 
as substitution. While much of classical theology 
rooted the substitutionary character of Jesus' death 
in his person as the God-man, Pannenberg, on the other 
hand, offers a two-part grounding for the assertion of 
such substitutionary character. Mrst, a general 
anthropological approach which tries to overcome the 
individualism of much of modern thinking about sin and 
іб: 
guilt so that one can better understand the Old 
Testament notion of human solidarity in guilt and 
punishment. The second part of his effort consists 
in portraying the representative role the Jewish 
Judges played for the Jewish people, and the Jewish 
people for all mankind, roles which became apparent 
only in the "reversal" which was the resurrection, 
where the blasphemer was revealed to be the Holy One 
and the accusers, the blasphemers. 
The descent of Jesus into hell is taken to be a 
symbolic expression of the meaning of Jesus1 death on 
the cross, that Is, an expression of Jesus' state in 
death as one utterly forsaken by Cod. Jesus died for 
us the full death of the sinner, which is an estrange­
ment from the source of life. 
Luther's theory of Jesus' death as penal suffer­
ing Is accepted by Pannenberg as coming closest to 
the real meaning of his death. His basing this on 
the concept of the incarnation does not, however, 
escape criticism. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE DIVINITY 0?' CHRIST 
AND THE ilAN JESUS 
A. ГУі Problem of the Doctrine 
of the Two Natures 
It is characteristic of Pannenberg's Chrlstology 
that consideration Is given to the question of the 
unity between Jesus and God only at the end of his 
study. Beginning with a treatment of the claim 
offered by Jesus and Its confirmation by the God of 
Israel in the resurrection (a confirmation which led 
to the affirmation of Jesus' divinity), Fannenberg 
moved, in the second part of Grundzüge der Christologie. 
to a consideration of Jesus' activity and fate. Only 
now, at the conclusion of his Christology, does he 
discuss the classical question of the relation between 
the two aspects of Jesus: vere Deus and vere homo. 
The expression vere Deus, vere homo has its roots 
in Rom. 1.3 and was used by Irenaeus;! it expresses 
the same truth that was intended by the later 
Chalcedonlan formula of A.D. ^51. On the other hand, 
the formulation of the two natures in Christ, which was 
first used by Mellto of Sardls and which became charac-
teristic for patristic Christology, says something 
quite different, even though it was no doubt meant to 
repeat In a new context the vere rJeus, vere homo. The 
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central problem of Patristic Chrlstoloey appears In this 
seemingly simple formulation. 
What constitutes the real difference between the 
two statements regarding Jesus Christ Is the fact that 
the earlier vere Deus, vere homo takes lts starting-
point In the one concrete person of Jesus Christ, 
while the ChalcedonIan formula takes the difference 
between the human and the divine as Its point of 
departure. Thus the formula moves In a direction oppo­
site to that of the vere Deus, vere homo, and so was 
an Inappropriate beginning for a discussion of the 
unity of Jesus Christ. 
Pannenberg agrees with Schleiermacher's contention 
that in complete contrast to all normal usatre, accord­
ing to which the same nature belongs to many Individuals, 
here one person is supposed to participate In two 
wholly different natures.^ Yet this does not mean 
that Pannenberg will settle for an ethical or moral 
union between the divine and human In Jesus. "In 
contrast to such attenuations It can make good sense 
to retain the formula 'two natures'" (ЕГ, p. 286).Э 
The Impasse of the two natures Chrlstology shows 
Itself In three stages through which the Chrlstologlcal 
discussion has travelled during the centuries: (1) in 
the antithesis between the Monophyslte and Nestorlan 
if; 
theories of the Incarnation; (2) the question of the 
communlcablo Idlomaturn; and (3) In the doctrine of 
self-emptylne; (kenosls) of the God-man In the condi­
tion of his humiliation. 
1. "Unification Chrlstoloi-y" and 
"Disjunctive Christology" 
Pannenberg views the Chalcedonlan formula as a 
compromise which did not move the problem of Christ's 
unity in distinction to a new level, but which tried 
to combine the best elements of the Alexandrian and 
Antiochene positions. "Put these antitheses are 
necessary results of a Chrlstolo-ry that begins with 
the concept of incarnation and were not, therefore, 
ultimately overcome by the Chalcedonlan formula but 
broke out again and again in the new forms" 
(51, p. 28?). This viewpoint, as we have already 
seen, is fundamental to Pannenberg's search for a 
different approach in Chrlstology. The Alexandrian 
Chrlstology threatened the integrity and completeness 
of Jesus as a man, while in the Antiochene Chrlstology 
the man Jesus became so Independent that the unity of 
Tod and man seemed to be always In danger. This 
antithesis is classic.5 
РаппепЬегя traces briefly the line of development 
of Alexandrian Chrlstology, beginning with Athanaslus, 
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the real founder of this "school," for whom the Logos 
was the bearer of all Jesus' spiritual functions of 
life, and the flesh Is only the tool or instrument of 
the divine principle. In Apolllnarls of Laodicea the 
Logos takes the place of Jesus' human soul, and so 
the Alexandrian tendency Is Intensified to the point 
where man's redemption Is endangered. Apolllnarls 
was condemned In Alexandria In J62. Cyril of 
Alexandria' developed Chrlstology along the lines of 
Athanaslus. The Logos assumed all the elements of 
human nature, but did not assume an individual human 
nature. Individualization came only through the 
Logos. rhls Is for Pannenberg the greatest and 
indeed insurmountable weakness: Jesus Is not conceived 
of as a real, Individual man. 
The Antiochene Chrlstology was unable to provide 
a better alternative to the Alexandrian efforts because 
of the former's conceptuallty of "two natures." The 
unity of Jesus Christ remained unexplained. The man 
Jesus was as such fully individual and human, and 
precisely this fact raised the problem which only the 
Alexandrian theologians could deal with. 
It Is worthwhile noting that Pannenberg disagrees 
with Aids Grillmeier when the latter maintains that 
Cyril of Alexandria was able to overcome the dangers 
ie? 
of a Lorços-sarx Chrlstoloçy. "Above all, Jesus' 
human nature possessed no hypostasis of Its own, 
and for Cyril, as for a Ion? time after him, this 
meant that the human nature of Jesus by itself was 
not individual" (^ Г, 289). íor Pannenberc this 
conception of Jesus' unity with "od calls his full 
humanity into serious question, so that the Io^os-
sarx Christo]o^y's impasse remains. 
iestorius seeiis to have advanced the understanding 
of the divine-human unity the furthest, by maintaining 
that the human nature of Jesus was of itself Individual, 
havin-r its own hyDostasis.' he attributed concrete 
individuality to the hupailty and divinity of Jesus, 
united in a third prosopon which enerves аз the result 
of the -nutual inte^Denetration of the two natures. 
"his third prosopon common to both natures finds 
concrete expression, in the volitional unity of the man 
Jesus with God. This attempt of !;estorius failed because 
of his conceot of nature as a static, isolated substance 
and because he sou^ht the unity in л ;J - "> 'opon that Is 
neither divine nor miman. 
Thus we are still in need of a solution. Instead 
of seekin" the basis of the confession of jesus' 
divlnitv In the historical concreteness of Jesus' 
human activity, these lisputin^ theolo-lans focused 
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on the model of the two-natures and tried to solve 
within this framework the inevitable dilemmas that 
thus arose." The Chalcedonlan formula remains for 
Pannenberg an expression of the aspects of truth In 
both the Alexandrian and Antiochene standpoints, yet: 
"It only Indicates the criteria that must be uncondi-
tionally observed in every Chrlstologlcal theory" 
(áT, p. 292). Pannenberg insists that a truthful 
understanding of the unity of Jesus and God will have 
to maintain both the real Individuality of Jesus the 
man (a unity which does not come to the man Jesus 
from the Logos but which is possessed by the man 
himself) and a unity of God and Jesus which Is of such 
an intimate nature that the man Jesus cannot be 
thought of apart from that unity (p. 291). 
Pannenberg sees the same fundamental antithesis 
reappearing in the seventh century controversy con-
cerning the will or wills In Christ. The Dyothelltes, 
who were Antiochene In background and persuasion, 
spoke of two "wills," meaning by this word the 
voluntary capacity, whereas the Monothelltes were 
stressing the moral unity of Jesus with God the 
Father. Oyothelltlsm won the day and so the two-
nature model was confirmed and developed even further. 
tor Pannenberg it is clear that "the basis for 
іьэ 
affirming Jesus' iivlnlty ll^s precisely In hl«? unity 
о*" vili wit>n the Father in the execution of his 
mission" (TT"1 D. 29it/. And, Inleed, the founder of 
"'onothelite Chrlstolosy, rheolor« of Fharan, vas 
concerned vlth the moral unity of Jesus' will with the 
will of his father, and not with the question of one 
or two capacities of will. The ".onothel Ites were not 
able to qnswer the question whether every act of the 
will presupposes a voluntflry capacity. Pannenter^ 
thinks this can only be answerel when one takes as the 
point of 1ep4rture the voluntary relation of Jesus to 
the Father, rather than the Christ of the two-natures 
doctrine, the Col-^an, as the -onothelltes also did 
(p. J03). The question of Jesus' own divinity can be 
answered only Indirectly, and not directly, as both 
the "'onothelltes and ^othelltes attempted (p. 303). 
The lyothellte position Inevitably sets up an 
opposition of wills within Jesus himself (ein 
"ey.enflber zweier Willen). thus tearing apart the 
personal unity of TeSus Christ. Yet the efforts of the 
sixth ecumenical council to rectify this by its 
assertion that Jesus' human will was subject to the 
divin» ani omnipotent will threaten the freedom of 
Jesus* human will.9 Thus the Impasse persists. 
The medieval theories of the Incarnation can be 
ivo 
arranr<=d under thi-ee headiir-s: the a§_sumptus. theory, 
the "vestnent" theory, and the subsistence1 theory. 
All three croups are found wantlnç. rhe assumptus 
theory, which originated with Abelard is faulted 
because the two persons belonging to the two natures 
are united in one, which is neither human nor divine. 
The "vestiient" theory, condemned in 117? In a letter 
of Pope Alpxander III, made Jesus' humanity so extrinsic 
that there Is uan^er of a denial of the incarnation. 
The subeistence theory, first developed by Gilbert 
of La toree, is rejected because here Christ is human 
only by virtue of the uniting of his body and soul by 
the lo^os at the incarnation. Pannenber? asks rhetori-
cally whether such a man is still a real man (p. 305).^ 
Cf all the medieval theoloirlans. Duns Scotus came 
closest to a solutio>~. of the prob] em of Jesus' unity. 
The basis oí' his Ch^istoloT-y was not the idea of the 
incarnation but the concept of person In general. 
iach created person Is able either to ^ive himself to 
'Od in dedication or to refuse to do so. All men, with 
the exception of Christ, refused. The divine person 
became the element of his existence which was consti-
tutive for his oerson. ^ Pannenber^ faults this view 
insofar а-з Scotus viewed Jesus' dedication as directed 
to the Lo'•os, and not to the l-ather. 
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il. An Attempted Solution: 
'lutual Interpénétration of the Natures in Christ 
A major problem that confronted systematic theology 
lies in the New Testament practice of attributing divine 
glory to the man Jesus and Imperfections to the Son of 
God.1 A way to resolve this was found In speaking of 
of a mutual interpénétration of the two natures in such 
wise that one (the divine) dwells in the other (the 
human), thereby providing a basis for a "communication 
of attributes" (communlcatlo idlomaturn). The 
Cappadoclans with their notion of mixture, Gregory of 
Nazlanzus' perlchoresls. and various figurative Images 
(fire in Iron, drop of vinegar in water) sought to 
express this Interpénétration. The problem was that 
these attempts were open to conflicting interpretations. 
The Alexandria-oriented theologians could speak of a 
penetration of the human nature by the divine, while 
the Antiochene theologians would only permit a communi-
cation of the attributes to the one person, excluding 
an exchange between the natures themselves. They 
Justified this way of speaking by asserting that the 
two distinct natures were united in a third, common 
hypostasis. The natures did not interpenetrate one 
another. For this reason. Nestorlus denied that ilary 
was the Mother of Ood, allowlne· only that she was the 
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Kother of Christ. Ше unity of Jesus Christ was 
thereby seriously threatened (p. 30?). 
Pannenber,": moves directly from the patristic 
literature on the conmunlcatlo Idlomatum to the 
Reformed writers, devoting no attention to Catholic 
Scholastics. In the lieformatlon theology the lines 
for ned similarly, with Luther holding to the real 
mutual Interpénétration of the two natures, and 
Zwinçli seeing the communication as having only a 
figurative sense, while Calvin held a position that 
resembled the Antiochene.^ The Formula of Concord 
expressed a position which became definitive for 
lutheran theology. Ihree kinds of communicatlo 
ldlonatum were accepted: according to the genus 
idlomatlcum, what applies to one nature can be asserted 
for the whole person; according to the кепиs apoteles-
matlcum all actions were attributed not only to one or 
other of the natures, but to the person of the Mediator; 
and finally, accordlnr to the ¡teaus malestatlcum, the 
divine attributes of majesty and omnipotence could be 
attributed to the human nature. This last position 
separated the Lutherans from the Heformed and from 
Roman Catholics. 
Pannenberg expresses scepticism with reaiard to 
these developments. The conflict concerning the 
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communication of attributes was inevitable and shows 
the inescanable dilemma before which a Christolotry is 
nosed when it considers the unity of "-od and -nan in 
Jesus as something which was cormleted at his creation 
in Gary's 'íomb. áuch a unlty must involve not only a 
communication oí attributes between the natures and 
the person but also between the natures themselves. 
"Of course, such a unity means a blending together; in 
this nrocess the human nature does not sinroly remain 
what it was and is before and outside of it" (^ Г, p. 301). 
If a Chrlstolojy basin itseli on the incarnation does 
not aefena a mutua] communication of attributes, then 
one is left with the sl-aple juxtaposition of natures, 
and if it does maintain such an interoenetration 
from the time of Tesus1 birth, then Jesus Is not all 
alonn: a iran in the same sense as all other men. The 
formel- situation holds for the ïoman Catholic theory 
accordin- to wnlch Jesus' humanity Is joined to his 
divinity through ^ifts of created grace. 
РаппепЪегг sees no exit from this impasse in 
sOeakln'v of the incarnation in dynamic terms, as 
'ari -arth does; the basic τ-lew at work Is still the 
incarnation as startin -point.-'••5 <!or is the dile.mna 
to be merely resoected by aüueals to the paradoxical 
or rysterious character of the incarnation (Faul Althaus 
m 
and Otto v.eber), since that attitude would invite us 
to remain with the vere Jeus, vere homo of Irenaeus. 
There may be a legitimate way to surmount this 
dilemma, and if so one should be encouraged to find 
it. Only in this way can the Christian faith in 
Christ be orotected,1^ 
A different conceOtlon of the incarnation is called 
for. Instead of thinking of this as having been 
corapleted at Jesus1 conception, it miiht be better to 
consider the incarnation as a process which continued 
throuTh Jesus' life ani which came to full expression 
in Jesus' resurrection and exaltation. Athanasius, 
-ïilary, Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antloch, and 
Theodore of .^opsuestla all maintained in one way or 
another the progressive penetration of the divine In 
the humanity of Tesus. The problem with this view, as 
Theodore of 'opsuestia pointed out, is that it does 
not make clear how Jesus as a Derson--that is, Jesus' 
whole life—was one with 'Tod. This Idea of progressive 
iivinization stood in tension with their notion of the 
incarnation: V'hat really came to be in Jesus' resurrec-
tion already existed at the start of his life. 
A modern exanrole of the effort to think out a more 
"processive" concept of the incarnation is Isaac 
August Corner.17 In his own words, he attempted to 
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think of the incarnation not as an event complete all 
at once, but as оп-^оіпз:, in that "od appropriates each 
new asnect that emerges in Jesus1 human development, 
just as Jesus freely united himself with ever nev 
asnects of the LOTOS.-^ Pannenberç's judgment Is that 
)orner does not manage to unite the two OOints of view 
which are essential here: (1) that the nerson of 
Jesus was fulfilled (vollendet worden) only at the 
resurrection, and (2) that Jesus' unity with '"-od 
extended fro4 the bs іп-іілг of his existence until his 
resurrection. jn the final forni of Corner's theory 
(in contrast to its initial for-a) he writes that at no 
moment is there sonethinj human in Christ that the 
divinity hai not assumed in order to satisfy his 
receotivity, and thus there is no moment in Jesus' 
life that did not have divine-hu^an character.15 
Pannenberr's own view is close to the old doctrine 
of the earthly and heavenly states of Jesus but with a 
distinctive emphasis on what he calls "the leíitiíaatlnι 
mesnln.T of Jesus' resurrection with its inherent 
retroactive Oower...as the Oivotal ooint ^or the know-
ledce of Jesus' Ourson" ('.", Ό. 307)· rhe notio.T οι 
the retroactive uower of the resurrection not only -ives 
exoression in systematic Christolo^y to the central 
"ole oí the resurrection for the recognition of Jesus' 
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unity with God In the history of traditions In the 
early Church, but It allows one to escape two fatal 
alternatives: either maintaining that Jesus' unity 
with God was complete at the beginning of his life or 
maintaining 'that It was completed only at the end of 
his life. Viewing the resurrection as an event which 
retroactively affects Jesus' entire life permits one 
to affirm a processive unification and at the same 
time maintain that Jesus' entire person and all the 
moments of his life are united with God In an unrepeat-
able and unsurpassable way. 
These reflections are not developed any more at 
this point. Instead, our author turns to the problem 
of the relation between the beginning of Jesus' life 
and his relation to God, a problem with which the 
theology of divine kenosla grappled. 
111. A Mediation of the Distinction Between the 
Natures: The Concept of the Self-Emptying of the Logos 
In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries Lutheran theologians tried to overcome the 
antinomies of the doctrine of two natures In one person 
and of the doctrine of the communlcatlo Idiomaturn by 
developing what can be called a "kenotlc Chrlstology." 
In each of these attempts the effort was made to dimi-
nish the tension between Christ's two natures by 
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süeakina oí a concealrrent or actual renunciation of 
those divine attributes of the Lo~os that fcould 
endanger the real human character of Jesus of Nazareth. 
'he seventeenth and eighteenth century theoloiians 
went beyond the patristic idea of kenosis (Origen, 
~re~ory of Myssa, Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, and 
Hilary), where "self-enrotylnf-11 meant the assumotion 
of nu^an nature by the Lo?-os or the mode in which the 
Lo^os vas in Jesus. or these Lutheran theologians the 
doctrine of kenosls was designed to hold back the full 
consequences of the lutheran doctrine of the interpéné-
tration of the two natures with the concomitant exchange 
of attributes between them. The dicuutin^ theologians 
at tne time agreed that no real ontolotTical chanje in 
the I o O S took place.^^ khere they differed was with 
regard to the Question whether Jesus simply concealed 
the divine attributes of irajesty or whether the incar-
nation involved a real renunciation of their use durinp-
iesus' earthly life. rhe problem with both of these 
positions is that they make the hunan life of Jesus 
less than credible: a human who simoly wills not to 
reveal his divine Qualities which he knows he possesses 
Is a kind of fabulous beine ( ρ, 319); on the other hand, 
a real renunciation by the Looos of the attributes oí 
n.ajesty makes it diííicult to affirm in Jesus a full 
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llviru unity between the humanity and the divine nature. 
"he two natures existed side by side, without vital 
unity. If the Losros ruled the world durins- the time 
of Jesus' earthly life apart from his unity with the 
man Jesus, then the personal unity was broken. Thus . 
the old Inpasse between what Pannenberg calls unlfica-
tion-Christolojy and disjunctive-Christolopy made its 
reappearance (p. 320). 
rhe nineteenth century kenotic theologians, on the 
other nand, spoke of a real self-limitation of the 
divine in the incarnation.^1 At the incarnation the 
Logos retained the "immanent" perfections of its 
divinity (holiness, power, truth, and love) while 
really surrenderina: the so-called "relative" perfec-
tions (omnlOotence, omniscience, omnipresence). The 
problem here, of course, is that a doctrine of the 
Lo,-os is offered which the early Church fought 
bitterly in the form of Arlanism; in the hypothesis of 
a real self-limitation we are dealing with a relative 
"de-deifIcation of God", as Paul Althaus expressed it.^^ 
' hile Pannenberg sees a Treat problem in the 
kenosls theology of the last century where it intro-
duces a real self-limitation in the frinity, this does 
not mean that he finds the traditional doctrine of 
'Jod's unchangeability without difficulties. Nonetheless, 
to highlight the fact that in the Eible God's 
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Immutability is not that of a "static neutrality" but 
rather the unchanfçeability of the Lord who is ever the 
same in his unshakable faithfulness does not protect 
the nineteenth century kenotlcists from justified 
criticism. One can legitimately say on the basis of 
of Jesus' unity with -od, that '"od humbled himself with 
sinful nan, but this cannot imply that Hod ceased beinp 
Cod in the process. Attributes which belon? essentially 
to his divinity were not, and could not be, surrendered 
in the process. nut if these divine attributes are 
reresent in Jesus, then the divine-human unity is as 
incomorehensible as ever (p. 322). 
Лпе fundamental difficulty which confronted the 
kenotic Christolo'ïy in the last century was that of 
any incarnational Christoloiry. It could think of Jesus' 
huranlty only to the extent that it ignored his divinity. 
Paul Althaus and Karl Jarth are examples of contem-
іэогагу theoloalans who have made use of the idea ot 
kenosis for their Christoloiy. Althaus takes over the 
kenotic point of view when he says that "od comes into 
contradiction with his majesty in the incarnation, but 
does this precisely in the power of his divinity. 
-annenberu points out that "contradiction" is the 
correct word here only if Althaus is reierrin"' to the 
total cisaonearance of the divine, ani not to its "тэге" 
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self-llmltatlon. But this sort of language does not 
Illumine the fundamental question of Christology: how 
such a unification of the divine and human in Jesus 
is possible. 
Karl Earth speaks of God's condescension in the 
incarnation, of the exaltation of man which occurs 
in the free humiliation of the Son, but nowhere does 
Earth show how the unity between God and man in Jesus 
is a personal unity. -' The unity in Christ seems to 
consist for Barth only in the "deed," In the "history," 
in the "event" of the humble condescension which takes 
on and determines the humanity of Jesus, and, therefore, 
humanity in general. But Pannenberg asks whether such 
functional community is personal unity (p. 325). 
Pannenberg finds the conceptually clearest theory 
of self-emptying in the Chrlstologlcal reflections of 
Karl Rahner. In several articles Rahner developed a 
metaphyslc of creation in which a "dialectic of self-
differentiation" is seen to be at work.2? This 
dialectic reaches its high-point in the incarnation, 
where God becomes one with the other (Jesus' humanity) 
in such wise that It is now God's own reality; in this 
process God becomes other in the other. This 
changinir in the other is made possible by the production 
of something other than himself In which he can change. 
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The DTOduction of the ot^ ier (creation) Is "od1 s selí-
emOtyin^. Par.ieiberir Quotes with аюого аі nahner's 
Idea (which ί-аппепЬегт considers to be said of "od as 
creator) that ^od constitutes the differentiation to 
hinself by retainin« it as his, and, conversely, he 
constitutes the other in its genuine reality because 
he wants to have the other as his ov.-n. However, 
Fannenber^ as.-cs whether the dialectic does not shov 
how God can be one with that which he has produced as 
distinguished from hinseli; indeed the use of the 
idea of self-emotylnj; seems to be a ліэге metaphor in 
îahner, and any real change in "od is excluded. Λ 
further criticism ty Pannenberu: is that fahner's ilea 
of nan's oOenness wis-à-vls ;od stands remarkably unre-
lated, though convergent,alongside the laea of self-
e'r.Otyin? (p. ТЭО). 
'Jnlike Pahner, Pannenberu would want to sueak of 
"od chan^ln'í Ια himself in the incarnation. Such a 
manner of soeakinc would nean that we would have to 
re-think the notion oí eternity in relatioa to time, 
seelna It, as Augustine did, as inclusive of ti^ .e and 
as unii'yin' what is separated in the succession oí 
te-nporal moments. Phis re-thlnkinr of "od1 s 
iirmutablllty and eternity is the first condition for 
a conterporary understanding of the incarnation. 
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іагііег Pannenberg had written in this connection 
that the truth of time Is the harmony (Zusammenklang) 
of all events In an eternal present. " Eternity is not 
somethin'- which stands over against time as something 
completely different. It does not form another 
content than time. Eternity Is the truth of time, the 
unity of all time. Eternity is God's time, and God is 
present to all time. Later, when writing of God's 
futurity, he suifrests that eternity is not tlraelessness. 
The >~od of the coming Kingdom must be called eternal 
because he is not only the future of our present but 
has been also the future of every are. Indeed, the 
very essence of "rod implies time. " rhe process 
Dhilosonhy of Whitehead and Hartshorne made the 
contribution of incorporating time into the idea of 
"od. f'neirs was an enormous achievement. But we 
cannot a^ree when Uhltehead suggests that the futurity 
of "od's Kingdom implies a development in God. fit 
is true tnatj the movement of time contributes to 
decidinz what the definite truth is noinr to be, also 
with regard to the essence of God. Eut--and here is 
the difference from Whitehead—what turns out to be 
true in the future will then be evident as havin·; been 
true all alonn."™ 
The second condition for a contemporary understanding 
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of the incarnation is the development of the dialectic 
of divine self-differentiation. That God can be one 
with what is other than himself presupposes that he can 
be and remain himself In creating the other, and it is 
this latter point that the dialectic tries to maintain. 
The third condition Is peculiar to Pannenberg. We 
muet so think God's eternity and his union with the 
other that what appears in history as novel and 
contingent, and yet at the same time united to God's 
essence (thus concretely, Jesus of Nazareth, affirmed 
on the basis of the resurrection as essentially one 
with God) is one with God on the basis of that history 
and not because of some sort of theological or histori-
cal determinism. "What Is true in God's eternity is 
decided with retroactive validity only from the perspec-
tive of what occurs temporally with the import of the 
ultimate. Thus, Jesus' unity with God—and thus the 
truth of the incarnation—is also decided only retroac-
tively from the perspective of Jesus' resurrection for 
the whole of Jesus' human existence on the one hand... 
and thus also for God's eternity, on the other" 
(ET, p. 321).^1 Until Jesus' resurrection took place, 
the ultimate decision regardlna; Jesus' unity with God 
had not yet been given; for this reason his unity with 
God was hidden not only from other men, but also from 
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himself. 
A fourth condition for a contemporary Christoloo;y 
Is ч1 е п in a footnote. Only the occurence of somethins; 
that is ultimate, something that cannot be superseded, 
Is able so to qualify the whole course of time that it 
can be strictly conceived as true in eternity and thus 
as united with God's eternity. rhis eschatological 
element, which is related to Pannenberg's notion of 
universal history and the resurrection as the anticipa­
tion of the end of history, is also a specific contri­
bution of the author (p. 332, n. 93). 
The theory of the retroactive power of the 
resurrection, accordine to which God, through that 
event which was always present to his eternity, 
entered into a unity with this one man which was at 
first hidden, accomplishes what the theory of kenosls 
tried to do with its "impossible" Idea of the surrender 
of certain divine attributes at the incarnation. Two 
things are Involved here. M r s t , a different Idea of 
incarnation is being suitested: Out of his eternity God, 
through the resurrection of Jesus which was always 
present to his eternity, entered into a unity with this 
one nan which at first was hidden. This unity illumi­
nated Jesus' life in advance, but its basis and reality 
were revealed only by his resurrection (p. 333). 
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oecondlv, the incarnation no longer чег1es as the 
startin^-Doint of Christoloíioal T-SÍlection, or es the 
exDlanation lor the urity of "od and men in Jesus. 
his unity must be explsined and established on other 
--rounds, vhile the conceDt of "incarnation" expresses 
what ore is tryin~ to exnlain. The two-^stures 
doctrine tries to understand the incarnation as the 
joinii^ to-ether (^ usa^ nensetzun.-r) of the di\'ine and 
human natures in one and the sane individual. " ..he 
ideasse reacned by every attempt to construct 
Ch-istolo'y by be imin<- ν ith the incarnational 
concept demonstrates that all such attsi'-Ots are door.ed 
to failure" (ИГ, υ. 322). 
The unity between Jesus and the od of Israe] 'íhon 
he callel ather is to be found only in the historical 
oarticularity of this man, his message, and his fate. 
r'he basis of this unity lies on •"тоа'з side, of course, 
but we can view this unity only irom our siie, from 
the perspective of the result of "od1s initiative. 
Phis result, the resurrection, allows us to affirr, that 
this man is ort, this man in his unique, particular 
situation with his uniaue historical mission and late 
is one with "od and thus is hirself od. 
fwo crucial problems still call for discussion, 
however; first, how this unity with "od which came 
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about through the resurrection was effective in advance 
in Jesus so that it constituted the unity of his 
earthly life, and secondly, the kind of unity which was 
involved here? 
B. The Personal Unity of Jesus and God 
'ле have seen that Pannenberg has been led to 
conclude to the essential unity of Jesus and 'ïod from 
the revelatory unity disclosed by the resurrection 
event. ïet only now does this process of thought, 
carried out in the first section of his study, lead to 
a discussion of the more exact nature of this unity. 
Pannenberc: wishes now to show how the unity between 
Jesus and jod is a personal unity. 
The terra person as used in Grundzüffe differs 
from the classical notion which overlooked the 
distinction between personality and spiritual individu-
ality. 32 in the conviction that self-consciousness, 
while not characterizing personality in an adequate way, 
is nonetheless an inescapable condition of personality, 
Fannenber.3 moves into an Investigation of Jesus' self-
consciousness as offering access to the question of 
the nature of the unity between Jesus and God. 
1. Jesus' Self-Consciousness 
Che ciuestion of Jesus' self-consciousness cannot 
be avoided no matter what historical and exe.^etical 
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difficulties are involved. Pannenbers·'s reason for 
sayin.' this rests on his approach to Jesus taken in 
this section. If Jesus is one vith Cod In the course 
ol his whole life (and thi^ is what the resurrection 
showed), then this unity could not have existed 
comDDetely outside his consciousness durln" his рт-е-
•"Saster, earthly life. А тэегзоп is one with hi-self, 
is himself, to the extent that the various levels of 
his personal life are integrated in his active relation 
to hi'iiseüf, that is, in his reif -consci о"ч íes". 
ле can take It as quite probable that none of 
the Ohristolo-lcal titles, includin that of "the 
òon" v.'as usea by Jesus of hiriself, and as Conzel"iann 
says, that Jesus' self-consciousness of a unique unity 
witn '."od expresses itseli only indirect] у, ата is not 
accessible In the Christolo-j;ical titles. '^ 
Pannenber- surveys the recent liooiai Catholic 
discussion of Jesus' self-consciousness, since the rore 
conservative exeretical conclusions them posp the 
orobl em e^en i^ ore sharojy. .-<arl iiah^er's theory of a 
noa-the-nstic, transcendental 3elf-consclousn3ss that 
is -з conseouence of the ontolo~ical union of the divine 
and njnan in Jesus Is accorded the most favorable 
treatment, yet not wltnout criticisn of ahner's 
tendency to rele~ate the a-nosteriorl dimension of 
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Jesus' knowledge and self-awareness to a secondary 
rank.^ Pannenberg asks Hahner whether the reflex 
objectifioation of that which was present non-
thematlcally. and non-objectlvely Is merely a secondary, 
supplemental sta^e. He Is concerned that the religious 
Ideas which Jesus took over from his environment not 
be related to a dogmatically unimportant "a posteriori 
zone" of Jesus' self-knowledge. The elements of 
Israel's religious tradition that were significant 
for Jesus' clarification of his mission and role become 
for that reason dogmatically significant (pp. 32^ί.). 
Since the awareness Jesus had of his mission and 
the coming Kingdom of God received attention earlier 
In Grundzüfte (Part I, ch. 3) what remains for 
Pannenberg to do Is to signalize the fact that the 
proper question for Chrlstology is not : how is the 
consciousness of Jesus the man related directly to 
the Logos, although this is the way the question is 
often posed. Rather, the proper question is, what does 
Jesus' relationship to his Father say about his unity 
with God? Not only Is this approach closer to that of 
Scripture, but it allows room for an essential aspect 
of Jesus' human consciousness: its openness for the 
future. A certain ignorance on Jesus' part regarding 
his future Is a condition for his freedom. Such an 
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i 'ηorane» was removed only when '-od finally decided 
who oesus wac an.i is; ani thin OCCJ^S ir the тп
я и г Г
ес-
tion. : inallv, t.iis i-r.oranos li 'ліі-hts the detiths 
and oerl pctio"1. of ..esus' self -dslication to the 
.ath?r, as well as relates his hunian liie to that of 
the rest of т.ачЧіпі. 
ii. The .Jialectic of Jesus' b'o-iShiO 
A study oí the \ew Testament oortrait of jesns 
"^ev°ils the privacy of his awareness of his l'athe1-, the 
"od oi Israel, and his corin." in^ dorn. .Je^ us annsrently 
•"ievred his own raissio". as thît of 01? who 'lot only was 
эппоипсіп'; tne i^ninent .ip^don but vjas lod's means of 
inau-uratin.-' that Ліп^іош. The unity 01 Jesus to 'od 
i.i this rsssact can be called a "functional" one. 
Famenber^· points out that iTesus expresses his conscious­
ness of a relationsnip to the .ather, and not to an 
hypostasis that Is other than the :ather; in any case, 
Scripture speaks only of Jesus as referring to himself 
in relation to the Father. Involved here also is a 
consciousness of the distance between the >ather and 
Jesus the man, of distance and oí subordination; the 
post-faster community would express this aspect οι his 
relation to the i-ather in the title "tne Son." 
The point of departure for the proper understanding 
of Jesus' Sonship is his relation to "od his lather. 
190 
We cannot put and answer directly the question of 
Jesus the man's unity with the eternal Son of God. 
When the concept of the incarnation is the basis for 
speaklnj of Jesus' unity with God, then one will— 
mistakenly—try to speak directly of this unity. 
"Incarnation" is an appropriate and indispensable way 
of expressing this unity, but it cannot help in 
understanding its inner structure and how it came to 
be. A "detour" is called for, for only the personal 
community of Jesus with his Father shows that he is 
himself identical with the Son of this Father (p. 3^6). 
The personal community existing between Jesus and 
his father took the form, from Jesus' side, of dedica-
tion to the Father in his activity and fate. This 
dedication was shaped and determined by Jesus' relation 
to the Kingdom of God and reached its culmination in 
the self-sacrifice on the cross. In the resurrection 
this community with God was confirmed by him and 
Indeed without this confirmatory event Jesus would not 
have been what he was later confessed to being: "Thus 
Jesus is not confirmed by the resurrection in something 
which he might have been by himself, but precisely in 
his havim: reserved nothing for himself in his human 
existence, in having lived entirely from God and for 
the men who must be called into his Kingdom" (ET, p. 335). 
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Jesus Is shown by his resurrection to be wholly and 
comtiletely dedicated to 'Jod, and so the revealer of 
"od's tlì'-ini ty. es"s is therefore inseparably 
united to God's essence and thus he is the .Jon. 
The personal conmunity between Jesus and Cod is 
a comminity of essence. Pannenberr follows a lead 
offered ty ríe -el at this Dolnt, and we have already 
seen the emoloyment of his notion ol person.3i An 
individual acquires concrete (i.e., related, and thus 
real) Dersonallty by self-dedication, by beinf, 
"submers-ed in the other," a submergence which means 
participation ii his Ьеіт.. The divinity of Jesus as 
^о^. is mediated by and ^rounded in his dedication to 
his .ather. Jesus is the ¿on in living out this dedi-
cation, showing his identity with the correlate 
iüiülied in his speech about "my rather." The Son 
lives ccnpletely out of the father (vom '. ater her) 
and not from himself. "The mutual dedication of lather 
and Son to one another, which constitutes the 
Trinitarian unity of God, also establishes thereby 
first of all tne true divinity of the bon" (Si', p. 336). 
Pannenberg refuses to speak ot Jesus as bein". the 
result of the combination (Zusammensetzung) of two 
substances, the divine and human. ^^ Bather, the man 
Jesus shows himself indirectly/ by his relation to the 
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father In the human historical aspect of Jesus' exis-
tence, his Identity with the other aspect, that of 
bein<5 the eternal Son of the Father, Is given. "Thus 
the perception of Jesus' eternal Sonshlp as dlalectl-
cally Identical with his humanity Is based noetlcally 
upon the particularity of just this human being In his 
relation to the divine Father; ontologlcally, the 
relation is inverted, for the divine Sonship designates 
the ontologlcal root in which Jesus' human existence, 
connected with the Father and nevertheless distinguished 
from him, has the ground of its unity and of Its 
meaning" (ET, p. 337)· 
The last remark makes a discussion of the neo-
Chalcedonian notion of enhypostasis Inevitable. 
Because Chalcedon made Impossible the attribution to 
Jesus' human nature of a proper hypostasis (Independent 
reality) or "person" (form of manifestation), Jesus' 
concrete reality had to have the ground of Its existence 
not In itself but in the Logos. This concept of 
enhypostasis goes back to Leontlus of Byzantium. The 
meanlnç oí the notion could also be expressed by saying 
that Jesus' human nature without Its own hypostasis 
could not exist on its own, but was united with the 
LO-OS from the very beginning so that Its creation and 
unification with the Logos coincide.37 
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What РаппепЪегг finds objectionable here Is not what 
the notion says, but what it falls to say. The true 
statement that Jesus' huiian nature throughout his life 
had the ground of its unity and meaning in the fact 
that Jesus was the eternal Son of ^od obscures th*» 
actual occurrence (Geschehen). the actual process of 
unification of "od and pan in the temporal execution 
of Jesus' life. The ontolo?lcal dependence of Jesus' 
human existence (menschliches Oaseln) on the person of 
the logos must be distinguished from his humqn dedica­
tion to the Father, which comes to Its completion 
(Vollendunj) on the cross, and which mediated his unity 
with the Father. This distinction, and the problem 
of the realization (Vollzur) of t^e divine-human unity 
in the course of Jesus' life lay outside the ken of 
Veo-Chalcedonlan Christology. Vhat the Antlochenes had 
striven for disappears, and Jesus' true humanity Is 
missed. "Thus In the doctrine of enhypostasls, the 
tenacious inclination of the lo?os-sarx Christology to 
miss Jesus' true humanity, continued. Nonetheless, the 
formula retains a truth that appears when we understand 
it as an ontologlcal Judo-ment summarl zlno- what took 
place In the course of Jesus' existence—distinguished 
from and materially subordinated to that" CT, p. 339). 
Jesus lived in dedication to the rather, he did 
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not have hls existence from himself but received It 
from God. The relation to the Father that Is 
designated by the name "the Son" applies to Jesus, 
because In his dedication he Is Identical with the 
eternal person of the Son of God. As such, the man 
Jesus had his Independence (In other words, the 
center constituting the unity and meaning of his 
existence) as the Son, In the person of the Son of 
his Father and In dependence on his Father. He did 
not live In dependence on the Son. This frequent 
understanding of the enhypostasls does not do Justice 
to the role of the Father In Jesus' life. 
The questionable conclusion has sometimes been 
drawn that Jesus was a human Individual not In his 
hunan nature, but only as a result of the letter's 
unification with the Logos. For Pannenberg the 
completeness of Jesus* human nature would be problema-
tic If this were true. The "Kestorlan" Chrlstology, 
as well as leontlus of Byzantium at a later date, 
affirmed that the Logos assumed a complete man, but 
this direction of thought led to the affirmation of 
two Individuals in Jesus. 
In this whole question the difference between 
personality and Individuality was slow to appear. For 
noethlus the two were Identified, while another 
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understandinc oí person was developed by Richard of 
Ut. ictor, for w!io:n person was defined as ex-slstentla, 
an existence (slstere) which receives itself from 
another. Later Duns Scotus deepened this so that the 
locus of human personality lay in the relationship of 
, man to Cod in its dual possibility of devotion in 
ODenness to Ood or self-assertive seclusion from Ood. 
in the nineteenth century the relational notion of 
person prevailed, but without hlchard of 3t. "victor's 
notion of the "relation of origin." Certain 
Protestant theolo-lans reject enhypostasls because of 
Its Danthelstic flavor or because it makes Jesus as a 
лап impersonal. Pannenbera: comments that this 
critlcisn is related to the fact that oerson is here 
understood as individuality and not as mere Independent 
existefce (as was the case with hypostasis in Leontlus 
of ¿yzantiura), nor as relation. -he later Barth accentai 
Jesus' personality as a relational reality, but even he 
did not distinguish the dependence of Jesus on CiOd the 
bather, v^ hich establishes his identity with the Son, 
from his ontolo^ical roots In the eternal Son. 
In his narticular, concrete humanity fesus is the 
son of '"od. There is no question of thp combination 
of two substances, or of a third reality emerging 
from such a combination. The divire SonshiD of tnls 
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man constitutes his special character, but the converse 
Is even more true; the uniqueness of Jesus' human life 
Is what established and what today establishes his 
unrepeatable relation to the God of Israel, his 
bather. Not that this dedication as such is the divine 
in him in distinction from the other aspects of his 
being, but this self-dedication penetrates, transcends, 
and embraces all the moments of his existence, as his 
resurrection made clear (p. 35Ό. The concrete dedica­
tion of Jesus to his Father In the proclamation of the 
Kingdom of which he was the proleptlc presence, is what 
is here at Issue: an abstract, general notion of dedi­
cation will not suffice. This historical uniqueness 
(Blnmallgkelt) of Jesus' situation distinguishes him 
from all other men. 
One can say that Jesus' Identity with the eternal 
Son of Cod is dlalectlal; the understanding of this 
individual man. In his humanity, changes into Its 
opposite, by leading to the confession of his eternal 
divinity. Conversely, we can adequately establish 
something about an eternal Son of God only by recourse 
to the particularity of this man. "The synthesis of 
this dialectic, the unity of God and man In Christ, 
emerges fully only in the history of his existence. 
This happens not Just in the history of his historical, 
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earthly existence in his Isolated Individuality, but 
in the history of his existence to the extent that it 
embraces all reality from the perspective of' his 
historical particularity" ("_., p. 3Ό)· "he person of 
Jesus must be considered both as passive and active in 
his historical existence, ті еп the relational charac­
ter of personality. In the "flve-and-take" of acting 
and receiving, the existence of Jesus was Integrated 
into the person of the eternal Son throurh the 
concrete course of his earthly life In reference to 
his rather. The cerson of Jesus is the locus in vhlch 
Cod's essence and the essence of man which is integrated 
by this Oerson are united.-5 
Pannenber~ insists that the unity between the 
divine and hunian in Jesus was not somethlnp; alien to 
that huiranity, or to humanity in ;епега1.39 phe 
onenness of man to Cod Vihich Is the radical meaning of 
man's openness to the world Is fulfilled in Jesus. 
Hecelvlnr his personality from the bather, Jesus lived 
a life Integrated by this personality. All human 
existence is destined to be personalized by its 
dependence on ¡od, destined to be integrated into a 
person through its relation to God the i-ather. 
fhe Sonship which "'esus has from the rather all 
other тлеп may receive throu'-h Jesus. inls fact both 
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•"elites tie sonship of other men to that of Jesus 
ani iistin^uishes theirs from his: the difference is 
ото o^ character, of structure and. not simply of derree. 
¡'he uniQueness of Jesus' Sonship resides first of all 
in the historical oarticularlty of his life and fate, 
incluriinr here the resurrection. ^his event reveals 
^esus as identical with the eternal Son of 7od; only 
in Tesus has the Son of 3od beconie an individual man. 
The medium of Jesus' essential unity with ^od 
and the basis oí all assertions about Jesus' Sonship 
has been the absolute, real unity of Jesus' will with 
the lather's as confirmed in the resurrection. Given 
this Derspective, Fannenberg; finds it Impossible to 
assert that Jesus in his earthly life had freedom of 
choice over against God: "Jesus' enhypostasls in the 
Son of "od means precisely that Jesus claimed for 
himself no independence of any kind from 3od because 
his freedom consisted not In independence from íod 
but in unity with him" (ЕГ, p. 3^9).k0 
Philosophical considerations support this theolo­
gical Dosition. Accordin-- to Pannenbera human freedom 
is not rooted in an indeterminacy, open to all possi-
bìlìtips, but in the openness to human fulfillment, 
an OOenness which exists only in the hidden tendency 
tovard sonethlnn: that is able to fulfill the destiny 
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of man more deeply and richly than any present 
experience. 1 Moreover, man's openness to and transcen-
dence of particular, finite realities does not mean that 
man has the same openness to God. The decision 
against God, If made. Is not like any other decision, 
for It Is the attempt to say no to one's deepest self. 
Because he considers sin related to error about 
one's destiny, Pannenber* thinks it clear that one who 
lives In openness to God but also In clear, resolute 
dedication to him la thereby following the call of his 
human destiny and not acting arbitrarily. The clarity 
with which Jesus' mission claimed him must have 
excluded any alternative for him. This can be seen In 
the singleness of mind In which Jesus gave himself to 
the proclamation of the eschatologlcal Imminence of 
God's Kingdom (pp. J66f.). 
The Synoptic Gospels make It clear that Jesus 
experienced temptations and doubts during his life, but 
these could have power over him only to the extent that 
he lost clarity about his mission. To the extent that 
the consciousness of God's nearness was dominant, to 
that extent temptation arising out of his situation 
could not cause him to give up his task, even when 
the doubts he experienced, especially during the Passion, 
were able to threaten him with despair regarding that 
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mission. Yet we must bear in mind that no psycholo-
r-lcal reflection can te]l us how Jesus endured the 
doubt caused by his people's rejection of him in the 
name of the God whose Kln-idom he proclaimed (p. 36?). 
The negative expression of Jesus' freedom as the 
Son in dedication to the rather is his sinlessness. 
After reviewinp; the '.'ew Testament statements regarding 
Jesus' sinlessness, Pannenberg traces briefly the 
development of the idea of Jesus' sinlessness. 
According to Irenaeus and Tertulllan Jesus did not 
sin, but stress is laid on his similarity in nature 
to us. lor Origen the very possibility of Jesus 
sinnin.- was excluded from the start because of the 
dedication of Jesus' preëxistent soul to God. With 
Augustine Western theology moved from the thought of 
Jesus' sinlessness as an overcoming of sin in the 
flesh to the idea of an inability to sin which was 
present from birth.^3 His view regarding original sin 
and its transmission led to an emphasis on Jesus' 
birth from a virgin and later, in hl^h Scholasticism, 
to the doctrine of ¡lary's Immaculate conception. In 
the older Lutheran dogmatics the doctrine of Jesus' 
sinlessiess vas retained, but it was based on a parti-
cular unlerstandinsr of the communication of attributes. 
vineteenth-century theolop-ians made much of Jesus' 
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ethical crrarìdeur and sinlessness, although strict 
inability to sin was not maintained. 
Pannenber^ considers the idea that Jesus exhibited 
in his life irreproachable moral conduct to be an 
Inadequate basis for Christolos:y. ¿tie moral character 
of Jesus raay not be painted abstractly, omittln? the 
peculiar relation he assumed with respect to Cod's 
law, which led its upholders to accuse him of blasphemy. 
Moreover, Jesus was born into a sinful world, a world 
marked by original sin. The doctrine of original sin 
will emphasize the fact that sin is not just an 
individual deed but is also the fundarertal coridltion 
of the actual existence of man in his etocentrlcity 
and e-o-obstructedness ( Ichverschlossenhe 11 ) to C-oJ. 
I-aithful to his whole Chrlstoloiical approach, 
Pannenberr sees the resurrection event, considered as 
Jod's coniirmation of Jesus' claim and dedication, as 
the only basis for the Christian conviction that Jesus 
overcame sin under the conditions of existence to 
which all men are subject and that he lived in full 
openness to Cod. Apart from the resurrection, Jesus' 
conduct would be ambiguous, because of the radicality 
of his claim. That Jesus spoke with God's authority 
in total dedication to God was revealed and became 
fully real, became a fact, only in the resurrection. 
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Jesus' sinlessness, or, positively expressed, hls 
divinity, became apparent and fully came to be only 
in the resurrection, which as eschatologlcal event had 
retroactive effect on the whole course of his life. 
This event was God's judsrment on the meanlna- of Jesus' 
appearance. Once again, the future Is decisive for 
the present.^? "As in the llcrht of his resurrection 
Jesus is the Son of God in the whole of his existence, 
so, too, he Is sinless, precisely because with the 
flesh he also took upon himself the sin of humanity 
and submitted to the death that set the purity of his 
mission free from all ambiguity" (fîT, p. J6k). 
C. Jesus Christ's Lordship 
1. Christ's Kinashlp 
rhe last chapter of Grundzüge der Christologie Is 
devoted to a discussion of Jesus Christ as the Risen 
Lord. Even here Pannenbero; Is consistent in his 
approach for he will view the Lordship of Christ against 
the background of Jesus' earthly activity, and thus 
will bescin again with the historical Jesus of Nazareth. 
We have seen that Jesus' proclamation of God's Imminent 
Lordship and Kingdom was confirmed in Jesus' resurrection. 
God's presence In Jesus during his life was that of One 
who will come, Just as the future Impinges on the 
preseit precisely as future (p. 379). Phis difference 
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between the present and the future remalis even In the 
resurrection, so that Jesus' лІп-shiO and the Lordship 
of the father never become one and the sarne. ¥et, as 
xve have seen, by •"Irtue oi the resurrection Jesus' 
disclnles identified Jesus not only with the Con of 
.'.an, but also with the /essiah, since there was no 
reason to expect still another one to brin<s the escha-
tolorical salvation besides Jesus. The first stages 
of Jesus' identification with the '.essiah sav. hin as 
messlas designatus, who at the imainently expected end 
of the world would return as actual . essiah and Lord. 
In iiellenistic-jewlsh circles the Lordship of Jesus 
was understood as one that was already actual in heaven; 
this view was not foreign to the Palestinian community, 
since anocalyotic was able to think of that which is 
to be revealed in the future as already present in 
heaven. c rhe resurrection саме to *nean the exaltation 
of Jesus to Lord. This Lordship was hidden now, since 
the end of the world and the parousia had been "post-
Ooned," yet the history of traditions of this idea of 
hidden LordshiD shows that the confession of faith rests 
on the anticiOation of the pschaton, sì".ì]ar to the 
пгезэпсе of the divine LordshlO in Jesus' own activity. 
It is reality for the tine beinr only in heaven, in a 
hidden, if superior mode (p. 3^1). 
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Pannenberg sees the passage from Jesus the 
preacher to Jesus the preached as a materially estab­
lished step In the primitive Christian history of 
traditions, and not as an arbitrary leap or something 
that is disloyal to Jesus' own proclamation. The 
resurrection established and revealed Jesus as the 
reality in person of the future eschatoloçical salva-
tion which he had proclaimed, and because Jesus as the 
eschatologlcal revelation of God is inseparably "of 
God," his Lordship could not be limited to the future 
since as part of God's eternity it is also effective 
in the present out of the power of God's eternity.^? 
The relation of Jesus' Lordship to that of the 
Father has been formulated In various ways. Chlllasm, 
with Its idea of a thousand-year messianic age before 
the Father becomes Lord, was one such formulation, and 
it tried to distinguish chronologically the two reigns 
in terms of Jewish apocalyptic. While this view has 
kept alive part of the continuity between Christian 
and Jewish hope, still It is false because it sets up 
a competition between the Kingdom of the Son and that 
of the Father, and ignores the structure of sonshlp 
existing between Jesus and his Father. I Cor. 15.28 
expresses the true situation, and Pannenberg translates 
this verse into rather Hegelian terms when he writes 
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that as the àon Jesus brings the entire creation into 
the obedience of sonship, thereby mediatine it into 
immediacy to the rather (p. 383). Another reason for 
maintaining; subordination and distinction in the rela-
tionshiD between „esus is the Christ and the Pather is 
that the resurrection was the confirmation of Jesus 
precisely in his dedication and subordination to his 
lather. This dedication and subordination were the 
Dath by which we have had access to the Oersonal unity 
of Jesus and God. Lvne eschatolo^lcal tension in Jesus' 
activity is not -Ίνβη up wholly in his Lordship. 'The 
eschatologlcal tension that characterizes the entire 
activity and destiny of Jesus may not be ignored. 
Otherwise, the difference between .sther and áon is 
also lost with the loss of the difference between 
future and present, between the lordship of C-од. and 
Jesus' ovn historical activity. As the Son is identi­
cal with the Father only in the self-dedication of his 
obedience as the Son through which he lets the 
.ather be wholly and completely '^ od and jather, so îod's 
future Is present in Jesus' activity only in that he 
lets It be wholly and completely future, and certainly 
' od's future, beside which all else pales" (іГ, p. 370).' 
11. fhe Summation of Humanity in Jesus Christ 
The *ew lestament witness exnressed in various ways 
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the relation of Jesus to the history of mankind. Paul 
used the idea of the first and second Adam, as well as 
relating Jesus to the law and to the promises made to 
Abraham, while John spoke of the connection between 
Jesus and the liçht that enlightens all men. The 
attempts to relate Jesus to Old lestament promises and 
Drophecies (for example, "iatthew's concern to confirm 
as many individual elements in the Jesus tradition as 
possible as the fulfillment of particular words of 
Scripture), show the same effort to insert Jesus in a 
divine plan for history. 
Luke offers a systematic theolosiy of history, 
in which Jesus is the ruling center of history on the 
basis of the divine Dresentatlon. Ey no longer under-
standing the Spirit eschatologically and In his 
"eneral de-eschatolo~izatlon of the apocalyptic theme 
of Cod's plan for history, Luke had Боше difficulty 
in exDressin^ Jesus' uniqueness in human history, even 
thouch he did try to show that all of salvation history 
is oriented to Jesus (pp. 39^f.). 
Paul retained the eschatoloTical dimension, however, 
when he sooke of Jesus as the apcearance of the final 
eschatolo3;lcal destiny of òonshin to which all men are 
called (^ .om. 8.29), and thus was ноге successful in 
cxcrensin~ Jesus' uniqueness as well as his relation 
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to all men (of. ROTI. 5.12ff., Hom. eh. 9-11, Cal. 3.1 
to ^.7). In the Introduction to ïpheslans Paul wrote 
of the election, before the foundation of the world, 
of Christians to rpceive Sonshln through Jesus Christ 
(Jph. 1.4f.)· Christians are elected "in" Jesus 
Christ to the extent that they participate in the 
summation of the universe in hl*n and in the orderinn: 
of all things toward him. tlere both humanity and all 
of creation are Involved. 
'"his formulation in iphesianr vas influential 
in early Christianity, especially in Justin, Irenaeus 
and Ignatius. In their effort, Christ's predestination 
to be head of humanity is closely connected with the 
di\'lne plan for history. Itiis link is nlssln.^ in 
medieval scholasticism. Thomas лоиіпаз could handle 
the divine decree as motive of the incarnation apart 
from the cuestión of whether Christ was predestine! as 
a man and whether his oredestlnatior is prototype and 
cause of our Dredestlnation. Pannenbercr considers tho 
famous question of the Thomlsts and Scotlsts, whether 
Jesus' human nature was destined to unification with 
ths Io~os '•ven opart f rea Adam's sin, ss abstract and 
inapcroDriate to the substance of that matter. "li 
the predestination of Christ is most closely related 
to od's whole nlan for history, it is just тс nuch an 
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abstraction to conceive a creation without Christ as 
the head of humanity and of the universe as It is to 
conceive the order of salvation without reierence to 
the actual situation of humanity, namely, without 
reference to sin" (ii1, p. 383). Ί hen one considers 
the election of ¿esus in relation to the divine plan 
for history, then one can .-rrant the relative truth 
that each of the positions maintains, without having 
to choose between them. 
In Karl Earth's doctrine of election Pannenber-T-
sees the election of Jesus becoming once a^aln a 
•listiict theme in Protestant dogmatics.^9 But even 
here divine history and the election of Jesus Christ 
are not related themes. Indeed, the foundation of 
the relation between Christ and Christians in Barth's 
doctrine of election is provided by the idea of the 
prototyDical character of Jesus Christ, not by his 
bein; ordered toward God's plan for humanity, toward 
God's Lordship over humanity. rhe latter is, however, 
decisive, both in the historical activity of Jesus 
of Nazareth, in his dedication to his mission of 
preacMn- the Kincdom of Ood on earth amone raen, and 
for the 'ew Testament assertions about Jesus' election 
and predestination. JThis remark points in the direction 
in which Fannenbera;'s thoughts reTardinj; Jesus' election 
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move. Hls person is elected, but not for Itself; 
Jesus vas elected In his mission of service to the 
people of God who are elected throuRh him. The 
unique character of Jesus' historical mission was that 
It was completely amalgamated with his person. Our 
election Is brought about In that of Jesus, not by the 
fact that Jesus' election preceded ours, but In that 
Jesus' election has an eschatologlcal character since 
it sums up all humanity and creation from the perspec-
tive of the end of history. This point does not come 
to the fore In Barth (pp. '»Olf.). 
Xarl Hahner has impressively related the two 
themes of Christ's predestination and an eschatologl-
cally oriented theolop-y of history. Rahner conceives 
Christ as the "fullness of time" who ultimately embraces 
the eons as head, recapitulates them, and brings them 
to their end. In this perspective all of creation can 
be seen as developing toward Christ, not as an upward 
striving under its own power but as an orientation 
rooted in God's own self-communication to the world.50 
Pannenberg asks whether Hahner has given sufficient 
attention to the ontologlcally constitutive significance 
of the eschaton for the totality of history. Rahner 
seems to speak of evolution as the self-unfolding of 
an entelechy. "However, the Christ event Is not the 
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goal of history In the sense that all events are 
tending toward Jesus Christ by their own Intrinsic 
nature. He is their consummation In the sense of 
something contingent but ultimate from which everything 
happening before—as well as the history following 
Jesus' historical activity, in that It is already 
surpassed by him as the eschatologlcal event—is 
Illuminated and receives its true significance and 
thus Its essence" (ET, p. 388). Because the Christ 
event has consummating power in the fullness of time 
it is the basis of the unity of human history and the 
summation of the universe. 
Because the unity of the world, the "worldllness 
of the world" comes to It from man, his thought and 
technical organization, the unity of the universe is 
mediately rooted in the Lordship of Christ, because 
mankind and human history are united by the eschatolo-
glcal power of Christ. Christ Is Lord of mankind, and 
thus Lord of the universe. 
111. The Creation of the World 
through Jesus Christ 
We have seen several times that Pannenberg views 
the world-process in terms of what he calls the 
eschatologlcally oriented Israelite understanding, so 
that the essence of a thing, and the "essence" of the 
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whole process has not always existed, even hlddenly, 
but is decided by what becomes of it. "with this <5reat 
accent on the end as the decisive moment both ontolo-
гісаііу and eDistemoloclcally, It is not surprising 
that Pannenber? sees Jesus1 role as mediator of creation 
based on his resurrection as the proleptic end of all 
history. The basis for Jesus1 mediatorshlp of creation 
is, in. other words, rooted in his predestination by 
Cod as history's ultimate fulfillment. In the resurrec­
tion event Jesus became the (proleptic) end of the world, 
so that his medlatorship of creation does not lie in a 
suprahistorical function of an eternal L O O S , but in 
an historical event possessing eschatolo^ical signifi­
cance. 
As the mediator of creation, jesus Christ is the 
reconciler, not tne lav, of the cosmos. oy this 
Pannenbera; means that Jesus does not bear the function 
which the ancient phllosoohers attributed to the Logos, 
that of the "worüd-la*'" or the archetypal principle of 
order in things. 51 ι or iiodern 'зчп, »'hose id^a of law 
involves a multiplicity of contingent, individual events 
whose typical, repeated ele r.ent is exOressed in a 
for-nula, the Idea of "world-law" or world I OTOS is 
completely íс чігп. Jesus Christ is inde-îd the -round 
of the unltv of tho cosmos but not in such a way that 
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the historical event loses Its contingency or that 
nature ceases to be a history of nature. 
If there is any sense In which Jesus Is a law 
for others, or for the cosmos as a whole, then It Is 
the way In which his dedication to the Father and to 
his mission for humanity Is exemplary for the structure 
of every Individual event. 
Everything Is what It Is only In transi-
tion to something other than Itself; 
nothing exists for Itself. Every 
particularity possesses Its truth In 
Its limit, through which It Is not only 
Independent, but Is also taken up Into 
a greater whole. Through giving up 
Its particularity, everything Is 
mediated with the whole, and transcend-
ing Its flnltude, with God, who 
nevertheless wanted this particularity 
to exist within the whole of his 
creation.... Jesus1 saying about losing 
and finding life dark 8.35 and 
parallels) has universal ontologlcal 
relevance (ET, pp. 395f.). 
Sumnary of Chapter IV 
Pannenberg considers the question of the unity of 
Jesus and C-od to be the crowning theme of Chrlstology. 
because of his method "from below" this question can 
be posed and answered only at the end of Chrlstology. 
The conviction which emerged early In the Church 
that Jesus was vere Deus and vere homo was understood 
In terms of the Incarnation process In which the 
préexistent Son of God became man, lived, died, and 
then rose from the dead and reascended to his bather. 
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The problem of the unity of the divinity and humanity 
of Jesus was posed at each later stage of the develop­
ment of Christologlcal doctrine within this same 
context of an "incamatlonal Christology. " The 
"unlficatlon-Chrlstology" of the Alexandrians and the 
"dis.lunctive-Christology" of the Antlochenes led to 
the compromise formula of Chalcedon which, to be sure, 
preserved the elements of truth on each side but 
which did not solve the problem of Jesus' unity in a 
lasting way. The doctrine of the conununlcatlo 
idlomatum in Reformation theology led either to a 
suffocation of Jesus' humanity or to a mere Juxtaposi­
tion of the two natures. The kenotic theology of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries introduced the 
Image of a Jesus who deliberately willed not to reveal 
the divine qualities he knew he had, and those of the 
nineteenth century proposed a real self-limitation of 
the divine in the incarnation. Neither solution could 
satisfy those who considered Jesus to be a credible 
human being In whom the fullness of God is revealed. 
Pannenberg congratulates Karl Hahner for bring­
ing the most clarity to the notion of kenosls in his 
theory of the »dialectic of differentiation." But 
even Hahner could not allow that Γ,οά. changes In him­
self when he changes in the other, so that Rahner's 
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Inearnational theology Is unable to explain the unity 
of Jesus and God In a satisfactory way. 
four conditions for a contemporary Christology 
are listed by Pannenberg: (1) a rethinking of the 
notion of eternity in relation to time, In which 
eternity Is viewed as that which unifies what is sepa­
rated in time; (2) a development of the "dialectic of 
self-differentiation" to show how God can be and 
remain himself In creating the other; (3) we must be 
able to think God's eternity and his union with the 
other in such wise that contingent events of history, 
I.e., Jesus' life and fate) can serve as the basis for 
what Is—eternally—true In God's essence; if Jesus 
had not been raised from the dead It would not be true 
that he is eternally one with God; (Ό the third 
condition will be secured If we can think of the 
"eschatologlcal" as that event which so qualifies the 
whole course of time that it can be conceived of as 
true in eternity and united with God's eternity. 
Because of the Impasses which the "Incarnatlonal 
theology" led to at each stage of the development of 
Chrlstologlcal doctrine, Pannenberg wants to think 
the unity of Jesus and God from the perspective of 
the resurrection in its retroactive power. Within 
this perspective one Is entitled to ask how the unity 
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with God which came about through the resurrection was 
effective in advance so that it constituted the unity 
of his earthly life. To provide an answer Pannenberg 
discusses first Jesus' self-consciousness. Here he 
shows himself close to Karl Eahner, with two Important 
differences. Pannenberg takes those elements of 
Israel's rellp-lous tradition in Jesus' consciousness 
to be of dogmatic importance. Again, Pannenberg's 
accent on the crucifixion as the apparent failure of 
Jesus' mission leads him to view jesus' basic 
situation (Grundbefindi1chke11) as Jeopardized or at 
least called into question at the end of his life. 
Pannenberg insists that we cannot fruitfully 
speak directly of the relation between the Logos and 
the man Jesus but that we must arrive at this rela­
tionship indirectly by considering Jesus' relation to 
his father, a relation which Is characterized by a 
self-surrender and obedience in which Jesus reserved 
nothing of himself for himself; this relationship can 
best be summed up in the title "the Son." The 
resurrection revealed the depths of the relation that 
was present: Jesus is inseparably one with God's 
essence. 
Піе unity between Jesus елй Cod v.es first called 
a functional unity by Pannenberg, and later essential. 
Cree again making use of Kegel's notion of person as 
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relational and dialectical, Pannenberg now sees the 
best way of explaining the relation of self-surrender 
(Hingabe) to the rather as personal unity. Phis 
unity is not the Zusammensetzung of two substances, 
the divine and human, but rather the divine and human 
are two complementary total aspects of the one Jesus. 
Pannenberg takes over the Veo-Chalcedonlan notion of 
enhypostasls to designate the relation between the 
divine and human in Jesus so far as Jesus the man and 
the Logos are concerned. However, this term may be 
used only as an ontological statement summing up what 
is disclosed in the historical particularity of the 
man Jesus: in Jesus' human dedication to his tather, 
which finds its high-point in his death on the Cross 
and Its acceptance and final achievement In the 
resurrection, there Is Implied an ontological depen­
dence of Jesus' human existence on the eternal person 
of the Logos. 4ut this must not be taken to mean that 
Jesus lived in dependence on the Logos. The identity 
of Jesus and the Logos is dialectical, mediated by 
Jesus' human dependence on the lather. 
The notion of person Pannenberg employs is also 
closely related to that of «ichard St. Victor and 
Duns Scotus. Шеіг insistence on the relatedness and 
îod-centeredness of the human person can help to 
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express the fact that Jesus' life was a process In 
which he Integrated the difference between himself and 
the rather at ever new stages. rhis differentiation-
through- surrender vls-a-vls the Father was precisely 
what mediated hla unification with the Son. 
rhe Sonship which Jesus received from his lather 
is shared in by others Insofar as they are united to 
Jesus. because of the specific character of Jesus' 
history, his unity with riod is unique and unrepeatable, 
while the necessity that other men have of beln^ r united 
to Jesus in order to be united with God reminds us that 
Jesus' relation to the rather is structurally different 
from that of other men. 
Pannenbere- closes his discussion of Jesus' unity 
with God with a consideration of his freedom and 
sinlessness. Jesus' freedom Is seen precisely In his 
dedication to Cod as the fulfillment of man's nature, 
and not in an indetermlnateness by virtue of which he 
"could have chosen otherwise." Jesus' sinlessness Is 
not a metaphysical "could not sin" but an aspect of 
his freedom. Ihe final judgment of his sinlessness 
cannot emerge from an objective study of his behavior 
but comes from God's decision In the resurrection. 
The last chapter of Grandzüge is devoted to the 
Risen Lord, dlscusslns: first Christ's Álngship, then 
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hls role as the summation of humanity, and finally 
his role as mediator of creation. 
Faithful to his chosen approach, Pannenberg 
viewed Christ's Lordship against the background of 
Jesus' earthly activity. He was concerned to employ 
apocalyptic ae much as possible In order to understand 
the transition from the earthly Jesus to the exalted 
One. And In the question of the relationship of 
Jesus' reign to that of his Father, he was willing to 
see In the chlllastlc theory at least the effort to 
maintain the connection between Jesus' Lordship and 
the Old Testament. 
With regard to the election of Jesus Christ as the 
summation of humanity, Pannenberg attributed great 
merit to Karl Berth's restoration of a theology of 
election as a distinct theme, although he cannot accept 
Berth's basing Jesus' relation to Other Christians on 
Jesus' prototypical character. Instead of this, 
Pannenberg would want the basis to be found In Jesus' 
being ordered toward God's plan for humanity which 
already showed Itself In his mission of preaching God's 
Kingdom among man. Karl Rahner also Is congratulated 
for his theology of history Interpretation of Christ's 
role vls-a-vls mankind, even If Pannenberg has reserva-
tions regarding the evolutionary context In which 
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Rahner develops hls conception. The ontoloçically 
constitutive slc-nlfIcance of the eschaton must also 
receive greater attention than Is the case In Hahner. 
Because the world really becomes "world," a 
unity, only through man, his thought and technology, 
Jesus' Lordship over man Is also Lordship of the 
world, mediated by man. This consideration leads 
Pannenberg Into a section on Jesus Christ's role in 
creation. Jesus mediates creation Insofar as, (1) 
creation Is eschatologlcally conceived—because 
something l^s only at the end and because of the end, 
and (2) Jesus as the resurrected lord Is one with the 
End of history (God). 
In this chapter we have dealt with the heart 
of Pannenberg's discussion of Jesus' personal unity 
with God. Before proceeding to a critical discussion 
of his contribution it would be good If ve considered 
for a moment his relation to the three theologians 
considered in Chapter 1 on this Doint. 
It is clear that Pannenberg has taken sides in 
the longstanding Protestant discussion recardlntr the 
contemporary relevance of classical docmatic Chrlst-
ology. With his former teacher, Karl Barth, and 
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ая-alnst Eultmann and Ebellno-, he maintains an 
appreciative. If critical, stance with respect to 
the achievement of Chalcedon. He differs with his 
mentor, however, In asserting that the constitutive 
moment for Jesus * being was the resurrection, which, 
as eschatologlcal event, claimed retroactively all 
of Jesus' earthly life as Tod's own. A second 
Important contribution of Pannenberg Is his notion 
of the dialectical Identity of the man Jesus with 
the eternal Logos, a notion which allows him to dis­
tinguish the ontologlcal root of the man Jesus In 
the Logos from the moral, dlaloglcal union of Jesus 
with the eternal bather. Here Pannenberg Is attempt­
ing to save the classical notion of enhypostasls 
from misunderstanding without having to affirm with 
Barth that the Loeos assumed a human nature, but not 
an Individual man. 
PART III: CEITICAL HEFLECTIOHS 
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СНАргеЯ V: ÎX'-r.îTICAL АЧЭ HISTCRIC4I RJIFLB'CTICríS 
Nov that we have had an opportunity to summarize 
Pannenberg's understanding of Jesus' personal unity 
with Tod, we are In a oosltlon to attempt an assess-
ment of his achievement. In this chapter, as in the 
next, our critique will be a selective one and will 
follow Pannenberg's own ieve] onment. Betçlnnintr with 
the historical Jesus and his fate as testified to in 
the Vew Testament, our author finds in Jesus the 
proleotic presence of '"•od as well as a unity between 
Tesus and ^od that Is initially called functional 
unity, and then—on the basis of the Intrinsic signifi-
cance of the resurrection—re^elatlona] presene» and 
»ssentlal unity.1 Thus this chapter will deal vith 
aspects of the historical and exep-etlcal basis for 
Pannenbera's assertions гегагііп; this proleptlc 
presence and functional, revelatlonal, and essential 
unity. 
Txarcinlns; further the Imollcations of this 
presence and unity, Pannenbers- comes to the affirma­
tion of a oersonal unity between Jesus and "¡od, a 
therje which he develops on the basis of systematic, 
that Is to say, philosophical and theological, 
reflections. A second chaoter will thus deal with 
systematic aspects of his Chrlstoloc-y. It is admitted 
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at once that systematic aid hlstorlcal-execetlcal 
moments in Pannenberg's thought are not always neatly 
distinguishable. As someone recently wrote, "the 
historical data presented for systematic synthesis is 
always incomplete, and it is precisely the systematic 
impulse which raises the new questions, which in turn 
urges us on to the new questioning of the historical 
data whereby we discover the inadequacies of our 
previous historical Impressions."2 Uhlle the dialec-
tical relation between these two modes of thinking is 
apparent to any reader of "rundziipe. this dialectic 
requires a healthy tension between the terms related 
if the result is to be a Chrlstology that is as true 
as It Is "relevant." 
A. "Traditionsgeschichte" 
In the Foreword to the first edition of Grundzüge 
Pannenberg calls attention to the two major problems 
which a contemporary Chrlstology must confront: first, 
the dominant contrast between the Alexandrian "fusion" 
of Jesus with God and the Antiochene separation between 
them, a contrast which still has not been satisfactorily 
resolved; secondly, the separation between the historical 
picture of Jesus and the Christ of dogma which began 
with the Enlightenment and which has grown in propor-
tions since then. Pannenberg proposes to face each of 
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these problem areas with an approach which he hopes 
will lead one beyond the Impasses Involved. This 
approach is a special kind of rradltlonsgeschlchte. 
which In English can be translated as "the history of 
the transmission of traditions."3 This approach makes 
use of the findings of Formfteschlchte. Redaktions-
geschichte. and exegetlcal-historlcal rradltlons-
geschlchte. where the starting-point of research Is 
the final stage of a literary unit and where first the 
prior written stages, and then the oral stages are 
studied. Pannenberg's systematic notion of rradltlons-
geschlchte Is to be distinguished from this. The 
systematic concept finds Its point of departure In the 
•DOlnts of origin that the usual hlstorlcal-exegetical 
research has disclosed and Inquires Into an open 
future of transformations, mixtures, or ramifications 
of traditions, and It Inquires In such a way that the 
contents cannot be treated apart from the concrete 
behavior of the individuals. So by including the 
implied behavior of the participating individuals in 
the investigation, one moves from the current hlstorlcal-
exegetical notion of rradltlonsgeschlchte to the broader, 
more Inclusive, systematic concept. 
By means of this approach one tries to discover 
the events which "stand behind" the phenomena being 
226 
studied, the behavlor of the bearers of the tradition 
and the events and realities which determined their 
behavior and how these factors are related to the 
contents which have been passed down. Thus Tradltlons-
ffeschlchte Is a comprehensive approach to past events, 
but It does not bring with it a set of hard and fast 
rules; Indeed, this sort of rradltlonsffeschlchte can 
even Include within Itself the Enlightenment's 
"rupture with tradition."5 
Unless the Chrlstologlcal traditions can be tested 
against the significance Inherent in Jesus' own life 
and fate, set against the historical background of his 
own time, then our age, for which tradition conceived 
as merely external authority Is unacceptable, can find 
no access to the real Jesus Christ." 
Admitting that the tradìtlonsgeschlchtllche study 
of the Chrlstologlcal traditions Is only In Its begln-
Ing staece, Pannenberg will nonetheless try to trace the 
development of Chrlstologlcal statements, as well as 
their transformation and reconstruction from the logic 
proper to Jesus' life and fate. If there was a universal 
element In Jesus' life and fate, that element will have 
set forth a history of Interpretation since those who 
come after him and who are gripped by that universal 
significance will feel compelled to help that 
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significance become universal "In fact." 
But this universal significance resides In parti-
cular events that have their own proper horizon of 
Intelligibility. Thus the Justification of the view 
that certain events In history have Indeed universal 
significance depends on a close study of these events, 
a study In which the historical context Is not consi-
dered something external but as essential to an 
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understanding of what those events should say to us. 
Now the horizon against which Jesus Is originally 
to be understood Is provided by the history of Jewish 
traditions and, in particular, by apocalyptic. 
B. Apocalyptic and Prolepsis 
rhe special role which apocalyptic assumes In 
Pannenberg's Chrlstology cannot escape the attention 
of any reader of Grundzüge. 
Jesus' claim to authority through Its 
proleptlc structure corresponds to the 
apocalyptic vision's relation to 
history, which in turn roes bacie to the 
relation of the prophetic word of God 
to the future (5Γ, pp. 60f.). 
hor Jesus' Jewish contemporaries, 
insofar as they shared the apocalyptic 
expectation, the occurrence of the 
resurrection did not first need to be 
Interpreted, but for them it spoke 
meaningfully In Itself: If such a 
thing had happened, one could no 
longer doubt what It meant (ΕΓ, p. 6?). 
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The discovery of the apocalyptically 
conditioned character of Jesus' 
message and of the whole of his 
activity, which was slowly achieved 
by the question for the historical 
Jesus after David Friedrich Strauss 
and which achieved a breakthrough 
with Johannes Weiss, presents even 
today the real problem for the ques­
tion of the universal validity of 
the figure of Jesus (ΕΓ, p. 2^0). 
Quotations of this kind could be multiplied, but 
It would be better for our purposes to see In sharper 
focus the relevance of apocalyptic for the under­
standing of God's presence In Jesus as a proleptlc 
presence. According to Pannenberg, Jesus' behavior, 
claim, and fate all have a proleptlc relationship to 
the coming Kingdom of God. The word prolepsis Is the 
equivalent of "anticipation" or "pre-happenIng." 
Pannenberg Is maintaining that In Jesus the coming 
Kingdom of God "pre-happened" or was "anticipated."^ 
Jesus' claim Involves an anticipation of a 
confirmation that Is to be expected only from the 
future. The Important text here Is Luke 12.θ : "I 
tell you, whoever acknowledges me before men—the Son 
of Man will acknowledge him before the angels of God." 
Pannenberg accepts the text as expressing the authentic 
words of Jesus.' The saying expresses a relationship 
between Jesus and those who confess him and the Son of 
Man and those he will Judge. In Jesus salvation is 
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offered to men, and this offer has a proleptlc struc-
ture, as it were, In that It is the pre-happenlne; of 
an eschatoloïical event (salvation) involvlne the 
anticipation of an eschatologlcal Judgment. 
There are two essential dimensions to this saying: 
first, it is expressed In apocalyptic terminology, 
that Is, with reference to the figure of the Son of 
ilan, God's eschatologlcal judee; secondly, there is a 
specific turn to the present, a qualification of the 
present introduced, which cannot be found in the gene-
ral apocalyptic backnround (salvation Is now 
available). Thus in his claim Jesus is and is not 
apocalyptically marked. 
For Pannenberi Jesus' behavior and claim indicate 
a functional unity between God and Jesus: in Jesus 
men meet Tod's salvation (p. 64). The manner in which 
Jesus addressed the God of Israel, the authority with 
which he discussed the Law, the way in which he made 
sinners and those outside the pale share in God's 
forgiving love, the urgency with which he proclaimed 
the coming Kingdom and associated people's response to 
him with their entrance into that Kingdom: all these 
are signs for Pannenberg of a special relation between 
Jesus and his Father, a relation going quite beyond that 
of an Old Testament prophet, whose messaere and person 
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were not so closedly linked to one another as In Jesus' 
case. Yet all this stands under the need of a confir­
mation of Jesus' claim, an unequivocal acceptance of 
Jesus' life by God as the life throua;h which Ood offers 
himself to men. This event is the resurrection. 
The resurrection also possesses proleptlc struc­
ture. If Jesus rose from the dead, then in the context 
of Jesus' world that could only mean that the begrlnning 
of the end of the world pre-happened, happened "ahead 
of its time" (pp. 6lff.). At first the resurrection 
was viewed as the beginning of the total "end event" 
but with the delay of the Parousla Jesus' resurrection 
came more and пюг to be seen in its anticipatory 
character. The final saving event occurred in Jesus— 
in anticipation and tension with the final, universal 
eschaton which is still outstanding. The proleptlc 
structure of the resurrection of the dead expected by 
apocalyptic occurred in only one person. Once again, 
Jesus stands in a positive and negative relation to 
apocalyptic. 
While Jesus' claim and behavior before his death 
Indicated a functional unity between himself and the 
God of Israel (a claim which, to be sure, was oriented 
towards its future confirmation by God), the proleptlc 
structure of Jesus' resurrection Indicates a revelatlonàl 
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and essential relation or unity between God and Jesus. 
Only God can bring about the end of the world, whether 
"proleptlcally" or finally, for Cod Is the "power over 
all." If Jesus did rise from the dead, then God Is 
himself In that event, since God Is the "end of the 
world" which "occurs" In the resurrection. Thus Cod 
discloses himself in this event and from now on he 
cannot be thought of apart from Jesus and his fate: 
revelatlonal and essential unity. 
Two "prolentlc structures," two kinds of urity 
between Jesus and God: that is what the first Dart 
of Grundzuqe der Christologie offers the reader. At 
this point we would like to offer some comments, 
comments which do not hope to be exhaustive, but vhlch 
concern themselves with problems central to our chosen 
theme. 
i. Apocalyptic: The State of Research 
Pannenberg tries to situate Jesus' whole behavior 
against sin apocalyptic back,?round. But where elements 
apoear which seem to Indicate that Jesus was related 
to traditions other than apocalyotlc (for example, the 
wisdom parables which imply the present rule of Cod, 
without an eschatolosrical tension), Pannenber« tries 
to relate these systematically to apocalyptic. In the 
example a;lven, he speaks of creation and eschatolo^y 
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being one.1^ This may be systematically legitimate, 
but from the historical point of view this complexity 
In the portrait of Jesus as it comes to us through the 
Gospels may Indicate that apocalyptic, while very 
important for understanding the historical Jesus, Is 
not capable of being the single horizon of Interpreta-
tion that Pannenberg wants it to be. Jesus appears to 
have r.ade use of the richness of his tradition— 
prophetic, sapiential, and apocalyptic—to preach 
L-od's Kingdom. Does the state of research in the area 
of apocalyptic allow one to acquire a reasonably clear 
idea of the relation of the fundamental motifs of the 
Jewish tradition to apocalyptic, motifs such as Law and 
history, Msdom and Prophecy? 
Indeed, the decisive role Pannenberg attributes 
to apocalyptic in providing the context within which 
Jesus of Nazareth Is to be understood makes it Impera-
tive that we devote some attention to the ¡Munich 
theologian's use of this area of scholarship. As a 
systematic theologian Is he building his argument on 
a basis of assured consensus among Scripture scholars 
regarding the nature of apocalyptic. Its understanding 
of human history (for example), or does his use of 
apocalyptic set him apart from the majority of scholars 
who have worked in this area? A brief overview of the 
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state of scholarship preceding Pannenberg1s contribution 
will be helpful In answering these questions. •'· 
Since 1959 there has been a renaissance in Germany 
of Interest In apocalyptic but this Interest has been 
spurred not by new work on apocalyptic texts or by Old 
Testament and Intertestamental scholars but by systema-
tic theology (Wolfhart Pannenberg) and New Testament 
studies (Ernst Käsemann). But nothing In the preva-
lent views among nineteenth and twentieth century 
German Old Testament and New Testament scholars would 
have suggested that such a renaissance would emerge; 
Nineteenth century German scholarship, represented 
by Julius Wellhausen and Bernhard Ouhm, considered late 
Judaism Inferior to Israel and its prophets. The link 
between the Old Testament and New Testament was found 
In the relationship between Jesus and the prophets. 
This meant that five centuries of Jewish history were 
Ignored; At the turn of the century nothing really 
changed with the arrival of the rellglonsgeschlchtllche 
Schule and Formgeschichte. Hermann lunkel saw that the 
so-called "Propheten-Anschluss-Theorle" did not do 
Justice to the complexity of the relationship between 
Jesus and the history of traditions out of which he 
came, but even Gunkel soon gave up Interest In apocalyp-
tic as a source of light for understanding the New 
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resta-nent. ^ The first World War set the staçe for the 
explosion of dialectical theology, in which the Word 
of God and the scriptural canon became central. 
Apocalyptic was ¿iven very little attention and the 
"Propheten-Artschluss-rheorie" was accepted by Walter 
Slchrodt, for exa-nple, without even beln? discussed. 
In fact, non-Gemans had to be recruited to contribute 
to German Old Testament commentaries on the book of 
Oanlel and to the topic "Apocalyptic" In lexica.1^" 
After World War II Martin "»Joth delivered a lecture 
on "Das Geschichtsverständnis der alttestamentllchen 
Apokalyptlk" (1953). although this lecture tried to 
derive this understanding from only two chapters of 
the book of Daniel. Of greater significance are the 
more recent books of Otto Plöger and Dietrich Bossier. 
Klaus Koch writes that Plöger's Theokratle und 
Bschatologle (1959). which sees In late Judaism two 
movements, a theocratic movement which Involved the 
priestly aristocracy, and a prophetic movement which 
was open to Persian Influence, has not had much effect 
on the scholarly scene Ρ whereas Rössler's Gesetz und 
Geschichte. Untersuchungen zur Theologie der jüdischen 
Apokalyptlk und der pharisäischen Orthodoxie (i960) 
did. Rössler also views late Judaism divided Into 
two movements, but in this case they are rabbinic and 
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apocalyptic. The former had no vital appreciation of 
history, while the latter viewed even the Torah as 
havlni Its meaning from Israel's history as sign of 
the Chosen People. Hössler tries to establish the 
Identity of the apocalyptic movement as a reality In 
Its own right, with its own attitude to Law and history 
in contrast to the more widespread late Jewish view.l° 
In the second edition of the second volume of his 
Theologie dea Alten Testaments (19^5) Gerhard von Had 
gave Increased attention to apocalyptic. He goes 
against the usual idea that apocalyptic was the succes-
sor of prophecy. He takes Wisdom to be a very important 
root of apocalyDtic (something not considered by either 
Ployer or Rössler), and finds this evidenced by Its 
encyclopedic tendency. But concern with history In 
other than a deterministic way and from a spectator 
point of view Is, according to von Rad, forelprn to 
apocalyptic. 17 
The principal names in Anglo-Saxon Old Testament 
research reprarding apocalyptic are Robert Henry Charles, 
George i'oot 'oore, R. Travers derford, Harold Henry 
howley, Stanley B. ïrost, and u. G. Hussell. Charles, 
whose influence In England Is dominant, postulated two 
movements before Christ In late Judaism, apocalyptic 
Pharisaism and legalistic Pharisaism, -oore tried to 
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determine "authentic Judaism" before and after 70 A.D. 
and opined that apocalyptic was nothing but an unsuc-
cessful aberration. Herford separated apocalyptic from 
Pharisaism more sharply than Charles.18 in his The 
Relevance of Apocalyptic (19^). Rowley wrote (In a 
sentence that strikingly meets Pannenberç's views): 
"Generally speaking, the prophets foretold the future 
that should arise out of the present, while the apoca-
lyptlsts foretold the future that should break Into 
the present."^9 р
о г
 Rowley apocalyptic emerged from 
a combination of prophetIsm and Persian Influences. 
S. B. trost's development mirrors the confusion 
of the larger scholarly scene. Earlier he had main­
tained that the apocalyptic writers attempted to 
develop a theodicy through evidence from the only 
medium of revelation which they recognized, namely, 
history. "If they did not always get their facts clear, 
they were at least the first men to essay a philosophy 
of history."20 But he later wrote that apocalyptic 
signalized late Israel's abandonment of the historical 
thinking of ancient Israel.21 Koch remarks that this 
change of view was not based on a deeper understanding 
of apocalyptic texts!22 Russell Is strongly dependent 
on Rowley. He contends that there was neither a 
normative Judaism nor a recognized orthodoxy before 
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70 A.D. Independently of Plöger and Rössler he sees 
two streams In late Judaism of equal influence and 
authority: apocalyptic and rabbinlsm.^3 
A survey of the English New Testament field reveals 
a switch from the twenties when Burkltt stressed the 
necessity of understanding apocalyptic In order to 
understand the earliest Christianity, to the position 
of William Sanson In І^З who rejected any real link 
between Jesus and apocalyptic.^ Since the thirties 
emphasis has been given to "realized eschatology," which 
reduces the role of apocalyptic considerably.^^ 
In Germany, the Rellglonsgeschlchtllche Schule. 
whose principal New Testament representatives were 
Johannes Weiss, Albert Schweitzer, and Wilhelm Bousset, 
viewed religion as a dynamic reality which could only 
be understood from Its context and in Its development 
from older strata to newer. They rejected the 
"Propheten-Anschluss" theory and considered apocalyptic 
to be the link between the Old and »Jew Testaments. 
Weiss' Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes (1892) 
destroyed forever the spiritualized, non-eschatologlcal 
Image of the Kingdom offered by Liberal theology by 
showing its apocalyptic provenance. Bousset's Die 
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geschlchtllche Herkunft und Ihre Bedeutung für das Neue 
Testament (1903) stressed apocalyptic as a principal 
movement of Judaism at the time of Jesus. Albert 
Schweitzer's presentation of Jesus In the context of 
apocalyptic Is marked by the fact that his "consistent 
eschatology" does not spare the person of Jesus from 
apocalyptic.2''' 
Between 1920 and i960 the "Word of God theology" 
In Its various forms—dialectical, Lutheran-confessional, 
and existential—was dominant. Kerygma and history 
became mutually exclusive quantities, and very little 
research was done on apocalyptic texts or In the 
history of New Testament times. The emphasis was 
rather on rabbinic studies. Joachim Jeremías, Strack-
Billerbeck, and Gerhard Kittel are the prominent 
names. Klaus Koch contends that Strack-Billerbeck was 
able to fit apocalyptic texts In among rabbinic talmud1с 
writings seemingly without any friction. 0 For Kittel 
apocalyptic is a Nebentypus. The Theologisches W3rter-
buch zum Neuen Testament, whose Influence on theologians 
is very considerable, involves with but few exceptions 
what Koch calls "constriction" of apocalyptic. On the 
whole and with but few exceptions, apocalyptic litera­
ture as a field in Its own right does not play a role 
in this massive work. 
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Oscar Cullman's Christus und die Zelt (19^5). for 
all lts concern for the relation of Jesus to world 
history, does not consider the relevance of apocalyptic 
for this relation. Rather, Cullman emphasizes the 
radical difference between the 4ew Testament and 
Judaism,^9 
between the two world wars there were, however, 
scholars who were able to treat apocalyptic as a pre-
Christian phenomenon In Its own rlp,ht: Rudolf Otto, 
Ethelbert Stauffer, and Rudolf Bultmann. In Reich 
Gottes und Menschensohn (193^). Otto described the 
determinative Influence of apocalyptic on Jesus and 
all of early Christianity.30 Yet In doln? this he was 
an outsider among \Tew Testament scholars, Just as was 
Stauffer, when he wrote in Theologie des Чеиеп 
Testamentes (19^1) that the thought-world In which the 
men of the "Few Testament were at home was that of 
aiiocalyptlc.31 
Bultmann linked Jesus' view of the future of 
apocalyptic expectation. Here he showed his геіідіопв-
geschlchtllche orientation. Bultmann locates Jesus' 
preaching In Judaism and not In Christianity, while Paul 
Is related to Gnosticism and Its primal man-savior myth. 
In Bultmann's Neues Testament und lytholoale (1941), 
which Inaugurated hls program of demythologlzlng, he 
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disengaged from the cosmic eschatology which marked 
Jesus and his late-Judaic world a personal eschatology 
of decision and responsibility which he considered 
perennially valid. The mythological world of the New 
Testament, stamped by apocalyptic and gnosticism, can 
be safely left behind once the self-understanding 
concealed In this mythology is uncovered.32 
In the 1950' s New Testament exegetes "competed" 
(thus Koch) to make Jesus a pure Kerygmatlker. the 
first theologian of the demythologlzlng program, the 
unique witness of faith.33 A methodological principle 
which gains ascendency with some Is the Idea that we 
can safely attribute to Jesus only those logia which 
sound non-Jewish or which cannot be attributed to 
early Christianity. Philip Vlelhauer, for one, follows 
this principle consistently: Jesus could not have 
expected the coming Son of Man because this sounds too 
apocalyptic and cannot be united to the more existential 
Idea of God's Kingdom.З'* 
The problem of the delay of the parousla which has 
haunted New Testament scholarship since the last century 
has been defused by the formula "already-not yet" used 
to describe the complex situation of the Kingdom of God 
as reflected in Jesus' sayings. But in order to allow 
this dialectical way of expressing the relation of the 
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eschatoloçlcal Klnedom to the present; лю4егп 
theologians have had to remove all spatial and structu­
ral traits from the notion and have understood It 
verbally, as God's rule or nearness or as Identical with 
God's being and activity.35 However, Martin Werner 
applied Albert Schweitzer's "consistent eschatology" 
to the history of the Church's dogma. Disagreeing with 
Harnack's view that apocalyptic was like a shell which 
could be peeled off Jesus' message and the New Testament 
In general, Werner maintained that to the extent that 
the Gospel was universal It was also late Jewish In the 
sense of apocalyptic eschatology, and to the extent 
that it is late Jewish it Is also a kind of dogmatic 
teaching. Werner viewed later dogma as the step-by-
step de-eschatologlzlnir of Christianity. Werner's 
views have not had much effect on the writing of the 
history of dogma, and he has been sharply criticized, 
but the theme of the delay of the parousla Is one which 
contemporary exegesis cannot shake off.3° 
In 1959 Ulrich Wllckens published "Die Bekehrung 
des Paulus als rellglonsgeschlchtliches Problem" and 
In 1961 "Das Offenbarunisverständnis In der Geschichte 
des Urchristentums," both of which give so much emphasis 
to apocalyptic as the almost all-determlnln? factor 
at the turn of the century that other currents at the time 
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threaten to become totally overshadowed.37 The pharlsalc-
rabblnic stream moves Into the background. Ve have 
already seen the influence which Wllckens has had on 
Pannenberg·s Chrlstology, yet among exegetes he has not 
been warmly received. 
As already mentioned, in i960 Ernst Käsemann 
published "Die Anfänge christlicher rhéologie" in which 
he postulated an eschatologlcal ,1us talionis (e.g. Mt. 
18.28f.). Jesus preached the near Ood and his preaching 
was not stamped by apocalyptic, although it was apoca-
lyptic which enabled Christians to think historically. 
Käsemann calls apocalyptic the mother of Christian 
theology. Unlike Wllckens, Käsemann received almost 
immediate response from Gerhard Ebellng and Ernst 
Fuchs, to which he replied in 1962.3° 
Against the confusing background sketched above, 
two contributions in the systematic area appeared in 
the same year in Germany which took apocalyptic most 
seriously: Pannenberg 's Grundzüge and Jürgen Moltmann's 
rhéologie der HoffnunK.39 Holtmann's book heralded a 
new theological movement and made eschatology a widely-
discussed concept even beyond professional theological 
circles. In comparison with Pannenberg one can signa-
lize several Important differences in spite of their 
common concentration on the future and Its power over 
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the present and past. Mrst, Koltmann remains within 
the framework of the Viord of God theology Insofar as 
he refuses to arirue from history to revelation and 
refuses to ground trust and hope by historical arffuraen-
tatlon.^O and, secondly, he sets up an opposition 
between hope and eschatolotry on the one hand and the 
present time on the other hand:4! in this he is also 
being faithful to dialectical theology. But he does 
aeree with Pannenberg that apocalyptic hlstorlclzes 
the cosmos, so that salvation of the individual is 
part of the salvation of the people and of the whole 
cosmos.^2 
Earlier It was asked whether Pannenberg was build-
in« as a systematic theologian on the basis of an 
assured consensus regarding the nature of apocalyptic 
and regarding apocalyptic's understanding of history.^3 
It would seem that even such a brief overview of the 
state of affairs in apocalyptic research as the one 
offered above shows that Pannenberg1s view of apocalyp­
tic is dependent on scholars such as Wllckens and 
Bossier, who themselves have met with strong criticism 
from their colleagues. The thorny question, for example, 
of the relationship of apocalyptic to other theoloelcal 
currents In late Judaism, Is far from resolved, even 
In Its main outlines. The equally Important question 
Ü4íi. 
of a possible apocalyptic theology of universal 
history (within which context the resurrection event 
would possess proleptlc character In the emphatic way 
envisaged by Pannenberg) Is also far from resolution.^5 
But, In any case, Pannenberg has made apocalyptic 
respectable to the systematic theologian and Indeed 
central to his task, and has provided a stimulus to 
scholars to reconsider their (perhaps merely Inherited?) 
positions regarding Its message and significance. This 
Is also an achievement In Itself. 
11. The Divine Confirmation 
One might say that Pannenberg views the life and 
death of Jesus of Nazareth In the perspective that Is 
opened up by two questions. First, did Jesus' life 
and claim require a confirmation from "outside" himself, 
from God, or was his behavior seif-validating? Secondly, 
did Jesus In fact anticipate a (necessary) divine 
confirmation of his life and claim? These two questions 
pose the problem of prolepsis. 
With regard to the first question Pannenberg 
contends that all of Jesus' life was ambiguous. This 
Is not simply a question of the ambiguity which belongs 
to the general human condition. Claiming that God's 
salvation comes to men In connection with their accep-
tance of himself, Jesus was viewed by some as the 
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Promised One and by others as a tool of the devil. 
In his relation to the Law he could be considered by 
his listeners as a liberator or a blasphemer. Thus 
the special character of his claim called for a confir-
mation from the God In whose name Jesus spoke. Only 
a confirming act that was truly divine (and for 
Pannenberg this means an act which while historical 
affects the meaning of the whole of reality) could 
deliver Jesus from the ambiguity to which he was 
exposed.^" 
This need for confirmation Is especially evident 
when, with Pannenberg, we consider the manner of 
Jesus' death. Jesus' crucifixion, while carried out 
by the Romans, was demanded by the leaders of God's 
people in the name of the God whom Jesus had "blas-
phemed." On the cross Jesus could not authenticate 
his claim, but could only give himself over to the same 
God in whose name he stood accused. Pannenberg Is 
quite correct, it seems to us, in stressing the negati-
vity of the crucifixion. ? The death on the cross 
called into question everything Jesus claimed to be. 
If the end events had In no way occurred after Jesus' 
death, then it would have appeared that Jesus' claim 
during his life that in himself God was offering 
salvation (the fullness of life) to men was not really 
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«of God." Because Jesus1 claim had transcended that 
of the prophets who preceded him, it was necessary 
that the manner of God's confirmation of his life and 
words should transcend the manner in which God had 
accepted the life and death of one of the prophets or 
a just man.^" 
The second question which Fannenberg poses is, 
whether Jesus did In fact anticipate a divine confirma­
tion. Only in Luke 12.θ can Pannenberg find a saying 
of Jesus which comes close to indicating that Jesus 
thought of himself as anticipating God's confirmation. 
But the authenticity of this saying Is, as we have seen, 
much disputed. In addition, Pannenberg interprets 
specific actions of Jesus, such as his forgiving of sins 
and his eating with sinners, as expressions of an anti-
ciOated confirmation on his part. These actions are 
open to the interpretation which Pannenberg gives them; also 
valid Is the general fact that Jesus' life and claim 
as a whole needed divine confirmation. Where Jesus 
engao-es his fellowmen with full confidence and in God's 
name, Pannenberg sees Jesus deliberately anticipating 
that final confirmation. ° 
ill. Apocalyptic Models 
It Is interesting to note that while Pannenbern 
makes central use of Luke 12.8 to Illustrate the 
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proleptlc character of Jesus' claim, when It comes to 
the confirmation of that claim he does not stress the 
corresponding apocalyptic model--whlch would be that 
of removal and exaltation (or as the Germans express 
it, "Entrückung/Erhöhung"), but the apocalyptic notion 
of the (universal) resurrection of the dead, but now 
applied to only one man, which Is unknown In apocalyp-
tic (see below). By stressing the resurrection model 
as the fundamental one, Pannenberg Is able to speak of 
a proleptlc structure—the prehappening in one man of 
the promised universal resurrection, of the promised 
consummation of the world—and this agrees much more 
with his theology-of-history approach to Jesus than 
would the model of the glorification of one man. While 
this glorification would in its apocalyptic context be 
understood as the beginning of the end events, it could 
not be viewed as their anticipation or pre-happening.50 
Both exaltation (Phil. 2.5-11) and resurrection 
(I Cor. 15.3-5) were used of Jesus before the time 
Paul wrote, but It is not agreed which idea Is the 
earlier Interpretation, or the "better" one. What is 
certain Is that the resurrection model became dominant.51 
Vihlle scholarship In the area of apocalyptic has not 
come even close to a consensus regarding the role of 
the idea of universal history in late Judaism, still 
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Pannenberg has made systematically very fruitful the 
central truth expressed In such New Testament texts 
as Acts 26.23, Col. 1.18, and Rev. 1.5 where Jesus Is 
spoken of as the first-born from the dead. 
The question of the exaltation motif In early 
Christianity calls for comment. In the last chapter of 
Grundztige Pannenberg reflects on the Lordship of Jesus 
Christ. He writes, as we have seen, that at first the 
resurrected Jesus was probably viewed only as the one 
designated to be the future Messiah, who had been 
taken away to heaven until the parousia and his 
appearance as Messiah.52 "Thus the Lordship of Christ 
the Messiah was originally related to the eschatologlcal 
future. This future, to be sure, was thought to be 
Immediately near, indeed, to have already begun in 
Jesus' resurrection. Corresponding to this atmos-
phere of earliest Christianity, under the influence 
of the Greek version of Ps. 110.1 (LXX), the tfessianlc 
Lordship of Jesus was understood in Hellenistic circles 
as a Lordship already taking place in heaven, as 
Ferdinand Hahn has shown" (ET, p. 366). Pannenberg does 
suggest that Hahn's locating of the motivation of the 
transition of the idea of an already present heavenly 
Lordship of Jesus in Hellenistic Jewish circles is not 
necessary and finds a possible motivation in apocalyptic's 
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Idea that what Is revealed in the future Is already 
present in heaven (p. 380).53 
Hahn's treatment of the exaltation motif was also 
discussed in a critical way by Philip Vlelhauer In 
1965.5 He recognizes that It is central to Hahn's 
thesis that exaltation in the sense of an enthronement 
of Jesus as Messiah arose in Hellenistic-Jewish circles 
and not in the earliest Palestinian community, that it 
was associated with the Septuagint version of Ps. 110.1 
and that the motivation for this came from the delay 
of the parousia. Hahn's view thus runs counter to the 
usual view that the motifs of resurrection and exalta-
tion originally belonged together. 
Vlelhauer faults Hahn for misusing Heinz Tödt's 
statement that In the words of the coming Son of Man 
the motif of exaltation as an Independent Chrlstologlcal 
moment is absent because Tödt also says that he does 
not intend to dispute the existence of the idea of Jesus 
as the exalted one In the earliest Palestinian community. 
Hahn states that Tödt proved conclusively that there 
is no room within the Son of nan Chrlstology for the 
exaltation motif, a statement which goes far beyond 
what T8dt wanted to say.55 
Hahn appeals to three texts to show that Jesus1 
assumption (Aufnahme) Into heaven could only have been 
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viewed at first as a removal (Entriickuna;) and not an 
exaltation (Erhöhung): Acts 3-20, 21a; ιk. 2.18-20; 
Acts 1.9-11.^ Vlelhauer accepts that Acts 3.20, 21a 
does not come from the early Palestinian community. Ч'ог 
does the text say that Jesus was established as the Christ 
only at this sending; phllolop-lcally the text of v. 20b 
shows that Jesus Is already the Christ in heaven, that, 
therefore, exaltation Is already presupposed.57 vith 
regard to Ik. 2.18-20, Vlelhauer remarks that the text 
gives the community' s Justification for the custom of 
fasting, but that Chrlstologically it has nothing to 
say. The accent lies on the earthly Jesus' absence 
from his followers, but nothing Is said about his 
present status.-- Acts 1.9-11 contains no reference 
to exaltation, says rfahn, but rather here one' s view 
Is directed exclusively to Jesus' return. Vlelhauer 
counters that Hahn Is turning the text on Its head. 
4ahn sees an older tradition contained In Acts 1.9-11 
from which he tries to draw conclusions for the earliest 
Palestinian community, but he does not offer a recon­
struction of the early tradition. The ascension as a 
distinct act is a very late motif and appears first in 
the Lucan writings. Thus the three texts adduced by 
Hahn do not support his view that the earliest 
Palestinian community did not know the exaltation motif. 
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With respect to the use in the early Church of 
Ps. 110-1 as motivation for the introduction of the 
idea that Jesus was the exalted Lord before the 
parousia, Vlelhauer points out that Hahn contradicts 
himself when he asserts that the exaltation motif was 
linked completely with this verse. For Hahn himself 
admits that in Phil. 2.9ff. and John's Gospel the 
exaltation motif is not Joined with Ps. 110.1. 
Vlelhauer suggests three more texts: Hom. l.JT., Col. 1. 
8ff., I rim. 3.16. These examples not only show that 
the motif of exaltation is found completely Independent 
of Ps. 110.1 but that it is found in very old and 
recent parts of the New Testament and in traditions of 
varying provenance. Vlelhauer's conclusion: the use 
of Ps. 110.1 Is not constitutive for the exaltation 
motif/7 
The third point Hahn wishes to make is that the 
exaltation motif presupposed the delay of the parousia. 
The greatest counter-evidence for this are the earliest-
writings in the J^ew Testament, Paul's letters, where 
one finds the expectation of the Imminent end along-
side the idea of the present of the exalted one (e.g., 
II Thess. 2.l6f.). Vlelhauer writes: The complex state 
of affairs In the Chrlstology of early Christianity 
cannot be pressed into a unilinear chronological (and 
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geographical) scheme, but one has to reckon with a 
development which even In Its beginnings was very much 
more differentiated. As the ancient formulas show, 
this development was determined from the beginning by 
theological necessities of very different kinds (of 
which the coming to terms with the delay of the 
parousla was only one among many and not the first), 
as well as by heterogeneous Influences In the history 
of religions. This variety Is mirrored also In the 
expressions regarding the exaltation.""^ 
Vlelhauer thus lends support to Parmenberg's 
hesitancy with respect to Hahn's position about the 
place of emergence of the exaltation motif In early 
Christianity. Vlelhauer sees In the weakness of Hahn'β 
argumentation regarding this point (which Is central 
to his whole study) a confirmation of the more prevalent 
view that It Is In the Easter appearances that one must 
find the beginnings of the recognition that Jesus was 
not only raised from the dead and assumed Into heaven 
but that he was exalted In the resurrection."^ 
We turn now to a consideration of these Easter 
appearances and the question of the historicity of the 
resurrection. 
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С. Hesurrection and History 
1. Vision, Resurrection, and Exaltation 
It Is now time to examine one of the most discussed 
aspects of Pannenberg's Chrlstology, his argument for 
the historicity of the resurrection. 
The present writer Is prepared to agree with 
Pannenberg that (1) It Is quite probable that disciples 
of Jesus, after his death, did have audlo-vlslonary 
experiences, the content of which they Identified as 
the resurrected and exalted Jesus of Nazareth; (2) that 
no theory of subjective visions or hallucinatory 
experiences has up until now successfully explained the 
origin of the Easter faith of the disciples; (3) that 
the story of the empty tomb has Important elements that 
are very early and possibly historical;^ and (Ί) that 
no argument offered until now has successfully explained 
In terms of human agency the fact of the empty tomb. ^ 
Yet even If one goes this far with Pannenberg the 
following essential points have not been historically 
proven, and It Is questionable whether they can be 
historically proven: (1) that the disciples' Identifi­
cation of the appearances with Jesus of Nazareth together 
with the conviction generated by the apparences that 
Jesus, once dead. Is himself now alive and exalted were 
the correct Identification and the correct conviction; 
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and (2) that the reason why the tomb was empty was that 
Jesus, once dead. Is now alive In a special way. 
We will concern ourselves here only with Pannenberg's 
discussion of the visions. He offers two principal 
arguments for the "objectivity" of the visions. rhe 
first has to do with the change which occurred In the 
disciples after Jesus' death. Now he maintains that 
the standard psychological arguments for the "objecti­
vity" of the visions, while possessing merit, only 
acquire importance 
In connection with findings in the 
history of traditions, in this case 
the improbability of the assumption 
that people who came from the Jewish 
tradition would have conceived of the 
beginning of the events connected with 
the end of history for Jesus alone 
without compelling reasons. The 
primitive Christian news about the 
eschatologlcal resurrections of Jesus— 
with a temporal interval separatinj it 
from the universal resurrection of the 
dead—Is, considered from the point of 
view of the history of religions, 
something new, precisely also in the 
framework of the apocalyptic 
tradition (ΕΓ, p. 96). 
We would like to turn to the Ethiopian Book of 
Enoch to Indicate that the question of the novum of 
which Pannenberg speaks must be conceived even more 
broadly than he suggests. 
first, however, we must consider whether this 
apocalyptic work is valid evidence. A work which 
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represents "an exceptional syncretlstlc combination," 
Enoch has been a problem for commentators to date. 
According to Reginald Fuller, the Similitudes of 
3noch (Sth. Enoch, 37-71). which will concern us here, 
are dated by most continental European scholars between 
175 and 63 B.C., and are regarded as an authentic part 
of the Book of 3noch. * In Sn/rland and America, however, 
this portion of Ethiopian Enoch Is looked upon as 
Christian Interpolation. Two principal arguments are 
adduced: (1) that in the not inconsiderable Greek 
fragments of Snoch which have been hitherto discovered 
the äimllltudes have been conspicuously absent; (2) 
that at Cumran the Semitic fragments of Enoch which 
were found did not include any of the Similitudes."5 
"Nevertheless," writes Miller, "it seems that certain 
considerations of a general character may be advanced 
on the other side, without necessarily deciding in 
favour of a pre-Christian Jewish origin for the 
Similitudes themselves. First, ... the Son of Kan in 
the Similitudes lacks the distinctively Christian 
differentia, viz., the identification with Jesus of 
Nazareth In his ministry (which ... Isa very early 
Christian use of the Son of ''.an) and in his passion 
(which ... is, though not quite the earliest, at least 
a Palestinian feature), öecond, the logia of Jesus ... 
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seem to presuppose a reduced apocalyptic In which the 
future coming Son of Man as eschatologlcal Judge was 
part of the traditional Imagery.... Vhlle, therefore, 
we cannot be sure that the Similitudes themselves ante­
date the Christian era, we may treat them with some 
degree of confidence as evidence for a tradition In 
Jewish apocalyptic which Is pre-Christian."°° 
In the Similitudes an eschatologlcal figure, the 
"Son of iCan," Is connected with the following motifs: 
(1) with the Ancient of Days Is one whose countenance 
Is like the appearance of a man (46.1); (2) he walks 
with the Ancient of Oays (46.2); (3) he Is hidden with 
God before creation (48.2); (4) the hidden Son of і.ап 
Is revealed to the elect on "that day" (62.7; 69.26); 
(5) he will hold Judgment (46.3; 63.11) on the throne 
of his glory (62.5; 69.2?; 69.26); (6) the Just will 
live eternally with him (62.14; 71.17); (7) Enoch Is 
removed from the earth Into heaven to the Son of rían 
and Lord of the spirits (70.1); ( ) he Is enthroned 
In heaven as Son of ilan as example of righteousness and 
as first of the Just (71.14),67 
The biblical Image of "removal" (Зегтап: "Entrückung") 
goes back to Genesis 5.2J+ and IIKlngs 2.11. In Genesis it 
Is said that "Enoch walked with "Od, and he was no 
longer here, for God took him" while the passage In 
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II Kinns reads: "As /Slisha and Elijah/ walked on conver­
sing, a flaming chariot and flaming horses came between 
them, and Elijah went up to heaven in a whirlwind." 
The relatively uncomplex Image at work In these two 
Old Testament texts acquires complexity In Enoch when 
associated with a whole series of names, not only "Son 
of "an," but (eschatologlcal) "Just one" (38.1; 53.6), 
the "elected one" (39.6; ^0.5. ^ 5.3Г., ^9.2. 51.3, 5.15. 
52.9; 53.6; 55·Ό: the eschatologlcal "Judge" (41.9); 
the anointed one (48.10; 52Λ); «my son» (105.2); "the 
man" (90.14,15,17). The plethora of names leads one 
to suspect that there Is no question here of a fixed 
title but of various functional designations for one 
through whom God works salvation."" It should be further 
noted that Enoch is not spoken of In terms of Incarna­
tion, but rather of enthronement. According to Enoch 
70-71 Enoch was not the Son of Man before or during his 
earthly life. ihe existence of the one "like a son of 
тал" with God can be thought of as an Ideal préexistence, 
while this Ideally préexistent one is personified, 
acquires personality, when he is identified with the 
historical figure of Enoch. 9 
According to Eth. Enoch 22.2ff. and 51.Iff., the 
eschatologlcal Judge is associated with the resurrection 
of deceased souls, yet the eschatologlcal saving figure 
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Is not the one who raises the dead, for this Is performed 
by the "Lord of the Spirits." 
On the basis of what has been summarily presented 
above, we would like to return to Parmenberg's statement 
that the eschatologlcal resurrection of Jesus tempora-
rily distant from the universal resurrection of the dead 
Is In the history of religions a novum, precisely within 
the framework of Jewish traditions. rhls statement, 
fundamental to Fannenberg's argument for the historicity 
of the resurrection event, should be supplemented with 
the following points: 
1) The Similitudes In Eth. Enoch can quite possibly 
have a pre-Christian Vorlage ; 
2) There Is reference In these Similitudes to an 
earthly figure, Enoch, who Is taken up Into heaven and 
Identified with an Ideally préexistent eschatologlcal 
redemptive agent designated by various names; 
3) the temporal distance between the removal of 
Enoch to heaven and the end-events (resurrection; 
Judgment, eschatologlcal salvation) remains Indetermi-
nate ; 
Ό Enoch by virtue of his removal Is considered 
not simply the chronologically first to enter an eternal, 
eschatologlcal mode of existence but Is Identified with 
the agent through which C-od will save others. 
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The "removal" model is a very early one, Implied 
In the Q tradition, for example.70 While It Is 
Impossible, as hilli i'arxsen has pointed out, to 
determine whether the resurrection model or the removal 
model Is the earlier, they are both very early.?1 Now 
the apDllcation of the removal model to Jesus required 
a significant modification of the model, because In 
the case of Enoch (and Elijah) It Is a living person 
who Is removed to heaven, while in Jesus' case it is 
a dead person who is removed to a new, eschatologlcal 
mode of existence.72 
Ve do not wish to argue here that it Is demonstrable 
that the Ethiopian aook of Snoch was employed by the 
early Church to Interpret the meaning of Jesus' fate. 
The evidence is fragmentary and precise correlations 
with Enoch are difficult to find. But we do want to 
call attention to the fact that in the case of the 
resurrection motif and In the case of the removal-
exaltation motif there are serious modifications of the 
motifs involved In their aDDllcatlon to Jesus. 
Indeed, one could argue that the transfer of the removal-
exaltation motif to a dead person was a greater modifi-
cation than that of the resurrection, since at the very 
beginning, Jesus' resurrection was understood as the 
beginninu; of the end events which were to follow in 
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quick succession, so that the novelty of the view that 
only one man rose from the dead hinged on the delay of 
the end events. Pannenberg is certainly correct when 
he says that the historian has the right to seek the 
Anlass, the stimulus, in history for these serious 
modifications. Faithful to his critical methodology 
the historian will first seek the Anlass for these 
modifications within the horizon of earthly space-time. 
That means that he will first seek the Anlass for 
these modifications not in the fact that Jesus truly 
rose from the dead, but In the Easter appearances, 
considered as occurrences which do not fall completely 
out of the purview of the scientist and student of 
religion, but which find analogues in the cases of 
apparitions studied by the science of parapsychology 
(see below). If it can be shown that there is something 
special--precisely in the field of psychic research-
about the appearances of the "risen Jesus," then the 
historian would again be forced to face the question 
of an explanation of the changed psychological state 
of the disciples, an explanation for the transformation 
of the Jewish tradition at that time, and for the 
special character of the appearances themselves. 
The second argument offered by Pannenberg for the 
"objectivity" of the appearances is that the number and 
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temporal distribution of the visions precludes enthu-
siasm or mass hysteria as their explanation. He 
accepts on the basis of I Cor. 15-3-8 the appearances 
to Peter, James, the five hundred, and Paul as histori-
cally probable. But what he does not discuss Is the 
question of the Independence of these visions, or, to 
express It differently, the relationship existing among 
these experiences of coming to faith In the risen Jesus. 
Willi r^ arxsen has called Into question the Independence 
of the appearances, not as distinct occurrences, but 
precisely as stimulating a passage to Easter faith on 
the part of the percipients.73 of equal Interest Kould 
be a discussion by Pannenberg of the relation of 
appearances and visions to hysteria and enthusiasm. 
This relation has been the subject of research In 
parapsychology. "The Jewish experience of the world 
was deeply determined by the possibility of always new, 
unexpected interventions, and this fostered a fundamental 
openness for a new activity and a fresh Word from God, 
an openness which belonged in an essential way to the 
character of Israelite faith."7^ 
All this the twentieth century historian can 
subscribe to as a description of the "climate" In which 
these appearances, or visionary experiences, took place. 
but now the difficulties begin. V»hat was then 
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"reality"—of the highest order—Is not necessarily 
"reality" for the twentieth century historian.75 The 
resurrection event as Implied by the visions seems so 
different In kind from events which the historian 
normally studies that hesitation at this point Is under-
standable. 76 
In any case, one thing Is certain. If the historian 
accepts the "objectivity" of the appearances and the 
reality of Jesus' resurrection as the only probable 
explanation of the appearances, then the historian has 
to recognize and affirm that the God of Israel was at 
work In the resurrection event. While this affirmation 
would be presented with only one or other degree of 
probability, still It is unavoidable, given the meaning 
of resurrection In the context of Jesus' time. "In 
the early Christian talk about Jesus' resurrection the 
decisive thing Is this, that here God's creative power 
Is at work."77 
In discussing the Easter appearances and the weak-
nesses of the so-called subjective vision hypothesis, 
Pannenberg alludes to parapsychology and especially to 
experiments conducted In the United States regarding 
clairvoyance and precognition. By way of complementing 
Pannenberg's discussion I would like to call attention 
to an article by a Boman Catholic exegete dealing with 
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the differences and similarities between the description 
of the Easter appearances in John's Gospel and post­
mortem apparitions as studied in parapsychology.7™ in 
this article Benedikt Schwank, O.S.B, draws principally 
on the work of two prominent scientists, a German, 
Dr. Hans Bender, and an Englishman, George N. №. 
Tyrrell.79 it Is particularly the letter's work on 
apparitions which allows Schwank to make some interesting 
comparisons between parapsychology and John's report 
of apparitions, which is the most detailed In the New 
Testament. 
In Tyrrell's work sixty-one characteristic and 
well-documented cases of appearances are reported, after 
which Tyrrell offers a theory to interpret the phenomena. 
Four classes of appearance are sorted out: (1) experi­
mental cases; (2) crisis cases; (3) post-mortem cases; 
(Ό ghosts. ^ By experimental cases Tyrrell means 
those cases where an agent consciously wants to become 
visible to a definite but distant participant. These 
experiments have often been performed with success. 
In crisis cases someone who is In a dangerous situation 
Is seen, felt, or heard simultaneously by a friend 
or relative at a distant place. In these cases the 
liveliness of the appearance Is striking, as well as 
the fact that they are not the consequence of desire, 
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expectation, or anxiety. Indeed, it has been demons-
trated that the desire to see an apparition can effect 
the opposite.81 Die Society for Psychical Research, 
with which Tyrrell was associated, only recorded 
crisis cases in which the ao-ent died. According to 
his research, it does not matter whether the deal 
person appears twelve hours or three years after the 
hour of his death. 
Post-mortem cases really overlap with the previous 
class, because they are instances of anparltions of 
persons dead more than twelve hours (twelve hours after 
death was the arbitrarily set tlme-llmlt for classlfy-
incç cases as crisis cases), evidence of simultaneous 
appearances of exactly the same aooarltlon to different 
percipients at the same time rules out pure subjec-
tivls:n."2 "Ohosts" are not fundamentally different In 
nature from the first three cases according to Tyrrell, 
but contrary to earlier paraps.ychologlsts. The only 
distinction is that in the first three cases the a^ent 
wants to become visible to я definite person or persons, 
while In the case of p-hosts the agent wants to appear 
In a definite Dlace, usually in his home. Those who 
happen to be In the olace of атэреагапсе are those who 
see the aooarltion.°3 
Tyrrell offers thirteen points In which the 
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"perfect apparition" (that Is, an apparition which 
would present all the characteristics of all the recorded 
and tested cases of apparitions) is similar to the 
appearance of a normal human being, and six points In 
which It Is different.^ Schwank points out that the 
Easter appearances do not correspond to all the charac-
teristics of the "perfect apparition" nor can they be 
simply classified as post-mortem cases, since Jesus 
also appeared at places that were familiar to him; thus 
his appearances have something in common with "ghosts.1^ 
The appearances as they were described by John find 
analogues in genuine, tested accounts of appearances 
which combine elements of behavior proper to a normal 
person and elements which show that the appearance is 
not a physical object. Invented stories of appearances, 
on the other hand, generally try to show that the 
appearing reality was physically present and does this 
by indicating that an object was left behind by the 
apparition, or that footprints or other signs of 
physical presence were caused by the appearing reality.°° 
But in no case does Jesus leave behind an object or 
mark which would serve as proof of physical presence.8? 
Even the touching of the surface, i.e., the wounds of 
Jesus by Thomas, Is possible in the case of a psychic, 
non-physical object.°° (On the other hand, 
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Jesus' challenge to Thomas could be viewed as not so 
much a challenge to touch him as a challenge to believe.) 
Thus Pannenberg's remark that the appearances In 
the Gospels which are not mentioned by Paul "have such 
a strongly legendary character that one can scarcely 
find an historical kernel of their own In them" must 
be confronted with the fact that these appearances find 
an analogue in parapsychology. While this analogy does 
not of Itself suffice as a historical »proof," It 
does mean that one must vroceed with more caution In 
this area. The primary legendary characteristic 
Pannenborg finds Is the tendency toward underlining the 
corporallty of the appearances. In the light of 
parapsychology one can question whether the corporallty 
of the appearances was really what the Evangelists 
were after. If so, they could have done a more convin-
cing job of lt'89 
If the risen Jesus was not a physical object In 
the Easter appearance then the light and sound would 
not have proceeded from the appearance as from a 
physical object. The perception of Jesus was not 
experienced through the known sense organs.90 schwank 
would not want to describe this tyce of experience as 
slnroly telepathic hallucination or extrasensory 
perception as commonly understood, but he does accept 
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Dr. Bender's definition of extra-sensory perception as 
a possible description of the kind of perception 
experienced by the disciples during the ¿aster 
appearances: "a response to an external occurrence which 
is represented by no known sense organ."91 
Schwank does not only Indicate the analogies between 
the Easter appearances and the findings of parapsychology, 
but the differences as veil. For example, Jesus does 
not apoear after his death as one who Is in need, as 
one whose former life is somehow continuing, as one 
returninir to haunt his place of execution, or one who 
charges the percipient of the apparition to fulfill an 
obligation or pay a debt which should have been fulfilled 
or paid in his lifetime. These characteristics of post-
mortem apparitions familiar to parapsychology and the 
history of religions are simply absent from the accounts 
of the Easter appearances. Jesus comes, not as one in 
need, but as victor from his i-ather, as one living an 
eschatologlcal, exalted mode of being, as one full of 
power and authority. It was the disciples who experience 
Jesus in his faster appearances as the revealer, as a 
personality who can declare: Peace be with you.'. 
Зесеі е the 4oly Spiriti AB the father sent me, I send 
you.1 khose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven.' 
(John 20.19-23). Ihus in spite of the striking 
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similarities between the Easter appearances and the 
tested cases of apparitions, there are also striking 
differences. Given the contribution which the history 
of religions and parapsychology make In this area the 
historian Is compelled to treat the appearances as 
recounted In the Gospels with great respect.92 it is 
unlikely that they are completely Inventions of the 
writers of the Gospels nor do they fit without more ado 
into the pattern uncovered by the science of parapsycho­
logy. 
We have seen that at a certain point in the history 
of Jewish traditions a novum occurred, the introduction 
of the Idea that one man was raised from the dead by 
the God of Israel as the first fruits of a new creation 
and the Introduction of the conviction that a dead 
person was exalted to God's right hand. Trying to 
discover the occasion or cause for these significant 
developments in the history of Jewish traditions, we 
examined the Easter appearances. Once again we were 
faced with a novum which calls for explanation, the 
qualitatively different Impression Jesus made on the 
disciples compared with post-mortem appearances 
examined by the science of parapsychology. The 
historian seems confronted with two alternatives: 
either to continue searching within the dimensions of 
269 
space-time for an adequate explanation of these 
phenomena, or to accept the explanation offered by 
those who experienced the appearances and who Intro-
duced the changes In Jewish Tradìtlonsgeschichte. 
But who Is the historian who would be prepared to 
go beyond the affirmation of the fact that apparitions 
of "Jesus" occurred after his death; that the disciples 
were convinced on the basis of these apparitions that 
Jesus truly lives as the Exalted One, and that these 
apparitions led them to modify certain apocalyptic 
traditions? Who Is the historian who would be prepared 
to move beyond this point to make a further, different 
affirmation, namely that Jesus of Nazareth really and 
truly lives In the glory of his Father? 
11. Faith and the Reflective Historian 
Expressed briefly, the historian who would best 
be In a position to conclude to the historicity of the 
resurrection Is one who, first. Is willing to admit 
that the resurrection can be called an historical 
event, thus falling within the purview of the historian, 
and, secondly, one who finds that the resurrection 
event, Implied In other historically ascertainable 
events, corresponds to and satisfies In a striking way 
the postulates and basic drive for Intelligibility of 
his historical research. 
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Regarding the character of the resurrection as an 
historical event, Pannenberg lays great stress on Its 
pastness. By definition this event, as understood by 
Christians, Is Jesus' passing from death to a new, 
eschatologlcal mode of life In which he Is appointed 
Lord of history. Understood this way, the event cannot 
be occurring now, or In the future, or be an "eternal" 
event that Is contemporaneous with every earthly 
moment. No, the transition from death to life occurred, 
to be sure, on the other side of death, but It occurred 
"between" directly datable historical «vents, Jesus' 
death and his appearances. And it happened to Jesus 
of Nazareth. Thus Pannenborg Is asking historians to 
enlarge their notion of historical event to Include an 
event that Is at best only Indirectly ascertainable, 
which Is In principle non-empirical and which came to 
pass on the other side of this mortal world. The 
historian who is willing to enlarge his notion of the 
historical would be open to the possibility of such an 
event occurring and to the possibility of It being the 
explanation for other (directly verifiable) events. 
We would like simply to offer two comments on this 
most controversial position of Pannenberg. First, the 
"oddness" of the resurrection event cannot be got 
around. For Pannenberg It is the pre-happenlng of the 
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end of history. When It is a question of defending 
the historicity of this event, Pannenberg stresses that 
the resurrection is the pre-happening of the end event. 
But in other places, when he Is speaking of Christian 
faith, he stresses that It is the pre-happening of the 
end event. The ambiguity (or. If you will, the 
richness) of the concept and its oddness suggest that 
the methodology that would be appropriate in approach-
ing It would be equally "odd" from the standpoint of 
historical science as it is carried on by the community 
of historians.93 
Secondly, it is to be hoped that historians who 
refuse to consider the resurrection as falling within 
the class "historical event" will do so out of methodo-
logical modesty, and not out of metaphysical prejudice. 
When the methodological historlclsm proper to historical 
science freezes Into a metaphysical historlclsm, 
historians have gone unjustifiably beyond their own 
bounds.9 The past may hold hints half guessed, and 
gifts half understood, which historians, upon common 
agreement, choose not to follow up. All well and good. 
But an historian must remain a student of history and 
not Its keeper. 
The second condition that Pannenberg posits If an 
historian is to conquer his hesitations before the 
•¿r¿ 
strangeness of an event such as the resurrection Is 
that the historian must have reflected on the under-
lying dynamism of historical research and must have 
accurately formulated the basic postulates which are 
implied In the workings of historical science. (In 
other words, the historian must become something of a 
philosopher of history.) Four of the relevant postu-
lates, as Pannenberg "reads" them, can be formulated 
succinctly: 
1) Every historical event has its meaning in 
the context of the totality of history, which is only 
given at the end of history;95 
2) This end of history Is anticipated by the 
historian whenever meanings are attributed to 
historical events;96 
3) History must have a temporal end, if It Is 
to be Intelligible;97 
4·) The ultimate subject of history, which gives 
it its unity and Intelligibility, cannot simply be an 
intramundane reality (for example, mankind considered 
collectively or as a species).9° 
lïiese postulates are defended by Pannenberg 
precisely as postulates. Their truth can only appear 
from an examination of history. Specifically the whole 
field of the history of religions must be searched for 
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the answer to the question of meaning implied In these 
postulates.°° 
The problem is, of course, that historians, when 
they philosophically reflect on their undertaking, do 
not arrive at the same postulates as Pannenberg. The 
most striking illustration of this are the second and 
fourth postulates. Pannenberg himself admits that the 
second postulate is contradlctable, and the fourth 
postulate runs counter to the contemporary attitude to 
history.100 If Pannenberg is correct that contemporary 
historical thought does not direct the right questions 
to history when ultimate meaning Is at issue, one may 
ask what it Is that does uncover the right question for 
Parmenberg. How does Pannenberg come to formulate 
different postulates, to pose different questions, than 
contemporary historians and philosophers of history? 
It seems to me that the structure Pannenberg gives to 
historical reason when he formulates his postulates is 
precisely the structure which (historical) human reason 
discovers as it formulates the "reasons" for the 
surrender to the divine Invitation offered In the Christ-
event. The Christian believer who reflects on his 
faith and formulates his faith within the categories 
of universal history (In relation to the apocalyptic 
horizon of the Christ-event) is the one who Is most 
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likely to uncover postulates such as the ones presented 
by Pannenberg.101 
But Is this a vicious circle? Does it mean that 
faith dictates to reason how reason should Interrogate 
history? These questions bring us into the heart of 
the hermeneutlcal problem. In order to keep my 
remarks within bounds, I shall restrict myself to a 
consideration of Pannenberg's understanding of the 
relationship between reason and faith. 
The principal points from his discussion can be 
profitably separated out from his writings to show that 
his position regarding this delicate issue is a 
nuanced one In spite of a certain one-sldedness: 
1) Even if in the concrete the Christian act of 
faith psychologically usually precedes the rational 
knowledge of the grounds of reliability (credibility), 
the latter is logically prior to the act of faith. 
Most Christians do not, and need not, examine the ground 
of their faith. Their faith contains within itself, 
however, the (at least implicit) anticipation of a later 
Justification of the decision to believe. It is the 
task of theology within the Christian community to 
examine the reasons accessible to human understanding 
for believing.102 
2) Historical reason Is able to arrive at the 
"¿Tb 
knowledge that God has revealed himself In Jesus 
Christ. This historical knowledge can possess at best 
a high degree of probability.103 
3) Christian faith, as distinct from fides 
historica (historical knowledge) Is a special gift of 
God, and God himself Is Its ground. Christian faith 
In Jesus' resurrection Involves one's personal partici-
pation In the Spirit-character of that eschatologlcal 
event. But even before the assent of faith Is made the 
Holy Spirit's action Is often needed to remove obstacles 
Impeding a person from recognizing with his reason the 
event of revelation. But at no time does the Holy 
Spirit's work of Illumination mean that the Spirit adds 
persuasive power "from outside" to the Christ-event 
which It does not possess of Itself, nor does Its 
activity supplant the work of "natural" reason. Rather, 
the grace of the Holy Spirit helps reason to be most 
faithful to Itself by transcending Itself, but this 
transcendence is in response to an invitation which can 
be perceived by human reason.ЮЧ· 
it·) Human reason is able to recognize that God 
has revealed himself, yet the person can refuse the 
Invitation recognized. This refusal can be a sinful 
one.
105 
5) Because the reason why one believes resides 
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(or should reside) In what one believes, the resurrec-
tion of Jesus Christ is both ground and object of 
Christian faith. Logically, knowledge of the ground 
precedes the commitment which Is faith, yet the latter 
is the richer form of knowledge, for it is knowledge 
by participation, whereas knowledge of the ground of 
faith is still, logically, only knowledge of the Invi-
tation to participate. Moreover, faith is able to 
serve as the criterion of the rationality of reason.10° 
In comparison with his earlier essay in Offenbarung 
als Geschichte Pannenberg's position regarding the 
relation between faith and reason in later writings is 
similar in some respects to the teaching of the Roman 
Catholic maglsterlum. With Vatican Council I Pannenberg 
argues that faith Is a gift of God, that Its object 
and ultimate ground (motive) of assent is the revealing 
God himself; on the other hand, there are reliable 
external arguments for the credibility of revelation.107 
He seems to argue that it Is possible to arrive by human 
reason alone at the conviction that God has revealed 
himself in history (although he admits the need in 
most people of the Holy Spirit's aid in removing 
subjective hindrances to recognizing God's revelation 
which in end out of itself is clear and demonstrably 
true). Here he comes close to a concern expressed in 
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the encyclical Human1 кепегіз.10" The concern of 
Vatican I that the decision of faith be a free one, can 
be positively compared with Pannenberg's Insistence 
that while the decision of faith as such Is not based 
on Itself but on a ground extra se which Is perceivable 
by reason, still It Is possible for a person to 
perceive the Invitation of the revealing God and yet 
refuse to commit himself.109 
Like many contemporary Roman Catholic theologians 
Pannenberg develops a rich and open notion of human 
reason, stressing Its heuristic dynamism, Its power of 
transcendence of the given, and Its proleptlc or 
anticipatory structure.HO Thus he Is able to see faith 
as a reason Itself being most faithful to Itself when— 
gifted by God—It yields Itself to God's future 
revealed In Jesus Christ. 
However, I have a reservation regarding Pannenberg's 
understanding of the relation between faith and reason. 
I think that he has underestimated the obscurity of 
faith's object. By Insisting that God's revelation Is 
clear In and of Itself and that the difficulty In 
perceiving It lies In subjective hindrances In man which 
can be removed (to a great extent) by openness to the 
Holy Spirit and by dint of hard Intellectual work, 
Pannenberg has neglected a fundamental dimension of the 
2 7ΐ> 
Christian venture, namely, the dimension of mystery. 
God as he Is In himself and also for us is the Infinite 
personal mystery. For finite man God Is mystery not 
only because man Is sinful or full of prejudices calling 
for Intellectual, moral, and religious conversion,Ш 
but also because he Is the Infinite God. The action 
of the Holy Spirit Is not simply a clearing action 
(Ausräumung) but an action which con-naturalizes or 
attunes man to the things of God. This process of 
attuning reaches down to the personal center of man, 
where freedom sind knowledge are one.H^ Because of his 
reaction to the dominant theological position In Germany 
at the moment, Pannenberg has emphasized, understandably, 
the rational moment of Christian faith. But his 
association of the action of the Holy Spirit with the 
object and ground of faith (I.e., the resurrection of 
Jesus as an eschatologlcal and thus "pneumatic" event) 
together with his notion of historical reason offers 
the basis for a correction of his one-sldedness. 
Earlier I asked whether Pannenberg Is Involved 
In a vicious circle when he discovers In human 
historical reason Implicit postulates which correspond 
to the proleptlc and eschatologlcal character of the 
resurrection-event. I think that the answer is, no. 
Pannenberg has not "proved" that the God of Israel 
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exists, чог has he "proved" that Jesus of Nazareth 
rose fron the dead. The understandable reluctance on 
the part of historians to include an eschatological 
event within their area of study is enouçh to prevent 
talk of "proof." Eut in his examination of the signs 
given within human experience (particularly the 
quality of Jesus* life and death, and the Easter 
appearances) he has offered, at the least, important 
elements of a Justification of the act of faith in 
Jesus Christ as a prudent and responsible act.ИЗ 
Yet the truth accepted and shared In this commitment 
of faith mist, as Pannenbero says, always be tested 
anew, in relation to ever-new and wider horizons of 
human existence and human history, for the recognition 
that "lOd was at work in a special—indeed unsurpassable— 
way in Jesus Christ is the recognition that the origin 
of all meaning and the power over all was at work in 
Jesus. And so the analysis fidei is a never-completed 
task of theology, and its results, as important and 
Irreplaceable as they are, are always provisional, this 
side of the eschaton. •'• 
It is precisely his taking serious the task of 
theology which Потіап Catholics call the analysis f idei 
which sets Pannenbera- apart from the three theoloslans 
»e considered in Chapter I. Parth, "ultrann and Ebellno-, 
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for all their significant differences, have no use for 
a "legitimation" of Christian faith by human reason. 
Tiey view any attempt to ground the faith in historical 
science as a perversion of the Inteerity of Christian 
faith and as a substitution of 'works (of reason) for 
faith. Pannenbere-, on the other hand, is concerned to 
develop a "foundational" theoloiy, one which tries to 
justify to modern man the use of "od-talk as responsi-
ble and necessary, if one Is to be faithful to reality. 
i hile, as we have seen, his approach Is definitely 
one-sidedly rational In the sense that he does not 
attend sufficiently to the mystery-character of reve-
lation and the need for the connaturalizinç action of 
"-od· s çrace If the mystery is to be recognized and 
entered Into, still he has offered Important ele^en^s 
to the discussion of the relation between faith and 
(historical) reason which contemporary theolonry cannot 
afford to ignore. 
Summary of Chapter V 
i e divided our critical reflections into two 
chapters, not onüy for reasons of convenience, but 
because Fannenber^'s own discussion calls for a distinc-
tion between exesetical and historical themes on the 
one hand, and systematic Issues on the other. 
At the beginning of this chapter we called 
attention to the peculiar understanding of Tradltlons-
Keschlchte as employed by our author. While making 
use of the findings of form-criticism, redaction-
criticism, and historical criticism of the traditions 
in question, Pannenberg1s Traditionsgeschichte 
ambitions the actualizing of the traditions into the 
future. It is, however, very difficult to discuss 
the merits and demerits of this ambitious approach to 
the past in an abstract way, and so we turned next to 
the Munich theologian's treatment of the relationship 
between Jesus and his apocalyptic milieu. 
In reviewing Pannenberg's idea of prolepsis, we 
concluded that the New Testament evidence does Indicate 
a proleptlc character In Jesus' message and behavior, 
but that apocalyptic may not be capable of providing 
the single horizon against which the preaching of 
Jesus—who used the richness and diversity of his 
inherited traditions—would be best understood. The 
idea of Jesus' anticipating a future confirmation 
acquires its greatest support not from textual conside-
rations (Lk. 12.8 Is asked to bear a lot of weight In 
Pannenberg's analysis) but from historical considerations, 
particularly from the recognition that Jesus' claim 
did possess an ambiguity for those who saw the maintenance 
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of the Law as Cod's will and who were impressed by the 
fact that the leaders of »od's People rejected the man 
from Galilee. 
A thornier and more basic problem arises when one 
considers the state of scholarship with regard to 
apocalyptic at the present. A review of the state of 
scholarship would seem to indicate that the systematic 
theologian can build on no existing consensus when he 
attempts to construct a Christology which makes apocalyp­
tic and its understanding of history pivotal to 
understanding the historical Jesus and hirj relevance 
for contemporary man. 
We then moved on to a discussion of Pannenberg1s 
ilea of the resurrection as an historical event and 
his examination of the faster visions as "evidence" 
of the actual occurrence of the resurrection of Jesus. 
'«/e saw that the careful examiner is confronted with a 
novum at each step of his examination. In the history 
of traditions out of which the Saster faith arose the 
idea that one person rose from the dead was a novum 
calling for explanation. So, too, the idea that a dead 
person was translated and exalted into eschatological 
existence was a ηоvia m (although this facet of the 
Easter tradition Is not attended to by Pannenber?). 
Plnally, the examination of the Easter appearances 
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as depicted by the Evangelists (we focused with 
Benedikt Schwank particularly on John's version) 
revealed that the appearing agent was portrayed as 
qualitatively different from those apparitions studied 
by the science of parapsychology. While such an 
examination can in no way replace the historical and 
literary analysis of the Easter stories as carried on 
by exegetes, still it performs the modest service of 
indicating that the faith conviction that is expressed 
in the formation of these stories contains a novum 
when compared to the conviction regarding apparitions 
otherwise studied by science. At the same time, such 
an examination makes one cautious about describing 
the apparition stories as involving a "gross 
materialization" of the resurrected Lord. 
Confronted by these nova, the human inquirer can 
decide to remain exclusively on the "horizontal" level 
in his search for an explanation, or he can begin to 
detect a sign value in these nova. This latter 
possibility led us into a discussion of "faith and the 
reflective historian" in which we saw that Pannenberg's 
concern to test the grounds of credibility or 
reliability of the act of faith, while possessing a 
one-sldednese which calls for correction, still offers 
elements which contemporary theology (particularly 
2Ö4-
Evangelical theology) needs to be reminded of. 
And now It Is time to turn our attention to the 
systematic aspects of his Chrlstology, although this 
will not mean that we shall have to turn our backs 
on the historical and ezegetlcal questions. To the 
extent that Pannenberg1s Chrlstology Is, at least In 
Its most Important contours, a faithful presentation 
for our time of the ancient Christian message regarding 
Jesus Christ, to that extent the systematic 
contribution will allow exegetlcal research to "come 
Into Its own" for our time. 
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CHAPTER VI: SYSTEMATIC REFLECTIONS 
I shall restrict myself here to a consideration 
of three fundamental contributions of Pannenberg 
regarding the resurrection considered as retroactive 
event, Jesus dialectical identity with the Son of God, 
and God's transcendence In the Incarnation. 
A. Resurrection and Retroactivity 
Pannenberg sees the fundamental problem of 
traditional Chrlstology residing In the doctrine of 
the incarnation Itself. This appears from his analysis 
of the aporias of Antiochene and Alexandrian 
Chrlstology (pp. 295f.); from his examination of the 
doctrine of the communicatlo ldlomatum (pp. JIJT.); 
from his discussion of the kenosls theory, which tries 
to escape from the dilemma but which in turn either 
calls God's divinity into question or renders Jesus' 
real humanity problematic (pp. 319f·); and finally, 
this becomes apparent from his discussion of the role 
of the resurrection In modern theology, in which the 
incarnation is generally conceived in such a way that 
the resurrection acquires secondary Importance 
(pp. 106-112). 
In order to escape the dilemma of traditional 
Chrlstology Pannenberg proposes his theory of the 
retroactive power of the resurrection (rückwirkende 
Kraft, e.g., p. 13^). In general it can be said that 
this means that Jesus is essentially one with God on 
the basis of the resurrection event, and that his 
entire earthly existence is united essentially to God 
via this event which was temporally future with 
respect to his earthly existence. But what this 
precisely means for Pannenberg is not clearly 
expressed. The relation between the resurrection and 
Jesus' divinity is expressed by him in a number of 
ways: 
1) Sometimes Jesus seems to be divine only 
because of the resurrection: pp. 230, 336, 37Θ; 
2) Yet Pannenberg insists that it is wrong 
to say that Jesus received his divinity only at the 
resurrection: pp. 13^-6;1 
3) Sometimes Jesus is said to be divine from 
the beginning of his existence but that this fact 
becomes apparent only at the resurrection: pp. IkO, 
152: 
k) Sometimes there is talk of a progressive 
incarnation (dlvlnlzation) which is completed at the 
resurrection: pp. 31?. 333, 350, 356f; 
5) Sometimes Pannenberg speaks of Jesus· 
divinity as recognizable in his earthly life and 
confirmed by the resurrection: pp, 303, 3/*-7f; 
¿δν 
6) Yet he maintains that Jesus1 life was 
thoroughly ambiguous, and that his death was a 
catastrophe for Jesus and his disciples: pp. 2J0, 
337; 
7) The resurrection is sometimes called the 
confirmation of what Jesus already was in his life: 
P. 363. 
It is not our contention that each of these 
statements is irreconcilable with the others. But 
what is especially important is to see how the first 
three statements can be reconciled. Two positions 
are definitely excluded by Pannenberg: first, the 
view that through his resurrection Jesus received his 
divinity without relation to his claim or message, and, 
second, the view that the resurrection was simply the 
becoming apparent of a divinity which Jesus had 
independent of the resurrection. 
For Pannenberg the resurrection is both ontologl-
cally (quoad se) and epistemologlcally (quoad nos) the 
basis of Jesus' essential unity with God. This Involves 
him in a new metaphysical view, partly inspired by Old 
Testament and New Testament eschatology, which runs 
counter to common sensei The future is ontolo^lcally 
prior to the present. Thus when Fannenberg speaks of 
the "retroactive power of the resurrection" he is not 
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drawing on our ordinary notions TPirardinn: the relation 
of the nresent to the future. 
Sometimes Pannenberrç tries to explain his vlew-
üolnt in terms of common sense and ordinary experience. 
He does this when he invokes two common experiences to 
Illustrate what he means by "retroactivity." First 
he refers to legal terminology (p. 13'»·)· But he 
acknowledges that this does not go far »nough, since 
a retroactive declaration in law does not yet reach the 
ontological order. The second Illustration comes from 
our experience that, for exanmle, th<» future of a 
person decides what and who that person really Is 
(лр. llUf.l. The future is constitutive of the meaning 
of a person. This second illustration, however, is 
deficient because it is open to an interpretation which 
Pannenberg wants to avoid. It can be interpreted in 
evolutionary categories, according to which we know 
something's essence only when we know Its final state 
of development. This is a truism. But Pannenberg 
wants to express more than a truism. 
The new ontological perspective offered by 
Pannenbera; Is fflven its best expression in an article 
entitled "Theology and the Kingdom of God" which 
appeared In English in 196?. A selection of his 
remarks regarding the relation of the future to the 
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present will Indicate the novelty of this position: 
The resounding motif of Jesus' message— 
the Imminent Kingdom of God—must be 
recovered as a key to the whole of 
Christian theology.2 
The deity of God Is his rule.... The God 
of the coming rule Is related to all 
that is finite and is the power deter-
mining the future of all that is 
present.3 
The Interweaving of future and present in 
Jesus' statements is not taken seriously 
by those who denigrate futurity as a 
hangover from Jewish apocalyptic. On the 
other hand, neither can we agree with 
Cullmann, who says that Jesus understood 
the Kingdom of God as beginning, in his 
presence and only to be fulfilled In the 
future. It is more appropriate to 
reverse the connection between present 
and future, giving priority to the future. 
Of course, this Is strange for contempo-
rary thought....b 
One of A. N. Whitehead's most fascinating 
ideas is that the new Is not set forth 
by the already existing but enters 
subjectively into relation with what is. 
Thus the continuity of nature Is no longer 
understood as the irresistible dynamic 
of the already existing pushing forward, 
but as the building of bridges to the past 
that save the past from getting lost.5 
I believe Whitehead's vision can be 
conceptualized in a more consistent fashion 
than Whitehead himself utilizes, if the 
contingency of the ne* events or occasions 
which occur to the existing world is des-
cribed as a result of the futuristic power 
of creative love.6 
These quotations do not fully express Pannenberg's views 
on the relation of the future to the present, and some 
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of them deal directly with the philosophy of nature, 
but they do Indicate how Pannenberg wishes to 
"subvert" the common sense view of future and present 
(and past) when discussing Jesus1 unity with God.7 
The resurrection is the pre-happening of the 
future of the world, of the end of the world. Because 
God, as the "power over all" is the only one who can 
bring the world to Its End (which is himself), the 
resurrection is also the "pre-happening of God" as 
actual Lord of history. Thus Jesus is identified with 
God's essence as power over all and as end of history. 
God's unsurpassable future is present iri its futurity 
in Jesus. This means that God grasps Jesus' entire 
earthly existence as his own through (out of, on the 
basis of) an event that is future and outstanding with 
respect to Jesus' life on earth, but which in his 
claim and behavior he anticipates. God unites himself 
to Jesus not from "above" but "in advance of" Jesus. 
On the basis of this brief sketch of Pannenberg's 
point of view regarding resurrection as a retroactive 
event, it is perhaps possible to see how he reconciles 
the apparently divergent views referred to above. 
First, the resurrection event is essential for the 
constitution of Jesus as divine. Second, through that 
event God is uniquely present in Jesus during his 
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earthly life, preeent as the one who will come at the 
end of history and In Ita anticipation in Jesus' 
resurrection. Third, as Jesus grows his unity with 
God (who Is his future) grows, but as response to 
God's presence which comes to Jesus out of the future 
(his resurrection). The resurrection Is able to 
Influence Jesus' life precisely because it is an 
eschatologlcal event. 
By means of this conceptuallty (which is 
difficult going for common sense!) Pannenberg hopes 
to be faithful to the tension existing between 
present and future in both Jesus' message and in the 
resurrection event. He hopes also to achieve some-
thing that the kenosls doctrine tried unsuccessfully 
to do: relieve the pressure of divinity from the 
human shoulders of Jesus, but not In such a way that 
he falls into an adoptionist position. All of Jesus' 
life is the self-revelation of God, but because of 
the resurrection, which reaches back to claim 
(ontologlcally) all of his earthly life. 
The doctrine of the incarnation still retains 
its value as an expression of the fact that the 
resurrection not only sheds a light on Jesus' whole 
earthly existence but effects it as the self-revelation 
of God. What was hinted at in Jesus' earthly life 
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becomes fully constituted fact In his resurrection and 
in such wise that now Jesus' earthly life is no lonçer 
hint but is the unsurpassable medium of God's self-
communication. 
As far as the present writer can Judge, Pannenberg's 
notion of the ontological priority of the future, as 
applied to Jesus' unity with God, is original with him.8 
While Hegel, A. N. Whitehead. Ernst Bloch, and Martin 
Heidegger have a share in the shape which his thinking 
has taken, РаппепЬегк is offering his own contribution 
in Chrlstology.9 The usefulness of the notion for the 
question of the divinity of Jesus Is apparent. We 
would like here to address one question to Pannenberg, 
one which we think points up the difficulty and the 
challenge his reflections involved. The question can 
be expressed this way: According to Pannenberg is 
Jesus' resurrection a contingent or a necessary event 
with respect to his earthly life? In other words: 
In the light of what he now knows about Jesus and 
God's Involvement with him, does Pannenberg say that, 
up until and including the end of his earthly exis­
tence, Jesus had a genuinely open future such that the 
resurrection event overcame him (1) as unnecessltated 
by anything that preceded It, yet (2) as the fulfill­
ment of his whole life? 
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In the traditional Chrlstol оку It would seem that the 
Incarnation of the Logos occurring at the beginning 
of Jesus' existence is a contingent event In the sense 
that it is God's free self-communication to the world 
which is not necessitated by Jesus' pre-hlstory in 
Israel and which nonetheless comes as the fulfillment 
of that pre-hlstory. Within that perspective the 
resurrection is not contingent but is the bringing to 
conclusion of the free event of God's self-communication 
at the Incarnation. In Pannenberg's context, however, 
we are not permitted to speak first of the Incarnation 
and then of the resurrection: the order of ontologlcal 
priority must be reversed. Can we now say—must we now 
say—that Jesus need not have been raised from the 
dead? 
This question flows from Pannenberg's own point 
of view. It Is his contention that the resurrection 
event, and nothing preceding it, decides Jesus' 
divinity.10 That would seem to Imply that before the 
resurrection Jesus' essential unity with God was not 
yet decided, that he had an open future before that 
event occurred. If this openness of Jesus' existence 
to various possibilities was real and not simply 
apparent (needing, as It were, only the resurrection 
to clear up lingering doubts about who he was) then 
¿:уч· 
how can Jesus have been the presence of God In history 
in his earthly life? Would it be better to say simply 
that "das irdische Verhalten Jesu erschien Ja gerade 
als durchaus zweideutig" (p. 377)• 1 1 But Pannenberg 
rightfully does not want to leave it at that, because 
the resurrection event makes Jesus* earthly existence 
different from what it was before the event occurred: 
it makes it the life of the Resurrected One.' Still the 
complexity mounts: Jesus' earthly life was unique because 
It is effected by the resurrection event before the 
latter happened; that is, Jesus' earthly life anticipated 
the resurrection and all that it spelled for Jesus' 
llfeî12 
We are being asked by Pannenberg to apply to 
Jesus a statement which he first of all relates to the 
problem of the continuity of nature. Paraphrasing, we 
might say that the continuity of Jesus' entire 
existence (the earthly and the glorified) comes not 
from the beginning of his life (incarnation) but from 
its end, so that the resurrection as the eschatologlcal 
event can be conceived as the building of a bridge 
which saves Jesus' past (his earthly existence) from 
being lost, or, positively expressed, claims It as 
belonging to the Absolute Future of history, God 
himself. In this respect Pannenberg has made 
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systematically significant the esehatologlcal 
character of the resurrection. In spite of the 
occasional Inconsistencies In Its expression. The 
truth of his position regarding the relation between 
future and past events within the spatio-temporal 
continuum can be left undecided In Chrlstology, 
without his contribution regarding the relation of 
esehatologlcal reality to human history being 
endangered. 
B. The Dialectic of Jesus1 Sonshlp 
The unity which comes to be In Its fullness at 
the resurrection was already at work In the earthly 
life. Pannenberg's reflections on the personal unity 
between Jesus and God during his life on earth forms 
one of the most suggestive portions of GrundzOge. and 
It Is here, together with his notion of the retroactive 
power of the resurrection. In my estimation, that 
Pannenberg makes an Important contribution to contem-
porary Chrlstology. 
Pannenberg rightly points out that Jesus' life was 
marked by a profound commitment to his Father and to 
the task asked of him, the task of calling men Into 
the Imminent Kingdom of God. In all this Jesus 
revealed a consciousness of distinction from and subor-
dination to the Father. There Is no sign that Jesus 
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was conscious, In an Immediate way, of a relation to the 
divine Son as a reality over against him (p. 3^5). 
This distinction and subordination are not Just those 
of one who Is human over against the divine Thou, but 
of a specific relationship to the Father, the proleptlc 
presence of whose divine Kingdom Jesus was. Thus 
Pannenberg rightly speaks of the earthly Jesus In more 
than anthropological terms. The unity between the 
earthly Jesus and God his Father is first correctly 
described as a functional unity, Insofar as Jesus' 
life and fate consisted In preactuallzlng the future 
full reality of the Kingdom (p. 3^5). 
This functional unity was marked by a personal 
relationship between Jesus and God his Father: 
Pannenberg calls this Personffemelnsohaft. This 
personal relationship Involved a life of dedication 
(Hingabe) to the point of self-surrender (Selbstprels-
gabe) on the cross In which, paradoxically, the unity 
with God Increased in direct proportion to the loss of 
"clarity" which Invaded his life as he was rejected 
apparently by God.^ But the resurrection shows that 
Jesus Is wholly "of God," wholly "one with God." 
The striking thing about Pannenberg1s discussion 
of Jesus' divinity is that he insists on talking about 
Jesus' divinity Indirectly by way of what he himself 
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calls a "detour:" Scripture speaks of Jesus' relation 
to the Father. and that Is how we must speak about him. 
This principle—for such It Is—can be called, in 
Anglo-Saxon terms, a basic rule of the Chrlstologlcal 
language game: and might be also expressed by saying: 
Never formulate anything about the divinity of Jesus 
that Is not based on, and retranslatable Into, a 
statement about the concrete, unique historical rela-
tionship of Jesus to his Father and to his fellow men. 
This Is an eminently sensible control on Chrlstologlcal 
discourse, and one which is rooted in the New Testament. 
Jesus is said to have been functionally one with 
God and in personal community with him as his Father. 
Now Fannenberg goes farther. The personal community 
between Jesus and God is also essential community. 
As we have seen, Pannenberg Justifies this, first, by 
his understanding of the resurrection as God's self-
revelatlon, insofar as only God can bring about the 
end of history (even in a proleptic way) and secondly, 
he Justifies this with a reference to Hegel and 
"immersion in the other." Hegel's formula allows 
Pannenberg to say that Jesus' dedication to God his 
Father is what mediates (vermittelt) and establishes 
(begründet' his divinity (p. 3^7). Strange, but up 
until now one had the impression that this role was 
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attributed to the resurrection event, which occurred 
after Jesus1 death, when his earthly Hingabe was no 
more. But, In any case, Pannenberg sees his dedication, 
confirmed by the resurrection, as making clear that 
Jesus is the correlate of him whom he called Father: 
Jesus, in the execution of his dedication, Is the Son. 
We have seen that Pannenberg is the mortal enemy 
of that Interpretation of the "two-natures" doctrine, 
according to which Jesus is a "compound" (Zusammenset-
zung) of two substances or principles; for him—and 
I concur—Jesus' humanity and divinity are two comple-
mentary aspects of his existence. Noetically his eternal 
Sonshlp is grounded for us in his concrete existence 
and fate; ontologically, his entire human existence is 
rooted In the divine Sonshlp, for It is here that 
Jesus' human existence has the ground of Its unity and 
meaning. 
This ontological statement of the relationship 
between Jesus and the divine Son brings us to his 
discussion of the doctrine of enhypostasis. What he 
finds acceptable here—faithful to his methodological 
principle of the "detour"—Is that it expresses the 
truth that the whole course of Jesus' human existence 
was ontologically dependent on the Son of God. This 
ontological dependence is distinguished from personal, 
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dialogical dependence. The latter experiential form 
of dependence existed between Jesus and his Father, and 
Is what mediates the ontologlcal rootedness In the 
eternal Son. The more Jesus grew In his relation to 
the Father, the more he became the Son. Understanding 
the enhypostasis formula as an ontologlcal statement 
summing up what takes place In the course of Jesus' 
existence (including the resurrection as confirmation 
of that existence), Pannenberg reminds us that the 
abstract notion of enhypostasis may never be the 
starting-point of Christologlcal discussion. The 
starting-point and constant framework must always be 
Jesus in his concrete career. Ontology is unavoidable, 
If we are to be clear about our concepts of person, 
existence, and relation (for example), but these 
ontologlcal tools must help Illuminate Jesus' life for 
us in his concrete relations to the Father and fellow-
men. 
At work in this section of Grundzüge is a concept 
of person that calls for discussion. Pannenberg's 
analysis of the history of the idea makes it clear 
that for him It must be distinguished from spiritual 
individuality, that it should keep the Implication that 
personhood is grounded In a "relation of origin," and 
that being a person means in the last analysis transcen-
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dental openness to lod. rhe notion thus strongly 
emphasizes relatlonallty and üod-openness. *• What Is 
seriously lacking In his analysis Is attention to the 
correlative aspects of personhood: self-consciousness, 
Interlorlty, self-possession. Surely It Is possible 
to show that self-possession and relatedness are not 
mutually exclusive, while at the sarae time Indicatine 
the difference between the second Trinitarian hypos-
tasis and human personhood. Because he does not 
accentuate self-possession Pannenberg can speak of the 
Hegelian notion of person In the Trinity as the high 
point of Prlnltarlan speculation up until our day, 
because It gives the sharpest accentuation to the 
personality of the Father, Son and Spirit (p. ΙΒΊ-). 
According to Pannenberg the Trinity In Hegel's concep­
tion consists In three subjects "confronting" one 
another. But Pannenberg Is not at ease with this trl-
subjectlvlty, because he then Immediately quotes Hegel 
about how the subject surrenders Its subjectivity, and 
Immerses Itself In the other, In order to be really 
Person. We have to agree with Professor Berkhof that 
Pannenberg's Trinitarian theology Is sorely under­
developed. 15 This Is especially the case because It 
Is РаппепЬегя with his notion of the Indirect, 
dialectical identity of Jesus and the eternal Son of 
301 
God, who has shown the "simple" notion of God at work 
In the two-natures doctrine to be Inadequate and has 
made Trinitarian theology the more fruitful context 
In which to speak of the hypostatic union. 
What Is disappointing about Pannenberg's discus-
sion of Jesus as person is that he seems to suggest 
things about the divine Son which cry for further 
reflection. For example, he offers a fine methodo-
logical principle when he speaks of the necessity of 
speaking of the unity between Jesus and the eternal 
Son only indirectly, as an Implication of the unity 
between Jesus and his Father ("unity," of course, 
meaning something different but related In each of 
these cases).1° But doesn't this methodology have 
important implications? Doesn't It imply something 
about the way the Father is "person" In Jesus' life, 
and the way the eternal Son Is "person" In his life? 
Pannenberg insists that the only divine Thou In Jesus' 
earthly life was the Father. Might we not conceive 
the eternal Son as the Father's communication of his 
own integrity and unity of life to Jesus' existence, 
which integrity and unity is the second divine 
hypostasis? The Father, I am suggesting. Is "person" 
in Jesus' life, in a way different from the way the 
second divine hypostasis Is "person¡" does this not 
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reveal a difference within the Trinity?1''' Pannenberg 
does not go Into this question. But there are 
tantalizing hints of possible further development In 
his reflections. For example, he says that the person 
who Integrates Jesus' life Into a whole (here he means 
the eternal Son) Is both active and passive because of 
his relational character (p. 356). Again, he says 
that the Integrating person realizes himself precisely 
as the person of the Son belonging eternally to the 
deity of God (ibid.). To what degree did the eternal 
Son of God become son of God In Jesus of Nazareth? 
Pannenberg's statements are tantalizing, but they call 
for development. And we do not wish to draw conclu-
sions from them that Pannenberg does not draw. 
Pannenberg never speaks of Jesus explicitly as a 
human person, nor does he deny that he is one. He does 
seem to affirm that Jesus the man Is a concrete 
Individual, and this not because of his unity with the 
divine Son (p. 352)· Jesus is person (i.e., an 
eminently relational and unique reality) in the person 
of the divine Son. Yet he so expresses the matter that 
nothing is denied Jesus' human reality to leave room 
for a special divine principle. God and man do not 
compete in Jesus, as Pannenberg understands him. Nor, 
to discover the divine in him, must one move from his 
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humanity to another "level" of his being. Jesus' 
divinity is not a second "substance" In the man Jesus 
In addition to his humanity. Precisely as this man, 
Jesus is the Son of God and thus himself God. Precisely 
in his particular humanity Jesus is the Son of God 
(p. 35*). l 8 
There are open questions in Pannenberg's treatment 
of Jesus' divinity, but this affirmation of his regard­
ing where one meets that divinity sets the stage for 
the only kind of Chrlstologlcal discussion that has a 
chance of moving forward. Furthermore, when we compare 
Pannenberg to the five theologians reviewed in Chapter 
One, it is apparent that he has Improved on all of 
them In at least the two decisive points we have Just 
examined, namely, the retroactive role of the resurrec­
tion and the dialectic of Jesus' Sonshlp. On both counts 
he has shown that a fruitful confrontation of Scripture 
and Church dogma is possible and Indeed necessary if 
a Chrlstology adequate for the latter half of the 
twentieth century is to become a fact, and not Just a 
hope. 
С God's Transcendence in the Incarnation 
1. Our Knowledge of God's Transcendence 
As we have repeatedly seen, Pannenberg views Jesus' 
life and resurrection as the self-revelation of God. 
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But while God reveals himself In Jesus, he remains 
nonetheless the InfInltej mysterious, eternal source of 
created reality. Pannenberg maintains that, when the 
human mind applies itself to what happened in Jesus 
and tries to express the full depth of this event, it 
cannot help arriving at statements which, taken for 
themselves, are contradictory. He gives three examples 
of such statements: the idea that Jesus' divinity 
"precedes" his earthly existence; the notion that 
there is a becoming in God that leads to the incarna-
tion; and thirdly, the confession that the eternal 
Son is not the Father and yet Is essentially one with 
him (p. I85). Each of these statements is 
"doxological" in nature. That is to say, each is a 
human attempt to praise God on the basis of specific 
historical deeds. Because God himself Is involved in 
history, it is possible to formulate statements which 
go beyond a confession of God's Involvement In specific 
events (for example, "God raised Jesus of Nazareth from 
the dead"—which Pannenbere- calls a "kerygmatlc state-
ment") to a confession of God himself In his eternal 
essence. The finite character of these concepts Is 
"broken open" in the act in which the human mind praises 
God In his eternity by offering up the weak attempts to 
understand Who it is who is active in history on man's 
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behalf.19 
This Is an Important factor In Pannenberg1s 
theology.20 The Munich theologian wrote his 
Habilitâtlonschr1ft (still unpublished) on the history 
of the Idea of analogy between God and the world from 
early Greek philosophy up to and Including Thomas 
Aquinas. He rejects any form of analogical knowledge 
of God based on an analogy of being. The only kind of 
analogy which exists In authentic speech about God 
(I.e., In worship) Is linguistic, that Is, there Is a 
similarity between the way certain words are used In 
everyday life and In theology.21 But there Is no 
analogy between the theological usage and the reality 
of God, nor a (known) analogy between states of affairs 
In the world and within God. Bejectlng a common logos 
linking the world and God, Pannenberg has to reject 
analogical talk about God. But If our speech about 
God Is not analogical, neither Is It unlvocal. Borrowing 
a phrase from Boethlus, Pannenberg describes the nature 
of human talk about God as aequlvocatlo a Consilio 
(dellberate equivocation).22 Pannenberg employs this 
term to Indicate that, even though theological talk of 
God In his transcendence Is equivocal or metaphorical 
(übertragen), a control can be placed on this language. 
The equivocation Is never arbitrary, because It Is 
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always based on specific events in history and the 
experience of God engendered by those events. The 
recognition of God's action in history is the occasion 
for the transfer of words and expressions from ordinary 
life to God. That transfer, however, is not so much a 
cognitive act as it is an act of worship.^3 Thus 
Pannenberg seems forced to choose between a conceptual 
knowledge of God (which would be inappropriate to his 
transcendence) and a transcendence of the limits of 
conceptual knowledge through an act of worship.^^ 
Because all conceptual knowledge has a univocal core 
of meaning, our predication can be only univocal or 
equivocal. But one can ask whether analogical know-
ledge of God as presented by Thomas Aquinas is simply 
a question of conceptual knowledge. Edward Schlllebeeckx 
has not only shown that Thomas rejects the position 
that the human mind cam form a genuine concept of God, 
but he has demonstrated that his most "intimate" 
thinking about analogy (contrary to his numerous 
"conceptuallst" expressions of the meaning of analogy) 
rests on the insight that In the predicating of 
attributes to God the actus slgnlfIcandl transcends 
(cognltivelyi) the res concepta.^5 The dynamic which 
Pannenberg locates in the (voluntary) act of worship 
Thomas locates In the dynamic of the "notion" of 
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being." Fundamental Issues are Involved here, and 
eplstemology takes Its lead from metaphysics. 
Pannenberg Is opposed to the Idea of a philosophical 
knowledge of God: we know God only In his revelation. 
Yet the analogy of being Is simply the formulation of 
the basis for man's God-given capacity to recognize 
God when he In his graclousness steps out of his other-
ness and becomes one of us. ? 
It Is striking that Pannenberg Is afraid of an 
analogical knowledge of God while he tries so mightily 
to ground faith's character as a responsible human act 
In the historicity of the resurrection. His rejection 
of metaphysics Is, of course, an attitude he shares with 
the Reformed tradition when there Is question of a 
knowledge of God logically prior to faith In revelation. 
And yet Pannenberg Is confident that he, as a theologian, 
can criticize "dozologlcal" statements In spite of the 
fact that the only home for these statements Is In 
worship. For example, he can reject a notion of 
kenosls which Is Incompatible with the divine nature 
as we know it (p. I83ff.). Such critical Judgments 
are made by Pannenberg on the basis of what transpired 
In Jesus of Nazareth: the self-revelation of God. Again, 
we know that God acted in Jesus and we confess that 
this God Is personal, because he comes to us as an 
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essentially unmanipulable and surprising reality who 
initiates events in unforeseeable ways.28 it seems to 
me that this is not merely equivocal language, even 
equlvocity a Consilio.but is saying something about 
the transcendent God nlmself in his self-revelation. 
The notion of the "personal" truly points in the 
direction which the mind would travel to know God as 
he is in himself, even if we must admit that God is 
supra-personal, since his freedom and self-knowledge 
are unlimited. The unity in the attribute "personal" 
is not that of a conceptually univocal content, but is 
rather a transcendental unity in which the concept is 
always being broken open by the unlimited dynamism 
present in the content being affirmed.29 At the center 
of Pannenberg1s worshipper there is a cognitive 
reference to the infinite God which makes recognition 
of God possible, criticism of the limits of conceptual 
and discursive knowledire in his regard feasible, and 
which is the light which assures him that negative 
theology is the most appropriate form of God-talk. 
ii. The Préexistence of the Eternal Son 
One of the paradoxical statements which the 
theologian is led to make when he tries to express the 
deeper meaning of Jesus1 life and resurrection concerns 
the preeitl^ teicr· of the eternal Son of God with respect 
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to the earthly Jesus. We would now like to consider 
the merits of Pannenberg's treatment of this paradox. 
As Pannenberg expresses It, the doctrine of 
Christ's préexistence asserts that Jesus' unity with 
Gol, Insofar as It belongs to God's eternal essence, 
precedes Jesus' earthly life, or, omitting the Image 
of "temporal" priority, préexistence means that Jesus 
Is fully and completely one with the eternal God. The 
concept of préexistence is mythical in its manner of 
representing Jesus' unity with God, since it tradi-
tionally Invokes the image of a "descent from heaven" 
and an "ascent to heaven." Furthermore, the mythical 
character of the concept becomes even more apparent 
when we realize that it involves the conceptual 
separation which the concept of Incarnation then tries 
to reunite. In reality, however, we are confronted 
with the one concrete reality, Jesus of Nazareth. 
Yet in spite of the mythical character of the 
concept it does have one great merit: it gives striking 
expression to the fact of the transcendence of the 
eternal Son In the incarnation (p. 150).30 
On the other hand, Pannenberg Insists that accord-
ing to the logic of the resurrection God's eternal deity 
cannot be appropriately conceived except in relation to 
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Jesus of Nazareth. Going even further, he says that 
on the basis of the resurrection we know that the dis­
tinction Jesus maintained between himself and the 
Father also belongs to the divinity of God. "The 
relation of Jesus as Son to the Father may be summarized 
with primitive Christianity as 'obedience.' It Is 
. . . a relation proper to the essence of God himself" 
(ET. p. 159). One might recall at this point that In 
his reference to the Auerustlnlan doctrine of the 
Trinity, In which the three divine hypostases are 
conceived In terms of subsistent relations, Pannenberg 
finds the weakness of this theory to be Its tendency 
to dissolve the personal character (Personhaftlgkelt) 
of the Father, Son, and Spirit (p. 1Θ2). For the 
same reason he disapproved of Karl Earth's proposal 
that we speak of three Seinsweisen instead of persons 
(Ibid.). We have already called attention to the 
fact that Pannenberg emphasizes one aspect of persona­
lity—that of relation, of self-dedication—and falls 
to give equal emphasis to that other Important aspect, 
Interlorlty or self-possession. 
The incarnation reveals to us that the eternal Son 
of God Is capable of being in a genuine "Father-Son" 
relationship with him whom Jesus called Father, but is 
It proper to say that this relationship between Father 
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and Son precisely as a relationship of mutual love, 
mutual giving and receiving can belong to the "Immanent" 
Trinity aa such? The Hegelian understanding of 
trlnltarlan unity as presented by Pannenberg rests on 
the notion of a subject so Immersing himself in the 
other that essential oneness In personal distinction 
"results." One must guard against trltheism when one 
speaks of this subject giving up Its isolation (p. 183). 
The great danger of the préexistence idea, insofar 
as It was expressed in the early Church In terms of the 
Logos, is that Jesus of Nazareth and the Son's divinity 
were always on the verge of "coming apart." Pannenberg 
illustrates this by referring to Tatlan, who managed 
to develop an entire doctrine of the Logos without a 
word about Jesus (p. I65). It Is interesting to 
compare that sorry state of affairs with a striking 
sentence from Grundzüge : "That unity of the divine 
essence with the man Jesus which is brought to expres-
sion In the concept of revelation did not exist before 
Jesus appeared" (ET, p. 156). This may simply mean 
that the unity between the man Jesus and God's essence 
was an actual, historical fact only when the earthly 
Jesus was an actual, historical reality. Then again, it 
may be suggesting a new understanding of the relation of 
Jesus' time to God's eternity. (In a following section 
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of this chapter we will return to this Intriguing 
question.) In any case, it is to Pannenbeг«:, s trreat 
credit that he always tries to speak of the transcendent 
Son of Tod (and of the entire "Immanent" Trinity) in 
connection with the one concrete history of Jesus of 
Nazareth. 
Recently a Roman Catholic theologian. Piet 
Schoonenberg, S.J., has tried to shed light on the 
scriptural and magisterial understanding of préexis-
tence by asking whether. In the decisive early centuries 
of Christological development, there was talk of an 
eternal Son of God who "preexisted" the earthly Jesus 
of Nazareth In the sense of being within the Godhead 
In precision from the incarnation.31 This question 
does not mean that Schoonenberg is asking, "What would 
the Godhead have been like if the incarnation had not 
taken place?" He himself is aware of the problematic 
status of Just such a question. His heuristic brings 
him to one very Importait conclusion. In Scripture and 
maglsterlum there Is never anything said about the Son, 
even in his préexistence, which is not said In connec-
tion with the concrete Jesus Christ, from this 
Schoonenberg concludes that nothing that has been said 
in Scripture or tradition about the préexistent Son of 
God can ever be in conflict with or Jeopardize the 
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fundamental starting point of Chrlstology, namely. 
the fact that Jesus Christ is a person, and indeed a 
human person.32 it is clear from other things that 
Schoonenberg says that "person" as he understands it 
is a unique individual possessing a proper ontological 
and psychological "act-center," in other words, endowed 
with his own consciousness and freedom, over against 
other "act-centers." In contrast to Pannenberg 
Schoonenberg stresses the attribute of centeredness 
and interiority, since this is a basic attribute of 
modern man's notion of person, and it highlights the 
difficulty for modem Christians of calling the eternal 
Son of God in his transcendence a "person." Since the 
three hypostases in the Godhead do not have a proper 
consciousness or a proper will, Schoonenberg suggests 
that the eternal Son of God becomes "person," becomes 
real "son" In dlaloglcal relation to the Father, In 
the incarnation. Schoonenberg considers this a reversal 
of the traditional understanding of enhypostasis, 
although It seems to us that this is misleading, since 
"person" as used by Schoonenberg means something 
different from hypostasis as used by Leontlus of 
Byzantium.31* Moreover, the reversal Is not complete 
on another eount, because Schoonenberg also says that 
in Jesus' oase one and the same person is divine and 
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human and precisely as person so that the best thing 
to do Is to speak of Jesus Christ as divine-human 
person (godmenselijke persoon).35 This latter expres­
sion is not common to Chrlstology, but Schoonenberg·s 
real contribution consists in excluding within this 
divine-human person any form of dialogue between the 
eternal Son and the man Jesus. Jesus prays to and 
worships his Father. There is no sign in the New 
Testament (as Pannenberg also points out) that Jesus' 
humanity was In a subject-to-subject relation with 
his own divinity (I.e., the eternal Son). 
Schoonenberg is asking us to think more deeply 
about an aspect of trlnltarian theology which has 
been neglected: the difference between the three divine 
hypostases, precisely as hypostases. Karl Rahner has 
recently written that the formal distinction between 
the hypostases, while It can be affirmed, cannot be set 
out in concepts. Yet this formal distinction says that 
hypostasis as used of the "three" in the Godhead is not 
a universal concept or property. It stands In each case 
for "somebody else" who is not "something else."36 
Does not the "material" difference between the hypostases 
arise when Jesus prays to, is obedient to, the divine 
Thou in his life, his Father? On the basis of the 
Incarnation we know that God is able to be transcendent, 
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unorlginate Thou (the Father) for his own Incarnate 
eternal Son." And this understanding of Father and 
Son In their transcendence (as It Is revealed to us 
in Jesus) compels us to pursue yet further the Impli-
cation for God himself of the revelation that came 
to pass in Jesus. 
ill. God's Eternity and Jesus' Time 
The doctrine of préexistence, and indeed the 
entire doctrine of the Incarnation, raises the ques-
tion of the relation between God's eternity and the 
temporal event of Jesus' appearance on earth. From 
the Grundzü^e and other writings of Pannenberg, we 
can assemble his several suggestions In this subtle 
area of theology. 
1) God's eternity Is better thought of as the 
fullness of time, rather than Its absence. The 
presence of eternity includes in Itself and unites what 
is separated in the succession of temporal events.3° 
Indeed one can say that eternity has no other content 
than time; it Is the (now hidden) truth of time.39 
Eternity is the final simultaneity of all events divided 
in time and can be thought of as the brlnglng-forth 
(Hervorbringung) of the content of time. 
2) To speak of God as eternal Is to speak of his 
deepest essence as the unsurpassable future. Since God 
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and hls rule are ultimately identical there Is a sense 
in which God—as the world's future—is not yet, and 
thus in a sense his eternity as fullness (fulfillment) 
of time is not yet since the times have yet to be 
fulfilled by God.24,1 
3) Knowledge of God's eternity is knowledge of 
what God and the world will be; It Is not knowledge of 
God apart from or "before" the world.^ 
Ό Eternity enters time from out of the future. 3 
5) God does not need creatures to be God.^ 
6) Yet the very essence of God Implies time. 
God Is future not Just for the world but In himself.^5 
7) We can Justifiably speak of an eternal decree 
or intention in God aimed at the incarnation (p. 332). 
3) As a condition of possibility for the 
Incarnation we must recognize that what newly flashes 
into view from time to time In the divine essence can 
be understood at the same time as having also been true 
in God's eternity. The truth of this assertion is 
dependent, however, on the temporal actuality of that 
thing. Jesus' unity with God Is true from all eternity 
because it was decided for Jesus' entire life and for 
God's eternity retroactively from the resurrection 
(Pannenberg's emphasis) (p. 332). 
9) Only an event in history which Is fully 
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eschatological can so affect the totality of time that 
It can Ъе strictly conceived as true In eternity and 
thus as united with God's eternity (p. 332, n. 93). 
10) The resurrection was a genuinely contingent 
event unmarred by any sort of theological or physical 
determinism; on the other hand it was always present 
to God's eternity (p. 333)· 
Lining up these various ideas on the divine 
eternity reveals not only how suggestively Pannenberg 
deals with this difficult subject, but it unfortunately 
also shows us how fragmentary his Ideas are. 
There Is no doubt that his idea that eternity 
should be conceived as the fullness and truth of time 
has fine possibilities. ° Eternity and time no longer 
exclude one another in this conception; rather, they 
seem to mutually Influence each other's content. This 
mutual influence is, of course, not of the same kind 
in each direction. God alone Is creator in an absolute 
sense In this relation. But still, God's eternity in 
Its fullness comes to be only at the fulfillment of 
history. When Pannenberg Insists with the tradition 
that God does not need the world to be God he is 
making a statement about God in his transcendence of 
the world and yet says this on the basis of God's 
revelation in and to that world. However, is not a 
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"divine qualification" needed here? The American 
philosopher John Dewey once said that the idea that 
God does not need the world is simply an invitation 
to atheism. It seems to me that theology can say more 
on this score, and in fact must say more If the meaning 
of God as love is to receive its due in Christian thought. 
We would better conceive the relation of the world to 
God and of God to the world If we said—on the basis 
of his revelation in Jesus Christ—that God reveals 
himself as he who does not need the world but who 
iTeely chooses to need the world. God chose—freely, 
out of his own Infinite abundance—to depend on his own 
creation. For example, he chose to depend on the man 
Jesus so that he could become God for others, the Lord 
of a history that he freely chose to create. Of course, 
to say of God that he "needs" or "depends" is to use 
ordinary words In an "odd" way.^7 But the surprising 
ways of God ask of each generation of believers that 
they bend language In new ways to catch fresh glimpses 
of the same infinite love and the same limitless newness 
that he communicates to every generation. An Infinite 
God is not Infinite if he excludes absolutely from 
himself dimensions of love which make it believable to 
modern man while not threatening his deepest divinity. 
Paradox and metaphysics are not good bedfellows, but 
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God's revelation In Jesus can perhaps even here have a 
reconciling function. 
The more obscure statements of Pannenberg with 
regard to the relation of eternity to time have to do 
with the unity between Jesus and God. He maintains 
that unity is decided by the resurrection even for 
God's eternity (p. 332). We recall that we referred 
earlier to a remarkable sentence in which Pannenberg 
says that the unity between Jesus and God's essence 
would not have existed if the resurrection had not 
occurred. This unity was decided by the resurrection, 
and retroactively, and not only for the earthly life 
of Jesus. Basically, what Is he contributing here 
that Is new? It seems to me that he has simply trans-
lated into eschatologlcal terms the "préexistence" of 
the human reality of Jesus Christ in God. In other 
words, the Father's plan of salvation, which existed 
before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1.4·) Is 
translated by Pannenberg into his own perspective 
which gives priority to the future In God's dealings 
with the world. That which occurs in history in such 
wise that it Is unsurpassable (historically speaking) 
and that affects the whole of time Is, for Pannenberg, 
the occurrence of the End of history, which ultimately 
is the "happening of God" who alone can be the end of 
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history. Thus what Pannenberg Is sayin? here offers 
not a new view of the relation of time and eternity 
but simply the statement (translated): only the 
occurrence of the End of history (Jesus Christ) is 
an occurrence that can be strictly thought of as 
essentially one with the eternally divine. 
iv. Kenosis and Becoming in God 
A discussion of the relation between ^od's 
eternity and the world's time necessarily leads us to 
the subtle problem of jod's immutability. The doctrine 
of the incarnation tells us in deceptively simple terras 
that "Tod became man" yet the unavoidable question 
Imposes itself Immediately: what does becoming mean In 
God? 
When discussing the difficulties attendant upon 
the classical Logos doctrine, Pannenberg declares that 
the 3od revealed in Jesus of Nazareth is not revealed 
there as an unchangeable ultimate ground of the pheno-
menal order, but as the free origin of the contingent 
events of the world (p. 166). Further on in GrundzOge 
he makes It clear that the grave error of the nineteenth 
century kenosis theologians was that they portrayed jOd 
as surrendering the so-called "relative attributes" 
which nonetheless were essential to God's divinity. 
While theologians such as Sartori, Thomaslus, and Gess 
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had a keen appreciation of the distance between God and 
man, this they bridged only at the expense of the 
divinity of the God who entered history (p. 330). Thus, 
while affirming within God a freedom which can surprise 
us, Pannenberg finds the Idea of kenosls In the 
sense of a relinquishment of divine qualities by God 
an "Impossible Idea" (p. 333)· and asks whether the 
Idea of a divine kenosls In general has more than 
metaphorical truth (p. 330). 
Pannenberg's view regarding a divine becoming, a 
divine ability to change, Is quite different. That 
God Is Immutable can be understood to mean that God Is 
always faithful to himself, consistent with himself, 
In his dealings with the world.^° This self-consistency 
Is In fact the ultimate ground of the continuity of the 
world-process, In spite of the radical contingency of 
that process.^9 God Is alive In himself, and so 
beweglich, although In a way proper to himself. To 
say that God Is mutable Is to say that among the rich-
ness of possibilities embraced by his Infinity Is the 
possibility of becoming other than himself (becoming 
man) and precisely by so doing remaining eminently 
faithful to himself ("ever the same") as Love Itself 
(p. 331). One can even speak of a tendency In God 
toward becoming other (p. 33^)· There is no Inner 
322 
being of God which Is not touched by this "becoming 
other" and when we say that God changes In the other, 
we must point out at the same time that the change of 
God which takes place In the other occurs also 
(ebenso auch) In himself (p. 331, n. 91).^1 
It Is unfortunate that these splendid reflections 
are marred by an important slip. Pannenberg appeals 
to what appears to be a general metaphysical principle 
when speaking of God changing In the other: "The 
maker himself is changed by the production and shaping 
of another being" (ET, p. 320). This principle can be 
challenged on two counts. It is not at all certain 
that God must change In himself when creating something 
finite. Secondly, this general idea of making and 
producing does not touch the Incarnation, which is the 
point at issue. In the incarnation God becomes the 
other by constituting it as his own reality. 
Pannenberg usually is careful to stay within the 
context of Jesus Christ when speaking of the God 
revealed In him. If there is any place in Chrlstology 
where this is indispensable, it Is when we listen to 
the startling revelation that God is most affirming 
himself (as Love) when he freely chooses to become 
less than himself. The metaphysician must here become 
listener. 
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Becoming In God is real. But If this Idea Is to 
be defended against the objection that in God becoming 
is but a purely conceptual and so timeless becoming 
(p. 331Γ·)ι then it Is necessary to work out, as we 
have seen, an understanding of eternity which Includes 
time within Itself (p. 332).52 as well as take 
seriously the Christian faith in the God who is Love 
(see below). 
The unsuccessful attempt on the part of the nine­
teenth century kenosis theologians to clarify the how 
of the unity of God and man in Jesus of Nazareth was 
but one of a succession of failures to answer this 
central question of Christology. All Christologles 
which begin with the Idea of the incarnation, or which 
deny God his divinity, or Jesus his genuine humanity 
(as did, for example, the kenosis theologians of the 
seventeenth century) in order to overcome the limita­
tions of the Incarnatlonal starting-point, are exposed 
to failure. The how of the unity between Jesus the man 
and God requires a new approach. That new approach we 
saw when considering Pannenberg1s theory of the retro­
active power of the resurrection and the dialectical 
Identity of Jesus' sonshlp. 
I would like to conclude these systematic reflec­
tions on Pannenberg by considering his role in contemporary 
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Christologlcal discussion. First, I will examine an 
author whose Christologlcal project Is deeply Influenced 
by him and then an author who, while sharing many of 
Pannenberg's concerns, is partially Influenced by him 
and who yet proposes a corrective to Pannenberg's 
fundamental theology-of-history approach. 
D. Pannenberg in Contemporary 
Christologlcal Discussion 
i. Dietrich Wiederkehr: The Sonship of Christ 
The Influence of Pannenberg's Christology on 
Roman Catholic thought is seen most strikingly in the 
contribution of the Swiss systematic theologian Dietrich 
Wiederkehr to Mysterium SalutIs. which is entitled 
"Entwurf einer systematischen Christologie."53 
Because systematic Christology has tended to be a subtle, 
abstract elaboration of the metaphysics implied in 
Church dogma, Wiederkehr sees the necessity of bringing 
into dialogue the New Testament view of Jesus of 
Nazareth and the more ontologlcally oriented doctrine 
of the Church. In doing this he hopes to fulfill, at 
least In an initial way, the following desiderata of a 
contemporary Christology: that It be personallstic,5^ 
relational,55 functlonal-dynamic;5o that It leave room 
for genuine development In Jesus' life;57 that it make 
clear Jesus Christ's solidarity with all men;58 that 
325 
It be a Christology developed within the horizon of 
the history of covenant and revelation;59 and that It 
be closely bound up with an existential soterlology.°0 
Wiederkehr places his consideration of Jesus 
Christ In the widest possible framework, that of the 
relation of God to the world and of the world to God. 
This does not mean that he considers Christ's human 
nature as the ascending movement from men to God, and 
Christ's divine nature as the descending movement, but 
that the whole Christ Is viewed In his relation to the 
world and In his relation to God."1 The chrlstologlcal 
problem Is not first the relation of the two natures 
in Christ, but the relationship of the one Jesus 
Christ's action and existence to the world and to God 
his Father. Thus at the beginning of his study 
Wiederkehr sounds a motif to which he remains faithful 
at each decisive step of his essay (showing, as he 
does so, a deep Indebtedness to Pannenberg's stress on 
Christ's Sonshlp).°2 The New Testament does not offer 
any statement of Jesus about his relation to the divine 
Son, but only his relation to his Father, and this Is 
a hint to Wiederkehr as to the correct perspective In 
which to discover Jesus' divinity.°3 The Indirectness 
of the path to Jesus' Identity with the eternal Son 
thus becomes a central theme of Wiederkehr's 
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Chrlstology as well. 
A confrontation of the New Testament view of 
Christ and the Church's two-natures doctrine reveals 
both positive agreement and critical difference. In 
both views Jesus is the definitive, unsurpassable 
mediator between God and the world. furthermore, in 
both the full consubstantlallty of Jesus with God and 
man is maintained. However, the notion of divine 
nature loses its relational character in the dogma, 
because the source of Jesus' sonshlp in the father is 
not referred to; on the other hand, the notion of 
human nature gives but an abstract, formal picture of 
Jesus as a human being. In addition, the notion of 
hypostatic union puts the accent on the beginning of 
Jesus' existence, so that his full reality is in this 
perspective constituted by the Incarnation rather than 
being viewed as a constant development, with Easter as 
the moment of consummation."^ 
It Is In this last point that Wiederkehr once 
again shows his Indebtedness to Pannenberg. He takes 
over the letter's concept of the retroactive power of 
the resurrection, retroactivity in both the noetic and 
ontological senses."5 it is Interesting to note that 
Wiederkehr adoüts Pannenberg's idea, without feeling 
obligated to enter into a discussion of the kind of 
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ontologlcal question Pannenberg felt obliged to discuss, 
for example, the question of whether such an idea rules 
out evolutionary development. For Pannenberg, growth 
and development come to something out of Its future, 
and not as the unfolding of an already given entelechy. 
Wiederkehr, however, Is content to remain within the 
more customary horizon, where future development Is 
Intentionally present In the nature of a thing. ° 
Like Pannenberg, Wiederkehr Is able to Interpret the 
significance, in the light of the resurrection, of what 
the latter calls the "dynamic sonshlp" given expression 
In the New Testament portrayal of Jesus' baptism, and 
to the "entltatlve sonshlp" occurring at the Incarna-
tion.67 
The Easter event reveals Jesus as the definitive, 
unsurpassable revelation of God, a revelation In which 
God communicates his own reality: God becomes for us 
what he Is In himself. This recognition Implies that 
the mediation of the reality and history of Jesus,In 
which God gives himself In his self-revelation and self-
communication to the world. Is an eternal mediation, a 
mediation belonging to God's own nature. In other 
words, the Son of God Is préexistent.68 This pre-exls-
tence has nothing to do with a representation of 
eternity according to which It Is parallel to time, 
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equally linear, but more extensive In both "directions." 
Bather, préexistence refers to the fact that God commu-
nicates nothing less than what he Is In himself to the 
world; that this absolute self-communication Implies 
that God Is related to the world In divine Sonshlp. 
The relationship of Father and Son Is not simply 
God's relation ad extra, but God's own self-relation, 
pertaining to the divine essence. 
In common with Pannenberg Wiederkehr Introduces 
the divine "aspect" of Christ into human history more 
radically than the static notion of divine nature would 
seem to permit. Jesus is for Wiederkehr a completely 
human person, like all men in all things except the 
anti-human, which Is sin; possessing his own personality, 
psychologically and ontologlcally, his own human exis-
tence, responsible for his actions before his Father 
and fellowmen. As man Jesus Christ lived in a crea-
turely and filial relation to his iather, a relation 
of Seinsmitteilung and Seinsempfang, of obedience 
and dedication to that Father. This filial relationship 
of the man Jesus to his Father is (as we know from the 
resurrection) the spelling out (Auslegung)69 in time 
and space, in human risk and venture, of the radically 
other, yet analogous relationship of Lebensmitteilung 
and Lebensempfang which is the relation of the eternal 
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Son to hls Father, and the Father to his Son, a dynamic 
give-and-take, which, rather than being unhlstorlcal, 
or alien to human history. Is able to be translated Into 
human historicity. This full translation occurs at 
the resurrection, and affects Jesus' life retroactively. 
Through the resurrection as eschatologlcal event, God 
the Father grasps all of Jesus (I.e., his entire life 
on earth) as his οκη by constituting It the human life 
of his eternal Son. 
Both the analogous relation of Jesus' human sonshlp 
and divine Sonshlp (In spite of their Infinite diversity 
as divine and created) and their common provenance In 
the eternal Father allow their reciprocal Integration 
which culminates In the death and resurrection of Jesus.?" 
The human personhood of Jesus Is the personhood of the 
eternal Son; the latter posits Jesus' human subjecti­
vity as his own. Jesus Christ Is one life, one 
reality, possessing one ultimate source of unity (In 
the eternal Son, from and toward the eternal Father). 
He Is not two persons. The Ineinander of divine and 
human sonshlp which Is the hypostatic unity Is 
possible because "person" when said of Jesus' human 
subjectivity and "person" when said of the divine 
Son Involves one In an analogical use of the notion.71 
The parallelism which was attendant on the Antiochene 
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position in Chrlstology can be avoided when (1) the 
analogical use of the word person is kept in mind; 
(2) when the Gesenüber of the one Jesus Christ is 
acknowledged to be the Father; (3) when Christology 
always starts anew from the one, whole Jesus Christ 
related to his Father and fellowmen and recognizes 
on that basis that Jesus' divine sonship and human 
sonshlp exist in a relation of mutual implication.7^ 
The more Cod the Father and the man Jesus gave them-
selves to one another, the more rooted Jesus the man 
was in the eternal Son; and the more rooted Jesus the 
man in the eternal Son (I.e., the more the actions of 
the man Jesus were the actions of the eternal Son), 
the more Jesus the man was a reality in his own right. 
As Rahner said so well, ontologlcal nearness to, 
dependence on God, on the one hand, and creaturely 
subsistence, freedom, "independence," on the other, 
are directly proportionate.73 Jesus the man was 
related to both Father and eternal Son, and precisely 
as a creature, but In different ways: he was the human 
translation vis-à-vis the Father and the world of the 
eternal Son's relation of knowledge and love to that 
same Father and of the Father's relation to the Son. 
In Wiederkehr's conception of the unity of divine and 
human sonshlp In Jesus Christ, the human reality of 
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Jesus Is not simply the Instrument, or the "demonstra-
tion" of an Inner-dlvlne relation; rather "the 
personal center of human action Is at the same time 
the subjection of the ¿divine? filial relation to God 
and vice-versa."'''^ ' The divine person does not negate 
or compete with Jesus' human person, nor does the 
latter endanger Jesus' being ultimately rooted In the 
eternal Son. Without laying bare the mystery of the 
unity of God and man In Jesus (which Is, of course, 
Impossible) Wiederkehr hopes that the "dialectic of 
sonshlp" will help make the Christian conviction that 
Jesus Christ Is one person In two natures thinkable, 
without hurting either fundamental total dimension of 
his one existence. Translating his conception Into 
the traditional terminology of nature and person, the 
Swiss theologian can write: "The same human act-center 
Is person In relation to the human nature and Its 
possibilities of self-realization; but In relation to 
the person of the Son of God, who Is able to relate 
himself filially as transcendent divine person to God 
In human existence and as this man Jesus as well, this 
human act-center and this subjectivity Is simulta-
neously In the role of nature."75 
In keeping with his chosen framework—the relation 
of the one Jesus Christ to God his Father and the 
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world—Wiederkehr treats the problem of Jesus' know-
ledge and will as a question first of all of the ooncre-
tization in human acts of the one filial existence of 
Jesus Christ vls-à-vls his Father. Only in this 
context can one fruitfully ask about the relation of 
the divine and human "powers" within Christ. Just as 
Jesus' human sonshlp and divine sonshlp are oriented 
to the Father In a relation of reciprocal Integration, 
so it is with the powers of knowledge and will. Rather 
than speaking of the divine and human wills standing 
over against each other within Jesus, Wiederkehr 
stresses the unifying and unified filial structure which 
constitutes Jesus Christ's whole reality vls-à-vls the 
Father; within this structure one Is allowed to 
differentiate "faculties" or "powers" within Jesus.''" 
Fear of subordlnatlonism should not prevent us 
from taking Jesus' statements about his dependence on 
his Father and submission to him in obedience as 
pertaining only to his humanity. These statements have 
revelatory significance, and refer to the total Christ 
who receives all his being from the one Father in the 
two-fold (but mutually integrating and Integrated) 
reception of being (as creature) and life (as eternal 
Son). Jesus' statements about learning from the 
Father, about being spoken to by him, sharing in the 
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knowledge of the father, express the total relatedness 
of the one Christ to the Father, the ultimate source 
of all belnç, life and knowledge. Jesus' human open-
ness to his Father, his not-knowing and his growing In 
knoKledge and his waiting on his Father for a revela-
tory word, are the human articulation of the Inner 
divine communication between Father and Son who, equal 
In divinity, nevertheless are related to one another 
as generator and generated.77 Just as there Is an 
analogical relation between Jesus' creaturely reception 
of life from the Father, so too there Is an analogy 
between the knowledge of the eternal Son received from 
the Father and the knowledge of the human Jesus 
received from that same Father. Because In each 
relationship there Is the common note of sharing, 
participation and communication (commonness ¿n radical 
difference and despite radical difference), the human 
translation of the Son's knowledge of the Father into 
not-knowing, questioning, searching, learning and 
limited understanding is not simply a mark of deficiency! 
there is something positive at work here as well.7° 
The eternal Son, in assuming the human Jesus as 
his own proper reality within history assumes as well 
the conditions under which a human person grows In 
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knowledge, receives enlightenment from others and in 
turn communicates to others. When one takes this 
perspective seriously, and remembers that Jesus1 self-
knowledge and knowledge of his Father were complete 
and perfect only at the resurrection (with its retroac­
tive power), then one does not have to choose between 
the alternatives expressed in the question: Did Jesus, 
during his earthly life, stand In a relation of faith 
or of immediate vision vls-i-vls his Father? Beyond 
this alternative is the fundamental structure of Jesus' 
existence as Son which expressed and realized itself 
in a listening which was also an understanding and a 
certitude about God his Father which was also trustful 
surrender.79 One who poses this false alternative 
forgets that belng-orlentated- to-other, proceeding from 
another and sharing in another are not simply Imperfec­
tions. It is possible for the eternal Son's relation 
to his Father to be articulated in doubt and question, 
self-correction and trustful hope precisely because of 
the analogy (similarity In difference, difference in 
similarity) between the two-fold filial orientation 
of the one Son, Jesus Christ, to his Father. Understand­
ing growth in human knowledge as a progressive and 
laborious "catching-up" with one's self as one moves 
Into an always new future allows one to avoid a second, 
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equally false, dilemma, namely, having to choose whether 
Jesus had full self-knowledge at the beginning of his 
existence or only at the resurrection. As Jesus' 
human consciousness of his union with and dependence 
on his Father grew, there grew proportionally the 
consciousness (the self-consciousness) of his oneness 
with the eternal Son. In each case Jesus grew—not 
without hard work and suffering—from a pre-reflex to 
a reflex knowledge of these two radically different 
(and radically related) ways of being one with God. 
With respect to the problem of Jesus' will, free-
dom and obedience, Wiederkehr follows the same path. 
Human freedom, searching fidelity and obedience are 
not simply deficient modes of being In which the eternal 
Son's relation to the Father have been expressed and 
realized In human history In Jesus Christ. No, Jesus' 
freedom and obedience vls-à-vls the Father are the 
realization In the form of human risk and venture of 
the divine Son's relation to the Father, which is 
Itself a relation of communication and reception, dedi-
cation and loving response. The transcendence of Jesus 
the man to his heavenly Father In his volitional life, 
a transcendence which was there at the beginning of 
his life but which also had to be realized, concretized 
In successive acts of freedom. Is the human 
})Ь 
form of the divine self-transcendence of the eternal 
Son toward and Into his Father.^0 Obedience is not 
simply a deficient mode of being, but the human form 
of being related to that which is recognized— 
precisely in the personal realm—as "greater." "The 
Father is greater than I," said the whole Christ. 
Greater than the man Jesus as the source of his 
creaturely being, greater than the eternal Son in the 
only way that he can be: as Father, as source (not 
cause) of the life of the generated, but uncreated, 
eternal Son. The one, whole Christ makes that state­
ment, the full depths of which were revealed to him 
only in his resurrection, but which were foreshadowed 
in his total dedication to his Father during his 
human life on earth. 
The unity of the divine and human wills in the 
one Jesus Christ must be considered an expression of 
the one filial existence of Jesus Christ in his relation 
of communication with and participation In the Father. 
The will of the human Jesus l_s the will of the eternal 
Son in his dedication to and participation In the life 
of the Father, Insofar as that divine will is realized 
in human form."! As the human Jesus grew in conformity 
with and submission to the source of his freedom, the 
Father, his human volitional life was penetrated more 
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and more by the volitional life of the Son (whose life 
comes completely from the Father); the mutual pene­
tration of divine ani human volitional life In the one 
Jesus Christ Is an IneinanderseIn that Is radically 
oriented to the Father as Its ultimate source and as 
such It guarantees, rather than threatens, the 
reality of Jesus' own human volitional life In all Its 
concrete contours. The mutual penetration of divine 
and volitional life In the one Son of God allows the 
шал Jesus all genuine possibilities of freedom, 
Including (as deepest root and crowning gift) the 
making his own the "free" (because divine) relation 
of uncreated Son to Father. On the other hand, the 
more the divine volitional life penetrated Jesus' 
human volitional life as Jesus gave himself over to 
the Father's will, the more unauthentic possibilities 
of human freedom were really excluded from Jesus' life. 
Thus one can say (In words that are not Wiederkehr'a 
but which are, I think, faithful to what he is saying) 
that Jesus' growth In union with the Father and in 
rootedness In the Son gradually excluded the (from 
every point of view unauthentic) possibility of human 
freedom which is sin. 
To sum up Wiederkehr's contribution: 
1) He has developed in a consistent fashion the 
ззв 
two major contributions of Wolfhart Pannenberg to the 
contemporary discussion of the humanity and divinity 
of Jesus Christ: the dialectical Identity of Jesus' 
sonshlp and the retroactive power end thus constitu­
tive Importance of the resurrection. In this way the 
New Testament shows its perdurlng fruitfulness for 
dogmatic Christology: the New Testament idea of sonshlp 
and the New Testament eschatologlcal Zeltbewusstsein 
clear the way to think with less embarassment the 
full human and divine reality of the one Jesus Christ. 
2) In Wiederkehr the Trinity becomes the key to 
Christology, just as Christology is the revelatory 
locus for knowledge of the Trinity. In this respect 
the notion of Sonshlp shows its systematic fruitfulness 
in that at each step of Christologlcal reflection the 
completely false alternative of christocentricity 
versus theocentricity is avoided. Theo-logy has to be 
christologlcal, and Christology has to be theological 
(trlnitarlan), and the goal of one's reflections—the 
Father—and the path of one's reflections—the Son— 
remain permanently significant and mutually necessary. 
3) Wiederkehr's use of the notion of the retro­
active power of the resurrection without requiring a 
"new ontology" makes one wonder whether it is not 
sufficient to spell out the meaning of an eschatologlcal 
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event for space-time events (ontologlcal priority 
In spite of noetic and "temporal" posteriority) 
without requiring of the reader an acceptance of a 
"new understanding of the structure of reallty."°3 
It seems to me that the notion of a retroactive 
Influence of an eschatologlcal event can be accepted 
by even those who hold an evolutionary world-view. 
It would be a shame if readers thought that the 
validity of this central Idea in Pannenberg's 
Chrlstology hinged on the acceptance of an ontology 
which Pannenberg has not yet developed, but only 
suggested in outline. 
Ό By Insisting on the analogical and reciprocally 
uniting and united character of the two-fold filial 
relation of the one Jesus Christ to the Father, 
Wiederkehr has been able to say (alluding to the 
terminology of other theologians) that what occurs 
In Jesus' case is the actuation of a created relation 
(created sonshlp) by an uncreated relation (uncreated 
Sonshlp), which is a transposition into relational 
terms of de la Tallle's actuation créée par un acte 
Incrêé ·,°^ furthermore, instead of a communlcatlo 
idiomatum he can speak of a communlcatlo relatlonum 
(keeping In mind the "eschatological reservation" 
expressed by the notion of the constitutive Importance 
З'+О 
of the resurrection)."5 He has shown how In Jesus 
Christ there Is a mutual enhypostasls. with ultimate 
priority belonging of course to the divine Father and 
divine Son. Again, he affirms enhypostasls without 
anhypostasls. if one means by the first term that the 
assumption of Jesus' human person by the eternal Son 
meant the deepening and perfecting of Jesus as a human 
person, and if one means by anhypostasls that some­
thing prevented Jesus the man psychologically or onto-
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logically from being a human person. 
5) It seems to me that Wledekehr felicitously 
expresses the fundamental intention In the Idea of 
the préexistence of the Son when he says that the 
absolute, unsurpassable character of God's self-
communicatlon to the world in his Son Jesus Christ 
implies that God Is related to himself the same way 
that he is related to the world. In other words, the 
Trinity constitutes God as he Is in and for himself, 
and not only God as he is for and in the world. The 
God-for-us Is Identical with God-for-hlmself. How do 
we know this? Only In the light of revelation. It 
seems to me that Wiederkehr has been able to think 
of Jesus the man and the eternal Son as "persons" In 
a way which allows them to be thought—at least 
without contradiction and certainly In a way that 
з^ і 
Invites further reverent reflection—as ultimately 
constituting a unity of person, without parallelism, 
without rivalry, without Internal division or 
dialogue. 
If dogmatic Chrlstology must affirm In the light 
of Easter and retroactively from there that the man 
Jesus, lacking nothing In his humanity or personhood, 
Is the eternal Son of God as the latter realizes him­
self In human history, that does not prevent the 
believer from thinking of the pre-Easter Jesus as 
one who possessed a truly open future, who had to 
risk his Identity to acquire It, who had to worship 
his Father as his Lord and God and had to taste aban­
donment on the cross. A "low Chrlstology" Is 
perfectly orthodox, so long as one Is willing to 
affirm (from the resurrection) as well that this man 
Jesus who In his earthly lifetime bore the relation of 
son to his Father was himself borne. In different but 
related ways, by the eternal Son and his eternal 
Father. 
11. Jürgen MoItmann: A Trinitarian 
Theology of the Cross 
In his recent book on the theology of the cross,' 
Jürgen Holtmann has contributed what I consider a note-
worthy corrective to a tendency toward one-sldedness 
3^ 2 
Inherent In Pannenbero-'s universal-historical approach 
to Chrlstology. A strlklmr aspect of ^rundzütre is that 
one can leave out Part II—dealing with the life, 
message and death of Jesus--and Fart III seems to 
follow almost directly Part I. In other words, having 
established the presence of God In and his Identity 
with Jesus in the resurrection, Pannenberg ran go on 
to discuss the nature of this Identity, without losing 
a step. As Important as the cross Is for Pannenberg's 
understanding of Jesus Christ, still It does not have 
the central hermeneutlcal role which, as we shall see, 
Moltmann assigns to it. Yet it Is a crucified 
Christ which the Church, with Paul, preaches (I Cor. 
1.23), that Is, the crucifixion of the resurrected one 
and the resurrection of the crucified one. 
Moltmann wishes to focus on the theology of the 
cross in all its radicallty, yet, unlike the tradition, 
not one-sidedly, but in the light of and in connection 
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with the resurrection. In this understanding he 
distinguishes a two-fold hermeneutlc, the hermeneutlc 
of origin and the hermeneutlc of consequences. That 
is, first, the critical verification of the Christian 
faith In its origin in Jesus and his history, and 
secondly, the critical verification of Christian 
faith in its consequences for the present and future. 
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With regard to the first task, he writes that the 
historical critical quest of Jesus has determined 
both temporal discontinuity and material difference 
between Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom, as well 
as a plethora of transmitted continuities and material 
analogies. ° But If one carries on theology as 
historical work, one cannot go beyond the possibilities 
of historical knowledge of dialectical, historical 
connections. One must think of historical work as 
theological, which means In this case that one has to 
think of the relation of the primitive Church's message 
of Christ to the historical Jesus as a theme of 
Chrlstology. More particularly that means that the 
Intimate connection between Jesus' person and his 
message must be taken seriously, with the result that 
his death, as the death of one rejected by his Cod on 
the cross, cannot be simply compared with other collap-
ses In history, or be spoken of simply In terms of 
''continuity'1 and "discontinuity. " 9 0 
Turning to Jesus' death on the cross, Holtmann 
considers It from three perspectives: from the 
perspective of the Law, Jesus died as the "blasphemer," 
because of his unheard-of claim to authority; ' 
from the perspective of the Roman occupation forces, 
Jesus died as a political criminal, a trouble-maker 
344 
\ GO 
vis-a-vis the Pax Romana; 7 lastly, from the perspective 
(If one may ao speak) of his Father, Jesus died as one 
abandoned, as a Godforsaken and God-less one. 93 By far 
the most Important aspect of Jesus' death Is the 
experience of being abandoned by God. This can only 
be rightly understood in the light of Jesus' sense of 
God's nearness in his life. Like Pannenberg, Moltmann 
takes the descent into hell to refer primarily to 
Jesus' simultaneous sense of the divine nearness and 
divine abandonment. Although there is for Moltmann 
little doubt that the early Church put the verse from 
Psalm 22 into the mouth of the dying Jesus, we should 
Interpret the meaning of the verse as used by Jesus in 
the light of Jesus' situation on the cross.9** This 
situation on the cross is the source of Chrlstology, 
because here, and not simuly in his self-understanding, 
one learns who he truly Is. 
The cross of Christ separates God from God unto 
full enmity and difference. In the resurrection of the 
God-forsaken Son God united himself with God in the 
most intense community. The truth of each of these 
two provocative statements does not stand outside the 
other, just as the event of the crucifixion and the 
event of the resurrection did not simply follow one 
another in temporal sequence, as we customarily 
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understand the latter. The Tübingen systematic 
theologian takes over Pannenberg's Idea of the retro-
active power of the resurrection.95 There are two 
ways of "reading" Jesus1 history: the ontic-historical 
and the noetlc-eschatologlcal. The one Is intimately 
related to the other, and the results of both 
"readings" are identified with one another. The 
resurrection of Jesus, as the beginning of the end of 
history and the hidden anticipation of the eschatologl-
cal Kingdom, is itself as eschatological event. A new 
awareness of time is called for if one is to under-
stand the relation of Jesus' resurrection to his past 
life: an eschatological awareness. After the resurrec-
tion of Jesus from the dead. It is legitimate to speak 
of the resurrection of the crucified one and the 
crucifixion of the resurrected one. For if we are to 
see with the primitive Church the resurrection as 
constituting the unity of Jesus and God, still we must 
also acknowledge that the unity did not begin only at 
the resurrection but with his human life, but because 
of the resurrection. In the resurrection Jesus 
enters God's future as the first of a new creation; 
there was no question of a resuscitated corpse. 
Moltmann quotes approvingly W. Schrage's view that 
Jesus' resurrection did not relativlze the cross to an 
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Intermediate or transitional stage on the way to 
heavenly glory, but rather qualified It as the 
eschatologlcal salvlflc event.9° 
With respect to the historicity of the resurrec-
tion, Moltmann suggests that the truth of Jesus' 
resurrection from the dead depends on the truth of the 
future resurrection of the dead. Thus no historical 
proof of the resurrection of Jesus can be offered. 
While Pannenberg Is convinced as well that ultimately 
the truth of Jesus' resurrection rests on the occur-
rence or non-occurrence of the general resurrection, 
he draws, as we have seen, a different conclusion with 
regard to the value of historical argument, which 
attains, at best, probability.'' 
A word should be said here about the use of apo-
calyptic in Moltmann's book. As we have seen, the 
central concern for Pannenberg is apocalyptic's 
universal-historical viewpoint, which, to be sure. Is 
not found as a general given in apocalyptic literature, 
but which was (according to Dietrich Rössler and 
Pannenberg) a high point of its reflection on the 
relation of God to history. For Moltmann, Pannenberg 
has laid so much stress on the universal-historical 
interest of apocalyptic that he has neglected the over-
riding interest they had in the question of God's 
3^ 7 
righteousness In the face of the world's evil. The 
resurrection of the dead, and Jesus' resurrection from 
the dead, are not to be understood first of all as 
eschataloglcally realized anthropology or In reference 
to the Intellectual problem of universal history, but 
as the demonstration of God's victory and self-
justlfIcatlon In the face of evil. This concern of 
apocalyptic can receive Its due only In a theology of 
the cross, where God himself takes the mystery of 
iniquity into himself and conquers It.98 
We have seen that Pannenberg understands the vica-
rious character of Jesus' death as the death of the 
Just one who died In the stead of the true blasphemers, 
the Jews, who In turn represented all men, centered 
on themselves and closed to God. Moltmann, on the other 
hand, sees the divine abandonment on the cross as the 
aspect of Jesus' death which acquires vicarious 
character In his proleptic resurrection as the first 
of the new creation. There is a reciprocal relation 
at work here: the cross makes Jesus' resurrection 
ahead of us relevant for us Godless ones; the resurrec-
tion fills the cross with eschatology and saving signi-
ficance. Christ died for us. but to say that Christ 
died for our sins Is to involve one In the great 
difficulty of trying to unite a notion of expiatory 
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sacrifice with the resurrection kerygma. The idea of 
expiatory sacrifice makes sense only in the context of 
violated law for which restitution must be paid to 
re-establish the old order, while the resurrection of 
the crucified one heralds a new life, new creation, 
precisely for the God-forsaken.99 
Like Pannenberg and Wiederkehr, Moltmann does not 
want to discuss the unity of God and man In Jesus (in 
Moltmann's case, the unity of God and the suffering 
and dying Jesus) within the framework of the two-
natures doctrine, but in trlnltarlan terms. Accepting 
Rahner's statement that Jesus' death on the cross was 
the death of the immortal God himself, Moltmann asks 
whether God suffered this death himself or only in the 
other, in Jesus' humanity. He wishes to go beyond the 
recent contributions of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Hans 
Küng, Heribert Mühlen, Paul Althaus, and Karl Barth 
on the question of the "death of God" and rethink the 
fundamental questions of God's changeability, capacity 
to suffer pain and to suffer death.100 Moltmann faults 
Rahner and Barth for not thinking sufficiently in 
Trinitarian terms (the same criticism Wiederkehr makes), 
since at crucial moments in their thought they employ 
the "simple" concept of God when only the trlnltarlan 
concept will prevent one from landing in insurmountable 
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problems (for example, the problem of patrlpassionlsm 
and the problem of the man Jesus1 relation to the 
eternal Son as distinct from his relation to his 
Father).101 
Moltmann suggests that the fundamental Christian 
conviction that God is love and the fullness of life 
receives its due only if in the transaction between 
Father and Son on the cross real suffering is ascribed 
to the two persons of the Trinity. The divine Son of 
God himself suffered and died; Jesus Christ, the 
total, unitary Son. The divine Son of God himself 
suffered pain and died in his integral humanity, and 
in doing so, took this pain and death into himself 
and his relation to the Father. The Father suffered 
as well, but not in the same way as his Son. Here 
Moltmann introduces the notion of active suffering. 
We cannot ascribe to God suffering which is passively 
received by him, which would make him ultimately 
dependent on creatures. But we can attribute to God 
the Father a free decision in love to actively suffer 
the death of his Son. "Suffer" here does not merely 
mean "allow" but is a dimension of love.10^ »if love 
is the acceptance of the other without consideration 
of one's well-being, then it contains within itself 
the capacity of suffering-wlth and the freedom to 
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suffer the otherness of the other. An Incapacity to 
suffer In this sense would contradict the fundamental 
assertion that 'God Is love,' with which the spell of 
the Aristotelian doctrine of God was broken In 
principle. Whoever Is able to love. Is able to suffer, 
for he opens himself to the sufferings which love 
brings and remains superior to them by virtue of his 
love."10^ In trying to understand the event of the 
crucifixion as a Trinitarian fvent, Moltmann writes 
that Jesus Christ suffered the physical and moral 
Daln of dying, and the experience of divine abandon-
ment by his Father. The Father suffered with the Son 
In his pain and dying and exOerlence of God-forsakenness. 
The Father suffered as well the death of his Son (the 
S«n did not suffer his own death, for suffering 
Implies life). The cross stands In the midst of God's 
Trinitarian being, separates and unites the persons 
In relation to each other, and shows them concretely.10^ 
Jesus' death was, properly speaking, not the death of 
God, but death In God. Here God's being Is In suffering, 
and the suffering Is In God's being Itself, because 
God Is love and life. 
Moltmann cannot accept the traditional formula, 
according to which Christ suffered according to and 
in his human nature with the Implication that his 
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divinity was not affected by this. As Nlcea said 
against Arius, God is not changeable. But this is a 
relative statement. God is not changeable the way 
creatures are changeable, from without (veränderbar). 
but he is free to change himself and free to let 
himself out of his own freedom change through the 
other (veränderlich). God is not divisible (teilbar). 
but he is able, in his freedom, to communicate 
himself to others (mitteilen). So too, the choice 
between creaturely suffering and apathela is a false 
one with respect to the God who is essentially love. 
For God can choose, and did choose, to be affected by 
the other (which is created by himself), and this 
freely letting himself be affected by the other is 
the active suffering of divine love. 
Moltmann accepts Rahner's identification of the 
Immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, adding that 
the material principle of the Trinitarian doctrine Is 
Christ's cross and the formal principle of the know-
ledge of the cross Is the doctrine of the Trinity.1°^ 
The surrender of Jesus to his Father's will and the 
acceptance of that surrender in the resurrection 
allows us, as it did traditional dogmatic theology, 
to speak of consubstantlality of the Father and Son. 
But the trlnltarian theology of the cross allows the 
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unity of Father and Son to contain within Itself as 
well the difference ani inequality of the event of the 
cross. In the cross the Father and Son are in the 
deepest way separated in Jesus1 abandonment and at the 
same time united in the most intimate way in the 
surrender of Jesus to his Father. In making the start-
ing point of the theology of the Cross the total 
personal aspect of Jesus' sonship, Moltmann feels he 
is contributing something new in comparison to 
traditional theology. •1-07 
To sum up Moltmann's contribution in relation to 
Pannenberg's Christo!ogy: 
1) Pannenberg's universal-historical approach 
to Chrlstology, which tends to favor synthesis and 
intellectual coherence, is corrected, or at least 
complemented, by Moltmarm. It is not clear, however, 
that one must make a choice between the two 
approaches.^^° 
2) With Pannenberg (and Wiederkehr and 
Schoonenberg), Moltmann makes the Trinitarian under-
standing of Christ fruitful for Chrlstology. The same 
dialectical identity of Jesus' sonship is at work here 
that Pannenberg and Wiedekehr showed to be a neces-
sary corrective of perspective in Chrlstology. The 
relation of the one, whole Jesus Christ to his Father 
•55) 
and fellowmen Is the fruitful context in which the 
man Jesus' identity with the eternal Son is examined. 
Put Moltmann does not offer a complete Chrlstology 
(nor does he intend to do so), as is evidenced by the 
fact, for example, that he accepts the idea of anhypos-
tasls without any discussion. •'•09 
3) Pannenberg's notion of the retroactive power 
of the resurrection as eschatologlcal event is put to 
good use by Moltmann to show the saving significance 
of the cross. 
Ό Lastly, in my opinion Moltmann has offered 
an important contribution to the discussion of God's 
changeability and capacity to suffer. Even his most 
pointed statements (for example, "Auschwitz Is in 
God"), 1 0 when taken In context, are capable of an 
orthodox construction, and, more than that, reveal to 
modern man a fresh glimpse of the divinity of the God 
of Jesus Christ. 
Summary of Chapter VI 
This chapter has been devoted to Pannenberg's 
systematic argument. Here I considered the retro­
active character of the resurrection event, Jesus' 
dialectical Identity with the Son of God, and the 
problem of God's transcendence in the Incarnation, 
concluding with an examination of Pannenberg's role 
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In the contemporary discussion of Christology. With 
respect to the first point, I Indicated the ambiguous 
nature of Pannenberg1s formulations of hls thesis, but 
recognized that what In the last analysis Is Involved 
here Is a new metaphysical vision which is announced 
rather than adequately developed. In this perspective, 
the future is ontologically prior to past and present, 
and God Is related to, and active in the present out 
of the future of the world and his own unsurpassable 
future. Out of his future God is present as future 
In Jesus on earth and out of the future (the resurrec-
tion) God claimed Jesus as his own. Into the very 
heart of the usually abstractly metaphysical discus-
sion of the unity between Jesus and God Pannenberg 
Introduces an ontology inspired by the eschatology of 
the Old and New Testaments. While Pannenberg's con-
ception of the retroactive role of the resurrection 
is Indeed part of a "new ontology" he wishes to 
develop, it seemed to me that the Idea is an Important 
contribution to contemporary Christology even if one 
does not want to accept a "new ontology." 
The difficult question of Pannenberg's understand-
ing of God's transcendence In the incarnation was 
divided into four problems. Our knowledge of God's 
transcendence in Jesus, according to Pannenberg, is 
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characterized by an absence of analogy because all our 
concepts have an unlvocal core. We questioned whether 
Pannenberg1s use of an aequlvocatlo a Consilio was 
adequate and whether it did not presuppose what he was 
rejecting: analogy. Finally, we suggested that analogy 
Is never purely conceptual knowledge, and that the 
poverty of our thought Is transcended first not by an 
act of worship but noetically by the dynamism of the 
content (being) which is affirmed. 
The second problem was that of Christ's préexis-
tence. While this classic motif receives attention 
in Pannenberg's analysis, and while he appreciates the 
fact that, for all its mythical character. It defends 
the transcendence of God in the incarnation, still he 
does not take the opportunity to reflect sufficiently 
on what person means when applied to such a transcen-
dent being. In other words, the deficiency Inherent 
in Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity reveals Itself 
precisely here in the question of préexistent Son of 
God. 
Next to be considered was God's eternity and 
then, his openness to change within himself. Here we 
found that Pannenberg had several exciting and rich 
suggestions to offer which, rather than diminishing 
God's infinity, paid respect to the "surprise character" 
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which that Infinity exhibits for each generation of 
faith-full thinkers who reflect on It as It glances 
off the ШЕЛ who was Jesus. 
Finally, Dietrich Wiederkehr and Jürgen Moltmann 
have shown In their consistent development of the 
themes of retroactivity and dialectical sonshlp how 
fruitful they can be for a renewed Chrlstology, 
whether Roman Catholic or Evangelical. In addition, 
Moltmann1s reflections on divine mutability and active 
suffering In love promise to become an Important 
focus of theological discussion In the years ahead. 
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A CONCLUDING WORD 
Volfhart Pannenberg1 s Orundzügie der Christologie 
can truly be called a landmark In contemporary 
systematic Chrlstology. The synthetic power by which 
it Is able to relate the findings of contemporary 
exeiçetlcal and historical studies to a critical reading 
of the entire Chrlstologlcal tradition and to the 
systematic requirements of contemporary Christianity 
Is nothing short of admirable. Rather than flee the 
strange world from which Jesus came as so much 
"clothing" which the modern theologian can safely 
remove from the figure of Jesus himself, Pannenberg 
tries herraeneutlcally to merge the horizons of then 
and now in a way which Is faithful to the "Inherent 
significance" of Jesus' life and fate while not simply 
being slavishly fixed on the past. The historical 
and eschatologlcal Interests of Jesus' time are made 
relevant to the historical and futuristic concerns 
of today. This project is not without Its problems, 
as we saw, for example, when we examined the present 
state of research in apocalyptic. But that such an 
attempt as ^rundziige was made at all Is noteworthy. 
The criticisms that we have offered have always 
been made with an awareness of the dimensions of 
Pannenberg's undertaking. Hls approach is one 
Involving history, exegesis, respect for the 
Christo!οςleal tradition and constant dialogue with 
other Reformed theologians as well as with Roman 
Catholic thinkers. Like any superior Chrlstology, 
he raises new questions while he offers perspectives 
In which to escape old quandaries. And one could 
object that his .approach is characteristically 
"academic" and intellectual, that It concedes too 
much to the "over-heated" historical consciousness of 
Western man, that it is not attentive enough to 
contemporary religious experience. Nonetheless, 
Chrlstology and the Christian faith will always be 
Indissolubly linked with a particular time and place 
in the past, and the truth of the Christian faith will 
always be grounded in what happened then. That 
Pannenberg has made that (to us) strange past fruitful 
for our understanding of Jesus' universal signifi­
cance today cannot be faulted. Rather, he has put us 
in his debt. 
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NOTES FOR THE INTR03UCriON 
1 ^rundzüge der Christologie. Gütersloh (1964), 3rd ed., 
1969. Page references In the text refer to the third 
edition of this book. In the notes Indicated by GdC. 
English translation: Jesus - God and Man (tr. Lewis 
L. Wllkens and Duane A. Prlebe), Philadelphia, Ι96Θ. 
Henceforth referred to as ΕΓ. For the texts expressing 
the normative teaching of the Church In Chrlstology, see 
Henrlcus Denzlnger and Adolphus Schönmetzer, Enchiridion 
Symbolorum. Deflnltlonum et Declaratlonum de Rebus 
Fidel et Morum, Barcelona-Frelburg-Rome-New York, 32nd 
ed., 1963 (henceforth OS). 
2 Pannenberg defines Jesus' fate (Geschick) as "das 
Zugeschickte, das Jesus Widerfahrene, lm Gegensatz zu 
seinem Wirken und Auftreten" (GdC, p. 26). 
3 Herrmann argues with Kahler that faith ought not to 
depend on scholarly Investigation, yet the proclamation 
of Jesus as given In the New Testament witness "kann 
uns..., wenn wir uns Ihr überlassen, allein nicht gegen 
den Zweifel schützen, dass wir unseren Glauben auf etwas 
gründen wollen, was vlelLielcht gar nicht geschichtliche 
Tatsache, sondern Erzeugnis des Glaubens Ist" (W. Herrmann, 
"Der geschichtliche Christus, der Grund unseres Glaubens," 
Zeltschrift für Theologie und Kirche 2 (1892), 253, 
cited by Pannenberg, GdC, p. 17). 
іьг 
k Pannenbertr rejects the use of contemporary Christian 
experience as the starting-point for ChrlstolO'ïy, since 
this approach leaves unsettled the problem of the reality 
of the object of faith. Schleiermacher, Kahler, Bultraann, 
Otto Weber and Paul Althaus are, each in his own way, 
guilty of this. The ambivalence of Paul Althaus is 
shown in a pair of statements which for Pannenberg 
stand in irreconcilable tension: "Der Cffenbarungs-
charakter der Geschichte Jesu wird nicht durch historische 
Besinnung und Begründung erkannt. Aber auf der anderen 
Seite doch auch nicht ohne sie; denn das Evangelium 
handelt von Tatsachen, die in dieser unserer beschichte 
geschehen sein sollen" (Das sogenannte Kerygma und der 
historische Jesus. Gütersloh, 1958, p. 19; cited by 
Fannenberg, GdC, p. 20); the second member of the pair: 
"Die Würdenamen Jesu und ihre ''ieschlchte--dle des 
Kyrlostltels zeigt es am deutlichsten—sind durch die 
rellgionsgeschlchtllche Vor- und Umwelt der Jungen 
Kirche mitbestimmt. Es gilt, ihren christlich-legitimen 
Sinn festzustellen, ihre wesentliche christologische 
Bedeutung, die sich in ihnen ausdrücken will, aber 
vielleicht nicht an sie gebunden ist. Dazu muss die 
dogmatische Christologie hinter die neutestamentliche 
zurücksehen zu dem Grunde, auf den sie zurückweist, der 
den Glauben an Jesus trägt. Oas ist die Geschichte 
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Jesu. Ole Christologie hat zu fragen und zu zeigen, 
inwiefern diese Geschichte den Glauben an Jesus begrün-
det" (Die christliche Wahrheit. Gütersloh. 6th ed., 
1962, p. U2k; cited by Pannenberg, GdC, p. 23). 
5 '"îs sel noch einmal hervorgehoben, dass auch der 
Zusammenhang Jesu mit Israel und dem Alten Testament 
für eine Christologie, die vom Inkarnationsgedanken 
ausgeht, nicht so grundlegend sein kann, dass sie nicht 
auch ohne Ihn bestehen könnte" (^ dC, pp. 28f.). See 
In this connection also the excursus on the title 
"Chrlstoloîx." GdC. pp. 2l|ff. 
6 Pannenberg offers seven major soterlologlcal motifs: 
(1) deification through Incarnation; (2) deification 
through assimilation to God; (3) the Chrlstology of 
vicarious satisfaction; (<+) the Chrlstology of God's 
grace alone; (5) the prototype of the religious man; 
(6) the Ideal of moral perfection; (7) the Chrlstology 
of pure personality (GdC, pp. ЗЗ-^І). 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE 
1 Kirchliche Dogmatlk, vol. I: Die Lehre vom Wort 
Gottes. Zollikon-Zürlch, vol. I/I, 5th ed., 19^?; vol. 
1/2, JTU ed., 19^5. 
2 Kirchliche Do^matlk 1/2, p.135: "Die Christologie 
muss lm ganzem und dass helsst: sie muss schon In den 
Grundsätzen einer kirchlichen Dogmatlk herrschend und 
erkennbar sein, oder sie 1st es gar nicht. Gerade darum 
muss es aber auch eine besondere Christologie, eine 
ausdrückliche Lehre von der Person Jesu Christi geben." 
3 Kirchliche Dogmatlk, 1/2, #13. 
^ Ibid.. p.3: "Der Gegenstand, dem wir uns In Fort-
setzung der mit der Entwicklung der Trlnltätslehre 
begonnenen Analyse des Offenbarungsbegrlffs zunächst 
zuwenden, 1st die Lehre von der Inkarnation oder von 
der Fielschwerdung des Wortes Gottes. Es handelt sich um 
den ersten grundlegenden Teil der sog. Christologie, um 
den Teil nämlich. In welchem sie eben auf die Frage ant-
wortet: wie das In der Freiheit Gottes wirklich ist, 
dass dem Menschen seine Offenbarung widerfährt. Die 
eigentliche Lehre von Christi Person und Werk hat 
ihren eigenen notwendigen Ort Innerhalb der Lehre von 
der Versöhnung, mit der wir es hier noch nicht direkt 
zu tun haben." 
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5 Ibid., pp.Bf. 
6 Ibid.. p. 13. 
7 Ibid.. pp. 15f. 
θ Ibid., p. 24. 
Q Ibid.. p. 2?. 
in Ibid.. p. 30. 
11 Ibid.. р. 3^. 
1? Ibid.. p. 35: "Seine Majestät 1st so gross, dass sie, 
auch In der Niedrigkeit dieses seines Gottseins In 
unserem Bereich, Ja In der Identität mit einer der uns 
begegnenden Wirklichkeiten unseres Kosmos und gerade 
In dieser Niedrigkeit Majestät sein und bleiben. Ja 
gerade so sich als Majestät erweisen kann." 
1 3 Ιoc. cit. 
ΙΔ Ibid., p. 36. 
1 ς Ibid., pp. 36-38. Cf. p. 38: "Denn darin, dass Gott 
in seinem einen Wesen doch nicht einsam, sondern in 
seinen Seinsweisen verschieden der Vater 1st, der einen 
eingeborenen Sohn hat, darin ist es von Ewigkeit her In 
ihm selbst begründet, dass er für andere, dass er für 
eine von Ihm selbst verschiedene Wirklichkeit frei sein 
kann." Cf. p. 37: "Er 1st als Vater Sohn und Geist in 
seinem Wesen der eine Gott und In all seinem Wirken 
dieser eine Gott ganz und nicht teilweise. Der Satz, 
dass gerade das Wort oder der Sohn Gottes Mensch wurde, 
sagt also trotz seiner Unterscheidung des Sohnes vom 
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Vater und vom Heiligen Geist ohne Vorbehalt: dass Gott 
In seiner ganzen Gottheit Mensch wurde." 
Ift Ibid.. pp. 38ff. 
17 Ibid.. pp. kift. 
IH Ibid.. pp. I+Jtf. 
19 Ibid.. p. U9. 
?0 Ibid.. pp. 138f. Barth maintains that the Intention 
of the early Church, Including the Council of Chalcedon, 
was to declare the fact of the unity of God and man In 
Jesus, and not to offer an explanation of the fact. He 
agrees with Gregory of Nyssa: "wir können den Modus... 
der Einheit... von göttlichem und menschlichem Wesen in 
Christus nicht einsehen" (Ibid.. p. 138). 
71 Ibid.. p. 141. 
72 Ibid., p. 1^2. 
?i Ibid., p. IkJ. 
24 Ibid.. p. Ikk: "der Satz, 'Jesus Christus wahrer Gott 
und wahrer Mensch' /Tst7 die Voraussetzung, von der alles 
weitere Nachdenken auszugehen hat. Zu einer anderen 
Voraussetzung hätten wir nur auf einem anderen Wege kom-
men können. Diese Voraussetzung aber 1st Insofern eine 
echte, eigentliche Voraussetzung als sie nicht von 
einer anderen überboten, von einer höheren Voraussetzung 
aus begründet und dann vielleicht doch auch angefochten 
werden kann.'1 
J6Ö 
2? Loc. cit. 
?f Ibid.. p. 11*5. 
27 Ibid., p. 1^6. 
2Θ Ibid.. p. 14?. 
29 Ibid.. p. 148. 
30 Ibid.. p. 149. 
31 Ibid.. pp. 151f. 
32 Ibid., pp. l6lff. 
33 Ibid.. pp. l64f. 
34 Ibid.. p. 166. 
3* Ibid.. pp. 170f. "Der hier gekämpft und gesiegt hat, 
1st der, der siegen musste, der. Indem er zum Kampf 
antrat, schon gesiegt hatte. Er wusste wirklich um 
keine Sünde. So wahr das vere Deus glltj Das sagt das 
Neue Testament, well es um seine Auferstehung weiss. 
Die Auferstehung war Ja die Offenbarung des vere Deus. 
die Offenbarung dessen, dass das Wort Fleisch ward" 
(Ibid.. p. 173). 
4P Ibid.. p. 175-
37 Ibid.. p. 178. 
38 Loc. Cit. 
39 Ibid.. p. 180. "Was das Veue Testament von Jesus 
Christus sagt, das 1st Ja aufs letzte Wort von Ostern 
und Himmelfahrt her gesagt, d.h. aber aus der Erkenntnis 
der ein für allemal vollzogenen Einigung des ewigen 
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Wortes mit dem von Ihm angenommenen Menschsein" 
(Ibid.). 
40 Kirchliche Dogmatlk. 11/2: Die Lehre von Gott. 
2nd ed., IC'+ö, p. 102. 
41 Ibid.. pp. 108f. 
42 Ibid.. p. 110. 
43 Ibid.. p. 111. 
44 Ibid.. p. 123. 
45 Ibid.. p. 125. 
46 Ibid., p. 144. 
47 Kirchliche Dogmatllc. 1/1, #6, pp. 194-261. 
4Θ Ibid., p. 204. 
49 Loc, cit. 
50 Ibid.. p. 235. "Im Glauben hat und kennt und 
bejaht der Mensch nur diese Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis 
des Wortes Gottes: die Im Worte Gottes selbst liegende, 
Im Worte zu Ihm gekommene und Im Worte Ihm gegenwärtige" 
(p. 236). 
51 Ibid.. p. 258. 
52 Ibid.. p. 260. 
53 Ibid.. pp. 255f. "Man hat sich den Menschen Im 
Ereignis des wirklichen Glaubens als sozusagen von oben 
geöffnet zu denken. Von oben, nicht von unten! Was 
von unten, als menschliche Erfahrung und Tat, als 
Glaubensbewusstsein sichtbar, greifbar und analysierbar 
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wird, ...das 1st an sich ein 'Hohlraum,' der auch 
ganz anders gefüllt sein könnte als gerade durch das 
Wort Gottes" (ibid.). 
SA "Das christologische Bekenntnis des ökumenischen 
Hates," (1951/52), collected in Glauben und Verstehen. 
Tübingen, vol. II. 5th ed. I968, pp. 2k6-Z6l. 
5S Ibid., p. 2k6. 
«55 Ibid., p. 24?. 
57 James 2.19. 
^8 »Das christologische Bekenntnis," o£. cit., 
p. 256. 
59 Ibid.. p. 258. 
60 »Jesus Christus und die Mythologie" (I958), 
collected In Glauben und Verstehen. Tübingen, vol. IV, 
2nd ed., 1967, pp. líJ-1-189. See pp. 143-1^5. 
61 Ibid.. ρ. 1Ί-6. 
62 Ibid.. pp. 15^. 
ЯЗ Demythologlzlng finds here its deepest theological 
rationale: "Genauer ausgedrückt, 1st Entmythologlslerung 
durch radikale Anwendung von der Lehre von der Recht-
fertigung durch den Glauben auf das Gebiet des Wissens 
und Denkens" (Ibid., p. 188). 
R4 Ibid.. p. 159. 
CS Ibid.. p. 162. Elsewhere Bultmann has written: 
"Da Gott kein objektiv feststellbares Weltphänomenon 
3?i 
ist, lässt sich von seinem Handeln nur so reden, dass 
zugleich von unserer Existenz geredet vlrd, die durch 
Gottes Handeln betroffen 1st. Man mag solche Redewelse 
vom Handeln Gottes 'analogisch1 nennen. Es wird durch 
sie zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass das Betroffensein durch 
Gott schlechterdings seinen Ursprung In Gott selbst, und 
dass dabei der Mensch lediglich der Leidende, der ^ 
Empfangende 1st. Aber ebenso 1st festzuhalten, dass 
vom Betroffensein durch Gottes Handeln nur als von einem 
existentiellen Ereignis geredet werden kann, das objek-
tiv nicht feststellbar, nicht ausweisbar ist" ("Zum 
Problem der Entmythologlslerung" ¿195,27, in Glauben 
und Verstehen, vol. IV, p. 135). 
β6 "Jesus Christus und die Mythologie," o£. cit.. 
p. 168. 
67 Ibid.. p. 171. 
fiS Ibid.. p. 173· "Der Pantheismus kann mit Bezug 
auf Jedes Erelçnls sagen: 'Hier ist Göttliches am Werk,1 
ohne dass er die Bedeutung dessen, was sich ereignet, 
für seine eigene Existenz In Betracht zieht. Der christ-
liche Glaube kann nur sagen: "Ich vertraue daruf, dass 
Gott hier und da am Werk 1st, aber sein Handeln 1st 
verborgen, well es nicht direkt Identisch 1st mit dem 
sichtbaren Ereignis" (ibid., p. 175). 
*9 Ibid.. pp. 177f. 
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70 "Versteht man den /lenschen als ein ira wahren Sinn 
Reschlchtllches Wesen, dessen Virkllchkelt In konkreten 
Situationen und Ereignissen liegt, in den Begegnungen 
des Lebens, dann 1st einerseits klar, dass der Glaube 
sich selbst nicht gegen den Einwand, eine Illusion zu 
sein, verteidigen kann, wenn er vom Handeln Lottes 
spricht, und andererseits dass Glaube nicht ein psycholo­
gisch-subjektives Geschehen 1st" (Ibid.. p. 179). 
71 Heidelberg, 4th ed., I965. 
72 Ibid., p. 7. 
73 Ibid.. p. 13. 
74 Ibid.. p. 16. 
75 Loc, cit. 
7Λ Ibid., p. l^. 
77 Ibid.. p. 25. "Venn die blosse 'Wiederholung1 der 
Verkündigung Jesu—sei es durch die In den Synoptikern 
verarbeitete Tradition, sei es durch die moderne 
".eschlchtsschrelbung—die Vergangenheit in der Weise 
präsent macht, dass sie den Hörer (oder Leser) vor die 
Entscheidung für (oder gegen) eine in der Verkündigung 
des historischen Jesu erschlossene /.ögllchkelt des 
Selbstverständnisses stellt, so fordert das Chrlstus-
Kerygma den Glauben an den in Ihm präsenten Jesus, der 
nicht mar, wie der historische Jesus das Hell verheissen, 
sondern der es schon gebracht hat" (loc, cit.). 
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78 Ibid., p. 2?. 
79 "Kerygma und historischer Jesus," In Theologie und 
VerkündlgunR. Ein Gespräch mit Rudolf Bultmann. 
Tübingen, 2nd ed., 1963, P· 20· In giving this report 
on Sbellng's reflections on Chrlstology I have chosen 
to focus on an essay -which reveals his agreement with 
and divergence from his former teacher Bultmann. On 
the constitutive role of the historical Jesus In 
Chrlstolosry, see also "Die Frage nach dem historischen 
Jesus und das Problem der Christologie," In Wort und 
Glaube. Tübingen, vol. I, 2nd ed., І96З, pp. 300ff. 
80 "Kerygma und historischer Jesus," o£. clt.. 
pp. 21f. 
61 Ibid.. pp. гц-f. 
82 Ibid., p. 28. "Bultmanns Stellung zur Frage des 
historischen Jesus 1st vielmehr theologisch an seinem 
Kerygmabegrlff orientiert, der das Heden von Gottes 
Hellstat nur streng innerhalb der Relation von Kort und 
Glaube zulässt. Darum wird Jedes Zurückfragen hinter 
das Kerygma Im Sinne der Frage nach einem Legitimations-
ausweis, nach einem Beweis für die Wahrheit des 
Kerygmas mit Schärfe abgewiesen als dem Wesen ebenso 
des Kerygmas wie des Glaubens zuwider. Das Wort hat 
deshalb in Rultmanns Interpretation In erster Linie 
llntscheiduTï fordernden Autoritäts-Charakter und der 
ЗУЧ-
Glaube Gehorsams-Charakter" (loc, cit. ). 
5? Ibid.. p. 29f. 
Pd Ibid.. p. 31. 
'^ Ibid., pp. 31f. 
46 Ibid., p. 3?. "Denn als eschatologische Anrede 
1st das Kerygma Anrede Im radikalen Sinn, so dass das 
Kerygma als Anrede identisch 1st mit der Sache des 
Kerygmas: eschatologlsches Geschehen In der Helatlon 
von Wort und Glauben. Im Begriff Kerygma ist der 
skizzierte fundamentale Sachverhalt als Einheit In 
Griff genommen" (loc, cit.). 
37 Ibid.. p. UQ, 
->=» Ibid., p. 50. "Diese Aufgabe setzt das Inanspruch-
genommensein durch das voraus, worin das christologische 
Kerygma seine Notwendigkeit hat; und sie besteht darin, 
den Angeredeten daraufhin anzureden, dass und wie seine 
Situation bestimmt 1st durch das, worin das christolo­
gische Kerygma seinen Grund hat, und dass In diesem 
Sinne—also nicht kraft eines Postulats, sondern kraft 
eines Widerfahrnisses—das christologische Kerygma für 
den Hörer notwendig ist" (loc. cit.). 
0
ч Ibid., p. 55. "Aber eines ist die Warnunar vor 
unsachgemässem Zurückfragen zur 'Legitimation' und ein 
anderes 1st die Notwendigkeit sachiremässen Zurückfragens 
zur Interpretation. Dabei sei noch dahingestellt, ob 
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nicht In anderer Velse, als Eultmann diesen Terminus 
gewöhnlich gebraucht, die ГТаяе der Legitimation des 
Kerygmas auch angemessen verstanden werden kann und 
dann Identisch wird mit der Frage seiner Interpretation" 
(loc, cit. ). 
90 To explain the meaning of Sprachereignis Ebellng 
refers to Ernst luchs, "Das Sprachereignis In der 
Verkündigung Jesu, In der Theologie des Paulus und Im 
Ostergeschehen," in Gesammelte Aufsätze, vol. 1, 
Tübingen, 2nd ed., 1965. PP. 38lff. 
91 "Kerygma und historischer Jesus," 0£. clt.. p. 56. 
92 Ibid.. p. 6l. 
93 Ibid.. pp. 68f. 
94 Rudolf Eultmann, "Das Verhältnis der urchrlstllchen 
Christusbotschaft zum historischen Jesus," p. 16. 
95 "Nun darf aber durch diese berechtigte Abwehr der 
andere Gesichtspunkt nicht unterdrückt werden, dass die 
historisch kritische Forschung das Kerygma nicht als 
Irgendeine—völlig irregehende—Antwort auf Jesu 
Entscheidungsruf erkennt, vielmehr—in der Tat über das 
hinaus, was Bultmann unter 'Kontinuität' versteht--
durchaus als sachgemässe, als entsprechende Antwort. 
Das Urchristentum hat, so wenig die Art der Formulierung 
seiner Antwort von Jesus Intendiert war, Jesus nicht 
missverstanden, sondern verstanden. Das christologische 
3?6 
Keryirma ist nicht eine willltürliche Verkleidung; der 
Gestalt Jesu, sondern Explikation dessen, was in 
seiner Person, d. h. seinem Auftreten und seiner 
Verkündigung, implidert war. Ich wüsste nicht, was die 
Verhältnisbestimmung von imollziter und expliziter 
Christologie bedeuten sollte, wenn nicht eben eine 
dem historischen Urteil sich aufdränirende 'sachliche 
Einheit des Wirkens und der Verkündiirung Jesu mit dem 
Kerygma'." ("Kerygma und historischer Jesus," 0£. cit., 
p. 72). 
a(r Ibid., pp. 79f. 
07 Ibid., pp. 115f. 
of Ibid., p. 116. 
qq cf. "Historische und dogmatische Theologie," in 
Theologie und Verkündigung, pp. 10-18. 
100 Ibid.. p. 29. 
тщ Ibid., р. 68. 
102 See James M. Robinson, Kerygma und historischer 
Jesus. Stuttgart, 2nd ed., I967. This is a revised 
version of A New Quest of the Historical Jesus, London, 
1959. 
104 «Kerygma und historischer Jesus," 0£. cit.. 
pp. 70ff. 
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MOTES FOR СНАРІЧН TWO 
1 Fannenberg points out that doo-matics has preceded 
recent exegesis In finding the basis for faith in Jesus 
In his claim (".dC, p. 51). 
2 Pannenberg sides with Rudolf Bultmann, Günther 
Bornkamm, Heinz Eduard Tödt, and Ferdinand НаЙп regarding 
the authenticity of this saying. Among those on the 
opposing side are Philipp Vielhauer, Eduard Schweizer, 
Hans Conzelmann, and Ernst Käsemann. Por references 
see GdC, p. 53, n. 22. 
3 Ulrich Wilckens, in an article frequently quoted by 
Pannenberg In OdC, tries to account for Jesus' emphasis 
on the urgency of the present In terms of a personal 
experience he may have undergone. See "Das Offenbarungs-
verständnis in der Geschichte des Urchristentums," In 
Offenbarung als Geschichte. Göttinnen, ed. by W. Pannenberg, 
3rd ed., 1965. p. 5>+. n. 31. 
k The basic viewpoint which Pannenberg offers in this 
section of GdC has not undergone significant modifica-
tion since he wrote it In 196^. lor an alternate, less 
"polemical" statement of the same theme see his essay 
"Ole Offenbarung Gottes In Jesus von Nazareth," in 
Aeuland In der ГЬеоІокіе. vol. Ill: Theologie als 
Geschichte, ed. by James η. Robinson and John В. Cobb, 
Jr., Zürich-Stuttgart, 1967, pp. ІЗ5-І69. The book appeared 
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In English In the same year as Theology аз History 
(New York, Evanston, london). 
5 See Pannenbenr's "Doirmatlsche Thesen zur Lehre von 
der Offenbarung," In Offenbarung; als Geschichte, p. 112. 
For an analysis of the Issue and contestants In the 
debate around this position of Pannenberg and his 
"circle" see Robinson and Cobb, ГЬео1ов;,у as History, 
pp. 62-100. 256ff. 
6 Of the six elements In the "Immediate Inherent signi­
ficance" of the resurrection-event, the first three are 
apparently borrowed from Ulrich Vllckens' essay (n. 3 
above), pp. 6lff. Vo explicit reference Is made to 
Vllckens, however. None of the theoloelans examined 
In Chapter I has made apocalyptic so Indispensable to 
an understanding of Jesus' unity with Tod as has 
Pannenberg. 
7 At this point Pannenberg accepts the argumentation 
of rieinz Eduard Tödt, Der Menschensohn In der synop-
tischen Überlieferung. Gütersloh, 1959. Pannenberg 
considers It probable that the Easter appearances 
"Initiated" his coming from heaven, as far as the 
disciples were concerned (GdC, p. fk). 
8 Ue shall examine Pannenberg's further discussion of 
this central theme in his Chrlstology later. In connec-
tion with his notion of "revelatlonal presence." 
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9 This idea of epiphany (which Pannenberg calls the 
"Hellenistic concept of revelation") also prepared, 
according to him, the basic pattern for the later 
doctrine of incarnation. Epiphany was never a central 
category in the Old Testament, and while it did play 
a role especially in the early history of Israel, it 
was overtaken by the later idea that God's revelation 
would be eschatologlcal (Offenbarung als Geschichte. 
p. 91). The hellenlstlc (gnostic) idea of epiphany, 
which posed a most serious challenge to early 
Christianity, differs from the Biblical notion of 
revelation in that it is direct. Involves a secret 
knowledge and entails the appearance of the divine in 
the human but shuns full identification of the two. 
Biblical revelation, on the other hand, Is Indirect, 
universal and has its focus in the proclamation, cross 
and resurrection of Jesus (Ibid.. p. 110). 
10 Pannenberg's position regarding the relation between 
word and event in the resurrection appearances can be 
viewed as an application to the New Testament of an 
Insight that receives its most lengthy defense from the 
study of the Old Testament carried out by former asso-
ciates of Pannenberg In Heidelberg, especially Holf 
Rendtorff's study of the prophetic word. See his essay 
"Die Offenbarungsvorstellungen lm Alten Israel" in 
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Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 21-41. Fannenberi 
admits that It Is Rolf Hendtorff who gave the 
"ersten Anstoss" for the Heidelberg· troup that soon 
received Pannenberar' s name ( ibid. , p. 132, n. 1). For 
a discussion of Hendtorff's debate vith Ualther 
Zlmmerll about the significance of Yahweh's Ervelsvort. 
see Theology as History, pp. 42-62. 
11 Pannenberg goes on to say that the event of the 
Easter appearances apparently belonged to those events 
whose meaning is to a great extent unambiguous, while 
the crucifixion was experienced as obscure and enigmatic, 
givlni way to different interpretations of Its meaning. 
12 Reference Is made to Is. 26.19, Зап. 12.2, Eth. 
Enoch 92.3, Зуг. Baruch 30.1 and IV Tzra, as well as 
to Paul (I Phess. 4.13ff.; I Cor. 11.30; 15.6,20,51). 
Since writing this Pannenberg has changed his mind 
regarding the "completely metaphorical" character of 
the expression "resurrection from the dead." "Dennoch 
1st es mir zweifelhaft geworden, ob nur in einer 
Sprache, deren semantische Intention metaphorisch 1st, 
von der Wirklichkeit des Auferstandenen gesprochen 
werden kann. Wäre es nicht möilich, einen Begriff des 
•Lebens' zu bilden, innerhalb dessen unser organisches 
und mindestens in höher organisierten Testalten todver-
fallenes Leben nur einen speziellen tall darstellte...'' 
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Ein solcher Lebensbegriff wäre zwar nicht durchweg 
empirisch kontrollierbar, er wäre vielleicht auch 
durch Ausweitung eines engeren Begriffes von Leben und 
insofern durch einen Übertragungsvorgang entstanden, 
aber seine Gegenstandsintention, sein Bezeichnungssinn 
wäre nicht mehr metaphorisch" ("Dogmatische Erwägungen 
zur Auferstehung Jesu," Kerygma und Dogma Ik /T9687, 
113. η. Ό . 
13 Attention Is called to Werner Teorg Kümmel's idea 
that the resurrected body Involves'a difference In the 
corporeality Itself (see GdC, p. 71, n. 6l). He also 
approves of Ingo Hermann's explanation that "wegen der 
eschatologischen Bedeutung des Geistgedankens... ein 
Pneumaleib also ein der Auferstehungswirklichkeit 
entsprechender Leib sein wird" (loc, cit. ). 
Ik "Venn die apokalyptische Erwartung uns gänzlich 
unvollziehbar sein sollte, dann 1st uns auch der 
urchristliche Christusglaube nicht mehr vollziehbar; 
danri wäre aber die Kontinuität dessen, was nach solchen 
Abzüo-en noch als Christentum übrigbleiben mag, mit Jesus 
und der urchristlichen Verkündigung bis hin zu Paulus 
zerbrochen" (GdC, p. 79). 
15 Pannenberg has published a series of eleven lectures 
under the title Was 1st der i'iensch? )le Anthropologie 
der Gegenwart lm Lichte der Theologie, Göttingen, I962. 
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which he has described as being "preliminary" In nature 
(TdC, p. Sil-, η. 77). In these lectures he seeks to shov 
that the anthropological insight of .lax Scheler, Adolf 
Fortmann, and Arnold Gehlen that man's essence consists 
in freltoffenhelt has its deeper root in Gottoffenheit. 
This means at first that man is "ganz und gar ins Offene 
gewiesen" (ibid., p. 10), that he transcends every 
finite яі еп In his experience of the world (loc, cit.), 
and that In this openness the question of God arises 
(Ibid. , pp. 11-13) . Because man Is always the beln1*: who 
transcends the particular glvens of his world, he is the 
question beyond death, since his fulfillment cannot assume 
a final form in his earthly existence (Ibid. , p. 3^). 
16 4ans Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberlchte. 
C-öttingen, 3rd ed. , 196^. There is an ironical aspect 
to Pannenberî's use of this study since Grass Is of 
another opinion re^ardin-; the accessibility of the 
faster events to historical reason: "Oas österliche 
Handeln Gottes an Christus entzieht sich letzten ^ndes 
Jener objektiven liontrolllerbarkelt und Konstatierbarkelt, 
die das ireia-nls noch abgesehen vom Glauben feststellen 
und sicher möchte. Oas 1st nicht nur eine durch die 
historische Kritik bedingte ratalität für die Theologie, 
sondern entspricht den Vesen der Offenbarung und dem 
' esen des christlichen "lau'-ens'1 ( ibid. . р. 2Ц-6 ) . 
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17 Ulrich '. llckens, 'Чет Urspruntr der 'Jberlieferunç 
der ErschelmiriH-en des Auferstandenen," in Эочша und 
Denkstrukturen. ed. by ιilfried Joest and Volfhart 
Pannenberg, Tijttingen, 1963· pp. 63-81. 
18 At this point Fannenberç makes the methodological 
observation that parallels from elsewhere in the history 
of religions may not be employed as motives for the 
emergence of the primitive Christian tradition. The 
question is whether and to what extent the formal 
langage of the religious environment has been used In 
the handlna· down of the appearances of the resurrected 
Lord. Put here, too, care Is demanded as long as 
Gerhard Kittel's conclusion remains valid that hardly 
the slightest traces of cults of dying and risln* gods 
can be demonstrated in first-century Palestine. Phis 
means that at least for the early stage of the primitive 
Christian tradition such influences may be assumed only 
in the case of completely unambiguous similarities to 
motifs from the religious environment that cannot be 
explained from Palestinian presuppositions (GdC, p. 8P). 
19 "... allerdings geht auch hier der Inhalt der 
Audition kaum über das hinaus, was die Christuser-
scheinung selbst in der Situation des Paulus bedeuten 
musste" (^ dC, p. 89). 
20 See note 7 above. Cnce again Pannenberg appears to 
ЗИ4 
use the work of Ulrich Wilckens without making explicit 
reference to him. On the character of the Easter 
appearances as at least quasl-apocalyptlc visions see 
Wilckens' "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der 
Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen," 0£. clt.. pp. 81-93· 
21 Apparently Hans Grass convinced Pannenberg that the 
Easter appearances were. In form, visions. See Theologie 
als Geschichte, pp. 5?ff·. as well as "Hellsgeschehen 
und Geschichte," In Grundfragen systematischer Theologie. 
GBttlngen 196?, p. 53 (henceforth: Grundfragen). This 
programmatic essay, first published In Кегуя;та und 
Dogala 5 (1959). will concern us further below. 
22 It Is Incorrect to say, as Pannenberg does, that 
according to Acts 9.7 the companions heard the voice but 
saw "nothing" (p. 90, η. 8Θ). This verse says that the 
companions heard the voice but saw midena. no one. It 
Is striking that In this passage It Is not said of Paul 
either that he saw someone (cf. Acts 9·3-9). Pannenberg 
apparently prefers to attribute a visionary but not 
auditory experience to the companions because "s ehen und 
Verstehen scheinen hier doch ebenso eng zusammenzugehören 
hinsichtlich dessen was Im einzelnen gesehen wird, wie 
visionäre und audltlonäre Elemente" (3dC, p. 90, n. 88). 
23 Grass, 0£. clt.. p. 222. 
2Ц- Paul Althaus, Die Wahrheit des kirchlichen 
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Osterglaubens: Einspruch я:екеп E. Hirsch. Gütersloh, 
19^0, pp. l6f., and. Ulrich Wllckens, "Der Ursprung der 
Überlieferung der Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen," 
0£. cit., 85f. Cited, 3dC, p. 91. 
25 It Is significant that Pannenberg refuses to accept 
that the early Christian Easter message "burst the bonds 
of apocalyptic" by speaking of the present eschaton. 
"Dem 1st Jedoch entgegenzuhalten, dass diese Bedeutung 
des Ereignisses auch wenn sie die apokalyptische 
Erwartung 'sprengt.' nur in der Sprache der apokalypti-
schen Oberlieferung aussagbar wurde und so gerade In Ihre 
Einzigartigkeit auf den apokalyptischen Erwartungshori-
zont bezogen bleibt" CîdC, pp. 93f., η. 9Ό. This is 
consistent with Pannenberir·s view that an event can be 
correctly located within a particular tradltlo-
historical context even when it seriously alters that 
tradition. See Grundfragen. "Vorwort," p. 9¡ 
Offenbarung als "eschlchte. p. 133 and η. J; Theologie 
als Geschichte, pp. 326ff. 
26 A lot depends on the historian's idea of what is or 
is not "real," that is, historically possible. At this 
point it becomes clear that Pannenberg's discussion of 
the correspondence between the apocalyptic notion of 
resurrection of the body and modern anthropology was not 
simply an apologetica! moment in his argument, but an 
3öfc 
Introduction to the discussion of the historicity of 
the resurrection, and so forms part of the systematic 
argument regarding the unity of Jesus and God. Cf. 
:dC, p. 95. 
27 "Venn die Entstehung des Urchristentums, die abgese-
hen von anderen Überlieferungen auch bei Paulus auf 
Erscheinungen des auferstandenen Jesus zurückgeführt 
wird, trotz aller kritischen Prüfung des Oberileferungs-
bestandes nur verständlich wird, wenn man es Im Lichte 
der eschatologischen Hoffnung einer Auferstehung von 
den Toten betrachtet, dann 1st das so Bezeichnete ein 
historisches Ereignis, auch wenn wir nichts näheres 
darüber wissen. Als historisch geschehen 1st dann ein 
Ereignis zu behaupten, das nur in der Sprache der 
eschatologischen Erwartung aussagbar ist (jdC, p. 9 5 b " 
Such a position is allen to all three theologians we 
considered in Chapter I. 
28 The author Pannenberg enmloys the most in his discus-
sion of the empty tomb Is Hans Freiherr von Campenhausen, 
Jer Ablauf der Cstererelcnlsse und das leere ^rab. 
Heidelberg, 2nd ed. , 1958. As in the case of "¡rass, 
von Campenhausen does not arrive at the same conclusion 
as Pannenberg rejardlng the adequacy of historical 
reason In this matter. See Ibid.. pp. 5kf. 
29 In the concluding section of Pannenberg' s chapter 
з ? 
he speaks briefly of the delay of the parousla In Its 
relation to Jesus' resurrection. The basic scheme in 
which he situates this is that of promise and fulfill­
ment, in which the fulfillment that was the resurrection 
is by virtue of its situation within the apocalyptic 
tradition a proleptlc event as well, pointing to and 
anticipating God's final revelation. This final revela­
tion is the only real revelatory event in the full sense 
for Pannenberg (GdC, p. 105). 
30 Werner Eiert, Der christliche Glaube. Hamburg, 
3rd ed., 1956, p. 300; Paul Althaus, Die christliche 
Wahrheit. 6th ed., 1962, p. ^ 31. 
31 Gerhard Ebeling, Theologie und VerkündlRuna;. 19б2, 
PP. ^5. 5^f., 62, 71. 
32 Karl Earth, Kirchliche Dogmatlk. IV/2, pp. 136ff., 
pp. 156ff. 
33 Karl Hahner, "Dogmatische fragen zur Osterfrömmig-
keit," in Schriften zur Theologie, vol. IV, Einsiedeln-
Zürich-Cologne, i960, pp. l65f. 
Jk Ernst luchs, Gesammelte Aufsätze. Tübingen I, 1959, 
pp. 302f., 297. 
35 Walter Künneth, Theologie der Auferstehung. Munich, 
kth ed., 1951, p. 24; Gerhard Koch, Die Auferstehung 
Jesu Christi. Tilblne-en, 1959. p. 330. One might add 
to this comparison of Pannenberg with other theologians 
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on the resurrection that Bultmann views the resur-
rection as the expression of the saving significance 
of the cross and does not understand the resurrection 
as an historical event in the sense that Pannenberg 
accepts it. Bultmann is more inclined to view the 
eschatologlcal event which is Jesus Christ as a con-
temporaneous event of salvation, so that the past 
event in Its specific historical context is not of 
very great theological concern to him. Furthermore 
Pannenberg s effort to show how the resurrection Is 
central to the constitution of Jesus divinity would be 
quite foreign to him. 
36 In 1968 Pannenberg wrote that a historical event 
must take place in time and space and in relation to 
a definite point of time and a definite place. The 
resurrection is, according to him, an event in time, It 
Is datable approximately between the death of Jesus and 
his first appearances. With regard to space, one must 
say that the resurrection took place In Palestine, 
Indeed In Jerusalem and in and by the tomb (presupposing 
the historicity of the empty tomb). But there Is a 
problem here: Andere Ereignisse, die im Räume statt-
finden pflegen eine Fortsetzung in Folgeereignissen zu 
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haben, die ebenfalls Im Räume stattfinden, und zwar In 
einem kontinuierlichen Zusammenhang mit den vorhergegan-
genen. Die Auferstehung Jesu hingegen hat In bezug auf 
Jesus selbst keine Polgeerelgnlsse Im Raum und genauge-
nommen auch keine unmittelbaren Polgeerelgnlsse In der 
Zelt" ("Dogmatische Erwägungen zur Auferstehung Jesu," 
art., 109). See also the "Postface de Wolfhart 
Pannenberg" In Ignace Berten, Histoire, révélation et 
fol: dialogue avec Wolfhart Pannenberg. Brussels-Paris, 
1969. P. H D . 
37 "Die Krise des Schriftprinzips," In Grundfragen. 
p. 15. "Die 'Sache' der Schrift...nämlich Person und 
beschichte Jesu, 1st für unser historisches Bewusstsein 
nicht mehr In den Texten selbst zu finden, sondern muss 
hinter ihnen erschlossen werden" (loc, cit.). 
38 Ibid.. p. 11. 
39 Ibid.. p. Ik. See also Pannenberg's discussion of 
Luther's principle of the "outer clarity of Scripture" 
In "Hellsgeschehen und "teschichte" in "rundfra^en. 
pp. 63-66. 
kO "Die Krise des Schriftprinzips" o£. cit.. p. 15. 
hl Loç. cit. 
1+2 In 1968 Pannenberg expressed this point starkly: 
"wer bestimmte rraditlonen vor historisch-kritischer 
Prüfung...schützen wollte ρ der müsste um der intellek-
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tuellen Redlichkeit willen auch darauf verzichten, die 
dort überlieferten Ereis-nisse als in dieser unserer 
belt wirklich geschehen zu behaupten" ("Dogmatische 
Erwägungen zur Auferstehung Jesus," art., p. 109). 
Ό "Hellsgeschehen und Geschichte," oj). cit.. p. 6?. 
Ψ* Ibid., pp. 66ff. 
^5 Ibid.. pp. 68ff. "Alle berichteten Einzelheiten, 
immer als Ausdruck der Sicht der Pradenten verstanden, 
erhalten historische Pedeutung nur durch den Bezuz auf 
die vom Historiker mitgebrachte Konzeption des 
Teschichtsverlaufes: Diese wird durch die Einzelbefunde 
bestätigt, modifiziert oder als unzureichend aufgelöst, 
um einer neuen Platz zu machen" (ibid.. p. 70). In an 
article written in 1963 Pannenberg recognizes that the 
context within which a past event can be understood will 
expand to Include the point where the Interpreter 
himself stands, so that the problem of hermeneutlcs (i.e., 
the problem of the relation of the past text and the 
recorded event to the present interpretation and its 
future consequences) and the problem of universal 
history rejoin one another ("Hermeneutik und Universal-
geschichte" In Grundfragen, pp. 91-122, esp. 99. 92f.). 
^6 Pannenberg postulates a temporal end to history 
under the presupposition that only such a temporal end 
can give each event its definitive meaning and constitute 
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history as a whole and as a unity. "Nicht erst der 
Glaube hat ein Verhältnis zur Zukunft, indem er 
vorgreift als Vertrauen auf des Künftige, Unsichtbare. 
Sondern schon für die in ihrer offenen Geschichtlichkeit 
gedachte Vernunft ist der Vorgriff auf eine letzte 
Zukunft konstitutiv, well erst aus dem nur eschatolo-
«isch (weil zeitlich) konstituierten Ganzen die defini-
tive Bedeutung aller Einzelnen sich ergibt...." 
("Glaube und Vernunft," Grundfragen, p. 250). Cf. 
Pannenberg's remarks in Ignace Berten, o£. cit.. pp. 107f. 
Ц·? "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Grundfragen, p. 72. 
Furthermore, any view of history which makes man—and 
that means ultimately individual man—the bearer of 
history is doomed to failure, because history cannot 
receive its unity and final sense from such a fragile 
source (ibid.. pp. 37, 73). 
kB Ibid.. pp. 73ff. 
'4-9 "über historische und theologische Hermeneutik," 
Grundfragen, pp. 123-158. 
50 Ibid.. pp. 123, l^O. 
51 Ibid.. p. 125: "Die Ganzheit der Geschichte, auf 
die sich theologisches Reden von Gott und seiner 
Offenbarung in Jesus bezieht, bildet nun auf der 
anderen Seite ein unabweisbares Thema historischer 
Hermeneutik, weil nämlich alle historische Arbelt auf 
392 
das Problem der Universalgeschichte bezogen bleibt" 
(Ibid.. p. 140). 
52 Loc, cit. An early concern for Pannenberg was the 
"principle of analogy" In historical research. For a 
discussion of this problem see "Heilsgeschehen und 
Geschichte," o£. cit.. pp. 46-54. See also Theology 
as History, pp. 31-42, and "Dogmatische Erwägungen 
zur Auferstehung Jesu," art. p. 109. Pannenberg views 
the principle of analogy as inviting the historian to 
be alert for the new: "Die Erkenntniskraft der 
Analogie beruht nämlich gerade darauf, dass sie das 
Gleichartige Im Ungleichartigen sehen lehrt" 
("Hellsgeschehen und Geschichte," op. cit., p. 51). 
With this stress Pannenberg tries to remove this 
principle as a decisive criterion for the determination 
of the historicity of an event; see Theology as History. 
P. 31. 
53 "Nicht alle diese Wege Implizieren die Einheit Jesu 
mit Gott. Gegenwart Tottes in Jesus 1st nicht immer als 
Einheit Jesu mit Gott verstanden worden. Es bedurfte 
der schweren Aufeinandersetzungen der alten Kirche um 
die Gottheit Jesu, damit sich die Erkenntnis der Gegen-
wart Gottes in Jesu als Einheit Jesu mit Gott Durchsetzte" 
(GdC, p. 113). 
54 It can be said that of the five Christologlcal 
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"models" here reviewed, the "Spirit Chrlstology" and 
the Chrlstology of "mere appearance" involve a presence 
of God in Jesus which does not involve an essential 
unity between them. 
55 Pannenberg adds: "Dabei 1st aber die Wesensiden-
tität Jesu mit Gott lm Offenbarungsgeschehen von der 
funktionalen Einheit Jesu mit Gott her zu verstehen, die 
In der Traditionsgeschichte der chrlstologischen Titel 
im Urchristentum, soweit hier überhaupt das Verhältnis 
Jesu zu Gott ausdrücklich refleklert worden 1st, im 
Vordergrund stand" (GdC, p. 125), 
56 The concept of revelation as "self-revelation" can 
be traced back to German Idealism, especially Hegel, 
while it was Karl Barth who, influenced by Marheineke 
and Herrmann, made it central In Christian theology 
(see Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 8ff.). Pannenberg 
points out that this notion Is now almost universally 
accepted in Protestant theology. 
57 See note 10 above. 
58 Pannenberg admits that there Is only one concept in 
the Old Testament that designated a revelation of 
Yahweh's own essence: the concept of glory (kabod, doxa) 
of God (cf. Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 93-95). 
Apocalyptic took up the idea when It proclaimed that 
God's glory will only appear at the end of history. 
J 94· 
59 It Is Important to realize what Pannenberg Is and 
Is not trying to do at this Juncture. He is not main-
taining that the Church moved from an explicit concept 
of self-revelation to Jesus and his fate and then 
concluded to Jesus' divinity. He Is sayin; that a 
twentieth-century theologian, using the modern concept 
of self-revelation and after Justifying its use In 
connection with Jesus and especially his resurrection, 
can proceed to show to a twentieth-century audience 
what the implicit dynamic was which led to the affirma-
tion of Jesus' divinity. While the early Church 
applied titles to Jesus which do not belong to the 
thought-world of later centuries, the motives (Kotlve) 
behind the application of these titles can be shared by 
us. 
60 "Nur wegen der Auferweckung Jesu, nämlich weil 
dieses "eschehen der Anbruch des allen Menschen bevor-
stehenden Endes 1st, kann von Selbstoffenbarung Gottes 
in Jesus Christus gesprochen werden. Ohne das Ereignis 
der Auferweckung Jesu ware dem theologischen Reden von 
einer Selbstoffenbarung Sottes In Jesus Christus der 
Boden entzogen" (GdC, p. 12?). 
61 Heinrich Vogel was the first to derive the unique-
ness of the revelation-event from the concept of self-
revelation. See Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 8. 
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62 Ibid.. p. 10. 
63 "Die urchristlichen Ansätze zu chrlstologlschem 
Denken sind 'von unten' her entstanden, nämlich von 
dem durch das Ostergeschehen erwiesenen Vollmachtsans-
pruch Jesu her, obwohl die Vorstellungswelse, sowohl 
der Menschensohnchristologle als auch der an hellenis-
tischen Epiphaniegedanken orientierten Konzeptionen 
'von oben her' verlauft. Die Erforschung des Werdens 
der urchristlichen chrlstologlschen Überlieferungen 
zeigt, dass den Aussagen, die den Weg Jesu 'von oben 
her' darstellen, ein Ihrem vorstellungsmlsslien Sinn 
entgegenlaufender Hotlvlerungszummanhang 'von unten 
her' zugrunde liegt. Dieser Sachverhalt gewinnt In der 
heutigen Situation, der die Selbstverständlichkeit d«s 
Redens von Gott verlorengegangen 1st und für die darum 
Cffenbarungsgedanke noch mehr als früher zentral geworden 
1st, besonderes theologisches Gewicht" (GdC, p. 130). 
6k rhéologie als Geschichte, p. 308. 
65 W. Pannenberg, "Der Gott der Hoffnung," In Grundfragen. 
p. 393: cf. "Theology and the Kingdom of God" In 
Theology and the Kingdom of God. Philadelphia, I969, pp. 
58-62. 
66 Theologie als Geschichte, p. 308. 
6? Ibid.. p. 319. 
68 Ibid., pp. 320ff. 
69 Ibid.. p. 321. 
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70 Ibid.. pp. 32^ff. Cf. Pannenberg's "Oie Fraç-е nach 
Gott," in Grundfragen, pp. 36І-З66, esp. p. 378. 
71 Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. l6f. 
72 See Pannenberg's essay "Was 1st Wahrheit?" in 
GrundfraRen, pp. 202-222. He makes his own Hegel's 
saying: "Das Kahre 1st das Ganze" (cited on p. 21P). 
73 Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 95-9P; "Піеоіоку 
and the Kingdom of God," o£. clt.. p. 5^ : "Jesus 
proclaimed the rule of God as a reality belonging to 
the future. This is the coming Kingdom. The idea was 
not new, being a conventional aspect of Jewish expecta-
tion. Vhat was new was Jesus' understanding that Cod's 
claim on the world Is to be viewed exclusively-in terms 
of his coming rule. Chus it Is necessary to say that, 
in a restricted but Important sense, God does not yet 
exist. Since his rule and his beln^ are inseparable, 
God's being is still in the process of coming to be." 
Pannenberg also speaks of "die Zukunft als Seinswelse 
Gottes" ("Der Gott der Hoffnumr," Grundfragen, p. 393). 
7^ Pannenberg tends to follow Heinrich Kraft's analysis, 
accordine to which John's baptism of Jesus could have 
been a symbolic action pointing forward to the eschato-
logical baptism by the Spirit. "Die Anfänge der christ-
lichen Taufe," Theologische Zeltschrift 17 (I96I), 
PP. 399-^12. 
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75 Jesus1 death Is consistently portrayed by Pannenberg 
as an (apparent) disaster, negation, failure and aban­
donment by God; see GdC, p. 63, п. ^б and pp. 257-265. 
76 Principal use is made of Martin Dlbelius, Jungfrauen-
sohn und Krippenkind, Heidelberg, 1932, and Hans von 
Campenhausen, Die Jungfrauengeburt in der rhéologie der 
alten Kirche. Heidelberg, I962. Regarding the conflict 
between the idea of préexistent sonship and sonshlp 
occurring at Jesus' conception, cf. John A. T. Robinson: 
"Pannenberg goes so far as to say that the two concepts 
stand in 'irreconcilable contradiction.' This is clearly 
an exaggeration. They have been harmonized so success-
fully (as the miraculous insertion into history of the 
préexistent Son) that most people are unaware of any 
contradiction" (The Human Face of God. London, 1973, 
pp. l^f.). 
77 This position is repeated several times without any 
attempt to establish it and without reference to litera-
ture (see ^ C , pp. 1^6 and 1^9). The only reference is 
to Hahn, who stresses the adoptlonlst character of 
Lk. 1.35b.! 
A discussion of Tlarlology follows in which 
Pannenberg shows sympathy for a symbolic interpretation 
of statements about Mary with reference to the Church. 
78 Carsten Colpe's book Die reljglonsgeschlchtllche 
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Schule: Darstellunp; und Kritik Ihres Bildes vom 
Knostlschen Srl'ósermythos. jöttlncen, 19flt convinces 
Pannenberg that It Is very questionable whether a com-
plete redeemer myth already existed before the time of 
Christ, a myth which would then have been transferred 
to Christ (CdC, p. 151). lor Pannenberg's understanding 
of myth, see his Christentum und Mythos. Späthorizonte 
des 'lythos In biblischer und christlicher Überlieferung. 
Gütersloh, 1972. 
79 Reference Is made to Ferdinand Hahn, Christologische 
4oheltstltel. Göttlncen, 19^3. pp. 319-333, who follows 
Günther ^ornkamra, Jesus von N'azareth. Stuttgart, 1956, 
pp. ZoU-f. It will appear In the course of Pannenberg's 
study that the fundamental title for Jesus In his 
Chrlstology Is 'the Son,1 Insofar as this title sums 
up his relation of self-dedication (Selbsthingabe) or 
obedience to God the lather. While admittln,'- that it 
is only in the letter to the Hebrews (5-8) that this 
title is explicitly linked to the idea of obedience, 
still: "man wird wohl mit Cullman: Die Christologie des 
\ΤΓ. 2. Auflage, 1958. S. 2P9ff. eine über die venigen 
Pelege hinausgehende ursprüngliche Zusammengehörizkelt 
der Sohnschaft mit dem 1otiv des Gehorsams vermuten 
dürfen" (GdC, p. 159, n. 98). Cf. Bas van lersel, 
"Der Sohn" in den synoptischen Jesusworten. Lelden, 19ÉI. 
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80 tíore recently, Pannenberg has tried to express In 
a different way the basic Insight out of which emerges 
the doctrine of the Trinity, at least as far as It 
concerns the Father and the Son. In an article on the 
philosophical problem of the relation between appearance 
and that which appears, Pannenberg calls attention to 
the Christian belief In the appearance of God In Jesus, 
In which that which appears Is both Identical with the 
appearance (Son) and distinct (Father) from It. 
Relating this to the role Jesus had as the prolepsis of 
the (not yet realized) Kingdom of God, Pannenberg asks, 
"Hat die Zusammengehörigkeit von Identität und Differenz 
lm Verhältnis von Sein (oder Wesen) und Erscheinung 
etwas mit der Zeltllchkelt dieses Verhältnisses zu tun? 
Und stellt sich dabei das im Ereignis des Erscheinens 
Erscheinende im Modus der Zukünftigkeit dar?" 
("Erscheinung als Ankunft des Zukünftigen," Studia 
Phllosophlca 26 /T9667, 200). 
81 See Pannenberg's article, "Die Aufnahme des philoso-
phischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der 
frühchristlichen Theologie," In Grundfragen, pp. 296-
3<*6. 
82 Emil Brunner, Der Mittler. Zürich, I927. This 
failure of Brunner's Logos doctrine to have the necessary 
"ontologlcal weight" means for Pannenberg that it does 
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not measure up to an important aspect of the classical 
L O O S doctrine of the Apologists, 'obwohl Frunner und 
Barth meinten, mit ihrem personalen Vortbegrlff ohne 
weiteres die Leistungen der altkirchlichen Lo^oschris-
tologie, vor allem die Unterschiedenheit der Gottheit 
Jesu vom Vater, In ihre eigene Theologie übernehmen zu 
können" (jdC, p. 168). Pannenber« points out that the 
understanding of Logos as verbum (inner or outer word) 
In Irenaeus and Augustine was situated within the context 
of the cosmologica! L050S concept. lor a recent effort 
to develop a systematic ChristoloTjr такіпт use of 
Heldejier's and Sbellnir's understanding of word, see 
Peter C. '-todgson, Jesus—V ord and Presence: An Essay 
in Chrlstology. Philadelphia, 1971. 
83 Pannenber? maintains that the reality of the Koly 
Spirit Is to be understood personally, although the 
Spirit Is not "Person" in the sense of an individual 
beside and confronting other individuals (GdC, p. 178, 
n. 1^7)· See further Pannenberg's article 'The 
Working of the Spirit In Creation and In the People of 
jod," In Uolfhart Pannenberg-Avery Dulles-Carl S. 
Braaten, Spirit. Faith and Church. Philadelphia, 1970, 
pp. 13-31. 
84 Pannenberu- congratulates Hetrel for e-lvini the 
Sharpest possible accentuation to the personality of 
toi 
lather. Son and Spirit ("îdC, p. I83). 
P5 Pannenberff offers no developed treatment of the 
relations between the Trinity (but see GdC, p. 1ΘΊ). 
Part of the reason for this may lie In the distinction 
he makes between kery;jmatic and doxologlcal statements 
In theology. Kery?matlo statements speak of earthly 
events that are understood as events that come from 
God, while doxologlcal statements are statements about 
God's essence on the basis of events that are experi­
enced as coming from him. Doxologlcal statements are 
paradoxical, and appear to be contradictory (see GdC, 
p. 157, n. 96). Three principal examples of such 
statements are Jesus' préexistent divinity, God In his 
eternal essence possessing a becoming which leads to 
the Incarnation, and the unity and distinction of 
bather and Son ("dC, p. I85). Conclusions cannot be 
drawn from doxolofical statements without more ado, 
because the concepts therein employed are not unlvocal, 
but equivocal. See his article "Analogie und Doxologie 
In Grundfragen, pp. 181-201. 
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KOFIS f OR CHAPTER ΓΗΗΤΕ 
1 Pannenberg refers to IV Ezra 7.2^; Rev. 21.23; Eth. 
Enoch 45, ¿J-9, 50. 
2 "Indem Jesus das eschatologische Hell schafft und 
Indem der, der Jesus abweist, das eschatologische Gericht 
verwirkt, erweist sich Jesus als der Vollstrecker des 
Endes" (OdC, p. 196). 
3 Albrecht Rltschl, Rechtfertigung; und Versöhnung:. 
vol. III, 3rd ed., I889, ^ 8 , PP. 420ff. 
k I Cor. 15.45ff.; Rom. 5.15ff. In a long note regard-
ing the traditions behind Paul's Adam typology, 
Pannenberg writes: "Die auf Boussets 'Religion des 
Judentums im neutestamentllchen Zeltalter' 1903 
zurückgehende Auffassung, dass die Testait des 
'Menschen' im Judentum nach einer Erklärung durch 
Einflüsse ausserjüdlscher Vorstellungen verlange 
(S. 25З). bedarf neuer Überprüfung. Venn man mit 
unterschiedlichen selbstständigen Ansätzen zu 
'gnostischem' Denken auf dem Boden der verschiedenen 
altorientalischen Religionen zu rechnen hat statt mit 
einer weltgehend einheitlichen gnostischen Bewegung, 
dann wird man auch nach einer speziell Jüdischen 
rraditlonsgeschichte hinsichtlich des üenschensohn-
Adam-Komplexes fragen müssen.... Den Ilotlven aus 
ьоч 
Jüdischer Tradition dürfte oft eine stärkere motivier-
ende Kraft zukommen als den vielleicht als Anregung 
wirksamen, nicht selten aber reichlich vagen rellgions-
geschlchtllchen Parallelen" (GdC, p. 201). 
5 Few references are offered here, but Pannenberg does 
recall his earlier discussion of soterlologlcal motiva-
tion, GdC, pp. 33ff. 
6 Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatlk. II1/2, ^ V l and 
^5/1. Pannenberg approves Earth's glvlnç priority to 
Jesus' relation to God over his significance "for us": 
"so das die letztere gerade in dem Gottesverhaltnls 
Jesu Ihren allein tragfähigen Grund hat" (GdC, p. 203). 
7 Gerhard Ebellng, "Jesus und Glaube," Zeitschrift 
für Theologie und Kirche. 55 (1958), 6?; Das Wesen des 
christlichen Glauben. Tübingen, 1959, pp. 5, 58ff. 
8 Karl Hahner, Schriften zur Theologie, vol. IV, i960, 
pp. 1^2, 151¡ Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. 2nd ed., 
vol. V, i960, Art. "Jesus Christus," col. 956, (henceforth: 
LThK), Bernhard Weite, "Homousios hemin" in Das Konzil von 
Chalkedon. edited by Α. Grillmeier and Η. Bacht, Würzburg, 
1951, vol. Ill, pp. 51-80, esp. pp. 58, 6?, 71. 
9 It Is this consideration which led Pannenberg to 
consider history a process of the transmission of tradi-
tions, rather than formally a pattern of promise and 
fulfillment. Cf. Grundfragen. "Vorwort," p. 9. 
"+05 
10 Antlqu. XIII, 10, 7. Josephus refers to the 
Hasmonean John Hyrcanus (referred to by Pannenberg, 
SdC, p. 220, n. 11). 
11 Pannenberg does refer to an apocalyptic vision Jesus 
apparently had, witnessed to by Luke 10.18: "I saw 
Satan fall like lightning from heaven," and asks 
whether such a vision mlçht not have trlo-gered Jesus* 
message since, according to apocalyptic, the fall of 
Satan would Introduce the end events (Rev. 12.8f.). 
12 References are given at 3dC, pp. 228. 
13 Pannenberg, "Theology and the Kingdom of jod," 
op. clt.. pp. 6l-68; also Pannenberg's essay, "Kontlngenz 
und Naturgesetz" In A. lì. Klaus Hüller-Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
Erwägungen zu einer Theologie der ^atur. Gütersloh, 
1970. pp. 58-65. 
l^ The reference Is to Gerhard von Rad, Theologie des 
Alten Testaments, 'mnich, 1957, vol. I, p. 321. 
15 Friedrich Mletzsche, Antichrist. Magdeburg (I888/ 
I895). 193^· Cited GdC, p. 2^3. 
16 Karl Jaspers, Die grossen Philosophen. Munich, 1967, 
vol. I, pp. 186-214. Cited, GdC, p. 243. 
17 Hans von Campenhausen, "Die Christen und das bürger-
liche Leben nach den Aussagen des Neuen Testaments," 
Tradition und Leben: Kräfte der Kirchengeschichte. 
Tübingen, I960, pp. 180-202. Citation Is on p. 198; 
іи)б 
GdC. p. 2kk. 
18 Rudolf Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 
Tübingen, 1953, ΡΡ· 22, 25: Geschichte und Eschatologie. 
Tübingen, 1958, pp. 30-42. Pannenberg offers a fuller 
critique of Bultmann In his article "Hellsgeschehen und 
Geschichte," collected In Grundfragen, pp. 27ff. 
19 Willi Marxsen's argumentation Is used as a summary 
of the state of scholarship on this point : the passion 
narratives are llterarlly late, they presuppose a 
detailed knowledge of the passion and Easter history, 
and lastly, the sayings about the passion and resurrec-
tion of the Son of Man have nothing In common with the 
authentic sayings of Jesus about the coming Son of Man 
(Marxsen, Anfangsprobleme der Christologie, Gütersloh, 
I960, pp. 22 and 31f.). 
20 Pannenberg expresses in strong terms the role of 
the law in Jesus' path to death: "Man verstellt sich 
die Tiefe des Konfliktes Jesu mit der Jüdischen Tradi-
tion, die tatsächliche, tiefe Zweideutigkeit der 
Situation, In die Jesus sich begeben hatte, und damit 
auch die Sinntiefe des Geschehens seiner Passion selbst, 
wenn man aus voreiligem Elfer für das Bild der Reinheit 
und SündlosIgkelt Jesu auf selten seiner Gegner nur 
bösen Willen am Werke sieht. Jesus ist letzlich nicht 
an einigen unzulänglichen Individuen gescheitert, 
40? 
sondern am Jüdischen Gesetz selbst, dessen überlieferte 
Autorität durch die Art seines Auftretens In Frage 
gestellt wurde. Insofern sagt Paulus mit Recht, der 
Fluch des Gesetzes habe Jesus getroffen (Gal. 3·13)" 
(GdC, р. 2б0). 
21 "Die umfassende Bedeutung des Tausches der Rollen 
zwischen Jesus und seiner Richtern ergibt sich aus der 
Einsicht, dass die Mitglieder der Jüdischen Behörde 
nicht nur als besonders böswillige Individuen, sondern 
wenigstens im tieferen Sinne, nach dem Gesetz gehandelt 
haben, wenn auch vielleicht nicht einwandfrei Im formalen, 
verfahrensrechtlichen Sinne.... entscheiden! für die 
Verwerfung Jesu bleibt die Intention des Gesetzes. Das 
bedeutet, dass Jeder gesetzestreue Jude an der Stelle 
der Jüdischen Behörde ebenso oder ähnlich gehandelt 
haben müsste" (GdC, pp. 266f.). Recently Pannenberg 
modified his view that Jesus1 resurrection implied the 
end of the Jewish religion. He no longer holds that the 
Jewish religion and the religion of the Law are identical. 
See Das Glaubensbekenntnis ausgelegt und verantwortet 
vor den Fragen der Gegenwart, Hamburg, 1972, p. 6. 
22 "Die Verkündigung der urchristlichen Missionsbotschaft 
durch Jesus selbst Im Totenreich ist kein historisches 
Ereignis wie die Kreuzigung. Der Bildcharakter dieser 
Vorstellung bezieht sich hier auch nicht nur auf die 
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Aussageweise, wie bei der Auferweckung Jesu, die doch 
ein spezifisches, auch historisch zu erfragendes 
Ereignis ist. Die Bildrede von der Höllenfahrt Jesu 
und von seiner Verkündigung im Totenreich ist das, was 
man von der Auferstehung Jesu zu Unrecht behauptet hat, 
nämlich eine Aussage über die einem andern Geschehen, 
seinem Tode, eigene Bedeutung" (GdC, p. 280). 
23 See Pannenberg's article "Der Einfluss der Anfech-
tungserfahrung auf den Prädestlnatlonsbegrlff Luthers," 
Kerygma und Dogma 3 (1957). PP. 109-139-
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ЧОГЕЗ FOR CHAPTER 1 OUR 
1 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV, 6, 7. 
2 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube. 
¿96, 1. 
3 Pannenberg is opposed to what he calls ethical 
"attenuations" (Verenqunc-en) of the bond between Jesus 
and ^od; he accuses Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack, 
and Friedrich Gogarten of this tendency (GdC, p. 294). 
4 Піе Impasse of the two natures doctrine was formu­
lated as early as Appolllnarls of Laodlcea: two beings 
complete In themselves cannot together form a single 
whole (see PYledrlch Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der 
Dogmenyeschichte, Heidelberg, 6th ed., 1959, no. 35, 
4c., p. 210). "In Unterschied zu der Formel vere Deus, 
vere homo mündet das Beniûhen, die Vereinigung der 
zunächst Je für sich bestehenden iröttllchen und mensch-
lichen N'aturen zu einem einzigen Individuum, In welchem 
beide Naturen dennoch verschieden bleiben, zu denken, 
unausweichlich In ausweglose Aporlen. kenn Gottheit und 
i'lenschhelt als zwei Substanzen In der Individualität 
Jesu miteinander verbunden sein sollen, dann werden 
entweder beide zu einem Dritten vermischt, oder die 
Individualität, die konkrete Lebenseinheit Jesu wird 
gesprengt" (IdC, p. 295). 
4-10 
5 Pannenberg relies principally on Loofs, Рокшеп-
geschlchte. and Alois Grillmeier, "Die theologische und 
sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologlschen Formel 
von Chalkedon," in Das Konzil von Chalkedon. vol. I, 
1951, pp. 5-202, for hls assessment of the history of 
Christologlcal dogma. 
6 Grillmeier, ibid., p. 173. Pannenberg's disagreement 
with Grillmeier on this point signalizes a principal 
concern of the author of GdC. "Die menschliche Natur, 
auch wenn Jetzt eine Seele zu Ihr gehört, ist für Kyrlll 
wie für Athanasius nur das 'Kleid' des Logos jevesen 
(Kyrlll ep. ^5, 2). Vor allem aber besass die menschliche 
Natur Jesu keine eigene Hypostasis,--und das heisst bei 
Kyrlll und noch später: Die menschliche Natur Jesu war 
für sich genommen nicht Individuell. Ein Individuum 
wurde Jesu erst durch den Logos. Der Logos, der schon 
vorher selbständige Hypostase war, nahm bei der Inkarna-
tion menschliche iíatur an, aber eben keinen individuellen 
Menschen. Loofs hat recht, wenn er darin den tiefsten 
Gegensatz der alexandrinisehen zur antiochenlschen 
Christologie erblickt. Und gerade an diesem Punkt, In 
der Stärke dieser Christologie, in Ihrer Auffassung des 
Logos als Träger des Ich Jesu, liegt auch Ihre eben 
deshalb unüberwindliche Schwäche: Hier konnte Jesus 
nicht als ein wirklicher individueller ¡iensch gedacht 
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werden" (GdC, p. 298). Cf. John A. T. Robinson: "The 
fear of the Fathers, powerfully reiterated by Barth, 
against which they both thought It necessary to Insist 
on the doctrine that Jesus was not 'a man,' was to 
suppose that he existed or miKht have existed Indepen-
dently of God's purpose or Loe;os. But for the biblical 
writers, while he is totally human and, therefore, as 
Independent of God as any other man, his whole life— 
and all that leads up to it and flows from it—is seen 
as the climax and fulfillment of a divine process going 
back to the beginning. His entire being is shaped and 
constituted by the destiny to be God's true man, the 
Son of his love, the very reflection and image of his 
person. Yet there has been a persistent tendency in 
the history of Christian doctrine—stretching again 
from the Fathers to Karl Barth—to assume that Jesus 
could not be both a genuine product of the process and 
the Word of God to it. For one of the effects of the 
supranatural1st projection, which locates God outside 
the process and over against it, has been to confirm 
the Impression that nothing that does not come into it 
from without can really express his initiative" (The 
Human Face of Cod, pp. 200ff.). 
7 With respect to Nestorlus' position Pannenberg 
follows Grlllmeler, "Das Scandalum oecumenicum des 
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Nestorlus In kirchlich-dogmatischer und theologieges-
chichtlicher Sicht," Scholastik 36 (I96I), pp. 321-356. 
8 "Jede hat ein wichtiges Wahrheitsmoment vertreten: 
die antlochenlsche den Gedanken des wirklichen, Indivi-
duellen lenschselns Jesu, die alexandrlnlsche die unbe-
grenzte Einheit Jesu mit Gott. Aber eine Lösung der 
chrlstologlschen Problematik wäre nur möglich gewesen, 
wenn man die den beiden Thesen zugrunde liegende 
Fragestellung hätte überwinden können, nämlich die 
Frage nach dem Vorgang der Inkarnation, nach dem 
Zustandekommen der Einheit von 3ott und Mensch in Jesus. 
Eine solche Überwindung hätte vielleicht innerhalb der 
antiochenischen Betrachtungsweise nähergelegen, ist 
aber auch dort nicht erreicht worden, weil man im 
Schema der zwei Naturen hängen blieb...." (TdC, р. 300). 
9 ~>S, 556. 
10 according to Pannenber5, Thomas Aquinas took over 
from "ilbert the erroneous view that only the Logos 
unites the (otherwise separate) body and soul in Christ. 
He refers to Summa Theologjlca III, q. 6, art. 5 (mistakenly 
printed in jdC as q. 96). Thomas is here asking the 
question, "Utrum Filius }ei assumpserit totam naturam 
hu'ranam mediantlbus partlbus?" ils answer appears to 
be the opposite of what Pannenberg maintains he holds: 
'In incarnatlone autem oportet maxime attendere ordinen 
^13 
qui est ex parte asentís: quia, ut Augustinus dielt. In 
Epistola ad Voluslanui, In tallbus rebus tota ratio 
facti est potentla facientls. iianlfestum est autem 
quod secundum Intentlonem facientls prlus est completum 
quam Incoiipletum: et par consequens totum quam partes. 
Et Ideo est quod Verbum Del assumpserlt partes humanae 
naturae mediante toto." Yet Pannenbers-'s more funda-
mental objection to Thomas and Indeed the entire domi-
nant theological tradition Is, as we have seen, that 
according to it the Lojos assumes In the Incarnation 
not an Individual man but a human nature which receives 
its individuality only from the Logos (jdC, pp. JOkf.). 
11 Mo reference Is made to Scotus himself here, but 
rather to Heribert -lUhlen's study. Sein und Person nach 
Johannes Duns Scotus. Uerle-Viestphalia, 195^, PP. 95ff. 
12 Examples of this are: ¡lark 9.31, 10.33ff. (the Son 
of .Ian In the hands of men); II Cor. 5-21 (the sinless 
one made to be sin). 
13 An Important difference between the disputing theolo-
;lans of the Reformation and the theologians of the fifth 
century was that the former agreed that Jesus was one 
as person, while this was the point at issue In the 
fifth century. 
l^ It is interesting to note that Pannenberg feels that 
the rormula of Concord should be corrected insofar as 
kik 
It levels criticism against Scholastic Chrlstology, 
since Aquinas In the Summa Theologlca Is not concerned 
exclusively with the dona creata but with the participa-
tion through them In the divine nature and Its attributes. 
15 Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatlk. col. IV/2, p. 8?. 
16 Pannenberg adds a statement about the relation of 
theology to the mystery of Christ: "In gewissem Sinne 
hat Althaus wohl recht: 'Die Antinomien und die Negation 
sind die Wahrheitszeichen der alten Christologie. Mit 
beldem hütet sie das Geheimnis.* Sie hat es durch 
Antinomien und legatlonen gehütet, vo die Sache der 
Christologie beim derzeitigen Stand der Olslcusslonen 
nicht positiv und zusammenhängend zum Ausdruck gebracht 
werden konnte, ohne um Entscheidendes verkürzt zu werden. 
Aber die altkirchliche Theologie hat sich doch nie bei 
solchem Stand der Dinge beruhigt. Sie hat in Immer 
neuen Ansätzen versucht, über die 'Vot der konkreten 
Unvollkommenheit Ihres Verständnisses des Im Glauben 
Ergriffenen hinauszukommen. Nur wer das versucht, darf 
die auf neuer Ebene neu auftauchenden Schwierigkeiten als 
Zeichen der Geheimnistiefe der Wirklichkeit Jesu 
begrüssen, die sich trotz alles eindringenden Verstehens 
nie so endgültig auflöst dass kein Anlass zu weiterem 
Fragen bliebe" (GdC, p. 313). The reference is to Paul 
Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit. 6th ed., 1962, p. ^ 8 . 
^15 
17 Isaac August Dorner, System der christlichen 
Glaubenslehre. Berlin, vol. II/l, 2nd ed., 1886. 
18 Ibid.. p. 431. 
19 Ibid.. p. 438. 
20 The disputants were cast In two schools, the 
rübln^en. Influenced by Johannes Brenz, and the Tlessen, 
led by Chemnitz. 
21 Sartori, Thomaslus, von Hofmann, Frank, and Gess 
were the principal figures Involved here. 
22 Paul Althaus, ЕЭС, 3rd ed., vol. Ill, art. "Kenosls," 
col. 1245. 
23 With regard to the question of God's Immutability, 
Pannenberg writes in his article "Die Aufnahme des 
philosophischen C-ottesbegrlffs als dogmatisches Problem 
der frühchristlichen rheoloçle" (Grundfragen, p. 329): 
"Zwar sagt der Begriff der Unveränderllchkelt richtig, 
dass "Ott kein entstehendes und vergehendes Dins 1st. 
Insofern Veränderlichkeit uns nur In Verbindung mit diesem 
Prozess des Entstehens und Vergehens bekannt 1st, kann 
der Urheber der Welt In der Tat nicht veränderlich sein, 
wenn In Ihm der Bestand aller Dinge gründen soll. Aber 
Unveränderllchkelt sagt zu wenig, insofern als Gott nicht 
nur unbeweglich das Vorhandene In seinen gesetzmässlgen 
Abläufen begründet und erhält, sondern in sich den 
unendlichen Reichtum immer neuer ."ö^lichkelt hat, in 
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In deren Realisierung die Freiheit seines unsichtbaren 
Wesens sich manifestiert. Deshalb ist Gott, wiewohl 
ungeworden und unvergänglich, doch nicht unbeweglich, 
sondern In diesem inneren Reichtum der Lebendige.... 
Aber dass Gott sich in seinem Tun nicht ändert, das 1st 
nicht Ausdruck einer sein Wesen konstituierenden Unbeweg-
lichkelt, sondern das ist, ebenso, wie die schöp-
ferische Tätigkeit selbst, Gottes freie, Jeweilige, vom 
Kenschen nicht vorwegzunehmende Entscheidung. Es ist 
Identisch mit der Treue Gottes." 
21t· Paul Althaus, RGG, vol. I, art. "Christologie III" 
col. 1783. 
25 Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatlk. vol. IV/2, pp. 51-
60, 105ff., 122ff., li+Off. 
26 Heinrich Vogel's subtle attempt to resolve the ques-
tion of the unity between Jesus and God also passes 
under review. Vogel speaks of the incarnation as the 
paradoxical identity of God and sinful man; here Jesus' 
entire life—and not merely his death—is seen as a 
substitution of God for man: "Wenn Stellvertretung... 
wirklich nicht nur besagt, dass im äusseren Sinne der 
Platz gewechselt wird, sondern einer das Leben des 
andern lebt, den Tod des andern stirbt, der Schuld 
des andern schuldig wird, wenn Stellvertretung wirklich 
im strengen Sinne die Inexistenz des einen in der 
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Existenz des andern besagt, dann darf sie nicht in der 
Zwelhelt einer göttlichen und menschlichen Person als in 
einer Existenz gedacht werden" (Gott In Christo. Berlin, 
1951, pp. 696f.). The problem with the Idea of substitu-
tion, according to Pannenberg, is that it requires that 
the one substituting and the one substituted for not be 
Identical. "Darum muss die Ausweitung des Gedankens der 
Stellvertretung auf das christologische Problem die 
Radikalität des Unterschiedes, der hier zur Einheit 
zusammengehalten ist, verdecken, entgegen Vogels eigener 
Intention, die gerade auf die Radikalität dieses 
Unterschiedes zielt" (3dC, p. 328). 
2? Karl Rahner, LThK, art. »Jesus Christus," vol. V, 
col. 956; "Zur rhéologie der itenschwerdunj" in Schriften 
zur Theologie, vol. IV, i960, pp. 137-155. We shall have 
to consider later whether Pannenberg has understood Rahner 
correctly here. 
28 To this Pannenberg remarks: '"Ss dürfte kaum genügen, 
nur von einem Werden 'am andern' zu sprechen, als ob davon 
ein Inneres Wesen Gottes zu unterscheiden wäre, das von 
solchem Werden ganz unberührt bliebe" ("dC, p. 331). 
The change that God Is Involved in "am andern" occurs, 
says Pannenberg, in the same way ("ebenso") "an Ihm selbst." 
Both Rahner and Pannenberg refer to Hegel at this point; 
Pannenberg thinks that the dialectic of the "Etwas und ein 
íflB 
Anderes" In Hegel's Logik (Part 1) supports him. 
29 Pannenberg, Was 1st der Mensch? pp. 52f. 
30 Pannenberg, "Theology and the Kingdom of God," 
op. clt., pp. 62f. 
31 Cf. GdC, pp. 13'+ff· What Pannenberg says here Is a 
summary of his remarks made In Part I of 3dC. 
32 "Dennoch kann anerkannt werden, dass die vom Konzil 
zu Chalkedon herkommende christologische Überlieferung 
mit Ihrem Begriff der hypostatischen oder personalen 
Einheit—auch wenn und gerade well er zunächst für die 
unmittelbar Folgezelt und oft noch für die spätere 
Christologie mehr ein Problem als die Lösung eines 
solchen gewesen 1st—sich als Hinweis auf die tatsäch-
liche personale Einheit von Gott und Kensch In Christus 
bewährt hat" (GdC, p. 336). This positive evaluation 
of Chalcedon, in spite of significant criticism, sets 
Pannenberg apart from Bultmann, who, as we have seen 
in Chapter I, posits an opposition between biblical 
revelation and Greek metaphysics. Nonetheless 
Pannenberg is not content with the Chalcedonian paradoxes 
but seeks to explore the "how" of the incarnation. 
Unlike Ebellng, Pannenberg tries to unite, rather than 
oppose, the historical and ontological horizons of 
understanding. Unlike Barth, who is content to remain 
within the two-nature scheme, Pannenberg tries 
4·19 
to be more faithful to Scripture by Insisting on the 
Trinitarian character of the Christ-event with his 
dialectic of Jesus* sonshlp. This corrective of the 
two-nature doctrine in scriptural perspective (the dia-
lectic of sonship), which the tradition neglected after 
the domination of the two-nature scheme. Is a major 
contribution of Pannenberg to contemporary discussion. 
33 Hans Conzelmann, RGG, vol. Ill, art. "Jesus 
Christus, ·· col. 633. 
Jk Karl Rahner, "Dogmatische Erwägungen über das 
Wissen und Bewusstsein Christi," Schriften zur Theologie. 
vol. V. 1962, pp. 222-2U5. 
35 See above, p.146. 
36 It Is noteworthy that Pannenberg uses Zusammensetzung 
or zusammensetzen at least six times In this section, 
each time in a disapproving way. Contrasted with 
Zusammensetzung Is Synthese, used to designate the 
culmination of the unification of the human and divine 
In Jesus (GdC, p. 355). 
37 Pannenberg refers to Charles Moeller who emphasizes 
that Leontius himself was not a" neo" -Chalcedonlan 
theologian, but a thorough-going dyophyslte; as 
Pannenberg puts it, "im Unterschied zu diesen Theologen 
^20 
sah Leontlus von Byzanz es als rein zufällig an, dass 
faktisch die menschliche Individualität nie ohne 
Verbundenheit mit dem Lo;os existiert hat" ("Le chal-
cedonlsme et le neo-chaledonlsme," Das Konzil von 
Chalkedon, vol. I, p. 663). 
38 While Pannenberg prefers to speak of the person of 
the Son only in terms of the relation of Jesus to the 
Father, he does add: "Han 1st schon früh auf das 
eigenartig unterschiedliche Verhältnis von Person und 
Natur In der rrlnltätslehre einerseits. In der Christologie 
andererseits gestossen. Während In der Trlnltät mehrere 
Personen an einer einzigen Natur teilhaben, hat es die 
Chrlstoloo-le umgekehrt mit einer Verbindung mehrerer 
Naturen durch eine elnzlire Person zu tun. Diese Schwierig-
keit ist nicht bedingt durch die besondere Problematik 
der Begriffllchkeit der Zwelnaturenlehre und auch nicht 
zu beheben durch unterschiedliche Auslegung der Fegriffe 
Person und Natur für die beiden Problemkreise. Die 
gemeinsame 'Natur' des trinitarischen Gottes steht ja 
Jedenfalls auch für die Christologie als eine einzige 
dem Bereich der menschlichen Daselnswirkllchkelt gegen-
über, und die eine Person, mit der es die Christologie 
zu tun hat, ist Jedenfalls ebendieselbe, von der die 
Aussagen der Trlnitätslehre zu machen sind" (IdC, p. 355). 
39 Kan's openness to God Is an anthropological 
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presupoosltlon without which the Chalcedonian dogma 
would have no шеапіпк (GdC, υ. 357). This presupposition 
allows one to say that Jesus received his personality 
from the Father throueh his personal community with 
him, without introd'iclns; a restriction on the gen­
uinely human reality of Jesus. Pannenbernr sees It as 
a merit of contemporary Roman Catholic Chrlstology 
(especially Karl Rahner and Bernard Weite) that It has 
highlighted the transcendental openness of man for 
union with God. However, the sharp distinction between 
nature and supernature implied in the notion of potentla 
obedlentlalls In Catholic Chrlstology stands In the 
way of the concept of the "unendlichen Prozess der von 
Stufe zu Stufe sich selbst und seine Welt transzen-
dierenden Offenheit des menschlichen Daselnsvollzuges" 
(GdC, p. 357, n. k2). 
40 In a footnote Рапп^пЪРге· defends the Roman Catholic 
use ofII Peter 1.4 and other New Testament texts to 
suoport a narticlDStlon by grace In the divine nature 
as wel] as the patristic doctrine of theopolesls (GdC, 
Ό. 360, n. 45). 
41 For a further discussion of the root of e-enuine 
freedom and the theological difficulties attendant on 
a doctrine of voluntary Indifferentism, see Pannenbere's 
articlp, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," 
чгг 
Кегукша uni Dogma k (1958), pp. 251-280, esp. p. 260ff. 
Pannenberg sees Roman Catholic theory of the nerltorlous 
character of Jesus' suffering faced with a çreat 
problem since this Implies a real freedom of choice 
between possibilities (DS 2003), although Catholic 
theologians also wish to exclude a vacillation In 
Jesus' will between possibilities. Further conpllcatine 
the issue is the Catholic view that the earthly Jesus 
was blessed with the Visio beatifica (IS 36^5-36^7), 
although Karl Rahner's recent Interpretation of this 
makes it less a problem. See OdC, pp. Jklf. 
^2 Pannenberg refers to Gal; 3.13; II Cor. 5.21; 
Rom. 8.3; Heb. U.15; I Peter 2.22; John 8Л6; I John 3.5. 
All these texts are directed to establishing that Jesus 
committed no sin, and do not make a distinction between 
slnlessness and inability to sin. 
^3 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. Ill, 18, 7; Tertulllan, le 
carne Christi l6; Origen, Je prlnc. II, 6; Augustine, 
Oe pece, merit. 2, 11, 16. 
W "Es 1st unvorstellbar, dass Jesus wahrhaft ''ensch 
gewesen sein soll, in seiner Leiblichkeit und In seinem 
Verhalten, aber nicht durch die allgemeine Struktur der 
Zentrierthelt des animalischen Lebens, die der Selbst-
bezogenhelt menschlichen Erfahrens und Verhaltens 
zugrunde liegt, aber erst dem Menschen zur Sünde wird, 
^23 
geprägt gewesen sein soll.... Der Sieg über die Sünde 
1st nicht schon vor der Geburt Jesu, sondern erst Im 
¡ranzen Vollzuge seines Daseinsweges gewonnen worden 
(GdC, p. 376). Cf. Pannenberg, Vas 1st der Hensch?. 
pp. i*6rr. 
k5 "Wie unsere "erechtlgkelt nicht In der Vorflndllch-
^elt unseres Irdischen Daseins zu suchen 1st, so auch 
die Sündloslgkelt Jesu nicht In der VorfIndllchkelt 
seiner vorösterlichen Erscheinung. Auch Jesus Gerechtig-
keit lai extra se in den Händen des Vaters, In Gottes 
Urteil. Aber Im lalle Jesu bezog sich das Urteil Gottes 
bestätigend zuriïck auf den einmaligen Vollmachtsanspruch, 
der in Jesu eschatoloffischer Botschaft impliziert war. 
So ist, im Lichte des durch seine Auferweckung ergan-
genen g-öttllchen Urteils, Jesus tatsächlich In sich 
selbst sündlos" (TdC, pp. 377f.). 
k6 Pannenberg refers to Hahn's Christologische Hohelts-
stltel, pp. 179-193, for his discussion of the difference 
between the removal of Jesus to heaven and the already 
accomplished exaltation to Kingship. Pannenberg 
suggests that the use of Psalm 110.1 (LXX) could have 
been motivated by the apocalyptic Idea of the presence 
in heaven of one to be revealed in the future. The 
elevation of ^noch to Son of han (Eth. Enoch 71.1'fff.) 
Is here compared with the Christian concept of exaltation. 
k2k 
Ц-7 Pannenberg has written elsewhere: "The notion of 
the futurity of God and his Kingdom most emphatically 
does not 'remove1 God to the future. It does not mean 
that God Is only In the future and was not In the past 
or Is not In the present. Oulte to the contrary, as 
the power of the future he dominates the remotest 
past.... The God of the comino; Klns-dom must be called 
eternal because he Is not only the future of our present 
but has been also the future of every past age" 
("Theology and the Kingdom of God," o£. cit., p. 62). 
k8 For the linking of the distinction between Jesus 
and the Son and the Father with the distinction between 
the Dresent (presence) and the future of the Kingdom, 
cf. "Appearance as the Arrival of the Future" In 
Theology ind the Kingdom of God, pp. 132-136. The 
inroortance of historical science for Pannenberc Is once 
more most strikingly suggested when he speaks In this 
section of the continual reform of the Church: "Well 
In der historischen Erscheinung Jesu die eschatologische 
Wirklichkeit bereits angebrochen 1st, deshalb wird die 
Kirche die Erschliessung Ihrer Zukunft Immer wieder von 
ihrem historischen Ursprung her erwarten. Aber eben 
solche immer wieder neue 'Interpretation' ihres Ursprungs--
die nicht von aussen herangetragen sein darf, sondern 
sich einem der eigenen Gegenwart verantwortlichen Fragen 
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nach der historischen VIrkllchkelt Jesu von Mazareth 
von dem historischen Befund her aufdrängen muss—ist 
die spezifische Wirkung der Zukunft Jesu Christi auf 
seine Kirche" (~,dC, p. 388). 
^9 Earth's doctrine of election is found in Kirchliche 
Doe-mat Ik. vol. li/2. 
50 Karl Hahner, "Probleme der Chrlstoloçie heute in 
Schriften zur rhéologie, vol. I, 195k, р. 1ЯР. 
Fannenbero· thinks that such a formulation of the unity 
of Jesus and "od within a theology of history is a 
completely faithful translation of the Chalcedonlan 
άοσπιβ ( TdC, p. 403, n. 48). Christ must be conceived 
In such a schema as the contlnaient fulfillment of 
precedine events, while an evolutionary view, stressing 
the unfolding of an entelechy (which seems to be the 
case in Hahner) does not allow history to be history 
(Ibid.. η. 47). 
fi 'or other statements in 3dC regarding the relation 
between creation and eschatology, see pp. 56f·, I69. 
According to Pannenberg, the doctrine of the Logos was 
never thoroughly Christianized because the role in 
creation proper to the Loios was never thought through 
In an eschatological sense, nor linked closely enoujh 
to the resurrection event OdC, pp. 409ff.). 
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1 See, for exa-nole, "dC, ρυ. 12^-131. 
2 leorçe Vilsoi, n.J., "The fîlft of Infallibility: 
Reflections toward a Systematic rheology," rheolog;lcal 
Stuiles 31 (1970), pp. 626f. That dogmatic and 
historical interests are inseparably at work in the 
history of Christian thinking about Christ, even when 
the thinker considers himself free from dogmatic 
interest (e.g., in so-called "Liberal" theology of the 
nineteenth century) is the burden of Reinhard Slenczka's 
book, r.eschlchtllchkelt und Personsein Jesu Christi. 
Studien zur chrlstologlschen Problematik der historischen 
Jesusfгаз-e. Göttingen, 1967. 
3 i-or a Justification of this translation see the 
editor's preface in Theology as History. Mew York-
Svanston-London, 196?, pp. l^f. 
k Theologie als "eschlchte. p. 327, n. JU-. lor further 
discussion of this concept see ibid., pp. 32^f. and. 
Berten, histoire, revelation et fol, pp. 22f., 65-68. 
5 Offenbarung als "ieschlchte. p. 112. 
6 A similar and equally healthy concern has recently 
been expressed by Norman Pittenger: (a) ^o person 
can be understood In separation fron the past history 
to which he belongs and fron which he merges. 
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(b) Ίο person can be understood save in his relation­
ship with those vho associated themselves with him, were 
influenced by him, and In their turn both received him 
and influenced him. (с) ^o person can be understood 
unless the consequences of his particular Impact on 
history are taken very seriously into account. (d) 
Ч егу person, therefore, is to be seen as the focusing 
of the past, his present relationships, and the results 
of his appearance at some a-lven time ani place. (e) 
I'inally, any interpretation of such a person must heve 
reo-ard for all these factors; and if an activity of "od 
is said to have taken place In association with that 
person, however we may conceive this, especially if 
such activity is believed to be of singular Importance 
and remarkable intensity, that activity of Cod must be 
taken as occurring in and through the whole constella­
tion of which the person is the centre" (Chrlstolog;,y 
Reconsidered, London, 1970, pp. 6?f). 
7 See also Fannenberç's programmatic essay, "Чеіізге-
schehen und Geschichte,'1 in Grundfragen, pp. 22-78, esp. 
28-31. 
8 See Josef Blank's review of Grundzii^e in Una Saneta 
21 (1966), 98, note 1, on the notion of prolepsis. 
9 As we have seen and as Pannenberg admits, this is 
very much a disputed position. However, Pannenberjz- does 
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not rest hls entire case on this sayinp. 4e Is also 
concerned with the Implications of the voris of autho­
rity ("Fut I say to you," "Ат.еп, amen") and Jesus' 
forgiveness of sins and his welcomln? sinners to the 
eschatologlcal banquet, as analyzed, for example by 
Ernst Lohmeyer, Kultus und gvanjellum. Göttinnen, 19'<·2, 
pp. 89ff. 
10 4ans Conzelmann contends, "dass die Aussagen über 
Cottes V-alten und diejenigen über das Kommen seines 
Helches einltermassen unverbunden nebeneinander stehen" 
(Quoted in ''i.C, D. ZJ6). Fannenbercr connects the two 
kinds of statements--tvie sapiential and the eschatolo-
я-ісаі—by linking creation with eschatolozy: "jle 
"ichöpfunü- ist nicht zu verstehen als ein Akt, der 
vorzeiten einmal geschehen ist und mit dessen Resultat 
wir es gegenwärtig zu tun hätten, sondern die Schöpf-
ung aller Оіпке, auch des schon Vergangenen, geschieht 
von der letzten Zukunft, vom Sschaton her, insofern 
erst vom inde her alle Dinge das sind, was sie wahrhaf­
tig sind" (ibid.. p. 237; cf. p. 57). 
11 In this overview we have been creatly helped by 
Johann Michael Schmidt, Die jüdische Apokalyptlk. lie 
beschichte ihrer Erforschung von den Anfängen bis zu 
den ^extfunden von Cumran. Meuklrchen-Vluyn, 19^9, and 
ліаиз Koch, Ratlos vor der Apokalyptlk, Sine 
^ЗО 
Streitschrift über ein vernachlässigtes Gebiet der 
Rlbelwlssenschaft und die schädlichen Auswirkungen auf 
rhéologie und Philosophie. Gütersloh, 1970. See 
further, Hans-Joachim Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-
kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testa-nents. Veuklrchen-
îoers, 195é, and Werner Georg Kümmel, Das Neue Testament. 
Geschichte der Erforschung: seiner Probleme, Irelburg-
Hunlch, 1970. 
12 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Hellsgeschehen und Geschichte," 
Iierygma und Oogma 5 (1959), 218-237, 259-288; collected 
In Grundfragen, pp. 22-78; Ernst Käsemann, "Jle Anfänge 
christlicher Theologie," Zeltschrift für Theologie und 
Kirche. 57 (19^0), 162-185, collected In Exegetische 
Versuche und Besinnungen. Göttinnen, vol. II, 3rd ed., 
1968, pp. 82-104. 
13 Johann Wellhausen, Israelitische und Jüdische 
Geschichte. Berlin, 9th ed., I958; Bernhard Duhm, 
Israels Propheten. ГиЫпз;еп, 2nd ed. , 1922. Hermann 
Gunkel, "Aus Wellhausens neuesten apokalyptischen 
Forschungen. Einige prinzipielle Erörterungen, '* 
Zeltschrift für Mssenschaft und Theologie Ц-2 Mf 7 
(1899), 58I-61I; W. Klatt, "Ein Brief von Herman Gunkel..." 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 66 (1969), 4. Cf. 
Schmidt, o£. cit., pp. I62-I67. 
І^ Koch, 0£. cit.. p. 37 and η. 13· 
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15 See Ployer, Pheokratle und Sschatolojile. N'euklrchen, 
1959· esp. eh. 5. "fheokratlsches und TschatoloB-isches 
Israel," pp. 129-142. 
lé "Jas bedeutsamste Kennzeichen des apokalyptischen 
^eschichtsentwurfs, von dem wir elnlcce wesentliche 7ите 
herause-estellt haben, 1st fraglos dies, dass hier 'die 
beschichte als Sines und als "anzes in den Blick kommt. 
iJer Ablauf der Zelt von der Schöpfung· bis zum Sschaton 
wird als eine in sich leschlossene und überschaubare 
Grösse verstanden und beschrieben. Hese Einheit der 
"eschichte wird freilich nicht als die Einheit Ihrer 
einzelnen lakten sichtbar. Sie kommt vielmehr allein 
im mythologischen Bild zum Ausdruck, Indem die bruta 
facta nicht aus sich, sondern aus dem umgreifenden 
Zusammenhang des Genzen verstanden werden. Und darin 
zeigt sich, dass das еггапг-епе reschehen nicht als 
einzelnes lîrelçnis angesehen wird, das für sich ffenom-
men eine Dedeutun<t hätte und auf diese Bedeutung hin 
befragt werden könnte. Im apokalyptischen Entwurf hat 
das einzelne Erelrnls seinen Sinn allein vom umfassenden 
Bahnen der ganzen "eschlchte her.... Diese Einheit der 
beschichte hat für die apokalyptische rradition Ihren 
'¡rund im оггегеЬепеп göttlichen Plan, den Gott selbst 
durch sein -landein li der Zeit verwirklicht" (Rössler, 
"esetz und beschichte, 'leuklrchen, 19^0, p. 6"). 
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17 Gerhard von -ìad, rheoloarle des alten Testaments. 
"Ol. II, 2nd ed., 1965, Part II, sec. I. 
li Зее лось, o£. cit. , pp. '47ΐ. 
19 -îenry liarold lìowley. The Relevance of Apocalyptic. 
<•» Jtudy of the Jeylsh and Christian apocalypses fror 
)anlel to the '.evelatlon. Ioni.on, 2-1 ed., 1952, p. 35-
20 "^o, too, the apocalyptists, i-r they viewed the 
present vith darkest pessimism, sar the past through 
very rosy-coloured spectacles. They recalled the jreat 
acts of deliverance In order to emphasize the power ani 
benevolence of ~od tovarl 'lis people, or d»Telt on 
iisasters to sho*' the 'Wickedness of the vorld and the 
misery of the rijhteous. If their task vas a theodicy, 
then their answer nust ^e rale -ood in the one sure 
•neliuT. of revelation—and that for the :ebrew »-as 
history, the story of what "od had done in creation and 
l.i providence. They vere concerned to shov vhat 7od 
was about; not only what .^ od was гоіпт to do in the 
lunediate future, but what le had been about from the 
be -innln; and what all the past events of history had 
been leading up to—the 'ïnd.. . . ?hey were trying to 
view all history sub specie aeternltatls and if they 
ill not always -ret their facts clear, they were at least 
the first чеп to essay a philosophy of history" 
(J. -, .rost, Cid Testament apocalyptic, lts Origins 
э^э 
a^ id Growth» London, 1952, p. 8). 
21 "We may conclude then, that so far from being the 
first philosophers of history, the apocalyptlsts are 
In fact a school of biblical writers who recognized that 
the burden which Hebrew religion had laid upon history 
was areater than It could bear. They therefore returned 
from history to nyth, myth In a new amalaram with history, 
which we have learned to call eschatology. In so doing, 
however, they abandoned the teleologica! view of history 
and with It the attempt to justify In mundane events 
the ways of Ood to man" (S. B. frost, "Apocalyptic and 
History," In The Bible In Modern Scholarship, ed. 
James Philip Hyatt, London, 1966, p. 112). 
22 Koch, 0£. clt. , p. 50. 
23 D. S. Russell, Between the Testaments. London, I960, 
Part II¡ The Method and Message of Apocalyptic. London, 
1964, pp. 20-33; 'The evidence points... to the fact 
that apocalyptic was a fairly stron? current In the 
mainstream of Judaism in the years immediately before 
and after the beginning of the Christian era" (ibid.. 
p. 28). 
2k Γ. Vi. Hanson, "Some Reflections on Apocalyptic," 
Aux Sources de la tradition chrétienne. Paris, 1950, 
pp. 139-145. 
25 C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom. London, 
Ч-Э^  
1953: The Apostolic Preaching and Its Pevelopments. 
London, 1936; History and the "ospel, London, 193i'\ 
26 Koch, 0£. clt., pp. 5£f. 
27 Albert Schweitzer, Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-
lorschuns; (1913). Tübln-en, 6th ed., 1951, pp. f31-^2. 
28 Koch, o£. clt.. p. 57. 
29 Christus und die Zelt. Zolllkon-?ürlch, 1 9 ^ . 
30 ^elch "ottes und :enschensohn. Sin rellglonspeschlcht*· 
llcher '.ersuch, ,'unlch, 2nd ed., 19^0, pp. 2, 20-30. 
31 Stauffer, Theologie des ^Jeuen Testamentes. Stuttgart, 
19^1. 
32 " Veues Testament und .ytholoçle, " In і.егу- тіа uni 
• ythos. ed. by ilans Verner Bartsch, .-lamburu-Perz-stedt, 
vol. I, 19^1; Jeschlchte und Eschatologie, p. 35. 
33 Koch, ojo. clt.. р. 6Ц. 
Jk " "rottesrelch und lenschensohn In der Verkündi^uno-
Jesu," Festschrift für 3. Jehn. ''euklrchen, 195?. 
pp. 51-79. 
35 Koch, 0£. clt. , p. 67. Cf. Pannenbera-, Theology and 
the ^Іпр-dom of "Jod, pp. 55f. 
36 Эіе Sntstehuna: des christlichen Dogmas (19^1), 
Stuttgart, abrldTed ed., 1959: "Von so manchen frarn-ür-
dl^en Versuchen der Jorschun? des 19. und 20. Jahrhun-
derts zur Lösung dieses Problems hebt sich die konsequent-
eschatolc-lsche Auffrssun^ sehr deutlich dadurch ab, dass 
Ό5 
sie in ihrem methodischen Ansatz das Prinzip dea 
einheitlichen geschichtlichen Sinnzusammenhangs nicht 
freihändig als Eintragung in den Text konstruiert, 
sondern im eigentlichen Sinn im Text selbst entdeckt. 
da nämlich, wo man es bisher nie gesucht hatte: in der 
Tatsache, dass Jesus mitten im Zeltalter der spät-
Jüdischen Apokalyptlk auftritt und sich in eigenartiger 
Uelse deren eschatologische Grundanschauung zu eigen 
macht, und zwar im Sinne der Naherwartung des Weltendes" 
(ibid.. p. 13). 
37 The first article in Zeltschrift für Theologie und 
Kirche 56 (1959). 273-29З. 
38 See Koch. 0£. clt.. pp. Y^tf. 
39 Jürgen i.oltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, i'unlch, 
1964. 
kO Ibid.. pp. I56-I65. 250-259. 
kl Ibid.. pp. 21-27. 
k2 Ibid., pp. 120-I2I4·. 
43 Koch's general conclusion: "Die vorliegende Unter-
suchung kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein tieferes 
ereschlchtllches Bewusstsein bel den Exegeten nur selten 
vorhanden ist, wenn sie über die Apokalyptlk positiv 
oder negativ handeln. Ja, dass darüber hinaus selbst 
die seit Jahrzehnten bekannten historisch-kritischen 
/'ethoden nur mangelhaft auf diesem Gebiete angewandt 
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werden. Statt dessen werden gewisse Schablonen und 
Vorurteile von Jahrzehnt zu Jahrzehnt welterc-eschleppt. 
Schon das verhältnismässig kleine Gebiet der Apokalyp-
tik lässt erkennen, warum von der heutigen Theologie so 
viele Fragen im Blick auf Altes und Neues Testament 
über die Kassen undeutlich beantwortet werden. Ver den 
widersprüchlichen Urteilen über die spätisraelitische 
und philosophische Literatur nachspürt, entdeckt einen 
neuralgischen Punkt gegenwärtiger Eibelwlssenschaft, 
sieht sich zu dem Schluss gezwungen, dass trotz erstaun-
licher Einzelleistungen die Exegeten von einer zureichen-
den historischen Gesamterfassung ihres Gegenstandes noch 
weit entfernt sind (o£. cit.. pp.8f.). 
kk See Odll H. Steck, Das Problem theologischer 
Strömungen In nachexllischer Zelt, Evangelische 
Theologie 28 (I968) , pp. ^5-458. 
45 Koch discusses two positions of Pannenberg, the Idea 
that apocalyptic had a genuine Interest in history as a 
totality, in which the end of history was central, and 
Pannenberg s view of the resurrection. With regard to 
the first point Koch thinks that the position of those 
who deny this Interest to apocalyptic are so heavily 
dependent on dogmatic considerations, that Pannenberg s 
position can be considered probable until proof to the 
contrary Is offered. Pannenberg hat in der Tat ein 
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Anliegen erneuert, freilich aller mythischen Komponenten 
entkleidet und mit einer den Apokalyptlkern fremden 
historischen Wissenschaft kombiniert" (o£. clt.. p. 96). 
Regardino- the resurrection Koch thinks that Pannenberç's 
conclusion reçardins the relation of Jesus* resurrection 
to that of all believers is at least daring (gewapt). 
since the New Testament is seldom as clear as it is in 
I Cor. 15.20 regarding this connection. Koch thinks that 
the exaltation motif played an important, or perhaps a 
more important role, which means that a great deal of 
the proleptic dimension of Jesus ' resurrection would 
thereby disappear (Ibid.. pp. 9?f.). 
íj-é When lililí Harxsen, working accordlna; to the normal 
'"tradltionsBieschlchtlich" method asserts: "die (ursprüng-
lichen) Traditionen reden doch von einem so unmittel-
baren 'Ollmachtsanspruch Jesu, von einem Wirken, das in 
sich selbst eschatologlschen Anspruch erhob, aber keines-
wegs auf eine Ratifikation aus war" (Die Auferstehum: 
Jesu als historisches und als theologisches Problem. 
Gütersloh, 5th ed., 19^7. PP. 32f.), then one can ask If 
a literary approach is adequate to the question being 
posed and whether historical considerations are not also 
Important. 
U·? ^ut, as we have seen, Fannenberg does not stress the 
negativity of the crucifixion in such a way that would 
юь 
make the earthly Jesus irrelevant in Chrlstoloçy. On 
this problem see Edward Schillebeeckx, "Эе Toegang 
tot Jesus van Nazareth, " n.ldschrlft voor TheoloRle 12 
(1972), 28-60. 
<4-8 On the suffering of the just one, see Dietrich 
Bossier, од. cit., pp. 88-95, and udii 3teck, Israel 
und das gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten. N'eukirchen-
Vluyn, 1967. 
^9 It Is interesting to note that Pannenber?, does not 
explicitly attribute a proleptic character to Jesus' 
baptism by John. Ae does hold, hovever, that John's 
baptism was probably regarded by the baptist as symbo­
lically anticipating the pourinr out of the Spirit at 
the end time. The reason v-hy Painenber? does not see 
a proleptic character in Jesus' taptisii is possibly 
because this event in Jesus' life vas essentially so'ne-
thlnT vrhich happened to hin ani not directly a soterio-
loilcal e^ent for those who ca"ie into contact vlth 
Jesus, such as cones to expression in luke 12.8 and in 
the for-ivin" of sins (CdC, pp. 13ΓίΓ.). 
50 С. ?. lì. raíz, .'ethodlsche Froblexe der neutesta-
i.entllchen Ciri stol о^із. "euklrchen-Vluyn, 19Ê7, p. 253, 
η. 1. 
51 See 'nllli iiarxsen, JI? ^ uferstehun т,ол Jesus von 
"azareth. 'ütersloh, 19^8, op. 1^7-151. 
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53 Cf. CdC, p. 64. 
54 "Зіп ι ej zur neutestanentlichen Christologie 7 
FrüfuriiT іег Thesen terdlnand Hahns," Ïvari^elIsche 
"heoloTle 25 (W5). PP. 24-72. 
55 Ibid., p. 46. 
56 Ibid.. pp. 4?f. 
57 Ibid.. p. 4Я. 
5 P Ibid.. pp. 48f. 
59 Ibid.. pp. 49ff. 
60 Ibid.. p. 51. 
61 Ibid.. p. 52. 
62 Го keep this chapter within bounds I have concentrated 
on Pannenbers' s discussion of the "Caster appearances, 
although the tradition of the empty tcnb calls for 
special treatment. Tor the view that behind the tradi­
tion lies a llturçlcal and aetlolorical interest, see 
ludwlff Schenke, Auferstehungsverkünll7un,a: und leeres 
^гаЬ: ^іпе tradltlonsfl-eschlchtlIche Untersuchung: von 
ik. 16. 1-8. jtuttçart, I96P; also Jean Jelorme, 
"Resurrection et tombeau de Jesus: ;arc l6, 1-8 dans la 
tradition êvangêlique, ' in 5. de Surgy, e¿. al.. Ia 
résurrection du Christ et 1 exégèse moderne. Paris, 
1969. pp. IO5-I5I; further, Bas van lersel, "Auferste-
hung Jesu: Information oder Interpretation?, " 
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Concllluia (4eft 12) 1970, 696-702, esp. pp. 698ff. 
1 or an Interesting theory regarding the fear that 
Jesus ' body had been stolen (John 20.2) see Joachim 
Jeremías, Neutestamentllche rhéologie. Part I: Ole 
^erkündl-una; Jesu. Gütersloh, 1971, PP· 2Rc-295, esp. 
p. 289. 
63 Cf. Robinson, 0£. cit.. pp. 131-141. 
64 Healnald ruller, The -oundatlons of Wew Testarrent 
Chrlstolojy. London, 19б5. p. 37. 
6-5 Loc, cit. 
66 Ibid.. pp. 37f. 
67 .or the text see ?.. fi. Charles, Apocrypha and 
Pseudo-Eplfrrapha of the Cid Testanent In "n^llsh (1913), 
London, 1963. 
68 Balz, o£. cit., p. 106. 
69 Loc, cit. 
70 H. E. rödt, Der 'enschensohn In der synoptischen 
Pberlleferun?;. 1959. PP. 228-257. 
71 Uilll 'arxsen, 31e Auferstehung von Jesus von 
Nazareth, pp. l47ff. 
72 For a suT.mary of the materials regarding elevation 
and resurrection in late-Judaism see Ulrich Vilckens, 
Auferstehung. Das biblische Auferstehungiszeugnis 
historisch untersucht und erklärt. Stuttgart-Perlln, 
1970, pp. 132-144. See also ",. Eertram, art. ' ^ rhöhun^," 
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Heallexlkon für Antike und Christentum, vol. VI, 
Stuttgart, 1966, col. 22-43. See further, Vilhelm 
Itmsins. Ïrhöhumsvorstellun?; und Parusleerwartuna; in 
der ältesten nachösterllchen Christologie. Stuttgart, 
1969. 
73 ..arxsen, 0£. clt. . pp. 83-100. 
74 ','llckens, Auferstehung, p. 154. However, to the 
extent that the law was considered the ultimate revela-
tion of God* s will, Jewish leaders would Ъе suspicious 
of new revelations. On this score Wllckens should have 
expressed himself with more nuance. 
75 That norms for deciding what Is hallucinatory or 
Illusory or real are socially constructed Is made 
abundantly clear by Peter Ferrer and Thomas Luckmann 
In their book, The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise In the Soclolog;y of Knowledge. \'ew York, I967. 
4e can also say that what an historical event is Is 
decided by the community of historians. 
76 Ve shall return to this point in the next section. 
7? 'wllckens, o£. clt., p. 159· It Is Interestin? to 
note that V'llckens, on whom Pannenber? so frequently 
depends, parts company with him on the issue of the 
historical knowabllity of the resurrection: "...die 
Auferstehung selbst 1st ja als ein endgültiges Ereignis 
verkündigt und i-eflaubt worden, das sich als solches 
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grundsätzlich jedem o-egenwärtigen Erkennen entzieht" 
(Ibid.. pp. 153f.). 
7° Penedikt Schwank, "Tie Ostererschelnuncen des 
Johannesevangeliums und die Fost-norten-îrscheinuneen 
der Parapsychologie, " urbe und Auftrag 44 (196p), 
3é-53. 
79 H. Bender, Parapsychologie: gntvlckluno;, 
Srrebnlsse, Probleme, Darmstadt, 19^^· G. ". Л Tyrrell, 
"í.pparltlons" (1959) collected In Science and Psychical 
Phenomena and Apparitions In Cne Volune. "ew Hyde Park 
( ^iew ïork), 1961. 
80 Tyrrell, Ibid.. p. 33. 
81 í or example. In the '.orton case: " :iss ilorton says, 
'I felt conscious of a feeling of loss as If I h9d lost 
power to the figure.' Also some mental connection 
between the figure and the percipients is indicated by 
the fact that 'the figure has not been called up by 
desire to see it, for on every occasion when we had made 
special arrangements to watch for It, we never saw it. 
Cn several occasions we have sat up at nl-rht hoping to 
see it, but in vain—my father with my brother-in-law, 
•nyself and a friend three or four times, an aunt and 
myself twice, and my sisters with friends more than 
once; tut on none of these occasions was anything seen. 
Vor have the appearances been seen after we have been 
ΨΨ;) 
talkin.; ' or t h i n k i n g auch of t h e f i g u r e ' " ( T y r r e l l , 
op. c l b . , p . ]Л2. 
0 2 I b i d . . p . ¿l·?. 
83 I b i d . . p . 4 1 . 
84 I b i d . . pp . ?7 -P0 . 
q 5 3ch*'ank, a r t , c l t . . pp . '47f. 
P6 Tyrrell, OJD. clt. . p. fil: "...the ^host stories of 
fiction show no sl^n that their authors have even dimly 
conceived the Idea of a visible, audible, and tangible, 
yet non-physical ghost. In hearsay stories apparitions 
leave physical traces behind them, and the narrators 
appear to be unconscious that there ís any reason vhy 
they should not "(Ibid.). 
07 Sven the Johannlne and Lucan stories of Jesus 
handing the disciples somethlnc to eat do not 
necessarily nean to Imply that Jesus was physically 
present to the disciples. Tyrrell recounts a tested 
case which offers an Interestlnz parallel: "In one 
case the percipient heard her name called three times, 
and answered, thinking It was her uncle. The third 
time she recognized the voice of her mother, who had 
been dead 16 years. 'I said, "lamina." She then came 
round the screen near my bedside with two children in 
her агт.з, and placed them In my arms and put the bed­
clothes over them, and said, " Lucy, promise to take 
'm 
care of them, for their mother Is Just dead. " ...I 
remained, feellnç the children to be still in my arms, 
and fell asleep. Uhen I awoke there was nothlnç'" 
(Гуггеіі, Ibid.. p. 58). tilth regard to Jesus' Invita­
tion to Thomas to touch his wounds: Tyrrell points out 
that If we tried to take hold of an apparition our hand 
would go through It without encounterin? any resis­
tance, although It could be that we would feel our hand 
stopped at the surface by the apparition's body, as by 
something Impenetrable (Ibid.. p. 79.). 
88 Schwank, art, clt. . pp. Ί-Βΐ. 
89 Schwank cautions, however: "Selbstverständlich würden 
diese Überlegungen sinnlos, wenn mit rein exegetischen 
i'iethoden festgestellt werden könnte, dass die zwei 
Aufforderungen, nicht zu fassen, wohl aber zu berühren 
/John 20.17, 20.227, aus ganz anderen Beweggründen nieder-
geschrieben worden wären, aus Beweggründen nämlich, bei 
denen die Frage nach der Art der Lelbhaftlp-keit des 
Auferstandenen überhaupt nicht anvisiert wurde" (Ibid., 
p. 49, n. 22). This caution can be applied to all the 
parallels between the findings of parapsychology and the 
Sew Testament witness regarding Saster appearances. 
Still a comparison here can reveal similarities and 
differences between the Easter appearances and other 
apparitions which have been critically studied, and this 
^і+с 
Is a service in itself. Even if historical and literary 
analyses reveal that the faster appearances as we find 
them in the Gospels are to a great degree editorial contri­
butions, still one can only be surprised by the fact 
that they nonetheless differ significantly from Invented 
stories such as have been studied by parapsycholotçy. 
90 Schwank, art, cit.. p. fO. 
91 Bender, 0£· £ ϋ • · Ρ· И З : cited by Schwank, art. 
cit.. p. 50. 
92 Introducing the science of parapsychology at this 
point is in keepln; with the contemporary Soman Catholic 
approach to miracles, which does not consider it 
necessary (In contrast to the traditional viewpoint) to 
exclude secondary causality in the production of the 
miracle. On this point see Plet Schoonenberg, Зой of 
ens. Sen vals dilemma. In Hlj is een "od van mensen. 
Twee theologische Studies. 's-Hertogenbosch, 19^9. 
pp. 9-'+Я, esp. pp. 20-21 ; -Iet beloof von ons doopsel. 
vol. Ill, 's-Fertoeenbosch, 1956, pp. 157-1É6; also, 
Bêla Velssnahr, "Gibt es von lobt crevlrkte Vunder"", 
Stimmen der Zelt 9« (1973). ^7-61. 
93 "Einsicht und "laube. Antwort an Paul Althaus," 
In Grundfragen. p. 236, n. 12. 
9*+ Г y metaphysical hlstorlclsm we mean the view that 
all reality is historical and this In such a way as to 
^б 
exclude the existence of transcendent belnçr(s). 
Pannenberg can write that history characterizes all of 
reality (Theologie als Geschichte, p. 30f), but he roes 
on to explain how this for him Implies a transcendent 
principle (Ibid,, pp. 319ff.). 
95 "kas 1st l.ahrhelt?", In Grundfragen, p. 218. 
9f Ibid.. p. 2^9. 
97 Fannenberç as quoted in Ferten, 0£. cit., pp. 107f. 
This postulate is not a "necessary truth," but is capable 
of bein; contradicted, yet Pannenberg is convinced that 
a tenporal end of history is an implication of the 
historian's conviction that history has meaning (Ibid.). 
98 "'lellsgeschehen und Geschichte," in Grundfragen. 
p. 39. This idea is developed further In "Weltgeschichte 
und :ieils5eschichte," in Proble-ne biblischer Theologie. 
"erhard von Rad zum 70. Jeburtsta4. .lUnich, 1971, 
pp. 3^9-366. 
99 See the essay "Erwägungen zu einer Theologie der 
Religionsgeschichte" in Crundfra^en. pp. 252-295, esp. 
277-295. 
100 See note 98 above; Ferten, op. cit., pp. 107f. 
101 An instructive parallel to this question Is the 
nuanced analysis of the philosophical proofs of ^od In 
relation to Christian faith offered by the Catholic 
J. ¡I. Coffey in his article "natural Knovledcçe of "od: 
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Reflections on Romans 1:18-32" in Theological Studies 
31 (1970), 67^-691. esp. p. 688. 
102 Ibid., pp. 2Zk-228. In these pages Pannenberg 
explains his notion of faith as an act of trust logi-
cally based on a knowledtre of the ground of reliability. 
Only In this act of trust (which Is a divine çift) can 
one share in salvation. He concedes that one can also 
define faith legitimately as an act embracing notltla. 
assensus and fiducia (ibid., p. 225) In which psycholo-
gically the whole can precede its differentiated parts 
or moments. 
103 Ibid., pp. 230f. "So wenig daher einerseits der 
hahrschelnllchkeltscharakter unseres Dissens von dem 
das ergehen der Verheissung in sich schllessenden vergan-
genen "eschehen die Vertrauensgewissheit des Glaubens 
beeinträchtigen kann, so wenig kann andererseits durch 
solches lIssen von der Verheissung die Besonderheit 
des Glaubens verdrängt werden" ("Heilsgeschehen und 
Geschichte," in Grundfragen, p. 66). Cf. Perten, op. 
cit.. p. 110: "D'abord, Je n'attribue nullement aux 
arguments en faveur de l'historicité de la resurrection 
de Jesus une 'force contraignante'...." 
104 "Einsicht und Glaube," o£. cit.. pp. 227ff; pp. 
231ff. 
105 Ibid., p. 233. n. 11. Неге Pannenberg appeals to 
kW 
I Cor. k.3f. As long as a person remains with hls 
fides historica and does not commit himself In faith, 
he does not participate In the salvation offered In 
God's revelation (Ibid.. p. 230). 
106 Ibid. . pp. ZJl*f. " Der christliche Glaube 
erinnert... die Vernunft an Ihre ela-ene absolute Voraus-
setzune-. Indem er von der eschatolofflschen Zukunft spricht 
und von Ihrem Vorschein In der Geschichte der Auferste-
hung Jesu, von der der "laube herkommt. ")9mlt kann der 
Glaube der Vernunft dazu verhelfen, In Ihrer Reflexion 
sich selbst voll durchsichtig zu werden. Schon aus 
diesem Grunde--wenn es sonst keinen gäbe—sollte die 
Fheolosle Ihr Heden von der eschatologlschen Zukunft 
nicht als überholt preisgeben; denn gerade dadurch 
таЬе sie den positiven Pezug des Glaubens zum Vesen 
der vernunft auf. Gerade In seiner Ausrichtung auf 
eine letzte, eschatoloo-lsche Zukunft kann der Glaube 
sich als Kriterium für die Vernünftlgelt der Vernunft 
bewähren" ("Glaube und Vernunft," In ".rundfracen. 
P. 251). 
10? 03 3009-10, 3012-13, ЗОЗЭ-З^, "Einsicht und ~laube, " 
op. clt.. p. 232. On the maglsterium»s understanding of 
the act of faith, see Roger Aubert, Le Probleme de 
1' acte de fol ; Louvain, 2nd ed., 1950: Hermann J. 
Pottmeyer, Jer Glaube vor dem Anspruch der Ulssepschaft. 
Freiburg, 1968. 
108 DS З876. Pannenberg vrltes: " Oerartlge Vorurteile 
auszuräumen, kann wohl nie allein Sache rationaler 
Argumentation sein, well die Vorurteile selbst Ja Irra-
tional sind, wenn anders es sich um Vorurteile handelt. 
Insofern bedarf es einer Art Erleuchtung, damit die aus 
sich klare und aus sich als wahr erweisbare Wahrheit 
auch dem einzelnen Menschen aufgeht. Sie kann Ihr 
( read "Ihm") jedoch auch nach Ausräumung seiner 
Vorurteile nur unter der Voraussetzung aufgehen, dass 
sie In sich klar 1st und wenn nicht jetzt, dann doch 
prinzipiell und zumindest In Zukunft als wahr erweisbar 
sein wird" ("îlnslcht und "laube," 0£. cit.. pp. 233f.). 
109 DS 3010. "Einsicht und Glaube," 0£. cit.. pp. 230ff. 
110 One thinks, for example, of August Prunner, Carlos 
Clrne-Llma, Jean Houroux, Heinrich ITles, Guy de 
Fregile, Josef Fleper and Sernard Lonergan. Ulth 
respect to the distinction between supernatural and 
natural knowledge, Pannenberg writes: Ich gestehe, 
dass Ich von einem andern als natürlichen Hssen 
nichts verstehe. Uni Ich kann den "erdacht nicht 
loswerden, die Unterscheidung eines besonderen Tlaubens-
wlssens davon laufe doch wieder darauf hinaus, dass 
die lahrhelt solchen lIssens zuletzt nur durch eine 
"laubensentscheidung gerechtfertigt werden kann 
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("Einsicht und Glaube," 0£. clt.. p. 227). And then 
in a note he explains: "Dass sich dieses Bedenken gegen 
die franze Tradition der Unterscheidung eines übernatür-
lichen von einem natürlichen hissen richtet, 1st mir 
wohl bewusst. Dabei gilt es zu sehen, dass beide 
Selten dieser Disjunktion glelchermassen problematisch 
sind. Dsurum ist es nicht mit der Streichung der einen 
Seite (z. B. des tTbernatürlichen) getan. Das Ganze, 
das durch diese Scheidung zertrennt worden 1st, muss In 
seiner Einheit neu bedacht werden" (Ibid., n. 5)· cf· 
the Roman Catholic Bêla Weissmahr, art, cit.. pp. 60f : 
"31aube darf freilich nicht als eine Erkenntnis aufge-
fasst werden, die im jegensatz zur 'natürlichen* 
Erkenntnis steht, sondern sie 1st die letzte, sich 
selbst durch die Gnade Gottes überbietende Dimension der 
natürlichen Wirklichkeitserkenntnis, die aufgrund der 
Berufung des Menschen zur personalen Gemeinschaft mit 
Gott ansatzweise in Jeder die Person Irgendwie engagie-
renden 3rkenntnls anwesend içt. Sie kommt In der Glaubens-
zustimmung zur vollen Entfaltung, in der Weigerung zu 
glauben wird sie dagegen auf sich zurückgeworfen und 
letzllch der Sinnlosigkeit ausgeliefert." 
111 See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, ifethod in Theology. 
London, 1971. esp. chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
112 Cf. Georg ,-Iuschalek, Glaubensgewlsshelt In Freiheit. 
'•si 
treiburs-Jasel-Vlenna, 1968, pp. 76-80, 91-9^. 
113 I write "Important elements" because, on the one 
hand, I think that there are many approaches required 
In a contemporary "grounding" of the faith, and, on 
the other hand, Pannenberg's own historical arguments, 
to the extent (for example) thet they rely on scholar-
ship in the area of apocalyptic and require the 
historian to accept the resurrection as an historical 
event, are not as conclusive as he thinks. 
ll'l· "Es ist zu zelaren, inwiefern die Ganzheit der 
V irklichkeit und so auch das Dasein des henschen vom 
"Ott der Fibel her tiefer erschlossen ist als irgendwo 
anders. dadurch allein kann die Behauptung, dass der 
biblische "ott der wahre Gott ist, ihre Bewährung 
finden " ("Zur rheolosle des Rechts," Zeitschrift für 
evangelische Îthik ? /T96¿7', l6); "Im Hinblick auf 
das Christuspreschehen handelt es sich dabei darum, dass 
der ^ott Israels in diesem "eschehen in seiner Gottheit 
offenbar ist, —eine tîberzeuffunii, die sich freilich nur 
im Blick auf den universalen Zusammenhang alles Oesche-
hens rechtfertigen lässt und die daher immer wieder von 
neuem zur Jiskusslon steht" ("Einsicht und Slaube," op. 
cit.. p. 232). 
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NOTES Ю Н СНАРГЧН SIX 
1 This Is said in reaction to halter Künneth. The 
reason why Pannenberg rejects the proposition that 
Jesus received his divinity only at the resurrection 
is that the retroactive force of the event as eschatolo-
plcal event is ignored (GdC, р.ІЗ^). Hecently 
Pannenberp; wrote that retroactivity is perhaps the 
idea which supports his entire Christology (see 
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hendrik Berkhof, "Briefwis­
seling over christologie," Tijdschrift voor Theologie 12 
Л972/, 33*0. 
2 "Theology and the Kingdom of God," op.сlt., p.53. 
3 Ibid.. pp.55f. 
k Ibid.. p. 5^· 
5 Ibid. p. 67. 
6 Ibid., p. 66. 
7 The reader is referred to Pannenberg's article 
'•Kontingenz und Naturgesetz," op.cit., pp. 33-PO, for 
a restatement of many of the sane themes regarding the 
future. Here Pannenberg speaks of an "eschatologische 
Ontologie," of "Kontinuität nach rückwärts," (itila., 
p.44), of a "Kontinuität vom Ende her," of a "Brück-
enschlag nach rückwärts" (ibid., p. 65), all of which 
is relevant to Pannenberg's understanding of the relation 
between the risen Jesus and the earthly Jesus. 
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8 The Idea of the ontologlcal priority of the 
future is central to the thought of Jürgen Moltmann 
as well. See his Theologie der Hoffnung. 1964. Until 
recently, however, he did not apply this insight to 
the question of Jesus' unity with God. 
9 I offered a sampling of Pannenberg' s references to 
Alfred North Whitehead above. With respect to Ernst 
Bloch see Pannenberg's "Der Gott der Hoffnung, " 
Grundfragen, pp. 387-398. On Heidegger' s view of the 
future and Pannenberg's critique of the same, see 
"über historische und theologische Hermeneutik, " 
ibid., pp. l45ff· Por Pannenberg's assessment of 
Hegel 's view that history acquires its truth only at 
its end, see "Was 1st Wahrheit?" in Grundfragen, 
pp. 202-222. A new approach to Hegel can be found 
in Pannenberg's address to the Hegel Congress in 
Stuttgart In 1970," Die Bedeutung des Christentums 
in der Philosophie Hegels" in Gottesgedanke und 
menschliche Freiheit. Göttingen, 1972, pp. 78-113. 
He writes: "Was in Hegels Begriff der Freiheit sowohl 
Gottes als auch des Menschen nicht zu seinem Recht 
kommt, das 1st ihre Zufälligkeit, im Sinne des aus der 
Zukunft Zufallenden, ihre Unableltbarkelt aus allem 
schon Vorhandenen, auch aus dem was der Wollende 
selbst schon 1st. Mit diesem Moment des Zufälligen 
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hängt auch der Pluralismus der Individuellen Realisie-
rung der Freiheit, sowie das selbstständige Recht des 
Historischen gegenüber der logischen Form des Begriffs 
und die Unabgeschlossenhelt alles vergangenen und gegen-
wärtigen Wesens, sowie seine Verwlesenhelt auf eine 
noch offene Zukunft zusammen, die darum unerlässlicher 
Horizont für das Verständnis gegenwärtiger Wirklichkeit 
ist. All das führt auf die zentralen Fragen, ob Geist 
und Gedanke wirklich ihre höchste Gestalt im Begriff 
und in der Idee als realisiertem Begriff finden und ob 
der Begriff schon Subjekt und subjektive Freiheit nur 
Beerlff ist... die Freiheit der Liebe ist unrorgrelflieh; 
sie übersteigt alle vorgecrebenen Identitäten, und die 
Identität, die sie selbst hervorbringt, 1st zwar Ihr 
Ausdruck, aber nie schon ihr voller Begriff, so dass 
sie auch nicht eingeholt werden kann durch den Begriff. 
Aller Begriff bleibt hier blosser Vorgriff" (ibid., 
pp. llOf.). Pannenberg suggests that we think of God's 
essence In terms of the absolute future of freedom. 
"Nur als absolute Zukunft der Freiheit liesse sich 
Freiheit denken, die nicht der Notwendigkeit einer 
vorgänglaren Wesensnatur unterliegt" (Ibid.. p. 110). 
For Pannenberg's critique of Teilhard de Chardin, see 
"^eist und Energie," Acta Tellhardlana, 8 (1971), 5-12. 
esp. 8f. See further hls article "7ukunft und Einheit 
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der tlensc^heit," SvanaelIsche TheoloKle 32 (1972), 
JBk-kOZ, In which he discusses Whitehead further 
(see esp. pp. 388, 397). 
10 " Wäre Jesus nicht auferweckt worden, so wäre 
damit entschieden, dass er auch vorher nicht mit Oott 
eins war" (^ dC, p. 135). Cf. p. 333-
11 This is said by Pannenberg with respect to Jesus ' 
sinlessness, which was decided by God at the resurrec-
tion: " Dass gerade dieser Vollmachtsanspruch Ausdruck 
der gänzlichen Hingabe Jesu an Gott war, das 1st erst 
durch seine Auferweckung, durch die in ihr liegende 
göttliche Bestätigung Jesu sichtbar und wirklich 
geworden. 3s wäre ohne die Auferweckung Jesu nicht 
nur verborgen geblieben, sondern gar nicht Tatsache 
geworden" ("îdC, p. 377). 
12 Pannenberg Insists that Jesus ' resurrection was 
always present to God* s eternity and also insists that 
the resurrection works retroactively not only after It 
occurred (claiming all of Jesus' earthly existence as 
God· s self-revelation) but before It occurred, insofar 
as it is anticipated in the hidden unity in Jesus' 
earthly life (see GdC, p. 33). Perhaps Pannenberg 
would be open to rethinking Augustine's dictum about 
Jesus' human reality in a futuristic perspective: 
"Mec sic assumptus est ut prlus creatus post assumeretur, 
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sed ut Ipsa assumptione crearetur"(Contra Serraonem 
Arlanorum. 8, 6). For Pannenberg creation occurs out 
of the future (GdC, p. 237). 
13 The perfection of this surrender to the father, as 
Pannenberg earlier shows. Includes rather than excludes, 
on the level of conscious reflection, a degree of 
ignorance regarding himself and his Father's plans 
(pp. 3^3-3^5)· This ignorance constitutes the heart 
of his self-dedication and exemplifies what Pannenbers 
neans vhen he says that the relation of the infinite 
to the finite, even In Jesus' case, is "negatively 
mediated" (see Theologie als beschichte, p. 320). 
1'4· rie thus chooses those aspects he favors from 
Richard of St. Victor, Duns Scotus and Hegel (3dC, pp. 
32f.). Cf. Pannenberg's article "Person" in HOG, vol. 
V, col. 230-235: "Der Mensch ist erst dadurch 
Pierson?, dass er "Ott als P/erson7 geerenüber findet.... 
Oott macht den Henschen zur P/erson/. . . . .".enschen sind 
P/ërson7en In Beziehung zu anderen Menschen. ...In der 
individuellen Lebensgeschichte gewinnt die P¿erson7 
Gestalt als Persönlichkeit." Pannenberg distinguishes 
person from spiritual Individuality (self-consciousness) 
and personality. A human being is born a person, i.e., 
radically oriented and related to God and fellow men. 
As finite person, his personhood has the character of 
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self-consciousness over against other self-conscious 
centers. In the course of his life, the answer which 
he gives in his life to the question of his destiny-
shapes his personality (ibid., col. 231-233). It Is 
precisely here that РаппепЬегр* s undeveloped trinltarlan 
theology hurts him, because for him God is Person, is 
presumably self-conscious, and yet is not a spiritual 
individual. But Pannenberg never explains how the 
second person of the Trinity shares in the divine self-
awareness. 
15 In his review of Grundziige in Nederlands TheoloBlsch 
Tijdschrift 20 (1965-6), 72. 
16 That Pannenberg Is ambiguous in his use of Einheit 
for the union between Jesus and the Father and Jesus and 
the Son, is rightly pointed out by E. Hesseman-van 
Leer In her article "Inleiding tot ' Srundzüge der 
Christologie' van Wolfhart Pannenberg" (Kerk en 
Theologie 17 ¿\эШ. ^5). 
17 Pannenber?' s discussion of the préexistent Son of 
God does not shed much light on his understanding of 
his character as person. He correctly points out the 
mythological element in this concept, and admits that 
even today it is difficult to combine the two total 
aspects of Jesus· concrete existence, the eternal Son 
and the human individual in one (GdC, p. 155). While 
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it Is true that he does not speak of the préexistent 
Son except In relation to the history of Jesus (and 
expresses this as a requirement of a healthy 
Christology, GdC, p. 150), and while he elsewhere 
suggests that there may well be with "rod himself a 
tendency to (hypostatic) unity with a creature ('dC, 
p. 332), still Pannenberg appears to have no problem 
with a fully personal second hypostasis In the 
Trinity. The reason for this Is that the notion of 
person is for him completely and exclusively relational. 
18 The development of this central insight is the 
main preoccupation of the discussion among the Roman 
Catholic theologians A. Hulsbosch, E. Schlllebeeckx 
and P. Schoonenberg which appeared in Tl.ldschrlft voor 
Theologie í (19É6), 2^9-306. 
19 The contradictory character of an idea such as the 
Son' s préexistence Is, however, not absolute for 
Pannenberg, since, as he Indicates elsewhere, the 
theologian Is able to establish why in certain questions 
theology arrives at contradictory statements which are 
at the same time true. The very search for this 
"why" Is a sign that the human mind has transcended 
the contradiction (cf. GdC, pp. 157f., n. 96). 
20 It is amazing that an entire book has been devoted 
to a discussion of Pannenberg s theology of reason 
1+60 
without any reference to Pannenberg'e Ideas on keryg-
matle and doxologlcal statements, or on analogy. 
See J. W. V. van Huyssteen's Theologie van die Rede: 
Die lunkale van die Raslonele In die Denke van Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Kampen, 1970. 
21 See hls article "Analogie und Doxologie" In 
Grundfragen, pp. 181-201, евр. p. I85. 
22 Pannenberg refers to Boethlus, In cat. Arlst. lib. 1 
In Klgne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 6k, 166 В (cited by 
Pannenberg, 0£. cit., p. 193). 
23 Ibid.. pp. I85f. 
2k "Es wird sich zeigen, dass In doxologlechen Aussagen 
eine aequlvocatlo a Consilio stattfindet, obwohl keine 
Analogie des gewöhnlichen Sinnes unserer Wörter zu 
Gott selbst Intendiert Ist, oder vielmehr die gesetzte 
Analogie Im Akt der Anbetung transzendlert wird" (ibid., 
p. 193). The "gesetzte Analogie" here Is verbal and 
the transcendence of which Pannenberg speaks can better 
be called volitional rather than cognitive. He himself 
does not express the transcendence with this term, but 
It seems a legitimate conclusion from what he says. 
25 E. Schlllebeeckx, "Het nlet-begrlppelljk kenmoment 
In onze Godskennls volgens Thomas van Aquino," In 
Theologische Peilingen, vol I : Openbaring en Theologie. 
Hilversum, 1964, pp. 201-232, esp. pp. 229-232. 
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26 Ibid. . p. 209: "De 'res significata' en de' res 
concepta' vallen voor het historisch thomisme niet 
zonder meer samen. De akt van slgnlfleren grijpt 
verder dan de ' ratio nomlnls, doch hij overschrijdt 
deze 'ratio' In de rlchtln? die de Inhoud ervan zelf 
aanduidt, z6 dat de zaak werkelijk geviseerd, doch 
niet begrlppelljk gs-vat wordt. Dat de akt van het 
slgnlflëren verder reikt dan het begrlppelljk voorstel-
llngsmoment, ziet Thomas gefundeerd In het feit dat het 
schepsel uiteraard objectief naar 3od heenwljst, hoewel 
deze objectieve tendentie ontsnapt aan de scherpe 
omlijning van onze begrlppellJkheld. Ofschoon we dus 
de schepsellljke modus van de zgn. transcendentele 
volmaaktheden niet reëel kunnen abstraheren van hun 
diepste Innerlijke zin—waaruit volgt, dat wij die 
modus en dat begrip niet aan God kunnen toeschrijven— 
lijkt het toch een thomistische stelling te zijn, dat 
wij met het ontkennen van de schepsellljke modus dier 
volmaaktheden (welke wij overigens slechts als 
schepsellljke gerealiseerd weten), niet de gehele kenln-
houd prijsgeven. Wel kan de eigenlijke God-rakende 
kennis niet louter een uitdrukkelijke of begrlppelljke 
kennis zijn. 
27 We would wish to maintain, with Henri Bouillard, a 
natural knowledge of God as the transcendental condition 
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of faith. This does not exclude the fact that In 
most cases this natural knowledge becomes reflex (in 
the form of "proofs" ) when human reason structures the 
act of faith and formulates its " reasonableness. See 
Eouillard, Karl Barth. Parole de Dieu et existence 
humaine, Paris, vol. II, 1957. PP. 100-105. 
28 See "Analogie und Doxologie," og. cit.. pp. 196f. 
Characteristically, Pannenberg speaks of the Indirect 
knowledge of "od's action In history, when man on the 
basis of specific events perceives that the "deeper" 
meaning of these events provides a (provisional) 
unification of all reality. He insists that "od and 
"the whole of reality" are not interchangeable, but 
that the latter is thinkable only If it has a ground. 
Ibid., p. 195 n. 28, reading "ohne" for "mit." 
29 A detailed defense of this position would call for 
an analysis of the notion of "the person" or "the 
personal" to show that the concept does not necessarily 
Include flnltude. Cf. Pannenberg, art. "Person," RGG, 
vol. V, col. 232. 
30 "Whether the church will cease to employ temporal 
and spatial analogies to communicate this transcendent 
dimension of her faith is not yet clear. Perhaps she 
will. Perhaps new terms—depth, ground, center—will 
carry this freight of meaning... it is a clear and firm 
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conclusion of this Investigation that to drop the term 
"pre-exlstence" without an adequate replacement would 
be to run the risk of being left with no larger frame 
of reference for understanding the event of Jesus 
Christ. This Is another way of saying we would be 
left without a larger frame of reference for under-
standing human history.... Without the overarching 
(or permeating) presence of the Transcendent, created 
values cease to be regarded as created; relative values 
cease to be relative. Just as the lack of a doctrine 
of creation resulted In ancient man's dlvlnlzatlon of 
the world, the lack of transcendence can result In the 
absolutizing of history with all Its social and 
political structures" (F. B. Craddock, The Pre-eilstenoe 
of Christ In the New Testament. Nashville-New York, 
1968, p. I85). Pannenberg, of course, favors a new 
temporal Image, God as futurlstlcally present to man, 
and In this sense préexistent. This may be the reason 
why he does not locate the mythical aspect of the 
traditional notion of préexistence In the representa-
tion of temporal "priority" therein Implied. Since for 
Pannenberg God's being does not exclude temporality, 
"préexistence" out of the past (the traditional view) 
or out of the future (his view) Is not merely 
"mythical." Moreover, the New Testament offers a 
ч-ьч-
number of other expressions which guarantee the unlclty 
and universality of Christ, different from the préexis-
tence Idea. See Wilhelm ThUslng in Karl Rahner-
Wllhelm Thüslng, Christologie—systematisch und 
exegetisch. Ireiburg-Basel-Vlenna, 1972, pp. 2ίι3-2^9, 
esp. theses 6.21 and 6.23. Recently John Α. T. 
Robinson tried to show that the préexistence texts in 
Paul, John and Hebrews admit of an Interpretation which 
does not have to view the divine hypostasis (to use 
later terminology) as in itself a fully personal 
reality who then "assumes" a human form. See his 
The Human Face of God, pp. 1^3-179· He thereby lends 
support to Schoonehberg's interpretation of New 
Testament préexistence texts ("God en mens, of God In 
mens?" in H1.1 la een God van mensen, pp. 79-88), at 
least insofar as Schoonenberg was concerned with the 
character of the divine Word as "person." 
Robinson's conclusion is that it is less true and less 
biblical to say that a divine person assumed humanity 
them to say "that one who was totally and utterly a 
man—and had never been anything other than a man or 
more than a man—so completely embodied what was from 
the beginning the meaning and purpose of God's self-
expression (whether conceived In terms of his Spirit, 
his Wisdom, his Word, or the intimately personal 
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relationship of Sonshlp) that It could be said, and 
had to be said, of that man, 'He was God's man,' or 
•Ood was In Christ,' or even that he was God for us. 
This way of putting It clearly Involves no whit less 
of a stupendous claim" (Ibid., p. 179). 
31 In his H1.1 Is een 3od van mensen: rwee theologische 
studies. See further, Hendrik 3erkof, "schoonenber? 
en Pannenberg: de tweesprong van de huidla-e chrlstoloçle, 
Tijdschrift voor TheoloRle 11 (1971). 413-^22; 
P. Schoonenberg, "Het avontuur der christologie, 
Tijdschrift voor Theologie 12 (1972). 306-332. esp. 
308-315. 
32 Schoonenberg, H1.1 Is een God van mensen, p. 82. 
33 Ibid.. pp. 67f., p. 70. 
Jk IMd.. p. 86. Cf. GdC, p. 350. "... In propounding 
hls theory of the enhypostasla. leontlus does not mean 
that In the union the manhood of Jesus Christ Is 
devoid of the quality of self-determination, as If It 
were wholly dominated by the Person of the Logos. On 
the contrary, the manhood continues In Its natural 
property': It Is rational and has Its operations. 
Put—and this Is his point—the manhood has not a 
separate hypostasis as if it existed side by side with 
the Godhead and Its hypostasis; rather, coitlnuin? in 
reality. It Is an 'enhypostatlc nature' in that It 
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exists in the hypostasis of the Logos" (H. V. Sellers, 
The Council of Chalcedon. A Historical and Doctrinal 
Survey. London, 196I, p. 319). 
35 According to Schoonenberg there Is but one act of 
existence In Jesus, a human one, because he Is but one 
person, a human person (0£. cit., pp. 7^, Θ5). 
Yet if the best way to speak of Jesus is as a divine-
human person, how does this receive its full metaphy­
sical due? Can we be satisfied with speaking of Jesus 
belnp- completely filled by God' s Word or by Sod through 
his Word (o£. clt.. pp. 86, 90) without saying with 
Pannenberg that the ontologlcal root of Jesus* life 
was the eternal Son which was mediated by Jesus' 
relation to his Father? Indeed, more recently 
Schoonenberg has affirmed a mutual enhypostasla of the 
man Jesus In the Logos and the Logos in the man Jesus 
("rfonophysitlsches und dyophysltl'sches Sprechen über 
Christus," Wort und Wahrheit 2? /Γ9727, 263f.). 
36 Karl Hahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott als transzen­
denter Urgrund der Hellsgeschichte" in Mysterium 
Salutis; Grundriss hellsgeschlchtlIcher Do^matlk. ed. 
by J. Feiner and M. Löhrer, Elnsiedeln-Zürlch-Cologne, 
vol. II, 1967. PP. 390ff. 
37 Ibid.. pp. 329-ЗЗ6. 
38 "The eschaton is eternity in the fullest sense " 
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("Theology and the Kingdom of God," o£. cit., p. 64); 
GdC, p. 331. 
39 Was lat der Mensch?, p. 51*· 
kO "Kontlngenz und Naturgesetz," op cit.. pp. 6lf. 
41 "Theology and the KlngdoŒ of God," оц. cit.. pp. 55. 
42 Ibid.. p. 63. 
43 Erwägungen, p. 62. "Von den Zeltmodi stünde dem 
ewigen Akt der Schöpfung nicht die Vergangenheit, 
sondern die Zukunft am nächsten" (Ibid.). 
44 "Theology and the Kingdom of God," o£. cit.. p. 55. 
45 Ibid.. pp. 62f. "These thoughts provoke another 
question about the futurity of God. Is God future In 
himself or does he merely appear to be future In 
relation to our, and perhaps every other, finite 
standpoint? Obviously, the very Idea of future Is 
relative to present and past. So It might be argued 
that the power of the future Is simply the way In 
which God relates himself to time-bound man. But 
this Is not adequate. We must go farther and say that 
God Is In himself the power of the future. The reason 
for this Is that the very Idea of God demands that 
there be no future beyond himself. He Is the ultimate 
future. This In turn suggests that God should be 
conceived as pure freedom. For what Is freedom but 
to have future In oneself ana. out of oneself? In 
6^tí 
hls freedom, God Is present to himself and keeps 
present to himself everything that Is past, of which 
he has been the future. Now, when we say that he was 
the future of his past creatures, we are speaklnç 
according to our finite experience of time. Because 
there Is no future beyond God, his having been the 
future of his past creatures, has not, for him, passed 
away. He remains the future of the whole of the past 
and keeps present to himself his having been the 
finite /slc_7 future of every finite present »hlch has 
now become past. Thus he keeps his past creatures in 
the present of ils future." (loc, cit. ). Cf. note 9 above. 
¿4-6 Recently a Roman Catholic philosopher has suçsiested 
as well that eternity be conceived as the fullness of 
time: E. R. Paltazar, "¡od within Process. Paramus, N.J.-
J^ew York, 1970, Ch. 'J-, pp. IO6-13O. 4e develops this 
Idea In detail within an evolutionary perspective. 
bhile Pannenberg would no doubt find this perspective 
unacceptable, many of the things Baltazar says could 
be used with profit by Pannenberg, for example, the 
idea that only at the fulfillment of the world-process 
will the world be genuinely temporal. Also of signifi-
cance In the context of the question of God's tempo-
rality is S. 11. Ogden's essay on this topic in his 
book. The Reality of Zod and other Essays. London 
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1967. pp. 1А4-16Э. 
't? Itila Idea that God chooses to need and chooses to 
be dependent touches a favorite theme of "process 
theologians," the distinction between the "primordial" 
and "subsequent" nature of God. See, for example, 
Norman Plttenger, Process Thought and Christian Faith. 
Dlgswell Place, I968, Ch. 2. 
¿tS "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegrlffs 
als dogmatisches Problem der frUhchrlstllchen 
Theologie," a¿. cit., 329. 
49 "Kontlngenz und Naturgesetz," op cit.. pp. 58-65. 
Pannenberg favors speaking of God's personality and 
freedom In connection with the contingency of the 
world-process (see also "Theology and the Kingdom of 
God," op cit.. pp. 57-60) and God's "Immutability" 
(his self-fidelity) In the context of the continuity 
of that process. ("Kontlngenz und Naturgesetz," 0£. cit.. 
p. 46). Thus here too talk of God's transcendence Is 
kept within the horizon of his relation to the world. 
50 A recent, very subtle effort to think this tendency 
within God toward unity with the other Is Eberhard 
Jttngel's Gottes Sein 1st lm Werden') Verantwortliche 
Rede vom Sein Gottes bei Karl Barth. Eine Paraphrase. 
Tübingen, 2nd ed., I967, esp. pp. 103-122. Reference 
could also be made to Karl Rahner's consideration of 
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the dialectic of self-differentiation within the 
Trinity as the ground of possibility of the Incarna-
tion ("Zur Theologie der Menschwerdung," Schriften 
gur Theologie, vol. IV, I960, p. 149). Unfortunately, 
Pannenberg makes no use of Rahner's discussion of the 
necessity of the'Logos' becoming man, and not one of 
the other hypostases (assuming, of course, the freedom 
of the decision for Incarnation). 
51 Pannenberg thinks he is correcting Rahner here 
(ibid., p. 1^7), but they appear to be saying the 
same thing. For Rahner God really changes himself in 
the other, the change affects himself (an idea which 
an undlalectlcal view of divine immutability would 
find repugnant; ibid.. p. 1^8); Cod, he himself, 
he changes in the other (Ibid.). To be sure, Rahner 
also says that when God changes in the other, he does 
not change In his own proper reality as the unorlgi-
nate origin (ibid.). Pannenberg himself says neither 
more nor less than this in his own presentation. It 
is surprising that Pannenberg misrepresents the 
thought of one who, in this area, he thinks has 
offered unexcelled clarity (GdC, p. 331). Other 
examples of misrepresentation can be given. Pannenberg 
asserts that Rahner refers the following sentence to 
God the Creator: "Er konstituiert die Unterschied-
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llchkeit zu sich. Indem er ale als seine behält und 
umgekehrt: well er wahrhaft das andere als sein 
eigenes haben will, konstituiert er es In seiner 
echten Wirklichkeit" (cited by Pannenberg In GdC, 
Р. 329)· Yet It Is clear from both the content and 
the context that Rahner Is here speaking of God In the 
Incarnation. Piirthermore, Pannenberg represents 
Rahner as thinking of the act of creation as a self-
emptying, which Is not the case (Ibid.. p. 332). 
Rahner restricts the Idea of kenosls or self-emptying 
to God's becoming less than himself, and so to the 
Incarnation (o£. cit., p. 147, end of note 3). 
Finally, Pannenberg seems to think that Rahner Identi-
fies kenosls with the dialectic of self-differentiation; 
at any rate he speaks of the two as the same In seeming 
dependence on Rahner (GdC, p. 322). Rahner, however, 
carefully distinguishes three radically different (but 
not unrelated) dialectics: that within the "Immanent*1 
Trinity, that of the Incarnation, and that of creation. 
The actuality of the first Is the condition of possibi-
lity of the second and third; the possibility of the 
second is the condition for the third, although 
creation can occur without Incarnation (o£. clt., 
p. 149). When Pannenberg objects that Rahner has not 
shown how the unity between God and man Is possible In 
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spite of the subtle formulation of a "dialectic of 
self-differentiation,** one must ask whether Indeed 
Pannenberg has gone beyond Rahner on this point. 
52 Flet Schoonenberg has recently made what Is among 
Roman Catholic theologians the farthest-reaching 
effort to think of God's mutability In connection 
with the Trinity and Incarnation. ("God en mens of 
God In mens?", o£. clt.. pp. 176ff.). He suggests by 
way of hypothesis that God freely becomes triune in 
freely choosing to communicate himself completely to 
the world. This free unfolding of the divine nature 
Is In no way necessitated from without and Involves 
for Schoonenberg no Increment In the divine being. 
God becomes more "God for us," but not more "God for 
himself." He contends that Scripture and maglsterlum 
have never expressly excluded this possibility, although 
the theological tradition has excluded this possibility 
because of Its conviction that God was Immutable In 
himself. Even If he Is correct that Scripture and 
the Church ' s maglsterlum do not positively exclude 
this way of viewing the Trinity, still the Introduction 
of contingency (which Is Inseparable from concrete 
freedom) Into the very constitution of God calls for 
a much fuller treatment than Schoonenberg has offered 
to date. If he Is to protect himself from the charge 
^73 
that, contrary to his express Intention, he Is endan­
gering (for our thought) the deity of God. 
53 Mysterium Salutla, Grundriss hellsaeschlchtllcher 
Theologie, vol. III/l, pp. 478-6^5· 
5^ Ibid.. pp. ^90f. 
55 Ibid.. pp. 491f. 
56 Ibid.. pp. 492f. 
57 Ibid.. pp. 493ff. 
58 Ibid., pp. ^ f f . 
59 Ibid.. pp. ^ 96ί. 
60 Ibid.. pp. U98f. 
61 This Is a criticism Wiederkehr levels against 
Rahner's "transcendental Chrlstology" and which he 
suggests Is related to Rahner's choice of Logos 
(God's word to the world) as his systematic name for 
the second person of the Trinity In his Chrlstology 
(Ibid.. pp. 503 and 593f· and η. IO6). See a similar 
criticism by Wilhelm Thilslng In Karl Rahner-Wllhelm 
Thilslng, 0£. clt.. pp. 98-ІІЗ. 
62 Ibid.. p. 530, n. 1*9. 
63 On this account Wiederkehr faults Rahner, who at 
decisive moments speaks of the human Jesus' relation 
to the Logos as a dlaloglcal relation. See Ibid., 
pp. 503 n. 29; p. 572 n. 86 and 87; p. 594 η. IO6; 
p. 619, n. 127. (See also Schoonenberg, op. clt.. 
k?1* 
p. 71 and η. 9)· In this respect Schoonenberg and 
Wiederkehr have made an important contribution to 
Roman Catholic Chrlstology; Wiederkehr in dependence 
on Pannenberg, Schoonenberg Independently of him. 
6k Wiederkehr, art, cit.. pp. 51?f. 
65 Ibid.. pp. 520-530. 
66 Ibid.. p. 637. 
67 Ibid.. pp. 531-53^. 
68 Ibid.. p. 535; cf. pp. 630-633. Wiederkehr prefers 
the term "eternal" over " préexistent." See pp. 53^. 
535. 632. 
69 Auslegung is a basic image or metaphor in 
Wiederkehr's Chrlstology. See also Rahner's statement: 
••"Ott entwirft die Kreatur schöpferisch immer als die 
Grammatik einer möglichen Selbstaussage...," ("Zur 
Theologie der Kenschwerdung" in Schriften zur Theologie. 
г'о!. IV, i960, p. 14-9). These metaphors have patristic 
roots. 
70 Historicity, in the sense of beine communicated 
and shared, can be said of Ίοά as well as man. The 
creature* s reception of being and share in being on the 
one hand, and the divine Son's reception of divine 
life and share in divine life on the other hand, are 
thus not alien forms of being, but analogical 
realities, their infinite qualitative difference 
«•75 
lotvlthstendln-;. Vlederttehr owes this Insight to 
Hahner; cf. Vìederkehr, art, cit.. p. 572 п. 86. 
71 rhe Зсоtlstic notion of person as relation is 
favored by 'niederkehr (as it is by Pannenberg) over 
the autonoiious notion of person elaborated by 
Boethlus and the Scholastics who followed him. 
Fannenber? and ι iederkehr have ^one beyond Scotus in 
recoffnizlnf the dialectical identity of Jesus* sonship 
vis-a-vis the father, and the role of the resurrec­
tion for the constitution of his full person. Cf. 
Ibid. , p. 5ІЙ·, n. 71-
72 ·· 'an darf nur die Begriffe von göttlicher und 
menschlicher Natur, von sohnschaftlichem und mensch-
lichem "ottesverhältnis, aber auch von göttlicher und 
menschlicher Person nicht univok, sondern -nuss sie in 
einer gestuften und inte.-rrlerbaren inaloirie verstehen" 
(ibid.. p. 619). 
73 Karl Rahner,"Probleme der Christologie heute," 
Schriften zur Theologie, vol. I, 1954 PP· 169-222, esp. 
p. 183. 
7*+ "Das tragende Subjekt dieser Oottesrelation 1st 
auch nicht Jenseits oder ausserhalb der menschlichen 
bubjektlvität und Personalität Jesu zu lokalisieren, 
als ob die menschliche Natur nur das versichtbarende 
"aterlal einer inneroöttlIchen Relation wäre, sondern 
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es 1st die personale ,;itte menschlichen Handelns 
zutrlelch das Subjekt der sohnschaftllchen "ottes-
relatlon und uraçekehrt " (Wiederkehr, art, cit., р. біР). 
By sohnschaftllche Sottesrelation he means the second 
person of the Trlnltyî cf. quotation in note 20 above. 
Cf. John 4. ?. Robinson: "There Is no contradiction 
betveen a man •llvina-· rOd and Sod 'llvlnir· a man" 
(op. clt. , p. 199)· Phis seeirs to me to be a succinct 
summary of what V.lederkehr Is sayini. Cf. 5choonenbeгя;, s 
notion of mutual enhypostasls, " ,:onophysitisches und 
dyophysitisches Sprechen über Christus," p. 2^3. 
75 Art, cit., p. 620. Cf. Sdward Schillebeeckx: "Jesus 
heeft dan ook niet de menselijke natuur min de pense-
lijke oersoon, doch de menselijke persoon is Identiek 
de persoon -ran het goddelijk Voord.... IVee menselijke 
personen kunnen nooit een persoon vormen, omdat hun 
eindigheid hen tegenover elkaar afgrenst. aar het 
wordt heel anders waneer het paat οτι ein 'oneindla-e 
persoon'" ("Persoonlijke Cpenbarin rse-e stalt van de Vader" 
Tijdschrift voor Theologie f /19667, 2?^); "7o is 
Jesus de nensellJke wljze van lod-zljn, In volstrekt 
enkelvoudig men-zljn.... 31t nysterie is slechts 
mogelijk omdat de mens nooit bij lod kan vorden 
ODgeteld, nooit met dem in een rij kan staan.... 
(Ibld. , ρ. 28Ό. "Smphasls Is the author's. 
4?7 
76 Ibid.. pp. 56lff. 
77 Ibid.. pp. 563-566: 635-638. 
78 Ibid.. p. 56^. 
79 Ibid.. p. 565. 
80 Ibid.. pp. 566f.; 638-642. Wiederkehr does not 
think that Pannenberg applied the filial structure of 
Jesus Christ In a consistent way when treating the 
questions of Jesus' freedom and slnlessness (Ibid., 
p. 568, n. 83), since It Is not always clear whether 
Pannenberg Is speaking of the obedience of the man 
Jesus vls-a-vls his divine will or the Father's will. 
But certainly Pannenberg's Intention is to remain 
within his chosen framework, that of the filial 
relationship of the one Jesus Christ to the Father. 
81 "In dieser Sicht wird es nicht möglich und nicht 
notwendig sein, ein ausschliesslich innermenschliches 
Aktzentrum einer ausschliesslich transzendent-äusseren 
Person entgegenzustellen, sondern es 1st eine gegen-
seitige Offenheit denkbar, In der das menschliche 
Aktzentrum einen letzllch transzendenten personalen 
Grund hat, und In welcher die transzendente Person des 
Sohnes das menschliche Aktzentrum als Ihre eigene 
Subjektivität setzt" (Ibid.. ρ. 6ΙΌ. 
82 Ibid.. p. 6^1. 
83 "In speaking of the future, Pannenberg is not merely 
47d 
accenting: a neglected aspect of the Christian 
tradition, nor is he merely suggesting that the concept 
of the future have priority in theological thought, 
although he would agree with both these contentions. 
-lis intention is more encompassing than that. He 
argues for a new way of understanding the structure 
of reality" (Richard ^.euhaus, litro, to fheology and 
the Kingdom of Sod, p. 12). 
B^ Viederltehr, art, cit.. p. 555. Cf. ..aurlce de la 
Taille, "Actuation créée par acte incréê," Recherches de 
science religieuse 18 СІ92В), ?53-26R; also, his 
"Entretien amical d'Suxode et de Palamede sur la 
Trace d'union."Че ие apolecêtlque 4R (1929), 5-26, 
129-1^5. 
85 V'iederkehr, art, cit., p. 572. 
8é Plet Schoonenberg, "Monophysitlsches und dyophysl-
tisches Sprechen über Christus,"p. 263; "Het avontuur 
der christologie," p. 312. Pannenberg and Wiederkehr 
are criticized for not focusing sufficiently on the 
eternal Son of God precisely as person in relation to 
Jesus the man. Cf. "Ich glaube an Gott: Zum Problem 
einer nlchtchalkedonischen Christologie" (Trierer rheolo-
a-lsche Zeltschrift 81 (1972), 79-81. Yet Schoonenberg's 
conception of the Logos-hypostasis (he prefers the 
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less "personal" sounding title) as the divine mode or 
way In which the Father is present In Jesus Is not 
unlike Wiederkehr's and Pannenberg's conception (more 
fully developed In the former) according to which the 
man Jesus participates In the Father's self-communication 
which ,ΐβ the eternal Son. On the other hand, for 
Wiederkehr the eternal Son of God exists In an I-Thou 
relation to his Father, as we usually understand that 
kind of relation, only In and as the human person, 
Jesus of Nazareth. I cannot see any real disagreement 
between the two theologians on this point. And with 
regard to préexistence, Schoonenberg's hesitancy to 
affirm an eternal Logos for the sake of Jesus' human 
person, finds Its counterpart, so to speak. In 
Wiederkehr's consistent employment of a strictly 
analogical understanding of person when applied to 
Jesus and the eternal Son within the framework of 
the relation of the one Jesus Christ to Father and 
world. This framework and starting-point "qualify" 
the second trinitarIan hypostasis (see Ibid.. p. 79) 
so that a dialogue between eternal Son and the man 
Jesus is excluded at base. Surely a qualification of 
the Logos made later on In systematic Chrlstology 
would arrive too late to save the unity of Jesus 
Christ vls-a-vls Father and world. The difference 
wo 
between Schoonenberg on the one hand, and Pannenberg 
and Wiederkehr on the other, appears to come down to 
a different understanding of the meaning of "person." 
8? Der gekreuzigte Gott. Das Kreuz als Grund und 
Kritik christlicher Theologie. Munich, 1972. 
88 Ibid.. p. 9-
89 Ibid.. p. 110. 
90 Ibid.. pp. 113, H é . This Is, of course, the 
kind of approach which Pannenberg would find Inade-
quate, because It threatens to remove Jesus' cruci-
fixion from the realm of historically accessible events. 
91 Ibid.. pp. 121-129. Moltmann's approach to the 
delicate problem of law and Gospel is more ecumenically 
oriented than is Pannenberg's In ^rundzüge. By 
rooting Israel's identity in the promise to Abraham 
and the covenant rather than in a calcified under-
standing of the law, ;ioltmann hopes to show that Jesus' 
death ani resurrection, rather than nullifying Israel's 
claim as God's chose people, universalizes the 
election (ibid.. pp. 127f.). Jesus' history was 
ultimately a theological history; there can be no 
question of merely laying blame for his death at the 
door of the Jews of his time (Ibid., pp. 128f.). 
92 Ibid.. pp. 129-ІЗ8. 
93 Ibid.. pp. 138-1^6. 
ц-аі 
9^ Ibid., pp. l^Off. "Auch Іш áchrei Jesu, wie er 
mit Fsalra 22 gedeutet wird, finden wir nicht Selbst-
bemltleldunj und persönlichen Schmerzausdruck, sondern 
fcleder diesen liuf nach Gott um Gottes villen, die 
Rechtsklae-e. Vur klajt Jesus nicht allein, wie der 
Beter von Psaln 22, die dem ganzen ,-olk verhelssene 
Bundestreue des Cottes Israel ein, sondern er klagt 
auf besondere V'else die Treue seines Vaters zu sich, 
dem Sohn ein, der für Ihn eingetreten 1st. ¡"Ut den 
Vorten 'ein Gott, warum hast du mich verlassen? 
steht nicht nur Jesu persönliche Existenz auf dem 
Spiel, sondern eben seine theologische Existenz, 
seine tranze Cottesverkündloun?. Jarum steht mit 
seiner Verlassenheit zuletzt auch die Gottheit seines 
Gottes und die Vaterschaft seines Vaters auf dem 
Spiel, die Jesus den .lenschen nahegebracht hatte" 
(ibid., D. 143). 
95 ¡'.oltmann refers to Pannenberg's example of retro-
active laws, which Is a very inadequate Imae-e of what 
Pannenbern--and 'oltmann-wish to say (Ibid.. pp. l68f.). 
Like FamenberSf i'oltmann Insists that the end of 
history Is constitutive for the meaning of an histori-
cal event. He appeals here to Bultmann (ibid.. p. 151). 
96 W. Schrage, "Das Verständnis des Todes Jesu 
Christi im Neuen Testament," in Das Kreuz Christi als 
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'''rund des délies, ed. r. Vlerinç, "ütersloh, 19^7, 
p. 61; cited by Holtmann, a£. clt.. pp. 170f.). 
97 Pannenberg, "über historische und theologische 
Hermeneutik," In GrundfraRen. p. 156. There Is a 
structural difference between the relation between 
Jesus' resurrection and the final resurrection on the 
one hand, and any time-space event's relation to the 
final resurrection (end of the world). for, while 
every event within history anticipates. In a partial 
way, the complete context In which It will acquire 
its full теапіпя, the resurrection of Jesus from the 
dead was the pre-happenlmr of this full meaning. And 
so /joltmann can write: "Doch kann eine Vorwegnähme 
sich als solche und damit das Vorwegzunehmende nur Im 
Kontext des Vorweggenommenen selbst bestätigen. Und 
dieses eschatologisch Vorweggenommene In der Folge der 
aufeinander angewiesenen und sich bestätigenden «eschlcht-
llchen Vorwegnahmen zu erkennen, fordert Glauben, 
nämlich Glauben an die vorweggenommene Sache, die 
nur in den Vorwegnahmen erkennbar 1st. Vährend Jesus 
durch sein Wort das kommende Reich vorwegnahm und 
dafür öffentlich gekreuzigt wurde, wurde die öster-
liche Vorwegnähme der Auferweckung nur so offenbar, 
dass die Erkenntnis unmittelbar zum Glauben an 
Jesus, zur gewissen Hoffnung auf sein Kommen und zur 
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Praxis des Apostolats führte. Es war mithin keine 
unparteilich und neutral festgestellte Erkenntnis, 
sondern eine ençag-ierende, parteiliche, und zu aposto-
lischer Praxis berufende Erkenntnis. Garnit entzieht 
sie sich dem, was man neuzeitlich unter einem 
historischen Tatsachenbeweis versteht" (op. cit., 
pp. 159f.). 
ÇP 'oltmann is Indeed correct that Pannenberg's 
anthropology of "world-opennes^' could become a 
Dostulate In his system, of which Jesus' history and 
resurrection vonId becone the ргі-чг exairple (Ibid., 
v. If'j- and n. 30). ut this danger is avoided in 
Pannenberg's theolozy. Such a dancer is present in 
any theolog-y which insists on presuOposltions in 
created reality for the reception of Tod's revelation, 
presuppositions which, to be sure, are created by the 
revealing Tod. 
99 Ibid.. pp. 170ff. 
100 Hans ''rs von Balthasar, " nysterlum Paschale, " 
in 1 ysterlu-n Salutls. Grundriss hellsqeschlchtllcher 
JO'^atlk, vol. 111/2, pp. 133-326, esp. pp. 159ff.; Hans 
i\ün^ , 1 enschverdun? Gottes. Sine ËlnführunK in hecrels 
."'heoloirlsches ")en-cen als Prole'Оі-ірпа zu einer ¿ünftlpen 
Christologie. Ireibur^-fasel-Vienna, 1970, pp. (22ff. 
and é37ff.; Paul Althaus, "Jas Kreuz Christi," In 
u-ач-
Theologlsche AufsStze, Oütersloh, 1929t PP. 1-50 and 
art. "Kenosls," In Η"!", vol. Ill, 12kk-12k6; 
Heribert ilühlen. Die Veränderlichkeit Gottes als 
Horizont einer zukünftigen ChrlstoloRle. Auf dem Кеде 
zu einer Kreuzestheoloirle In Auseinandersetzung mit 
der altklrchllchen Christologie, .iünster, 1969; 
Karl Barth, Kirchliche Doqmatlk. vol. II/2 and IV/1-ÍJ·. 
101 t.oltmann, 0£. clt.. pp. lP8f. 
102 "So kann man sagen: Der Vater 2;lbt seinen Sohn am 
Kreuz dahin, um der Dahlnsregebenen Vater zu werden. 
Der Sohn wird an diesen Tod dahlnçerçeben, um über Tote 
und Lebendige der Herr zu werden. Und wenn Paulus 
hier betont von Gottes 'eigenem Sohn' spricht, so 
ergreift Jenes Nlcht-Verschonen und Verlassen auch den 
Vater selbst. In der Verlassenheit des Sohnes verlässt 
auch der Vater sich selbst. In der Hingabe des Sohnes 
gibt auch der Vater sich hin. Jedoch nicht In dersel-
ben Welse" (Ibid.. p. 230). 
103 Ibid.. p. 217. 
104 Ibid.. p. 192. 
105 Ibid.. p. 216, 
lOé Ibid.. pp. 227f. 
107 In a brief reference to American process thought, 
Moltmann Indicates that an orthodox Trinitarian under-
standing of the cross such as he has tried to develop 
4Ö5 
can capture some of the significant insights offered 
by the di-polar notion of God In V'hitehead and 
others (Ibid.. pp. ZkZt.). 
108 It is Interesting to note that at the beginning 
of his book i'loltmann speaks movingly of the Impasse 
facing Christian student groups who act In solidarity 
with other groups to achieve common objectives and 
which at the same time are faced with a deep identity 
crisis because of this solidarity. He relates this 
enigma of losinc one's identity to acquire it in truth 
to the theology of the cross (ibid.. pp. 12-23). 
10Ç Ibid., po. 2lRf. 
110 Ibid.. p. 2(-(. That iioltmann's approach is not 
without Its own problems, in that human pain and death 
are in danger of beln·? sublated into the Trinity and 
so are in danger of losing their "bite," is indicated 
by Johannes P. /etz, "Erlösung und Smanzipatlon," 
òtlmmen der Zeit 98 (1973). 171-184·, esp. ІОО-ІЯІ4.. 
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STELLINGEN 
1. Er ligt een ironie in het feit dat een van РаппепЬегг*s bijdragen 
tot de hedendaagse christologie, nl. de vervanging van het twee-
naturen-schema door de meer trlnitaire 'dialectiek van het goddelijk 
zoonschap' tegelijk een belangrijke zwakte in zijn christologie 
openbaart: daarin wordt nl. oo «reen enkele wijze overdacht hoe 
de eeuwige Zoon van Ood het ene goddelijke zelfbewustzijn en vrijheid 
bezit en dus op welke wijze hij 'persoonlijk' is. 
2. Men kan op legitieme wijze met Pannenberg en tegen de Alexandrijnen 
beweren, dat bij de incarnatie het goddelijk Woord scheppend een 
individueel menselijk wezen heeft aangenomen en daarin Is binnenge­
treden, zonder dat men daardoor komt tot adoptlanisme of tot een 
Christus die uit twee personen bestaat. 
3. Pannenberg's begrip van de terugwerkende kracht van de verrijzenis 
maakt het mogelijk te zegs-en dat de eenheid van de aardse Jezus met 
God waarlijk gegroeid Is en zich ontwikkeld heeft, zonder dat men 
daarbij In adoptlanisme vervalt. 
k. Vat men het christologisch geheim samen door te zeggen dat het 
e-oddelljk Woord de menselijke werkelijkheid van Jezus als de hem 
eigene poneert of aanneemt, dan moet men zorgvuldig vermijden hieraan de 
gedachte te verbinden dat het goddelijk Woord op dusdanige wijze bron 
van initiatief en actie is, dat naar dit woord verwezen kan worden 
enerzijds zonder dat men tegelijk naar de Vader en de Geest verwijst, 
en anderzijds zonder dat men verwijst naar de menselijke uitvoering 
van het goddelijk initiatief in de geschapen orde, dat is naar de 
geschiedenis van de beslissingen en de voltooiing van de mens Jezus. 
5. R.A.Norrls heeft gelijk met zijn bewering dat de christologie van 
Cyrillus en van Chalcedon het christologisch denken op een dwaalspoor 
heeft gebracht door in feite een onderscheid te maken tussen het 
logisch subject van uitspraken over Christus en het historisch 
expllcandum waarin het christolo;lsch probleem wortelt (Lux in Lumlne. 
Essays to Honor W.Norman Plttlnger. New York I966, biz.79). 
6. De menswording van het goddelijk Voord Is tegelijkertijd zijn 
persoon-wording; van de andere kant echter bezit Jezus' menselijke 
persoon een onovertrefbare kwaliteit van zelfbezit en betrokkenheid 
Inzover God haar scheppend heeft opgenomen als zijn eigen tegen­
woordigheid en de uitdrukking van zichzelf onder de mensen. 
7. Zoals Pannenberg Juist gezien heeft, had Jezus' zondeloosheid, die 
ons definitief geopenbaard Is in zijn verrijzenis en verheerlijking, 
een dusdanig karakter dat zijn goedheid haar ambiguïteit niet verloor 
voor hen die Gods wil definitief belichaamd zagen in de mozaïsche 
wet, of voor hen die, zowel in de politieke als In de religieuze 
sfeer, de voorkeur gaven aan 'vrede· boven 'onrust stoken'. 
θ. De mens Jezus is persoonlijk ëên met de ene Cod, hetgeen betekent: 
hyDOstatlsch êên met het Voord, 
dialogisch êên met de Vader 
en revelatorlsch êên met de 'îeest. 
Dit op zulk een wijze dat elk van deze dimensies van eenheid in zijn 
en leven de andere twee impliceert en conditioneert. 
9. Een christologie die niet tevens een pneumatologle Is is geen 
adekwate christologie. 
10. Wij moeten ons ervoor hoeden, de preëxlstentleteksten In het 
Nlieuwe Testament te lezen door voorstellingen heen die aan een latere 
ontwikkelIngsfaze van de christologie ontleend zijn. 
11. Als een grondbeginsel van christelijke theologie moet gelden, dat 
Gods werking in de menselijke geschiedenis geen vervanging van iets 
in de geschapen orde Insluit, maar veeleer een verheviging ervan, 
zodat een schepsel, naarmate het meer participeert aan het leven van de 
scheppende, vrije, subsistente en oneindiee God, des te meer zelf 
scheupend en vrij zal zijn, zal subslsteren en zichzelf zal trans-
cenderen. 
12. Indien gebed hernieuwd betekenis wil krijgen voor vele heden-
daagse christenen, zal men moeten beklemtonen dat Gods kennis en wil 
met betrekking tot de schepselen niet eenvoudigweg vorhanden zijn. 
Ze zijn veeleer de bron van een open en bemoedigende toekomst 
voor degene die in zijn gebed ernaar smacht dieper met deze bron In 
sremeenschap te treden. 
13. Juist zoals in een vroeger tijdperk de christelijke theologie 
haar vindingrijkheid aanwendde om te laten zien hoe 'veelvuldigheid' 
In God geen teken van beperktheid is maar een uiting van de rijke 
enkelvoudigheid van het goddelijk leven, zo is de huidige theologie 
geroepen om te onderzoeken of het mogelijk is 'wording' en 
•betrokkenheid · op een dusdanige wijze aan God toe te kennen dat dit 
de oneindige rijkdom van Gods leven niet bedreigt, maar veeleer een 
stamelend getuigenis van deze rijkdom geeft aan de mens van heden. 
14. Het is uiterst belangrijk dat wij voortdurend onderscheid maken 
tussen 'religie' als het geheel van waarden die door leden van een 
bepaalde gemeenschap gedeeld worden, en 'religie' verstaan als de 
creatieve bron van profetische kritiek en bemoediging voor het mens-· 
zijn van die leden. 
15. Faschine-, F'óhn en Festwiese werken alle samen om München niet 
bepaald de Ideale plaats te maken voor academische arbeid. 
Theses belonging to В. M.cDermott : The Personal Unity of Jesua and God. 


